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Abstract
Inter-state wars are not one o f the most salient features o f current world politics. 
Indeed, the prevailing patterns o f contemporary armed conflict show an increasing 
trend in intra-state wars that spill over borders.
Beyond the continuities with the thirty-year civil war in Ethiopia, namely in 
the relations between the two former insurgent movements, the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the 1998- 
2000 war was waged between the armed forces of two sovereign states: Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. This is one o f the few cases of inter-state war in Africa.
The case-study provides evidence to contradict the strand o f the literature 
which claims that we are witnessing a decisive transformation o f warfare (Van 
Creveld, 1991); (Kaldor, 1999).
The central claim of the thesis is that neighbouring states do fight over 
territory. Indeed, territory is central to understanding the causes, the conduct, and the 
outcomes of the 1998-2000 inter-state war.
The case-study provides a contribution to the development o f a comparative 
perspective on the relationship between territory and the causation, conduct and 
outcomes of intra-state and inter-state wars in Africa and in other regions. My 
contribution is to the reflection on the challenges o f globalization to the territorial 
state and particularly to understanding the significance of territory for the survival of 
the modem sovereign state in Africa. The adherence to uti possidetis and the non­
interference norms coupled with de facto porous borders is one of the most 
challenging questions facing African states.
The findings o f the research highlight the value-added of the case- study to the 
debates on the general transformation and on the more specific patterns of warfare in 
Africa, the dynamics o f state formation in Africa and the region’s security dynamics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Wars o f outright territorial aggrandizement have been rare 
since 1945, while wars involving legally disputed territory 
have been a common occurrence.
(Kocs1 1995:159)
My knowledge about the technical aspects o f the border area 
is not satisfactory. What I really know is that the areas claimed 
and recently occupied by the Eritrean government have been 
under Ethiopian administration since at least the creation o f 
the modem Ethiopian empire state. But if  the historical fact 
that they remained under Ethiopian control was/is claimed to 
be wrong, then it can only be hoped that a sober reading of the 
past might solve the problem. But it should not be tied up with 
the real causes o f the present predicament. The real causes o f 
the Eritrean- Ethiopian conflict i.e. the regional, economic, 
political and socio- psychological factors are well-positioned 
in their proper place [sic]. ( ...)  Thus, the tendency to label the 
conflict as a mere border dispute will only do more harm than 
good to all interested on what should be next. This is so 
because it does not help to properly understand the nature o f 
the problem as well as the possible solutions.
(Medhane Tadesse2 1999: 161)
It would be a mistake and a gross understatement of the 
problem between the two governments to attribute the recent 
Eritrean- Ethiopian war solely to a disagreement of where the 
border separating the two countries lies.
There certainly were plenty o f reasons and incidents in the 
border areas to give the two governments enough tools to 
wage negative propaganda against each other, to fan the 
flames o f chauvinism and flex their military muscles. But that 
could never be sufficient to bring the two countries to full 
fledged war that consumed the lives of tens-of-thousands o f 
their citizens and caused the setback of their development 
efforts.
(Paulos Tesfagiorgis3 2004: 37)
1 Kocs, S. A. 1995. Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945- 1987'. The Journal o f  Politics 57: 
159- 175.
2 Medhane Tadesse 1999. The Eritrean- Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects: Reflections on the 
Making o f  Conflicts in the Horn o f  Africa 1991- 1998. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise. The 
author is an Ethiopian historian.
3 Paulos Tesfagiorgis 2004. 'Ethiopia-Eritrea relations: factors militating against normalisation' in 
Sorbo, G.M., and, Siegfried Pausewang, (ed.) Prospects fo r Peace, Security and Human Rights in 
Africa's Horn. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. The author is Eritrean and was awarded the Rafto Prize for 
Human Rights in 2003.
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The 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia took the protagonists and regional 
scholars and analysts by surprise. Indeed, for those living along the frontier in 
Southern Eritrea and in Northern Ethiopia the seven-year period o f peace since the 
overthrow of the Derg appeared just as a lull between the first and second wars. The 
first war refers to the Eritrean war for independence and to the Ethiopian civil war; 
the second refers to the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As war has been 
such a common currency in the everyday lives of citizens in this region, whenever 
asked about war, those who live in the area immediately ask: ‘to which war are you 
referring to, to the recent one?’4 However, the latter war was significantly different. 
The 1998- 2000 war was waged between the armed forces o f two sovereign states.
The author of this thesis was present at a public lecture on the inter-state war 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia organised by the East Africa Society at the School o f 
Oriental and African Studies in December 1998.5 Once the floor was open for 
questions the Eritrean and Ethiopian diaspora members embarked upon a wave o f 
intense mutual accusations. For students o f nationalism the powerful emotions which 
accompanied the debate should come as no surprise. Yet, paraphrasing Stevenson’s 
remark on the First World War, Eritreans and Ethiopians in London, removed from 
the trench lines on the battlefront, seemed: ‘embroiled in a tragedy in the classical 
sense of a conflict between right and right’.6 With hindsight, this coincided with the 
lull between the first and the second rounds of fighting, which had started on 12 May 
1998, and the second one which would start in February 1999 and would lead to the 
most intense episodes of carnage during the war. The author of this thesis became 
interested in the 1998-2000 war not because o f the international media coverage or 
the tragedy unfolding on the battlefield. It was quintessential^ Eritrean and Ethiopian 
diasporas’ passionate defence o f their homeland governments’ righteousness during 
the debate that engaged us. Paradoxically, more than any other means of coverage, the 
diaspora members’ passionate debate brought the intensity of the fighting and the
4 Various interviews in Addis Ababa, Asmara, Tigray Region, June- August 2003, July-August 2004, 
July-August 2005.
5School o f Oriental and African Studies, Public Lecture organized by the East African Society, 
10.12.1998, London. Speakers: Mr. Mulugeta Asrat; Mr. Ephrem Mehreteab; Dr. Gaim Kibreab; Ms T. 
Hagos; Chair: Mr. Carlos Oya.
6 Stevenson, D. 2004. 1914-1918 The History o f  the First World War. London: Allen Lane/ Penguin 
Books, p. xix.
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unfolding tragedy in the, until then, distant countries to our attention. In this sense the 
diaspora’s role in linking the unfolding of events in the homeland government to their 
everyday lives in the host countries should not be overlooked.
Despite the importance o f understanding this particular war on its own merits, 
only a partial understanding can be achieved without considering the broader patterns 
o f warfare. This chapter will start with an appraisal o f the causes associated with 
contemporary armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era and their applicability in 
understanding the war with which this thesis is concerned: the 1998-2000 war 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The first section examines the resurgence of nationalist 
conflicts in the aftermath o f the Cold War and analyses the relationship between 
nationalism and one o f the manifestations o f territory: boundaries. The following 
section defines the central research questions of the thesis. The third section analyses 
three strands o f the literature, namely the literature o f contemporary armed conflicts, 
the literature of globalization in relation to the territorial sovereign state and to civil 
wars and, finally, it engages with the historical sociological approach to the role o f 
war in the process o f state formation. This part identifies the major debates that have 
shaped our understanding o f contemporary armed conflict and discusses their 
contribution to opening up new lines o f enquiry, as well as their limitations. This 
section is critical to the development o f this thesis because it clarifies the theoretical 
assumptions underlining the collection, production and the treatment o f the empirical 
evidence in relation to the thesis’ framework of analysis. The fourth section exposes 
the methodological approach and discusses the strengths and the constraints posed by 
qualitative methodology in post-insurgent states. The closing section will clarify the 
structure o f the thesis with a brief synopsis o f each of its chapters.
1.1 Boundaries, War and Nationalism
In the post-Cold War era we have witnessed a resurgence o f nationalism, which has 
challenged existing frontiers and, ultimately, led to redistribution o f territory and, as a 
consequence, to a reconfiguration o f existing boundaries. Although this has been the 
case, the interpretation o f self-determination as decolonization has remained un­
challenged. The creation o f new states in the former Soviet Union and in the Horn o f
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Africa largely respected the pre-existing internal administrative boundaries. However, 
the resurgence of nationalist conflict has challenged ‘the political and economic 
arrangements of international society and the security o f its members'. This was 
particularly the case in the Balkans and in the Horn o f Africa.
The security threats caused by nationalist conflicts are mostly regional. As 
Mayall claims ‘nationalist conflicts in multi-ethnic states tend to spill-over across 
borders, as sympathisers in contiguous neighbouring states exert pressure on their 
governments to intervene.’8
This feature is, indeed, consistent with the prevailing patterns o f warfare in the 
post- Cold War era which point to an increasing trend in intra-state wars. As the 
prevailing patterns of warfare since the Second World War show a declining trend in 
interstate wars should we accept at face value the generalised assumption that war o f 
the ‘classic’ kind can be virtually ignored? The prevalence of intra-state wars does 
not mean that the classic kind o f war has simply vanished. As Holsti argues, security 
between states in the Third World and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent 
upon security within those states.9 Following on from this, it is important to consider 
both the inter-state, as well as the regional, implications o f the domestic security 
architecture within a given state.
The Horn o f Africa stands in contrast to other regions in Africa with regard to 
the patterns o f warfare and the frequency o f inter-state wars. The region has been the 
stage for two inter-state wars: the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia and the 1998-2000 
Eritrea- Ethiopia wars. Arguably, this gives the region ‘a more Westphalian feel than 
elsewhere in the continent'.10 In addition, Crawford Young argues that the crucial 
challenges to the AU lie in the Horn o f Africa, and the multiple crises in the region 
raise fundamental issues for the African state system.11
7 Mayall, J. Spring 1992. 'Nationalism and international security after the Cold War'. Survival: The 
International Institute fo r Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 21.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
9 Holsti, K. 1996. The State, War, and the State o f  War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15.
10 Buzan, B. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure o f  International Security. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 242.
11 Young, C. 1991. 'Self- Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System' in Zartman, 
W., and Deng, F. (ed.) Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, p. 320.
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The involvement of Ethiopia in yet another inter-state war raises the question 
o f whether nationalism, as was the case in the 1977-78 war between Somalia and 
Ethiopia, played a role in the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
This thesis challenges the abstract separation between territory and 
nationalism. Rather than understanding boundaries as mere lines on a map, territory 
needs to be understood in its relationship to the particular trajectories o f state and 
nation building in Africa. The literature on nationalism allows us to understand the 
relationship between territory and national identity.
In order to understand the multiple conceptions and practices concerning the 
boundaries and the nation-state it is necessary to incorporate strands o f the literature 
within International Relations, Anthropology and Historical sociology which show the 
multiple dimensions of territory. As a corollary o f the processes associated with 
globalization and with contemporary armed conflicts, the literature review will 
interrogate how territory in its multiple dimensions contributes to our understanding 
o f the continuities and transformations o f the sovereign state at the current juncture of 
world politics.12 Before coming to the literature review, the following section will 
define the research questions underlying this thesis.
1.2 Focus and Scope of the thesis
In the face o f the persistence and o f the intensification o f civil wars in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, the study o f this inter-state war is o f immense value for the ongoing 
debates on the changing nature of warfare, in understanding patterns o f warfare in 
Africa and the trajectories of state and nation building projects. The central goals of 
the thesis are to understand the role o f territory in this particular war and to assess the 
relationship between war and state making in Eritrea and in Ethiopia. The thesis aims 
to contribute to the broader debates on the relationship between territory and the 
causation, conduct and outcomes o f contemporary armed conflicts.
I2Donnan, H., and Wilson, Thomas M. 1999. Borders, Frontiers o f  Identity, Nation and State. Oxford 
& N.Y: Berg.
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The thesis is designed according to a central research question and to two 
subsidiary questions. The main question o f this thesis is to ask whether territory has in 
fact declined from its central position.
Central Research Question:
Clausewitzian interstate wars are about territory. So was the 1998-2000 war an Old 
war or did it display features of new wars - can a study o f the causes, conduct and the 
outcomes provide an answer?
In addition, the thesis reflects upon the relationship between war and state formation 
in the post-Cold War era in a region where the legacy o f colonialism played a role in 
the expansion and in the creation of the state, based on the Westaphalian model. As a 
corollary o f these aims the thesis addresses two subsidiary questions.
Subsidiary question 1:
Is the Eritrea - Ethiopia conflict a relic o f the past? That is, an anachronistic oddity in 
a world where intra-state and new wars prevail?
Subsidiary question 2:
11Are we witnessing an example o f state making wars that according to some are key 
to the emergence o f strong states in Africa?
The research question and the aims of this study raise a set o f complementary 
interrogations in relation to the broader patterns o f warfare and to the challenges to 
the sovereign state. These interrogations will be discussed throughout the thesis and 
in relation to the particular findings o f the case-study. The next section will clarify the 
thesis’ theoretical assumptions in relation to the main debates on the literature o f
13Luttwack, E. July-August 1999. 'Give War a Chance'. Foreign Affairs 78: 36-44.
Ayoob, M. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and The 
International System. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Herbst, J. 2000. States and 
Power in Africa. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Herbst, J. 2003. 'State and War in 
Africa' in Paul, T.V., Ikenberry, G. John, Hall, John A. (ed.) The Nation- State in question. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
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contemporary armed conflicts and of the African Area Studies’ understanding o f the 
state and o f the patterns o f warfare in Africa.
1.3 Literature Limitations and Theoretical Assumptions
1.3.1 Contemporary armed conflicts: Civil and New Wars
In the face o f the persistence and o f the intensification o f civil wars in the aftermath of 
the Cold War one strand of the literature highlights the transformation of the nature of 
contemporary armed conflicts.14
Martin Van Creveld15 argues that we may be witnessing the end o f an era of 
‘Clausewitzian warfare’ based on the distinction between government, army and 
people. However, as Anthony W. Pereira suggests:
To what extent was the Clausewitzian paradigm ever dominant? Haven’t irregular 
armed forces always been a feature of war- making? (...) Perhaps even at the height 
of the Clausewitzian era in Europe, the armed forces that could fight wars according 
to Clausewitzian dictums were the exception rather than the rule and could be 
effectively challenged by irregular armies. It therefore seems more plausible that 21st 
century war, at least so far, has reconfigured elements of conventional and irregular 
warfare, rather then moved decisively from one to the other.16
The contrasting positions between Van Creveld and Pereira suggest that rather than 
understanding Clausewitzian war as a stylized type o f war; some o f the features 
present in this type o f war may still be helpful in understanding contemporary patterns 
of warfare.17
14 Van Creveld, M. 1991. The Transformation o f  War. N.Y: The Free Press.; Cemy, P. G. 1998. 
'Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: Globalisation as Durable Disorder'. Civil 
Wars 1: 36-64.
15 Van Creveld, 1991, op. cit.
16 Pereira, A. W. (2003) In Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State 
Formation(Ed, Davis, D. E., and, Pereira, Anthony W.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 
393.
17 Duyvesteyn, I., and Angstrom, J. 2005. 'Rethinking the nature o f War'. London and N.Y.: Frank 
Cass.
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Two lines of enquiry deserve closer treatment because of their role in 
polarising the debate and in influencing the understanding o f contemporary armed 
conflict: the greed vs. grievances and the Old vs. New Wars debates.
The first debate points to the inevitable tension between greed factors and 
grievances as the key motivations to resort to force in intra-state wars. This debate 
acquires significance in cases when the duration and the protracted nature o f the 
conflicts are clearly related to the predatory nature of the belligerents’ motivations. 
However, as several authors argue, economic factors need to be taken into account as 
part o f a complex interaction with other grievances related to other sources of
to .
cleavages in the social formations. The focus on the economic dimensions o f civil 
wars overlooks the complex interaction between economic and political agendas, and 
the role played by political, cultural and strategic factors in the unfolding o f civil 
wars.19
9ftThe second debate culminated with Kaldor’s definition o f the ‘New W ars’ 
thesis. The proponents of this thesis21 argue that in terms of the methods o f warfare, 
the new wars draw on the experience of both guerrilla and counterinsurgent 
movements, but are distinctive as being essentially based upon the instillation o f fear 
among civilians, hatred and predation.
In the so-called ‘New W ars’, the units that fight include different groups not 
corresponding to the vertically organized hierarchical units o f conventional warfare. 
These units are composed by different types o f group ranging from paramilitary units, 
local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, and mercenary groups to regular forces.
Although these contributions have stimulated the debate around the 
understanding of the transformation o f warfare, a lack o f historical perspective
18 Keen, D. 2000. 'Incentives and Disincentives for Violence' in Berdal, M., and, David M. Malone, 
(ed.) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Colorado & London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers.; Berdal, M. 2005. 'Beyond Greed and Grievance- and not too soon... A Review Essay'. 
Review o f  International Studies 31: 687-698.
19 Berdal, 2005, op.cit., pp. 690-91.
20Kaldor, M. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.
21 Duffield, M. 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging o f  development and security. 
London: Zed Books. Munkler, H. 2005. The New Wars. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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overlooked continuities, simplified the complexities o f the conflicts and de­
emphasised the resilience o f the sovereign state in the face of these pressures.
Finally, as Berdal argues, the tendency in the new wars scholarship to identify 
common patterns in contemporary civil conflicts overlooks important differences
99among them.
Regarding diaspora’s remittances role in conflicts, both the new wars 
proponents and other authors tend to overlook the diversity o f outcomes and instead
9^
focus mainly on diaspora formations’ role in fuelling the conflicts in the homeland. 
Diasporas’ remittances may fuel and/or sustain insurgency in the homeland, as was 
the case with the Tamil diaspora from Sri Lanka in sustaining the Liberation Tigers 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE).24 Other similar cases include Eritreans during the war for 
independence; and over a much longer period the Kurds, the Palestinians and the
9c
Irish. However, diaspora remittances may instead play a role in averting conflict as 
in the case o f Kosovo when remittances were largely channelled to Rogova’s Kosovo 
Republic.26 The same can be said o f the Somali diaspora remittances.27 These findings 
again suggest the need to consider different linkages between the diaspora and 
homeland actors, both national governments and insurgents with diverse aims; most
90
notably in the case o f unfulfilled self-determination claims. Furthermore, the role o f 
diaspora formations in world politics needs to be examined according to: its origins; 
the nature o f the relations with the host countries and the homeland actors (both state 
and non-state) and the various dimensions o f these relations, that is, economic, 
political and cultural.
22 Berdal, M. 2004. 'The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed '. Security Dialogue 
35: 173-189.
23 Anderson, B. 2002. 'The New World Disorder' in Vincent, J. (ed.) The anthropology o f  politics : a 
reader in ethnography, theory, and critique. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Anderson, B. Winter 
1994. 'Exodus'. Critical Inquiry 20: 314-327. Lyons, T. 2006. Diasporas and homeland conflict' in 
Kahler, M., and, Barbara F. Walter, (ed.) Territoriality and Conflict in an Era o f  Globalization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24 Berdal, 2005, op. cit., p. 695.
25 Lyons, 2006, op. cit. 0stergaard- Nielsen, E. 2001. Diasporas in World Politics' in Josselin , D., & 
Wallace, William (ed.) Non-state actors in world politics Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 224.
26 Berdal, 2005, op.cit., p. 695.
27 ibid., p. 695.
28 Shain, Y., and Sherman, Martin 1998. 'Dynamics o f Disintegration: Diaspora, Secession and the 
paradox of nation-states'. Nations and Nationalism 4, p. 339.
25
Particularly in the case o f weak states the processes associated with
9Qglobalization have favoured the exploitation o f violence for economic purposes. I f  
they succeed in capturing a fungible resource, warlords and insurgent movements can 
use the global economy to sustain themselves.30 Following on from this, the conduct 
o f war economy businesses and the mobilization of non- state militias become
i
profitable and the armed factions resist resolution of the conflicts. This trend can be 
best understood within the interplay o f global and regional economic changes and the 
flourishing o f the un- official sector in the 1970s and 1980s in many African 
countries. This phenomenon, which intensified in the 1990s, had implications with 
regards to the diminishing centrality of the state as the main venue for securing access 
to critical resources in Africa. The political economy of war’s approach has provided 
a crucial understanding o f these linkages. In Africa, and in other regions, civil wars 
were shaped by the interplay between local and global forces o f the wider 
international political economy.
Africa’s wars have to be seen as phenomena associated with 
emergent patterns o f accumulation. Such patterns thrive on the 
dislocations o f globalization, and benefit, illicit or hidden global 
networks (sponsoring flows o f arms, trade in drugs and minerals, 
laundered money and other illegal finance (...)*32
However, it would be an over-generalization to take at face-value that all 
contemporary armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere fit within this pattern. This line 
o f enquiry highlights a part o f the complexity o f the conflicts. However, as Berdal 
argues the processes and phenomenon identified within the greed-motivated and new 
wars’ lines o f enquiry, such as diaspora’s remittances and the opportunities offered by 
economic globalization to armed factions, are ‘dynamic and context-dependent and 
their role in sustaining conflict is therefore neither given nor self-evidently good or 
bad’. As a consequence, in depth case-studies based on qualitative methodology
29 Munkler, 2005, op.cit., p. 8.
30 Buzan, B. 2005. ’Series Editor Preface’ The New International Relations" in Engel, U., and, Gorm 
Rye Olsen, (ed.) Africa and the North: between globalization and marginalization. London & N.Y.: 
Routledge.
31 Bujra, J., Lionel Cliffe, Morris Szeftel with Rita Abrahamsen and Tunde Zack- Williams, 2004. 
'Agendas, Past and Future.’ Review o f  African Political Economy 102, p. 569.
32 Ibid., p. 569.
33 Berdal, 2005, op.cit., p. 695.
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retain value to identify similarities and differences between contemporary armed 
conflicts across regions.34
The empirical evidence from various ongoing armed conflicts in Africa 
confirms the diversity o f current patterns o f warfare in Africa. Timothy Shaw 
highlights three different types of armed conflicts: 1) orthodox inter-state; 2) semi­
orthodox, semi-state and 3) non-orthodox, largely non-state.35 This line o f enquiry is 
more helpful than accounts which offer an understanding of Africa’s wars within a 
single pattern. This latter line o f inquiry incurs in germane constraints identified 
below in relation to the literature o f contemporary armed conflicts.
Just as trajectories o f state and nation building across Africa share similarities 
whilst also displaying diverse features, so do ongoing armed conflicts with regard to: 
the intensity o f violence, the types of actors, their causation, conduct and outcomes. 
The strands o f the literature that emerged in the wake of the Cold War, especially the 
political economy of violence and the ‘new wars’ thesis, have contributed to the 
understanding of Africa’s armed conflicts within the broader trends in the 
international system. The key contribution of these lines o f inquiry is to show that 
these patterns are not unique to Africa.37 However, the central analytical distinctions 
of these approaches incur in three major problems: 1) the dichotomy between greed 
and grievance and new and old wars is overemphasised; 2) they overlook continuities 
and the diversity o f forms o f warfare and 3) the interrogations they raise need to be 
examined on a case-by-case basis at the peril o f overgeneralization and simplification.
1.3.2 Globalization, the Transformation of Warfare and Implications for the 
Territorial Sovereign State
34 Bennett, A., and George, Alexander L. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
35Shaw, T. M. 2003. Towards a Political Economy o f  Regional Conflict and Cooperation in Middle 
Africa at the Start o f the Twenty- First Century' in Hentz, J.J., and, Boas, Morten (ed.) New and 
Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State. Alsdershot: Ashgate, p. 185.
36 Jackson, R. 2006. 'Africa's Wars: Overview, Causes and the Challenges o f Conflict Transformation' 
in Furley, O., and, May, Roy (ed.) Ending Africa's Wars. Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate, p. 21. 
Reno, W. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.;
37 de Waal, A. 2000. 'Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa' in Africa, J. 
(ed.). Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press, pp. 1-2.
27
The literatures o f globalization and of contemporary armed conflicts in Africa
'I  o
converge upon the assumption that the deterritorializing pressures upon the state
-IQ
corroborate a widespread trend toward a borderless world, which is particularly 
salient in Africa. According to these interpretations, both the effects o f trans-state 
regionalism40 and the spill-over effects o f civil wars across borders41 are further 
transforming Africa’s porous international boundaries and are contributing to the 
deterritorialization of the state.42 The shrinking o f the state’s capacity to maintain the 
monopoly o f the means o f coercion within its territorial jurisdiction is likely to erode 
weak states in Africa and will, eventually, lead to a reconfiguration o f boundaries 
along lines other than those inherited at independence 43 In addition, the increasing 
breaches to the territorial integrity and to the non-interference norms are a further 
threat to regional peace and security and suggest these are no longer operational rules 
for inter-state relations within Africa 44 The proliferation o f non-state actors and their 
increasing role in spheres traditionally reserved for the state are further contributing to 
the post-colonial states’ crisis.45 A multitude of non-state actors is displacing the post­
colonial state and increasingly challenging its survival.46 The further weakening o f the 
state under the combined globalizing and localizing pressures is already 
underway,47and will eventually culminate in the proliferation o f cases of 
disintegration. However, rather than accepting these propositions at face value, this 
thesis takes as its starting point their interrogations and the debate on the role of 
territory and boundaries in light of a case of inter-state war in the late twentieth
38 Held, D., Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and, Jonathan Perratan 1999. The Territorial State and 
Global Politics' in David Held, A.M., David Goldblatt and, Jonathan Perratan, (ed.) Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Oxford: Polity. Bach, D. 1999. 'Regionalism versus 
regional integration: the emergence o f  a new paradigm in Africa' in Grugel, J., and Hout, Wil (ed.) 
Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State strategies and globalization. London and New  
York: Routledge, p. 164.
39 Van Creveld 1991, op. cit. Kaplan, R. D. February, 1994. The Coming Anarchy'. Atlantic Monthly.
40 Bach, 1999, op. cit., p. 165.
41 Cemy, 1998, op. cit.
42 Bach, 1999, op.cit., p. 152.
43 Clapham, C. 2001. 'Rethinking African States'. African Security Review  10.
44 ibid., p. 5.
45 Clapham, C. 1998. 'Degrees o f  statehood'. Review o f  International Studies 24: 143-157.
46 Allen, C. 1999. ’Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa’. Review o f  African 
Political Economy: 367-384. Reno, W. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
47 Holloway, D., and Stedman, S.J. 2002. 'Civil Wars and State-Building in Africa and Eurasia' in 
Bessinger, M.R., and Young, Crawford (ed.) Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post Soviet 
Eurasia in Comparative Perspective. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 168.
48 Engel, U., and, Andreas Mehler, 2005. Under Construction: Governance in Africa’s New Violent 
Social Spaces' in Engel, U., and , Gorm Rye Olsen, (ed.) The African Exception. Aldershot: Ashgate.
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century. The strands o f the literature concerned with the impact o f globalization and 
of contemporary armed conflicts on the future o f the territorial sovereign state retain 
heuristic value to the extent that they open up space to interrogate the changing 
meanings of sovereignty in the twenty-first century. This legitimate quest needs to be 
set up against the empirical evidence emerging from particular case-studies and from 
different regions within the international system.
If Africa’s regional order is dwindling under the combined crisis of the state 
and of globalizing pressures, what is the alternative to the existing states carved 
within the territorial framework inherited from the colonial period?
It is unquestionable that the origins of Africa’s boundaries’ are contingent and 
largely the result o f an artificial creation by the colonial powers.49 Whether these 
boundaries have been an asset to state survival50 or instead have hampered state 
trajectories towards consolidation51 is indeed a source o f great controversy.
Africa’s boundaries - like all international boundaries - are artificial but unlike 
boundaries in some other parts of the international system are porous. Here again 
different authors offer different explanations. Whether the maintenance o f this feature 
is the outcome o f the states’ dysfunctionality or the outcome of the absence o f 
external threats, which would have forced upon political leaderships the imperative to 
create strong boundaries, is not possible to determine without considering the 
particular trajectories of the state. In addition, the OAU consensus on the respect to 
the existing boundaries at the time o f independence prevented irredentist and 
separatist claims for self-determination, along lines other than decolonization, from 
gathering legitimacy and recognition on the regional stage. The majority of Africa’s 
international boundaries have remained porous. However, not all swathes o f the 
frontiers are equally permeable and the international boundaries between states and 
across the Western, Eastern, Central and Southern African regions have acquired a 
diversity o f features and have been used in the pursuit o f different aims since
49 Mayall, J. 2000. World Politics: Progress and its limits. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 64.
50 Herbst, 2000, op. cit., p. 25.
51 Abraham, G. 2006. 'Africa and its boundaries, a legal overview: From colonialism to the African 
Union' in Clapham, C., Herbst, J., Greg Mills, (ed.) Big African States. Johannesburg: Wits University
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independence.52 Following on from this, although the post-colonial states’ political 
leaderships have faced similar challenges concerning their international boundaries, to 
assume that all the international boundaries have been eroded in a similar way by 
globalizing pressures or by (informal and/or irregular) trans-state flows of people and 
goods is an over-generalization. This thesis is built upon the theoretical assumption 
that Africa’s international boundaries display diverse features. The various 
dimensions of the international boundaries are used by a range o f actors (both state 
and non-state) in pursuit o f their own aims. State and non-state actors in pursuit o f 
their aims deploy different strategies concerning the international boundaries which 
may coincide at times, mutually reinforce or, instead, undermine each other. Finally, 
both state and non-state actors’ aims and strategies are influenced by different
c1!
conceptions o f the international boundaries.
Africa’s porous boundaries have been affected in a range of ways both by 
domestic, regional and globalizing pressures, and have been both a constraint and an 
opportunity exploited differently by a range o f state and non-state actors54. In addition 
the nature o f the international boundaries between states further increases the saliency 
of the blurring line between domestic and international politics in the African state 
system, and particularly in the Horn o f Africa.55 The porous borderlands, in fact, 
constitute the twilight region where the domestic and the international in African 
politics become indistinguishable.
But is it helpful to understand Africa’s porous international boundaries 
independently o f the peculiar features o f the process o f state formation? Rather than 
doing so, this thesis is built upon the assumption that the analysis o f the peculiar 
trajectories o f state and nation building projects in different countries is a fruitful path 
to follow in order to explore the diverse features o f Africa’s international boundaries.
Press, pp. 273-74. Griffiths, I. L. 1995. 'Political Boundaries' in Griffiths, I.L. (ed.) The African 
inheritance. London ; New York Routledge, p. 84.
52 Bach, 1999, op. cit., p. 166.
53 Donnan and Wilson, 1999, op. cit., p. 14.
54Nuguent, P., and Asiwaju, A.I. 1996. 'African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities'. 
London: Pinter.; Taylor, I., and, Williams, Paul 2004. 'Introduction: Understanding Africa's place in 
world politics' in Taylor, I.P.W. (ed.) Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the 
Continent. London & N.Y.: Routledge, p. 3. According to the authors both the society o f states and the 
global political economy influence the continent’s affairs.
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The focus on the trajectories o f state and nation building on a case-by-case basis 
offers a unique vantage point in understanding the international implications o f the 
domestic trajectories o f each country’s process o f state formation. This line of enquiry 
allows us to engage with an overlooked dimension o f a state’s relation with its 
territory: the interplay between its domestic and international boundaries. As Achille 
Mbembe notes, although the re-drawing of Africa’s international boundaries has been 
fiercely resisted by political leaderships, the re-drawing o f domestic boundaries has 
been common currency within state building projects and is indeed a legacy from the 
colonial period.56 Quite surprisingly, both the domestic and international implications 
o f the re-drawing o f domestic boundaries have been given scant attention. This 
feature o f state formation is arguably one of the most fruitful paths to explore in our 
quest to understand contemporary armed conflicts in Africa, not only civil but also 
inter-state wars. This thesis deals only with the latter case.
This thesis recognizes that without considering a variety o f actors’ aims, 
conceptions and strategies concerning domestic and international boundaries only a 
partial understanding o f processes o f state disintegration and/or consolidation in 
relation to contemporary armed conflicts can be achieved. However, within the scope 
of this thesis only a clear set of identified actors will be dealt with. The thesis takes 
into account the diverse aims, conceptions and strategies concerning the domestic and 
international boundaries o f Ethiopia and Eritrea, particularly of the following actors: 
states’ agents and institutions, borderland communities along the territorial boundary 
between the two countries and urban, rural and diaspora formations’ conceptions and 
practices concerning the boundaries.
There are three widely acknowledged international implications of Africa’s 
porous boundaries, and the common denominator between them is their role in the 
erosion o f the state’s sovereignty and o f the consensus around the norms which bind 
the African state system into a regional sovereign society of states. The international 
implications o f Africa’s porous boundaries are related to: 1) the phenomenon
55 Harbeson, J. 1991. 'The International Politics o f Identity in the Horn o f  Africa' in Harbeson, J., and 
Rothchild,D. (ed.) Africa in World Politics. Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, p. 122.
56 Mbembe, A. 2002. 'At the Edge o f the World: Boundaries, Territoriality and Sovereignty in Africa' 
in Bessinger, M.R., and Young, Crawford (ed.) Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post 
Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pp. 59-61.
31
described as trans-state regionalism;57 2) the patterns o f warfare, such as the spill-over 
effects o f armed conflicts in neighbouring countries58 and, finally, 3) the closely 
related pattern o f mutual interference in each other’s internal affairs.59 The degree, 
density and the extent o f these processes vary among countries, within and across 
regions in Africa. This thesis is only concerned with the interplay between these 
processes and, in part, the domestic and interstate security dynamics between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia and, finally, their interplay with the prevailing patterns within the Horn 
of Africa’s broader regional security architecture. The role o f boundaries in the 
politics o f the region needs to be understood against this backdrop.
In relation to trans-state regionalism, Daniel Bach describes this process as ‘a 
result o f the exploitation of dysfunctions and disparities generated by existing 
boundaries, with debilitating effects on the state’s control of its territory’. 60 The 
irregular movement of peoples and goods across boundaries has led to the emergence 
of trans-state informal networks which critically erode the state’s capacity to 
regularize the rules governing trade, currency exchange and migration. Within the 
irregular movement o f goods and people, the irregular trade in Eastern Africa o f the 
narcotic leaf khat and the irregular migration across the Red Sea from Somalia’s 
Puntland and Somaliland’s ports are just two of the most striking cases in point. These 
activities have tended to proliferate and flourish beyond the states’ control. However, 
the state’s agents and institutions own contribution to their increased saliency and 
magnitude should not be overlooked. Paradoxically, state agents and non-state actors 
may act in connivance to the detriment of the consolidation o f the state.61 The extent 
to which this has been the case needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Furthermore, this thesis incorporates the analysis o f the specific historical 
circumstances o f the crystallization of the boundaries. It is important to interrogate the 
extent to which the actors’ practices concerning the boundaries are reproduced, or 
follow a single pattern, along different swathes o f the adjacent regions to the frontier
57 Bach, 1999, op. cit., p. 152.
58 Mayall 1992, op. cit., p. 21; Rothchild, D. 2002. The Effects o f  State Crisis on African Interstate 
Relations (and Comparisons with Post-Soviet Eurasia)' in Bessinger, M.R., and Young, Crawford (ed.) 
Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective. 
Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 203.
59 Matthews, R. O. 1970. 'Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review'. International Organization 24, 
p. 345.
60 Rothchild, 2002, op. cit., p. 203.
61 Ibid.
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between contiguous neighbouring countries. Following on from this, the thesis 
considers separately the practices across the boundaries between Southern Eritrea and 
Northern Ethiopia, between Western Eritrea and Eastern Sudan, between Eastern 
Ethiopia and Western Somaliland and Somalia, and so on. In the scope o f this thesis 
the territorial boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Ethiopia and 
Djibouti, and between the former and Somalia will be privileged for two main 
reasons: 1) the outbreak o f the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the suspension 
of all Ethiopian transhipments to the Eritrean ports and 2) the diversion o f Ethiopia’s 
transhipments to the Djibouti and to Berbera ports (Somaliland), and to a lesser extent 
to Bossaso (Puntland/Somalia) port.
Africa’s porous international boundaries in relation to the patterns o f warfare, 
such as the spill-over effects o f armed conflicts in neighbouring countries, acquire 
two crucial attributes, which can unfold independently or simultaneously. 
Governments may be pressured to intervene across boundaries in order to provide 
support (military and/or political) to the contiguous state’s citizens of its own ethnic 
groups. The thesis interrogates under which particular circumstances national 
governments are likely to resort to hot-pursuit missions o f their own minority ethnic
fk'ygroups who cross the states’ boundaries in search of safe haven amongst their 
kinsmen on the other side o f the boundary. Which have been the prevailing 
motivations of these forceful interventions across state boundaries? Are they 
subordinated to the merits of the particular case and/or to humanitarian imperatives
/•j
or, instead, are they predominantly subordinated to realpolitik considerations?
Africa’s porous international boundaries have also led to a regionalization of 
the political space, particularly in the Horn of Africa. The members o f opposition 
groups, regardless o f ethnic affinities, tend to cross the boundaries in search o f a safe 
haven, against persecution from their own state and/or to conduct insurgent operations 
against their homeland government. The neighbouring countries have not acted with 
restraint and have instead supported various insurgencies. In a tit-for-tat tactic the 
targeted state has also provided support to the other state’s opposition groups. Has this
62 Mayall, 1992, op. cit., p. 21. Rothchild, 2002, op. cit., pp. 201-207.
63 Rothchild, 2002, op. cit., p. 207.
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been a continuous pattern? Is this pattern related to the nature o f the regimes or to the 
broader features o f the regional state system?
This feature o f the pattern of warfare and the mutual interference in each 
other’s internal affairs have been particularly salient in the Horn of Africa and have 
considerably eroded the consensus around the non-interference norm. It is particularly 
important to analyse whether these processes pose a threat to regional peace and 
stability or instead to the political leaderships at the helm o f the states. The extent to 
which these processes have fuelled the prolongation o f civil wars needs to be 
understood within the interplay between the domestic and the region’s security 
dynamics. As a corollary it is legitimate to raise the question whether these patterns 
have remained ever-present or instead have tended to wax and wane according to the 
domestic, regional and international system’s broader patterns?
1.3.3 Inter-state disputes and wars over territory in Africa
In Africa inter-state war is not a common phenomenon. In fact, based on the number 
o f death criteria, i.e., situations where the armed forces o f African states have engaged 
each other in any conflict resulting in more than 1,000 battle deaths, only two would 
qualify as interstate wars: the Ethiopian- Somali 1977-1978 conflict over the Ogaden 
and Haud regions, and the 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian war.64 Indeed, what seems 
to be particularly exceptional in Africa has been the low-incidence o f inter-state wars 
in the post- colonial period. Markus Komprobst distinguishes between border disputes 
and inter-state wars. A border dispute refers to a conflict between two states arising 
from the claim of at least one o f these states to a part o f the territory or, in extreme 
cases, to an entire region within the territory administered by the other state.65 The 
cases o f inter-state militarized disputes over the un-satisfactory nature o f borders have
f \ ( \  f \ lnot been rare occurrences. Border disputes in Africa have been frequent. In
64 Lemke, D. 2002. Regions o f  War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 167.
65Komprobst, M. 2002. The Management o f border disputes in African regional sub- systems: 
comparing West Africa and the Horn o f Africa'. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 40, p. 373.
The author only includes disputes over land borders, excludes maritime disputes and the ones 
involving at least one European colonial power.
66 The cases under scrutiny were the ones which involved direct military confrontation, short o f  
escalating into full-scale war. According to Markus Komprobst the inventory o f border disputes in 
West Africa and the Horn o f Africa involved the following dyads: WE- Liberia- Guinea; Mali- 
Mauritania; Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire (Sanwi irredentism) ; Liberia-Cote D ’ Ivoire; Ghana-Togo (Ewe
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addition to the interstate wars over territory between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977- 
78, Libya and Chad fought over the Aozou Strip in 1987 and Ethiopia and Eritrea in 
1998-2000. Other cases o f border disputes occurred: between Algeria and Morocco in 
1963; between Nigeria and Chad (over Lake Chad) in 1983; between Nigeria and 
Cameroon (over the Bakassi Peninsula) in 1978-79 and in 1993-94; between Mali and 
Burkina Faso (over the Agacher Strip) in 1985; between Guinea Bissau and Senegal 
(over the Dome Flore) in 1991 and between Eritrea and Yemen (over the Hanish 
Islands).68
Ethiopia within Africa stands out because o f the defence o f its territorial 
integrity by all possible means. This is indeed a key feature of its foreign policy. The 
state's leadership has repeatedly resorted to all means at its disposal, both peaceful 
and forceful, to defend the territorial integrity o f the country. First, let us assess the 
non-forceful ways that Ethiopia has used to uphold the country’s territorial integrity. 
A notable and early example of the Ethiopian state’s determination to uphold 
peacefully the territorial integrity of the state was Haile Selassie’s successful plea to 
the League o f Nations in 1926. Haile Selassie, at the time still Regent, requested the 
League to implement its normative framework, particularly article 10 o f the League 
Covenant concerning aggression, in defence o f Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and 
political independence against Britain and Italy.69 Haile Selassie claimed that a British 
and Italian economic agreement concerning their dealings with Ethiopia constituted a 
bilateral pact to exert diplomatic pressure and obtain economic concessions from 
Ethiopia. As a consequence Haile Selassie interpreted the economic agreement as an 
indirect threat to Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and political independence and thus a 
breach to article 10 of the Covenant League. Ethiopia skilfully resorted to the League 
of Nations’ obligation to combat aggression. As a consequence o f Ethiopia’s
irredentism) ; Dahomey-Nigeria (Yoruba irredentism) ; Dahomey-Niger; Upper-Volta (BF)-Niger; 
Mali-Upper-Volta (BF); Mali-Upper-Volta (Agacher Strip); Ghana-Upper-Volta/ HA-Ethiopia- 
Somalia; Ethiopia-Sudan (major Gwyne line) ; Eritrea-Djibouti and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Other sources 
consulted include: Brownlie, I. 1979. African Boundaries : A legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedie. 
Hurst & California: R.I.I.A.; Huth, P. K. 1996 Standing your Ground : Territorial Disputes and 
International Conflict. Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press , pp. 216-25; Day, A. J. 1987. 'Border 
and Territorial Disputes'. Harlow & Detroit: Longman and Gale, pp. 103-194.
67 Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2005. 'Introduction: The Eritreo-Ethiopian war1 in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, 
Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 
xix.
68 Ibid., p. xi.
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diplomatic protest via the League of Nations, Britain and Italy were compelled to 
annul the agreement under the moral weight o f the international legal norm on non-
70 •aggression. However, in other instances Ethiopia was compelled to resort to force in 
the defence o f its territorial integrity against external threat at considerable cost. 
These wars resulted in a wide number o f casualties for both parties. The first incident 
between Ethiopia and Italy was in 1887 and resulted in an estimated 1,000 casualties; 
in the war between Ethiopia and Italy in 1895-96 the estimated casualties were 
19,000; the 1935-36 resistance against Italy’s occupation resulted in an estimated 
20,000 casualties for both parties;71 and the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in
771977-78 resulted in an estimated 45,000 casualties. This historical trajectory 
confirms the centrality of territorial integrity within the pattern o f Ethiopia’s inter­
state relations and its determination to resort to all means necessary in defence against 
any threat to its boundaries. Perhaps the centrality o f this feature in the country’s 
history will be helpful in understanding why the border dispute with Eritrea, unlike 
other cases of border disputes in Africa, escalated into fully-fledged war. This will be 
further examined in chapters 2 and 5.
1.3.4 War and the Process of State Formation
For a truly comparative study o f politics to develop, the great but 
incomplete drama o f African state creation must be understood.73
The relationship between war and the process of state formation is central in 
understanding contemporary processes o f state building. From this it will not 
necessarily follow that Tilly’ s axiom that ‘war makes states and states make wars’74
69 Wilson, P. 2007. The International Politics o f Aggression: an Historical Analysis' Department o f  
International Relations. London: London School o f Economics and Political Science, p. 66.
70 Ibid., p. 61.
71Tir, J., Philip Schafer, Paul Diehl, and Gary Goertz 1998. 'Territorial Changes, 1816-1996: 
Procedures and Data'. Conflict Management and Peace Science 16: 89-97; Sarkees, M. R. 2000. 'The 
Correlates o f War Data on War: An Update to 1997'. Conflict Management and Peace Science 18: 123- 
144.
72 Gebru Tareke 2000. 'The Ethiopia-Somalia War o f 1977 Revisited'. International Journal o f  African 
Historical Studies 33, p. 637. Samatar, A. I. 1988. Socialist Somalia : rhetoric and reality.
London: Zed, p. 137.
73 Herbst, 2000, op. cit., p. 30.
74 Tilly, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime' in Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer 
and T.Skocpol (ed.) Bringing the State Back in. New York: CUP. Tilly, C. 2002. War Making and 
State Making as Organized Crime' in Besteman, C. (ed.) Violence: A Reader. Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave; Macmillan.
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will apply to the African context or to other cases o f state building in the 
contemporary developing world.
As Anna Leander well argues:
( ...)  Contemporary state building takes place in a globalised 
context which alters the effects o f the central processes which 
Tilly and others argued placed war-making and state-making in a
7Spositive relationship.
In contrast, this relationship must be considered on a case-by-case basis without 
assuming that the relationship is necessarily a negative one. This relationship needs to 
be understood against the causes and the outcomes of particular wars.76
In the analysis of the relationship between War and the process of state 
formation nowhere did Charles Tilly argue that the process should necessarily follow 
a similar pattern to the European one. As Benno Tescke argues:‘(—) There is no single 
world historical pattern’.77
The features of the contemporary processes of state formation pose further 
challenges to the understanding o f the outcome of the relationship between war 
making and state making. It is not possible in the short term (in a three to four decade 
period since most African states attained independence) to reach definite conclusions. 
However, it is important to identify the current processes and outcomes o f this 
interplay. As the empirical evidence does not lend itself to straightforward answers 
the majority of authors either conclude for a reproduction o f Tilly’s axiom or the 
opposite. Keith Krause has looked for a middle ground concluding that war both 
makes states and breaks states.78
75 Leander, A. 2004. Wars and the un-making o f states: Taking Tilly seriously in the contemporary 
world’ in Guzzini, S., and, Jung, Dietrich, (ed.) Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen 
Peace Research. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
76 Suganami, H. 1996. On the Causes o f  War. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
77 Teschke, B. 2003. The Myth o f  1648: Class, Geopolitics and the making o f  Modern International 
Relations. London and New York: Verso, p. 272.
78 Krause, K. 1998. 'Theorizing security, state formation and the Third World1 in the post-Cold War 
World'. Review o f  International Studies 24: 125-136.
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The formative period of statehood, as the European experience has shown, led 
to a greater salience o f inter-state wars. The comparison is fruitful not by assuming 
that the same will happen in Africa but by seeking to understand what kind of 
questions the analogy raises. As Holsti remarks: ‘Are we to assume that the ideas and 
practices that drove interstate wars in the eighteenth century in Europe must repeat
7Qthemselves in twenty-first-century Africa?’
Herbst argues that the reasons for the weakness o f the African states can be 
found in the absence o f inter- state wars. What can the inter-state war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea add to our understanding o f the relationship between war making 
and state making?
The post-colonial political itineraries o f the state in Africa show that many o f the 
features taken for granted on the study o f inter-state warfare fail to capture the 
complexity of the simultaneous processes o f state consolidation and disintegration 
across Africa and, most importantly, the ways through which the state has been losing 
the monopoly o f the means o f coercion. When analysing the process o f state 
formation in Africa one has to bear in mind the formal (Ethiopia and Eritrea) and un­
official (DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, etc) interplay between the conventional armed 
forces o f states and non state armed factions, be they irregular militias and warlords or 
more traditional insurgent movements.81
The relations between the state and its citizens in both the domestic and 
transnational spheres are central to understanding the role o f political violence in the 
process of state formation. In Africa, the diaspora is a key element in grasping the 
diversity o f paths and strategies deployed by the state in the pursuit o f its aims. With 
the increasing importance o f diaspora communities and their permanent links with 
citizens living within the boundaries of the state (in particular relatives), diaspora 
formations are part o f the set o f actors to whom African states’ rulers increasingly 
depend and eventually are accountable to.
79 Holsti, K. 1996. The State, War, and the State o f  War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
14.
80 Herbst, 2000, op. cit.
81 Clapham, C. 1998. 'African Guerrillas'. Fountain & Indiana: James Currey.
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Finally, the post-colonial period in Africa seems to confirm that war is not a
o  *y
consequence o f political change but is likely to become its catalyst. The complex 
relationship between war and state formation in Africa further highlights that this 
process is far from achieved, with outcomes yet to be ascertained. Whether war- 
induced activities lead to state consolidation or disintegration needs to be examined 
on a case-by-case basis and over an extended period.
1.4 Methodological Approach
This study will draw upon the accounts of authors and journalists who had 
first-hand access to Ethiopian and/or Eritrean sources, the protagonists, other social 
actors and/or those who were participant observers from either side o f the border. 
These published accounts will then be complemented with empirical evidence 
collected during this author’s own fieldwork in the two countries, in the aftermath o f 
the war. It should be noted that neither the authors and/or journalists who had 
privileged access to first hand accounts of one party or the other, nor this author, 
favour one side over the other, or for that matter, necessarily endorse a pro-Eritrean 
or pro-Ethiopian stance. Indeed, given the deterioration and disappearance o f the 
indispensable element o f political trust between the two former allies, one’s 
‘privileged’ access to the protagonists in one side of the border clearly conditioned 
access to the other party’s case (and at the time o f writing still does). The persistence 
o f this feature, especially in the aftermath of the war, unavoidably places constraints 
and limitations on independent reporting and scholarship. As a consequence, the 
growing literature of the case study provides asymmetrical accounts reflecting the 
researchers’ ability to negotiate the politics of fieldwork with the protagonists. Yet, 
these studies attempt to pave the way for future accounts that can ideally benefit from 
equal access to both protagonists.
The chapters on the causes, conduct, outcomes o f the 1998-2000 war rely on 
primary empirical evidence collected during fieldwork in Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
Secondary evidence, extracted from the growing literature on the case study, will be 
used to overcome the asymmetries in the data collected during fieldwork in the two
82 Halliday, F. 2005. The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 167.
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countries. The primary empirical evidence was collected both through semi­
structured interviews and participant observation in the aftermath of the war. The 
semi-structured interviews included a collection o f first-hand qualitative data drawn 
from a wide spectrum of perspectives on the war. The individuals interviewed were 
drawn from the following social groups: military and civilian external observers o f 
the post- war settlement, members o f International Organizations (both 
intergovernmental and non- governmental), members o f Eritrean organizations and 
state institutions working in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), members of 
Ethiopian organizations working south o f the TSZ, in the Northern Ethiopian Region 
of Tigray, and finally, members of domestic ‘embryonic civil society’ in both 
countries. The semi-structured interviews with those directly affected by the conduct 
o f the war offer a broad spectrum of experiences and perspectives from former 
combatants who belonged to the insurgent movements during the war against the 
Derg, former combatants in the 1998-2000 war, citizens who identified themselves as 
part of borderland communities living on both sides o f the border and those citizens 
expelled and ‘displaced’ during the war. The findings were supplemented with further 
interviews with Ethiopians and Eritreans visiting or living in Europe. In this thesis the 
focus on diasporas is related to understanding their role in world politics in relation to 
the homeland government. This thesis will follow 0stergaard-Nielsen’s definition of 
diasporas as transnational non-state actors:
Diasporas enter the international scenes as actors in their own 
right as they seek to intervene in the political affairs o f their 
homeland, or when the homeland seeks to gain economic and 
political support from its citizens abroad, or to provide them with 
economic and political support in their adopted countries. In these 
instances, the diaspora becomes a linkage group between its host 
country and its homeland.83
In order to understand whether the diaspora’s role in world politics is overstated or 
overlooked it is important to analyse in the first place the instances, modalities and 
specific links developed between a homeland government and its diaspora 
constituencies, spread in various host countries, and the relationship between diaspora 
members and state and non-state actors in the homeland.
83 0stergaard- Nielsen, E. 2001. 'Diasporas in World Politics' in Josselin , D., & Wallace, William 
(ed.) Non-state actors in world politics Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 223.
40
Finally, the author collected evidence from participant-observation in a series 
o f public events organised by several institutions and members of these diaspora 
formations in the UK.
When the rules o f the research game raise the ethical dilemma of inadvertently 
damaging the lives of the interviewees the questions of anonymity and confidentiality 
must be fully respected by the author. Only with very few exceptions were 
interviewees willing to be identified, let alone quoted. The present author sought 
authorisation, in advance, from the interviewees to insert direct quotations. However, 
particularly when cited the anonymity o f those interviewed is fully respected.
Conducting research in post- insurgent militarised states raises different 
challenges from fieldwork in the context of on- going armed conflicts. When
OA
conducting* fieldwork under fire’ the researchers share the fear o f escaping 
hostilities with the interviewees and need to be concerned with their personal and 
physical security. In post-insurgent or authoritarian states one has to be concerned 
about the implications o f his/her research for the interviewees, as ultimately between 
one day and the next they could be classified as a threat to the legitimate order as 
defined by the regime; in comparison, the implications for the researcher fade away. 
In these circumstances the invisible wall of the state’s authoritarian practices is 
extended to the interaction between its citizens and non-citizens. Despite these 
constraints and concerns, this study is based on primary empirical evidence and aims 
to contribute with original empirical evidence to the case-study literature.
The war and its aftermath significantly transformed the porous borders into a 
‘wall’. As a consequence, the practices across state boundaries changed and this 
significant transformation blocked movements o f people and goods across the border. 
This significant shift placed further constraints on conducting field research along the 
disputed border. Indeed, this feature is not unique to Eritrea and Ethiopia, as Donnan 
and Wilson note:
84 Nordstrom, C., and, Robben, Antonius C.G.M, 1995. ’Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies 
o f Violence and Survival'. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University o f  California Press.
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Governments often do not like foreign scholars, or national 
scholars from their own metropolitan centres, nosing around 
disputed borders, especially if  the governments fear security 
breaches.85
Moreover, with the establishment of the TSZ within Eritrean territory the state 
acquired further justifications to enforce its control over the movements o f both 
citizens and non-citizens within areas adjacent to the TSZ. This practice culminated in 
the curtailment o f movements not only of International Organizations in general, but
o<r
particularly of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is composed o f 7 chapters, with the Introduction and the Conclusion 
included. The thesis follows an understanding o f war as a sequence of events and 
hence the first part focuses mainly on the causes, conduct and outcomes o f this 
particular war. The final part examines the relationship between war making and state 
making in light of the case study’s outcomes and the region’s security dynamics. The 
1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has a value added in understanding 
contemporary trajectories o f state and nation building in relation to armed conflict 
against the region’s normative framework and the prevailing patterns o f the region’s 
security architecture.
This thesis starts with a brief introduction to the problem and a review o f the 
main areas of controversy in the literature o f contemporary armed conflicts and in the 
Africa Area Studies literature on patterns of warfare in Africa. As defined in the 
framework of analysis, the focus is limited to the interrogations raised by the 
outbreak, unfolding and the outcomes of the 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. This first chapter defines the central research question and the aims and 
contribution of the thesis in understanding the 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea within the broader patterns o f warfare in the region and elsewhere.
85 Donnan and Wilson, 1999, op. cit., p. 14.
86 This has been the case particularly since November 2005.
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are concerned with the causes, conduct and the outcomes 
of the war. These three chapters are guided by the central research question: whether 
the 1998-2000 war is a relic of the past, that is, a so-called Old War? Furthermore 
these three chapters examine the role o f territory in understanding this inter-state war.
The chapter on the causes of the war examines the case study literature and 
provides a critical assessment of both the contributions produced immediately after 
the outbreak of hostilities, in the heat of events, during the conflict and in its 
aftermath. The latter studies, as the present one, have benefited from hindsight and 
although subordinated to the scholarly maxim of knowing the causes of things sine ira 
et studio the constraints highlighted with regard to the collection o f data show how 
proximity to the events and the relations between the parties curtail access to 
information. The chapter provides a critical examination o f the various causes o f the 
war and puts forward the argument that territory was de-emphasised as a result o f the 
predominant trend to consider territory and the boundary between the two countries as 
mere lines on a map.
The chapter on the conduct o f the war follows a chronological approach since 
the escalation of the crisis on May 12 1998 until the signing of the peace agreement 
on December 12 2000. Chapter 3 seeks to understand the aims, motivations, strategy 
and tactics o f the parties. The focus on the first, the second and the third rounds of 
fighting is important to understand the transformation o f the value, conceptions and 
practices concerning the disputed border areas.
Chapter 4 analyses the outcomes of the war in its various dimensions, namely 
territorial, politico-military and socio-economic. This chapter is particularly important 
in order to understand the stalemate in the aftermath o f the peace settlement.
Chapter 5 examines the relationship between war and state making and 
remaking for both states and their political leaderships. Following on from the 
conclusions of the outcomes of the war in relation to state consolidation and or 
disintegration for the two states, chapter 6 explores the trajectories o f state and nation 
building against the region’s security dynamics and reflects upon the 1998-2000 war’s 
implications for the region’s security architecture.
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The Conclusion is preceded by an Epilogue on Eritrea and Ethiopia’s 
divergent approaches vis-a-vis the Somalia crisis in 2006-2007, as well as the 
attempts by the United Nations Security Council and the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission to overcome the stalemate between the parties.
In the Conclusion, the research questions are re-examined in light of the 
thesis’ findings. This chapter highlights the added value o f the case study in 
understanding the challenges o f globalization to the territorial state and particularly 
the significance o f territory for the survival o f the modem sovereign state in Africa. 
The thesis concludes by suggesting that rather than focusing our attention on the 
international rigidity o f the borders inherited from colonialism in Africa and on the 
contingent origins of Africa’s international boundaries, the most challenging 
questions facing African states are related to the non-interference norm and to the 
protection o f human rights and democratization within the boundaries o f existing 
states. This final chapter raises the implications and the limitations o f the thesis’ 
findings and reflects upon future areas o f research.
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Chapter 2: Causes of the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
2.1 On the Origins of the War: Looking at Causation
On 12 May 1998 the Ethiopian parliament announced that Eritrea had launched a war 
of aggression against Ethiopia and warned Eritrea that failure to withdraw its troops, 
from ‘occupied’ Ethiopian territory, would render war inevitable.1 As Tekeste Negash 
and Tronvoll state:
‘In four weeks what had started as a minor border skirmish had 
escalated into a full-scale bilateral war - the first such war on the'y
continent in decades'.
The 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia fulfils the conventional criteria for 
classification as inter-state war, namely with regard to the intensity o f violence and 
the status of the protagonists.
According to the intensity o f violence, the estimated number o f total casualties 
far exceeds the 1,000 death threshold in any given year. Indeed, references to the total 
number of casualties range from 50,0003 to 100,000.4 The available evidence sets the 
combat related deaths at a minimum of 87,000.5 According to the status o f the 
protagonists, this was a war between the regular armed forces o f two sovereign states. 
The World Bank Projects for Demobilization and Reintegration in Ethiopia and
1 Iyob, R. 2000. 'The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn o f Africa, 
1991-2000'. Journal o f  Modern African Studies 38, p. 666.
2 Tekeste Negash & Tronvoll, K. 2000. Brothers at War: Making Sense o f  the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
War. Oxford and Athens: James Currey and Ohio University Press, p. 1.
3 Tekeste Negash and Kjetill Tronvoll state that the number o f  fatalities ranged from 50,000 to 80,000. 
Ibid., p. 99.
4 Franklin Steves states that the number o f total fatalities in both sides ranged 100,000.Steves, F. 2003. 
'Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation o f  the Ethiopia- Eritrea Conflict'. 
Cambridge Review o f  International Affairs 16: 119- 133. Moreover, a World Bank Report for the 
Ethiopia Demobilization and Reintegration Project, o f May 6, 2003, estimated that the number o f  
beneficiaries included 68,000 families o f deceased soldiers. World Bank Report no. AC 109, 
6.05.2003.World Bank 16 May 2002. 'Emergency Demobilization & Reintegration: Eritrea 
(P07360460)': World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/9G5BT9KOOO.; Amanuel Mehreteab 2002. 
'Veteran combatants do not fade away: a comparative study on two demobilization and reintegration 
exercises in Eritrea'. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.
5 The stated number on the Eritrean side was 19,000 casualties. Amanuel Mehreteab 2001. 'Renewed 
Demobilization in Eritrea'. Bulletin o f  the Bonn International Center fo r  Conversion 21, p. 2.
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Eritrea after the 1998- 2000 war had as targets 150,000 and 200,000 soldiers 
respectively.6
The total number of displaced civilians was 600,000.7 In addition, 75,000
o
Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were expelled from Ethiopia. In the 
aftermath of the overthrow o f the Derg regime, Eritrea had expelled 120,000 
Ethiopian citizens involved in the army and the administration o f the former 
province.9
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of 
what caused the war. The chapter draws upon the multiple contributions produced 
during the armed conflict and in its aftermath.
The chapter will argue that the border dispute was the central bone of 
contention. The analysis of the origins of the war, in this chapter, treats separately 
what triggered the conflict, and its causes. The chapter will proceed to analyse the 
background conditions to the conflict through the analysis o f the socio-economic 
dimensions, political and military, and, finally, the territorial dimension.
The section on territory, firstly, examines the states’ diverging trajectories and 
the ruling parties’ conceptions o f statehood, nationhood and o f boundary maintenance 
in post- 1991 Ethiopia and Eritrea. The section closes with the analysis o f the 
conceptions and practices o f borderland communities directly affected by the 
secession of Eritrea and ends with a brief analysis of the contending visions o f the 
Ethiopian homeland, after Eritrea’s independence.
6 Adding the number o f  soldiers target for demobilization to total casualties one might estimate that the 
total number o f troops reached 500,000. This number is the one advanced by Steves. Steves, 2003, 
op.cit., p. 119. According to Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll the number o f troops involved 350,000 men 
and women in the Eritrean side and 450,000 men in the Ethiopian side. Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll, 
2000, op. cit., p. 2.
7 Steves, 2003, op.cit., p.l 19.
8 Human Rights Watch January 2003. The Horn o f Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality 
Issue (June 1998- April 2002)’. vol. 15, No.3 (A): HRW, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ethioerit0103/ethioerit0103 .pdf.
9 Gilkes, P., and, Plaut, Martin 1999. War in the Horn: The Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia: The 
Royal Institute o f International Affairs, p. 11.
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The current stalemate around the delimitation and demarcation of the border 
reflects that both the causes o f the war and that which kept it going were related in 
complex ways to territory.
2.2 Overview of the studies
As a general rule, the initial studies approached the economic, historical and political 
dimensions to identify the factors that could best explain the ‘grievances’10 between 
the dominant factions within the national governments. The intensity o f violence 
caused bewilderment both within Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the respective diasporas, 
and in the circle o f Ethiopianists, Africanists and journalists, who reported from the 
frontline. Addis Ababa immediately prevented any journalists from having access to 
the frontline. Asmara, in line with the EPLF’s practice during the thirty-year civil war, 
facilitated the access of correspondents to the frontline. A key question emerged: how 
could two o f the poorest countries in the world engage forcefully to settle a border 
dispute over a barren strip of land in the remote periphery o f the states.
Some studies took the form o f factual accounts to assess what happened;
when, where, why and how the border dispute had escalated into conventional
warfare. As discussed in chapter 1, contrary to what a strand o f International
Relations mainstream literature on the causation o f inter-state warfare in relation to
territory claim s,11 the literature on the case-study and the media coverage challenged
1 0the significance o f territory as an underlying cause o f the war. The present chapter
10 According to the contributions o f  several authors that point to the prevalence o f greed as the main 
causal explanation for contemporary armed conflicts, the evidence collected on the war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to suggest that elements o f greed played a role in the outbreak o f  hostilities. 
Indeed, greed contributed largely to the increased rivalry between the ruling parties. Berdal, M., and 
David M. Malone 2000. 'Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars'. Boulder and 
London: IDRC/ Lynne Rienner Publishers.
11 The central aim o f  the study is to test this explanation and the extent to which the evidence to collect 
will allow us to plausibly take in the post-Cold War era: ‘territorial disputes as an underlying cause o f  
war.’ Vasquez, J. 1993. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7. The 
relationship between territory and the causation o f  both past and contemporary armed conflicts is 
discussed in chapter 1.
12 Abbink, J. 1998. 'Briefing: The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Dispute'. African Affairs 97: pp. 551-565. 
Tronvoll, K. 2004. Trom war to peace - and back to war again? The failure o f OAU/UN to create 
sustainable peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia' in Sorbo, G.M., and, Siegfried Pausewang, (ed.) 
Prospects fo r Peace, Security and Human Rights in Africa’s Horn. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
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(and the remainder of the dissertation) will analyse the role o f territory in 
understanding this particular war.
The focus on the causes, conduct and/or outcomes varied according to the
1 ^dates of publication and to its remoteness in relation to the conflict.
In different proportions these studies continued to analyse the economic, 
historical and political dimensions of the conflict. However, within the historical 
dimension the process o f nation building became a central theme. Within this mode of 
inquiry two accounts prevailed: 1) the extent to which the question of the definition of 
the national identity was linked to the diametrically opposed views adopted by the 
two states14 after 1991 and 2) the importance o f the legacy of the Italian colonization 
o f Eritrea15 and o f its failed attempt to colonize Ethiopia.16 Guazzini’s early 
contribution to the understanding o f the war stands out because it was among the first 
to elucidate the political and symbolic influence of the boundary for the consolidation
| n
of Eritreans’ national identity.
Besides the connection between the challenges o f possession of statehood and 
nationhood, the history of the relations between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) became a cornerstone 
theme. Several studies tended to stress the continuity o f informal relations between 
the ruling parties in post-1991 Ethiopia and Eritrea. The proximity between the 
former leadership o f the insurgent movements implied a lack o f institutionalisation 
that the context o f statehood had required.18 The regional level was added as many
13 The list in Appendix 1 provides a selection o f scholarly contributions produced during the armed 
conflict and in its aftermath.
14The Ethiopian constitutional model implied restructuring the administrative subdivisions o f  the 
country on an explicitly ethnic principle. Ultimately the Constitution recognized the right to self- 
determination, including a right to secession. The EPRDF/TPLF divided Ethiopia into nine regions 
according to the major sub-nationalities or ethnic groups. The Eritrean government followed the 
opposite path by creating six administrative regions (zoba) that cut across ethnic and religious 
cleavages.
15 Eritrean Studies Review 1999. 'Eritrea & Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation to Cooperation to 
Conflict'. Eritrean Studies Review, Special Issue 3.
16 Triulzi, A. Janeiro/ Julho 2002. 'Violence and the acknowledgement o f  tense past in the Horn : a note 
on the Ethio- Eritrean War (1998-2000)'. Cademos de Estudos Africanos 2: 91-102. This will be 
further discussed in chapter 3 on the analysis o f the historical and symbolic dimensions o f territory.
17 Guazzini, F. 1999. 'La Geografia Variabile del Confine Eritreo- Etiopico tra Passato e Presente'. 
Africa: Rivista dell’ Istituto italiano per VAfrica e V Oriente LIV: 309-348.
18 Iyob, 2000, op. cit.
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authors stressed that the war aimed to guarantee political influence and hegemony in 
the Horn of Africa,19 a perception shared by the warring parties.
Another strand of the literature emphasised the central role o f warfare in the
process o f state and nation formation. On the one hand, some authors argued that in
this sense the war had benefited both parties.20 On the other hand, scholars concluded
that the results remained extremely fragile and not very persuasive with respect to the
1hypothesis that war has got a capacity to build nations and states. Chapter 5 will 
focus exclusively on the relationship between war and state making (and re-making) 
and national identity formation and consolidation.
Several authors and internal observers depicted the war as a war between 
‘Brothers’. These accounts suggested that the war only concerned the Tigrinya- 
speaking factions within the EPRDF and within the PFDJ. But was the war only 
between the two Tigrinya- speaking communities at the helm of the state in the two 
countries? Eritrea’s independence had formally changed the nature o f the relations not 
only between the political authorities but also between the communities in the 
borderlands.22 However, as the war unfolded it became clear that relations had 
changed fundamentally23 not only between the two communities divided by the 
border, but also between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This question in turn leads to an 
examination o f the current classifications o f this particular war.
19 ib id ., Komprobst, M. 2002. The Management o f  border disputes in African regional sub-systems: 
comparing West Africa and the Horn o f Africa’. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 40: 369-393.
20 Styan, D. mars 2000. 'Chroniques de la Guerre Erythreo- Ethiopienne’. Politique Africaine 77: 
183-191 ; Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, Kjetil, Lovise Aalen 2002.' Ethiopia since the Derg: A Decade o f  
Democratic Pretension and Performance'. London & N.Y: Zed Books; de Waal, A. 2000. Wars in 
Africa' in Kaldor, M. (ed.) Global Insecurity: Restructuring the Global Military Sector, Vol III, 
London and New York: Pinter, p. 30.
21 Clapham, C. 2000. War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Paper presented at the 
colloquium ' La guerre entre le local et le global’, Paris, Centre d' 'Etudes et de Recherches 
Internationales, 29- 30 May 2000', p. 13.
22 Jacquin-Berdal, D. 2002. Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn o f  Africa: A Critique o f  the Ethnic 
Interpretation. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, footnote 18, p. 84.
23 Tekeste Negash and Kjetill Tronvoll, 2000, op. cit., p. 94.
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The debate on whether the war was an inter-state or intra-state war can only 
be partially understood without reference to current debates on the transformation of 
warfare.24
Alex de Waal argues that '( . . .)  the war is anything but anarchic or ‘new’: it is
tfi ocredolent o f 19 century European wars during the age o f emergent nationalism1.
Shaw classifies the Ethio- Eritrean Conflict as an orthodox inter-state/ regime
conflict. However, Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll although classifying the war as
01inter- state, contended that the war displayed characteristics o f a civil war. In a 
similar vein Leenco Lata claims that the war 'can perhaps best be described as inter­
state war that is strikingly similar to intra-state conflict'.28
The present study argues that this is an inter-state war. Few other cases of 
contemporary armed conflict lend themselves to such a straightforward classification.
The distinction between inter-state and intra-state war in the post-Cold War 
era still holds its accuracy. The analysis in this chapter is based upon this premise. 
However, by acknowledging the distinction between inter-state and intra- state war 
one should not dismiss the importance of considering domestic causes and regional 
implications o f the inter-state war; as the complexities o f the dynamics o f this 
particular war show.
2.3 On the crisis that triggered the conflict
When the crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea escalated into conventional warfare the 
event was received with shock. Abbink promptly claimed that : '( ...)  the eruption of
24 Chapter 1 discusses the transformation o f warfare and the major patterns o f  contemporary armed 
conflicts.
25 de Waal, 2000, op.cit., p. 30.
26 Shaw, T. 2003. ’Regional Dimensions o f Conflict and Peace-Building in Contemporary Africa'. 
Journal o f  International Development 15, p. 488.
27 Tekeste Negash and Kjetill Tronvoll, op.cit., p. 94.
28 Leenco Lata 2003. The Ethiopia- Eritrea War'. Review o f  African Political Economy 97, p. 374.
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violent conflict in the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute is neither unexpected nor the result
90of a real border dispute'.
However, one has to distinguish between what caused and what triggered the 
conflict. Although the sources for potential armed conflict were all present, the war 
was not inevitable. The occurrence of the border incident per se was unlikely to be 
sufficient to cause the escalation o f the crisis on its own. Indeed, the way the two 
governments handled the increasing tension and rivalry between the ruling parties, at 
both the central state and regional state levels, determined the course of events.
Four events can be pinpointed as having had immediate consequences for the 
outbreak of hostilities. These incidents were related to the boundaries’ question and to 
the ambiguities with regard to the territorial jurisdictions of the states since Eritrea’s 
independence. The first incident occurred in July-August 1997 and was related to the 
movement o f Ethiopia’s armed forces within Eritrea’s territory. The second was 
related to Tigray’s Regional administrative map, which included large swathes of 
Eritrean territory. The third one, in the same year, was the introduction of a new 
Eritrean currency, which heightened ongoing economic disputes over trade and 
increased exponentially the saliency o f the border. The final incident occurred on May 
6 1998 and precipitated the escalation o f the crisis.
In the first incident, in July 1997 an armed TPLF/EPRDF unit requested 
access to Eritrean areas inhabited by the Afar, pursuing a non-state armed group 
called the Ugugumo. The forces went as far as Adi Murug, in the Bada area, but the 
precedent, although handled in cordial terms, had been set. Eritrea’s President wrote 
directly to Ethiopia’s Prime Minister to protest against the occupation o f Adi 
Murug.31 This event acquires particular significance for three reasons: 1) it is referred
T9to in the first framework for an Agreement between the two parties; 2) the hot
29Abbink, 1998, op.cit., p. 552.
30 Iyob, 2000, op.cit., p. 665.
31 ibid., p. 665.
32 The Framework Agreement only mentions the July August 1997 incidents over the administration o f  
Adi Murug. Indeed, the precise circumstances o f this incident remain unclear. While Iyob refers to 
Ethiopia’s hot pursuit mission o f the Ugugumo, Peninou relates this incident to the ARDUF. Gilkes 
and Plaut allude to the Ethiopian pursuit mission o f  an Afar opposition movement. Iyob, 2000, op.cit., 
p. 21. Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, op.cit. Peninou, J.-L. 1998. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Conflict'.
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pursuit mission of a domestic insurgency across state borders and the dismantlement 
o f the Eritrean administration to replace it by Ethiopia’s state officials set a precedent 
and contributed to increasing suspicion between the two leaderships and, finally, 3) 
in its aftermath the ruling parties decided to set up the long overdue Joint Border 
Commission to handle the ambiguities between the Treaties’ borderline and the de 
facto openness o f the border over the past century.
In the second instance, the Eritrean government accused Tigray's regional 
administration in Mekele o f being responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. 
According to the Eritrean government, Tigray’s regional administration issued a map 
in which the boundaries between the two countries had been modified without prior 
notification. The Regional Administration dismissed this claim. Similarly to other 
cases o f domestic border tension between the new regions within Ethiopia, the 
Ethiopian Federal state did not intervene. The matter was handled by the regional 
authorities and the neighbouring state.
The introduction of the Eritrean currency exacerbated and brought to the fore 
the growing rift between the ruling parties with regard to trade between the two 
countries, and especially between Eritrea and the Ethiopian Northern Region of 
Tigray.
Finally, the immediate precipitant o f conflict occurred in May 1998, when an 
armed Eritrean patrol, within what it regarded as Eritrean territory, was fired on and 
four o f its members killed by Tigrayan forces.
Several external observers tend to argue that the war was caused by an ill- 
considered Eritrean reaction to provocation by local officials on the Ethiopian side of 
the border, and then escalated beyond the capacity o f either government to control.34
Boundary and Security Bulletin/ International Boundaries Research Unit 6, p.50. This will be 
further discussed in section 2.4.3.
33 Iyob, 2000, op.cit., p. 663.
34 Clapham, 2000, op.cit., p. 13. Alex de Wall points in the same direction: Although each side accused 
the other o f having prepared for a major war, the evidence points to mutual miscalculation being the 
major reason for the descent into armed conflict, de Waal, 2000, op.cit., p. 12.
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As the incidents that triggered the escalation of the crisis show, in all four 
instances the bone o f contention was tied to boundaries’ delimitation, demarcation 
and/or maintenance. The second part o f the chapter integrates the four incidents 
within the analysis of the various dimensions o f the causes of the war.
2.4 The causes of the 1998-2000 W ar
2.4.1 Economic and social dimensions
With Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia became the only landlocked country in the 
Horn o f Africa.
The EPRDF/TPLF promptly recognized Eritrea’s independence, but in 
exchange free access to the Eritrean Assab port was granted to Ethiopia. In addition to 
this significant agreement, the free movement of people and goods between the two 
states was maintained, as well as the common currency. However, the Ethiopian 
government failed to put in place specific criteria for Ethiopians o f Eritrean origin 
residing in Ethiopia. As a consequence, those who decided to remain in Ethiopia after 
Eritrea’s independence enjoyed dual citizenship. Following from the ambiguities 
surrounding the acquisition o f Eritrean citizenship for those Ethiopian citizens of 
Eritrean origin, this group’s status became open to contention. According to several 
voices in Addis Ababa, this set o f provisions established an important exceptional 
and, indeed, privileged treatment o f Eritrea and its citizens as compared to relations 
between Ethiopia and citizens from other neighbouring countries.37
This chapter argues that the measures agreed between the transition 
governments benefited both states, particularly members o f the ruling parties in both 
countries and those segments involved in formal and informal economic relations.
35 This was quite an exceptional situation as the Ethiopian state’s practice historically was to recognize 
only a single nationality. Chapter 4 discusses the principles o f citizenship in further detail.
36 As Styan notes the Ethiopian government between 1993 and 1998 overlooked the legal and 
economic identity and status o f Ethiopians o f Eritrean origin and did not put in place criteria to 
regularize their investments in Ethiopia. Styan, D. 2005. Twisting Ethio-Eritrean Economic Ties: 
Misperceptions o f  War and the Misplaced priorities o f Peace, 1997-2002' in Jacquin-Berdal, D., and, 
Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 
194. The rules governing citizenship acquired serious economic implications for this group o f citizens 
once the war started, as chapter 3 will discuss.
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This section will first look into the economic and social dimensions o f the 
relations between the two states and the ruling parties, as well as to groups within 
society that benefited from the end of the insurgency in Northern Ethiopia and in 
Eritrea. This section covers mainly the economic and social relations between the 
ruling parties between 1991 and 1998. However, if  one fails to analyse the post- 1991 
relations between the ruling parties without reference to the preceding period its 
evolution will only be partially understood. The relations between the insurgent 
movements can be understood in light of their relations while strategically united in 
their aim to overthrow the Derg.
The section will look into three key aspects o f the economic and social 
relations between the states in the post-1991 context: 1) the access to the port via the 
Assab-Awash- Addis Ababa corridor; 2) the introduction o f the Eritrean currency and 
the arrangements on cross-border trade and, finally, 3) the social implications of 
these economic changes.
The access to the port via the Assab-Awash-Addis Ababa corridor
Both borderland communities, urban and diaspora groups were suspicious o f the 
ruling party in Addis Ababa over the loss o f access to the sea in the aftermath of 
Eritrea’s independence. However, until 1997 the arrangement o f free access to the 
port service and the transit o f goods to Ethiopia seemed to minimize Ethiopia’s new
o  o
status as a landlocked country.
In different proportions, Ethiopia’s new status benefited contiguous coastal 
neighbours, namely Eritrea, Djibouti and to a lesser extent Somaliland. However, in 
the post-1991 context, the Assab route remained Ethiopia’s main corridor to the sea.
37 Interview, Addis Ababa, July 2003.
38 Transit and Ports Services Agreement between the Transitional Government o f  Ethiopia and the 
Government o f  the State o f  Eritrea. September 27, 1993 in Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 19 
Dec., 2005. 'Final Award - Ports - Ethiopia's Claim 6 between the Federal Democratic Republic o f  
Ethiopia and the State o f Eritrea': The Hague, p. 3.
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Prior to 1974, 60 per cent o f Ethiopia’s foreign trade transited via the port of 
Djibouti. However, in the aftermath o f the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and 
Somalia, the Derg avoided this route because o f increased insecurity generated by 
domestic insurgent movements operating in the Somali, Afar and Oromo areas, which 
overlapped with the Djibouti corridor. During this period Assab held 90 per cent of 
the total share o f Ethiopia’s import and export traffic, while the remaining 10 per cent
on
was channelled via the Djibouti port.
The overthrow of the Derg, which brought to an end the insurgency in the 
North, contributed to the exponential growth of the traffic along the Addis Ababa- 
Assab corridor. During the civil war, although relations between the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) were generally tense,40 
the insurgent movements carried joint ambushes to the Ethiopian army along the 
stretch of the road, which runs through Afar territory 41
The share o f traffic along the corridor grew from 700,000 tonnes in 1991 to 
over 2,7 million tonnes in 1995. This growth signified an increase o f 400 per cent in 
a five-year period. The return truck journeys increased from 15,000 in 1991 to 45,000 
in 1995. At this point, the transit of goods from the port o f Assab to Ethiopia, 
accounted for 90 per cent o f imports and over 50 per cent o f exports.42 In 1997 
exports from Eritrea to Ethiopia were 63 per cent of total exports in goods. Non tax- 
revenues rose nearly to 23 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1997, 
almost half o f which came from charges to Massawa, and especially from the Assab 
port service granted to Ethiopia 43
39 Anonymous 2005. 'Positive Neutrality: Djibouti' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 171.
40John Young concludes that the most difficult area for the TPLF within the Tigray province was south­
eastern Tigray, especially the Afar inhabited areas. Young, J. 1997. Peasant revolution in Ethiopia : 
the Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 170.
41 Ibid., p. 150.
42 Cabanius, P. 23-27 June 2003. ’Improvement o f Transit Systems in the Horn o f Africa, Sixth 
Meeting o f Governmental Experts from Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries and 
Representatives o f  Donor Countries and Financial and Development Institutions'. New York 
UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3633&lang=l, p. 3.
43 World Bank/ International Finance Corporation, Africa Regional Programme on Enterprise 
Development : Pilot Investment Climate Assessment’ Obstacles to the Expansion o f  Eritrea’s 
Manufacturing Sector’ Final Report, December 2002.
Retrievable 16/03/04 http://wwwl .worldbank.org/rped/ , pp . 6-7.
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It seems that with Eritrea’s independence Ethiopia did not consider alternative 
routes to Assab. The evidence suggests that Ethiopia’s ruling party favoured the 
maintenance of the majority o f freight movements via the Eritrean port of Assab. 
Questions related to the pitfalls o f over-dependency upon one port were not perceived 
as a hindrance to Ethiopia’s foreign trade relations.44
With regard to geographical distance from the Ethiopian capital, Assab 
retained the comparative advantage of geographical proximity: it is located 882 
kilometres from the Ethiopian capital. The second best option was the Djibouti port, 
910 kilometres from Addis Ababa, followed by the Berbera port (Somaliland) which 
is located 964 kilometres east o f Addis Ababa. The Bossaso port (Puntland) is the 
fourth option with regard to geographical proximity. Port Sudan (Sudan) is located 
1881 km from Addis Ababa and Mombassa is 2077 kilometres from A ddis45 In 
addition, the arrangements between the two ruling parties reinforced the advantages of 
the Assab transit route.
Prior to the outbreak o f hostilities with Eritrea, other ports in the region were 
still able to benefit from the movement o f Ethiopia’s cargo. During this period 
Ethiopia used the Djibouti and Berbera corridors as additional routes to the Assab 
one. While the Assab route’s traffic to and from Ethiopia reached 2,7 million tonnes 
in 1995, the Djibouti route had a share of 1,7 million tonnes of additional Ethiopian 
freight movement.46 By 1997, Ethiopia accounted for 65 per cent of the trade shipped 
through Berbera, and 60 per cent o f the exports through the Somaliland port were 
from Ethiopia;47 but the question o f finding an alternative to Assab was raised just 
after the Badme incidents.48
44 As the chapter 4 will discuss only with the outbreak o f hostilities and in the aftermath o f  the war did 
Ethiopia implement measures to address the pitfalls o f  exclusive dependency on one route and port for 
foreign trade.
45The Reporter (Addis Ababa) Jan 21, 2006. 'Ethiopia's Search for a Port'.
http://www.ports.co.za/didyouknow/article_2006_01_21_3058.html.
46Cabanius, 2003, op.cit., pp. 3-4.
47 Yusuf Abdi Gabobe July 27, 2002. 'Editorial: Somaliland: Transit Shipment Corridor To Ethiopia?'
The Somaliland Times. http://www.somalilandtimes.net/Archive/Archive/00002800.htm.
48 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 2005, op. cit., p. 4 While Ethiopia accused Eritrea o f having closed 
the border on May 22 1998, Eritrea resented the former decision to divert all shipments to the Djibouti 
port and to cancel all Ethiopian Airlines flights to the city-port.
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Eritrea’s port service to Ethiopia remained the most competitive in the region. 
The second section will show the extent to which Eritrea’s manufactured goods were 
mainly geared towards the Ethiopian market. Indeed, prior to the war, Ethiopia’s 
dependency on Eritrea for access to the sea for its foreign trade was paralleled by 
Eritrea’s industry dependency on the Ethiopian market, especially the Northern 
Region of Ethiopia: Tigray.
The introduction of the Eritrean currency and the arrangements on cross- 
border trade
Eritrea’s independence reconfigured formally the relations between the two countries. 
The implications o f Eritrea’s secession for Ethiopia went beyond the loss o f access to 
the sea. This part will seek to understand the implications of two sets o f changes in 
the economic policies of both states: i) the introduction o f the new currency by Eritrea 
and the new currency exchange mechanisms required by Ethiopia ii) the changes in 
cross-border trade introduced by the Ethiopian government. These changes had 
implications for the relations between the two states at the national and regional level. 
At the regional level, the new cross-border trade procedures impacted mainly upon 
Eritrea, the contiguous Northern Ethiopian Region o f Tigray, and the borderland 
communities in both states.
In 1997, the dual exchange rate was unified, and the Bank o f Eritrea was 
established. This was also the year when the new currency, the Eritrean Nakfa (ERN) 
was introduced, on par with the Ethiopian Birr (ETB). This was done with the 
expectation that the rate o f parity between currencies would be kept. The Ethiopian 
government declined the proposal and instead insisted that the transactions should be 
carried in hard currency, in Letters o f Credit. After the disagreement, Ethiopia issued 
new Ethiopian Birr notes creating resentment among its counterpart. As Herbst 
argues, currency exchange mechanisms (i.e. the definition of the means of conversion 
between domestic and international units o f money) should be understood as part of 
the boundary politics o f the state.49
49 Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 
24-25.
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With the introduction o f the Nakfa, Ethiopia’s government demanded that all 
cross- border trade should be carried in Letters o f Credit with the exception of trade 
below 2000 ETB or approximately US$ 233, i.e., petty border trade.50 In response to 
Ethiopia’s distinction between petty and major trade, Eritrea’s government reiterated 
that its policy o f economic liberalisation implied openness to trade with foreign 
countries, Ethiopia included. The costs o f implementing the mechanisms required by 
the Ethiopian government would be a hindrance to trade relations. The Director o f the 
Eritrean Bank further argued that the distinction between petty and major cross- 
border trade and the conduct o f foreign trade relations in hard currency would 
encourage the smuggling o f goods across the border.51 The disagreement over the new 
trade policy pointed to a similar problem faced in the ex- Soviet Republics in the 
aftermath o f the Cold War. This shift o f policy and the subsequent disagreements 
mirror ‘(...) the practical difficulties involved in disentangling the infrastructure of 
previously integrated state economies'.52
Despite the disagreements on the modalities o f implementation o f the new 
Eritrean currency, the Eritrean government went about this measure to assert its 
national economy’s autonomy vis-a-vis Ethiopia.
The consequences with regard to price fluctuations were immediately felt. 
Basic commodity prices, such as salt exported from Eritrea and te jf exported from 
Ethiopia, immediately increased.
But perhaps more significantly to the economic exchange between the two 
countries was the new requirement on trade above the 2000 ETB threshold. Eritrea’s 
industrial sector had been oriented towards the Ethiopian market since its inception. 
Moreover, Ethiopia’s new trade policy with Eritrea was discriminatory. The trade 
regimes governing the relations o f Ethiopia with other contiguous neighbouring 
states, namely Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya were not submitted to similar 
requirements.
50Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, op. cit., p. 36; Iyob, 2000, op .cit.; Tekie Fessehatzion 2002. 
Shattered Illusion, Broken Promise: Essays on the Eritrea- Ethiopia Conflict (1998- 2000% 
Lawrenceville & Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 5.
5ITekeste Negash and Tronvoll, op.cit., p. 36.
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Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll claim that the *(•••) new trade policy created a 
barrier between the two countries that had never existed before’.
In 1995 manufactured commodities exports to Ethiopia accounted for 76 per 
cent of manufactured goods exports,54 while only 6 per cent o f Eritrea’s imports 
originated from Ethiopia. However, food imports from Ethiopia were still significant, 
accounting for 21 per cent o f the total. Eritrea’s export sector was critically dependent 
on Ethiopia. Eritrea’s trade surplus with Ethiopia represented a key part of Eritrea’s 
balance of payment profile.55 In Eritrea, industry accounted for 27 per cent of GDP, 
while agriculture accounted for 16 per cent. The new trade policy disrupted the flow 
of manufactured goods to Eritrea’s industry primary market. As Styan notes:
There were credible expectations that Eritrea’s industrial base, 
integrated to its natural markets in northern Ethiopia and eastern 
Sudan, would provide a foundation o f post- 1991 Eritrean 
economy.56
In cross- border trade, as in other areas, the diametrically opposing paths followed by 
the leaderships with regard to policy making compromised their bi-lateral relations. 
Indeed, while Eritrea followed an export-oriented growth strategy for development, 
with Ethiopia as the key market of destination for its exports, Ethiopia seemed to have 
favoured an import substitution strategy to protect its Northern Region’s nascent 
industries from Eritrean competition.
While this new set o f procedures governing the economic and social relations 
between the two states was decided in Addis Ababa and Asmara, the Ethiopian 
regional authorities were left with the daunting task o f its implementation. As with the 
internal re-drawing of Ethiopia’s domestic boundaries the government in Addis 
Ababa designed the policies evaluating poorly the implementation constraints at the 
regional level.
52 Mayall, J. Spring 1992. 'Nationalism and international security after the Cold War'. Survival: The 
International Institute fo r  Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 31.
53 Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, op.cit., p. 37.
54 Mainly textiles, footwear and beverages. Styan, 2005, op.cit., p. 188.
55 ibid., p. 188.
56 ibid., p. 189.
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As the analysis o f the relations between the party-owned companies will show 
the discriminatory trade policy towards Eritrea, contrary to accusations of TPLF 
favouritism of Eritreans in Ethiopia, mirrored the ruling party’s underlying policy o f 
protecting not only Tigray’s nascent industries from Eritrea’s competition, but other 
sectors of economic activity.
The rivalry between party-owned companies had increased before the 
introduction o f Eritrea’s own currency. The rivalry was most noticed in Western 
Tigray. This rivalry over access to the market escalated in the Humera area, which 
was incorporated in Tigray’s province after the redrawing o f regional boundaries in 
1995.57
The Red Sea Corporation was operating in Humera, along with the Guna 
Trading Company, among other traders from different parts o f the country. Their 
commercial aim in the area was to buy agricultural products, mainly grain produced 
by post- 1991 resettled returnee households.
The Red Sea Corporation was a trading company owned by the People’s Front 
for Democracy and Justice.58 According to Young, the Guna Trading Company was 
one of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation o f Tigray’s (EFFORT) most 
important holdings. The Companies owned by EFFORT operated as private 
enterprises. However, as EFFORT was predominantly managed by senior TPLF 
members, the Guna Trading Company was, indeed, owned by TPLF members. The 
thirty-two directors of EFFORT were elected by the TPLF’s functional mass 
associations, and the Fund was managed by seven sitting members from the TPLF’s 
Central Committee upon its creation in mid- 1995. Quite significantly, Siye Abraha, 
member o f the EPRDF Politburo and former Minister o f Defence was the Chairman
57 Criticism over the incorporation o f territory from other regions into Region 1 (Tigray), namely from 
Gondar and Wollo has increased dissention towards the Ethnic based Federal Model. Humera was one 
o f  the incorporated districts from Gondar (the other were: Tselemt; Welkait; Tsegede). The 
incorporated districts from Wollo were: Raya Azebo; Alamata; Ofla. The Ethiopian People’s Patriotic 
Front ( keffagne) emerged as an underground movement for the liberation o f  Humera/Tselemt/ 
Welkait/ Tsegede. Tilahun Yilma January 1996 'Ethiopia should secede from the Provinces o f Tigray 
and Eritrea'. Ethiopian Review 3.
58 Kassahun Berhanu 2000. Returnees, Resettlement and Power Relations: The making o f  a political 
constituency in Humera, Ethiopia. Amsterdam: VU University Press, p. 186.
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of EFFORT. Other Directors with senior positions within the TPLF were appointed as 
Chairmen of enterprises overseen by the Fund.59 EFFORT also assumed the 
responsibility for overseeing most o f the existing companies, predominantly in the 
field o f transportation.60
Prior to 1997, Young had already noted the increasing rivalry between companies 
owned by the PFDJ/EPLF and by the TPLF. As the author remarked:
Concerns have inevitably been raised about future government and party 
plans for the economy, as well as the likelihood that conflicts may arise 
between EPLF-owned companies that are also operating in Ethiopia.61
Kassahun Berhanu’s research in the Humera area (western Tigray Region) provides
substantive evidence on the increasing rivalry between PFDJ and TPLF owned
companies involved in trade. As o f 1996 the Guna Trading Corporation had managed
to secure a de facto monopoly of the agricultural local market. The Rea Sea Trading
Corporation had been hampered from operating in the area through a succession of
administrative requirements. Kassahun Berhanu’s interviewees claimed that
disagreements over the conduct o f trade and of Eritrea’s access to the Ethiopian
northern market had created tensions between the operators of the Red Sea Trading
Corporation and the regional authorities in 1995-1996.62 According to Kassahun:
It was reported by the local people that loaded trucks owned by 
the Red Sea Corporation remained stranded in Humera for several 
days by order o f the regional government demanding that the 
Corporation could take its merchandise to Eritrea after fulfilling a 
host of requirements like making the items ready for export by 
attaching labels to the packages indicating the items were 
produced in Ethiopia. ( . . .) I t  was alleged that this conditionality 
was not made known to the Corporation when it came to Humera 
to undertake the purchase of farm products. As o f 1996, the Firm 
did not appear in the Humera market again.63
59Young, J. 1997. Peasant revolution in Ethiopia : the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 88.
60 ibid., p. 88.
61 ibid., p. 86.
62Kassahun Berhanu, 2000, op.cit., footnote 159, pp. 187-88.
63ibid., footnote 159, pp. 187-88.
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Young suggestes that EFFORT’S operations reached far beyond Tigray.64 It is 
plausible to consider the extent of the involvement o f party-owned companies in the 
transport of goods and other commodities along the Addis Ababa-Assab corridor prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities. As a future area of research, it would be interesting to 
understand whether the participation of the two ruling parties-owned companies in the 
transport sector was extended to this corridor and whether it led to similar rivalry.
Another economic question related to foreign trade was the polemic around 
coffee export. According to Ethiopian sources, the problem emerged due to the 
exportation of Ethiopian coffee with Eritrean labels to the US.65 However, Eritrea 
dismissed the allegation and there is no substantive evidence available to confirm the 
Ethiopian position.
Ultimately, the rivalry between party-owned companies raised the stakes o f 
the disagreement over foreign trade arrangements between Asmara and Addis Ababa.
Eritrea’s expectation of parity between currencies, Ethiopia’s refusal o f this 
proposal and its requirement of distinguishing between petty and major trade can 
perhaps be understood as policies germane to what were best known as ‘beggar-your- 
neighbour policies’ during the Great Depression years in Europe.66 Mayall argues 
that ‘the competitive economic nationalism of the 1930s contributed to the European 
crisis and to the drift towards war'.67 The changes on the economic arrangements 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea’s governments can be best understood as a 
manifestation o f competitive economic nationalism.
The socio-economic implications for borderland communities
Eritrea’s status as an Italian colony attracted migrant labour from the Tigray Province. 
Eritrea later became the commercial and financial centre o f the Italian East African 
Empire. During this period Eritrea had far more industrial and commercial firms than
64 Young, 1997, op.cit., p. 86.
65 Jenny Hammond, The Eritrea/Ethiopia border issue: report on a recent visit. Paper presented at the 
North East Africa Seminar, Institute o f Social and Cultural Anthropology, Oxford, 13/02/04.
66Mayall, 1992, op.cit., p. 28.
67 ibid., pp. 28-29.
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the Ethiopian provinces or Italy’s Somalia colony.68 This meant that opportunities 
beyond the traditional sector of agriculture were available to an extent lacking in 
Ethiopia. For most o f the twentieth century, the Tigrayan peasants had migrated North 
(to Eritrea and especially to the capital, Asmara) when in need of supplementary 
income.69 Quite significantly, neither the incorporation of Eritrea as an Ethiopian 
province, nor the civil war or Eritrea’s independence had disrupted this practice.
The outbreak o f hostilities in 1998 and the subsequent closure of the border 
dramatically changed the most convenient destination for migrant labour from the 
Ethiopian Northern region of Tigray, as will be further discussed in chapter 4.
The Afar used to straddle the border in search of pasture, water and access to 
markets. The contiguity with both Eritrea and Djibouti and the relations with kin 
across borders meant that the Afar would search for buyers for their cattle and 
livestock regardless o f the border. Indeed, during the civil war against the Derg the 
Afar were treated forcefully and with suspicion by the Ethiopian state because o f their
70long- standing trade in cattle with the Eritreans. This practice was continued in the 
aftermath of Eritrea’s independence. Despite the grievances generated by the loss o f 
Assab and other stretches o f land within traditional Afar’s territory, the Afar 
continued to cross into Eritrea, for access to markets and as a transit point on their
71way to markets in Djibouti. The two- year war and the closure o f the border 
disrupted the economic livelihood o f the Afar borderland communities.
In guise o f conclusion to this section, the analysis o f the economic and social 
dimensions suggests that the functional cooperation agreed between the transition
68 Between 1935 and 1941, when Italy invaded and occupied Ethiopia, although Addis Ababa was the 
capital o f the Italian East African Empire, Eritrea remained the main commercial and economic centre. 
Indeed, by 1940, 54,8 per cent o f the industrial firms o f the Italian Empire were located in Eritrea, 
while 30,6 per cent were located in the remaining Ethiopian Provinces ( ‘Shewa, Harar, Amara and 
Oromo & Sidamo’) and the remaining 14,6 per cent were located in the Somalia’s Italian colony. With 
regard to commercial firms Eritrea’s economic prominence within the Italian East African Empire is 
again undisputable: 56,2 per cent o f the firms were located in Eritrea, with 30 per cent in the remaining 
Ethiopian Provinces and 13,8 per cent in Somalia. Bearing in mind the population proportions in each 
o f the Provinces o f  the Italian East African Empire, Eritrea’s privileged economic status within the 
Empire is indeed very significant. Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll, 2000, op.cit., p. 41.
69 Young, 1997, op.cit., p. 72.
70 ibid., p. 149.
71 Philpott, J . ,; Asnake Abera, ; Kassaye Hadgu, February 2005. 'Livelihoods/ Emergency Assessment 
in Afar Region’. Oxfam GB: Oxfam International.
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governments in the aftermath o f Eritrea’s secession failed. With hindsight, the 
maintenance of the earlier path o f cooperation could have sustained the consolidation 
of the necessary economic buffer mechanisms against the more militant forms of 
nationalism upon which the governments embarked. The disagreements over 
economic policies and arrangements on trade contributed to the crisis and to the drift 
towards war.
As the section on the economic and social dimensions has shown, the 
manifold problems of disentangling the previously integrated economies, coupled 
with the disagreements over the economic arrangements agreed immediately after 
Eritrea’s secession, led to the heightening of rivalry and competing economic national 
orientations. The economic dispute concerning foreign trade between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea antedated the introduction o f the Eritrean currency. However, the failure to 
agree on the exchange rate exacerbated the increasing rivalry between the ruling 
parties and increased the saliency o f the border between the two countries.
In conclusion, as Clapham reminds us:
In states which derived a high proportion of their income from 
customs duties, and from state manipulation o f markets for 
agricultural produce, control over the boundaries was essential to 
provide the financial underpinnings of the state itself; the creation 
o f national currencies, through which governments sought to 
establish their control over domestic economic transactions, can in
77turn be seen as a form of boundary maintenance.
Quite significantly, since 1997 and in the aftermath o f the war most analysts failed to 
acknowledge Eritrea’s introduction of its own national currency as a mechanism of 
boundary delimitation. After the drift in the bilateral economic relations any incident 
on the border gained a saliency, which had been absent before. Perhaps, the Adi 
Murug incident did not lead to an escalation o f the crisis because the element of 
rivalry at the time was not as pronounced as in 1998, when the incident in Badme 
occurred.
72 Clapham, C. 1999. 'Boundaries and States in the New African Order1 in Bach, D.C. (ed.) 
Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Desintegration. Oxford: James Currey, p. 55.
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2.4.2 Political and military dimensions 
Political
The secession of Eritrea and the transition period ran smoothly and were 
advantageous to the ruling parties.
The nature o f the post- insurgent states was conditioned by the different 
legitimacy enjoyed by the movements which had led the insurgency against the Derg. 
According to Clapham, the EPLF constituted a classical example o f a secession 
insurgency, while the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (which 
descended from the regional Tigray People’s Liberation Front) was a reform 
insurgency. Although ideologically and military these were different movements ‘in 
none did the government concede power to the opposition’.
Even before the two-year war, Abbink claimed that both countries had a 
dominant party political structure with no significant opportunities for opposition to 
participate, and Ethiopia ruled with a subservient parliament which had no legal right 
to initiative.74
The nature o f the relations between the insurgent movements during the civil 
war affected the nature o f the relations between the ruling parties in its aftermath. The 
psychological legacy, according to some observers,75 was relevant because the 
relationship was unequal, with the TPLF in the weakest and most dependent position. 
This situation was diametrically reversed with the TPLF’s capture o f the Ethiopian 
state.
According to Peninou one can identify the moment o f rupture between the 
leaderships of the EPLF and the TPLF as 1985. At this time, a strategic conflict arose 
around the issue o f Tigray’s independence. The rupture lasted until 1988. For the 
EPLF, it was clear that Eritrea’s independence could only be recognized as long as 
there was a change of regime in Ethiopia. Simultaneously, the EPLF was rightly
73 — 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics o f  State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 242.
74 Abbink, 1998, op.cit., p. 558.
65
convinced that neither the UN nor the OAU would recognize its claim to self- 
determination to the extent that it implied a disintegration o f Ethiopia. For this reason,
7 f%Eritrea’s independence could not be linked to Tigray’s secession from Ethiopia.
The seeds for disagreement between the leaderships were planted in this 
period. The purposes of the struggle forced them to cooperate in order to achieve the 
common aim: the overthrow of the Derg. Once the civil war was over and Eritrea 
achieved sovereignty and the TPLF emerged at the helm of the state the unresolved 
issues re-surfaced.
M ilitary dimension: the demobilization processes
In the aftermath of the civil war the immediate challenge was the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration both of Ethiopia’s state and non-state armed forces, 
and Eritrea’s combatants.
This section considers the demobilization processes in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
after the overthrow of the Derg. The purpose is to analyse to what extent the 
demobilization processes and the subsequent reintegration of ex-combatants in the 
societies (state and non-state armed forces) played a role in the outbreak of hostilities 
in 1998. While the studies conducted so far seem to confirm the overall success o f the 
programmes, it is important to consider two questions: 1) was there any political 
disruption by ex-combatants between 1991 and 1998 in either country?; 2) to what 
degree was reintegration of demobilized soldiers achieved?
As Campbell argues, the relationship between war and state formation 
outlined by Tilly77 and others needs to ‘integrate a balance between the emphasis on
75 Interviews in Addis Ababa, July 2003.
76 Peninou, J.-L. juillet 2000. Les Ambitions cachees d' Addis- Abeba : Ethiopie- Erythree, une paix en 
trompe l'oeil'. Le Monde Diplomatique URL http://www.monde- 
diplomatique.fr/2000/07/PENINOU/14025.
77 Tilly, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime' in Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer 
and T.Skocpol (ed.) Bringing the State Back in. New York: CUP.
66
raising and using troops with attention on how states rid themselves o f unwanted 
troops’.78
From the onset, the demobilization process posed numerous challenges to both 
governments. In Ethiopia, it entailed conducting the largest demobilization exercise in
70the aftermath o f the Cold War, namely, close to half a million soldiers of Mengistu’s 
army and another 22,000 combatants o f the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).80 The 
Transitional Government o f Ethiopia (TGE) established the Commission for the 
Rehabilitation of Members of Former Army and Disabled War Veterans on June 14,
1991. The overall cost, between mid-1991 and 1995, was estimated at US$ 195 
million.81
In Eritrea the challenge was to demobilize 54,000 out o f 95,000
O '!
combatants. The demobilization process was set to start after Eritrea’s statehood was 
internationally recognized, i.e. after the results of the April 1993 referendum. At the 
end o f 1992 the Provisional Government o f Eritrea (PGE) established an autonomous 
Department for Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Fighters (Mitias), within the 
Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA). Altogether an estimated US$ 82 
million was paid for the re-integration of ex-combatants, o f which only US$ 12
84million, including pledges, was provided through foreign assistance.
78 Campbell, A. 2003. Where do All Soldiers Go? Veterans and the Politics o f Demobilization1 in 
Davis, D.E., and, Pereira, Anthony W. (ed.) Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and 
State Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 114.
79 This value refers to a total o f 455.000 ex-combatants including returnees from refugee camps in 
Sudan (52.000) and Kenya (80.000). Daniel, A., and Dercon, Stefan 2000. 'From the Gun to the 
Plough: the Macro- and Micro- Level Impact o f Demobilization in Ethiopia' in Kingma, K. (ed.) 
Demobilization in Sub- Saharan Africa: the Development and Security Impacts. London: Macmillan 
Press., p. 134. Colletta, N. J., Kostner, Markus, Wiederhofer, Ingo 1996. 'Case Studies in War to Peace 
Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration o f Ex Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and 
Uganda, World Bank Discussion Paper no.331': World Bank, p. 4.
80 Coletta et al. refer to the demobilization of a total o f 21.200 fighters from the OLF, which included 
20% o f women fighters. Ibid., p. 2.
81 Colletta et al., 1996, op. cit., p. 19.
82 This value includes 13,500 women (25%). Bruchhaus, E. M., and Amanuel Mehreteab 2000. 
'Leaving the Warm House: the Impact o f Demobilization in Eritrea' in Kingma, K. (ed.) Demobilization 
in Sub- Saharan Africa: the Development and Security Impacts. London: Macmillan Press, p. 103.
83 Amanuel Mehreteab, 2002, op.cit., p. 7.
84 Ibid., p. 30.
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In Eritrea the seeds of discontent among ex-combatants were planted through 
the announcement in 1993 that EPLF personnel should continue voluntary national
Of
service. Ruth Iyob claims that the incident was resolved peacefully:
On the morning o f May 20, 1993, a commando unit took over Asmara 
International Airport in protest. ( ...)  By early afternoon, young fighters 
carrying Kalashnikovs took over key government offices (...). The protest ( 
Adma Tegadelti) was limited to Asmara and did not elicit similar actions from
o/r
the armed units stationed in other parts of Eritrea.
In the aftermath of Adma Tegadelti, the president of Eritrea announced on radio and 
television that steps would be taken to reduce the size of the army and to initiate 
salary scales.87
Marchal provides a different account of the same event. According to 
Marchal, after the occupation of the airport, 130 were arrested, 24 were released and
QO
100 were punished with 1 to 10 years in prison. However, their pledges did not 
remain unheeded resulting in a three times increase in the initial ‘salary*.
On July 1994 another disruption occurred. This time a group o f disabled ex­
combatants blocked the road between Asmara and Massawa, in Mai Habar. Finally, 
an army unit intervened reacting in a disproportionately forcible fashion.89 The 
intervention of the army highlighted the lack of preparation for guaranteeing order in 
the context o f peace.90
85 Issaias Afeworki announcement emphasised that ‘The decision to remain as unpaid volunteers taken 
by the seventh meeting o f the Central Committee, was based on the fact that this country did not have 
the sufficient economic resources. ‘ Issaias Afewerki statement in ‘ Press Conference o f Ato Issaias 
Afeworki’, Hadas Ertra n0.78, May 29, 1993 cited by Ruth Iyob, 1996, p. 142. In addition, Amanuel 
Mehreteab, head o f  the Demobilization and Re- Integration Program for ex-fighters between 1992 and 
1996 acknowledges the importance o f the incident on May 1993 as ‘( ...)  a potent reminder o f what 
the future holds if  timely preventive measures are not instituted.’ Amanuel Mehreteab, 2001, op. cit., p. 
50.
86 Iyob, R. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle fo r  Independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism 1941- 
1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 142.
87 Iyob, 1995, op.cit, p. 142.
88 Marchal, R. 1997. 'Erythree: la dificile transition civile1 in Marchal, R., Messiant, Christine (ed.) Les 
Chemins de la Guerre et de La Paix: fins de conflit en Afrique orientate et australe. Paris: Karthala, 
pp.141- 152. This version was confirmed by ex- EPLF combatants who left Eritrea after independence. 
Interview, London, April 2007. With hindsight it already gave signs o f the President’s increasingly 
authoritarian leaning after the end o f  the civil war. These events will be discussed further in chapter 5 
and 6.
89 This intervention resulted in three to twelve deaths. Roland Marchal, 1997, op.cit., p. 143.
90 ibid., p. 143.
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One of the goals of demobilization in 1993 was to create an army with 30,000 
to 35,000 effectives. The overall number raised concern. As Marchal critically 
assessed, an army of that size was equivalent to the number o f troops that 
Mozambique had agreed to keep at the time of the signature of the Rome Agreements. 
In Mozambique, the number was reduced by half, in relation to a population five 
times higher than that of Eritrea. Moreover, in Eritrea the army was to be established 
through national conscription. The conscription consisted of 6 months of military and 
political training, followed by 12 months of service for the effort of national 
reconstruction.91 This observation highlights the inherent contradiction between 
expanding military power and attaining the disarmament of subjects.92 Secondly, it 
raises questions about Eritrea’s aims o f guaranteeing military supremacy within the
93region.
One of the criteria to assess the success of the reintegration of ex-combatants 
is the degree to which they become unnoticed in the local communities.
After independence pressures increased and ex- combatants settled 
predominantly in Ali-Ghidir near the town of Tessenei. Ali-Ghidir was selected as a 
destination because of the cotton plantation, which the Italian colonial state had 
established in 1928. After Independence the government of Eritrea put in place 
measures for the development o f large-scale farms in this region. A substantial area 
o f land was cultivated in the Ali- Ghidir estate and other plantations. The Land 
Proclamation No. 58/ 1994 introduced favourable conditions for newcomers to settle 
in this area. The provision which placed all the land under state ownership led to an 
increasing emphasis on large- scale agriculture in the region, through the 
expropriation o f land from local populations.94 The groups that live in the area, 
namely the Kunama, Beni Amer and Nara resented the influx of settlers and the way 
the state authorities granted concessions o f land, and in particular the preferential 
treatment o f demobilized EPLF combatants.
91 Ibid., p. 134.
92 Alec Campbell provides a parsimonious perspective on this problem in Alec Campbell, op. cit.
93 The compulsory military service and Eritrea’s foreign policy towards the region will be further 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
94Alexander Naty 2002. ’Environment, Society and the State in Western Eritrea’. Africa 72: 569- 597.
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As Alexander Naty emphasises:
(...) the Kunama are angry at the state or individuals taking away their land. 
Likewise, pastoral communities like the Beni-Amer are resentful because they 
have lost a great deal o f grazing land: the free movement o f their livestock has 
been severely constrained.95
The situation in the Gash-Barka region exposes how some measures relating to the 
reintegration o f demobilized soldiers and refugees increased the potential for social 
tension and magnified grievances between the local communities, the newcomers and 
the state.
The Ethiopian state was still a weakly institutionalized state depending 
strongly on military might and patronage.96
The task o f demobilizing the ex-Derg soldiers was daunting. Furthermore, the 
OLF, one o f the political factions to sign the transitional Charter, withdrew from the 
Transitional Government o f Ethiopia (TGE) and opted for insurgency against the 
EPRDF in the summer o f 1992. The EPRDF captured 22,200 OLF combatants in June
1992. This contingent o f combatants was added to the Derg soldiers for 
demobilization.97
The process of restructuring the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) 
occurred much later. The ENDF absorbed 6,000 ex-Derg  soldiers whose special
QO
skills were needed in the military.
The character o f public disruption by ex-combatants in Ethiopia acquired 
different contours to the incidents described in Eritrea. After demobilization, 
lawlessness, armed banditry and crime were on the rise in the eastern and southern
95 ibid., p. 586.
96 Abbink, J. March 2001. 'Review o f Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution o f  a Multiethnic Society (2nd 
edition) by Donald Levine'. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 39, p. 176.
97 Daniel and Dercon, 2000, op. cit., p. 134.
98 A further 1,400 were employed in the Ministry o f Health. Another 39,330 were referred to 
contractual employment, for example, with the Ministry o f  Agriculture, especially state farms. This
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parts o f the country. According to a World Bank study, many ex-combatants seemed 
to have harassed the population, looted property and committed m urder." However, 
the extent of the involvement o f demobilized soldiers in destabilizing local 
communities is difficult to assess due to the overall increase o f non-state armed 
groups’ opposition and insurgency to the EPRDF/TPLF, in the newly created regions 
of post-1991 Ethiopia.100
In 1995, 30,000 EPRDF soldiers (mainly TPLF fighters) were disbanded101 in 
a move to reflect the new conception of the ethnic-based Federal model. The goal 
was to substitute this contingent with new recruits from various nationalities 
according to the criteria o f proportional composition. Evidence shows that several 
thousands o f these demobilized EPRDF fighters were incorporated into the police 
force with an increase in their salary.102
In addition, similarly to what happened in Eritrea in the Ali-Ghidir plantation, 
a significant proportion o f the 30,000 EPRDF demobilized combatants were 
encouraged to participate in the Humera resettlement scheme for cotton growing. This 
meant the settlement o f a large proportion of the demobilized soldiers in new 
communities on sparsely populated land in western Tigray. On a political level, the 
designated land had only recently been annexed to the Tigray region at the expense of 
Gondar. Despite criticism to the Humera cotton scheme, reports confirmed that the 
program moved to a smallholder approach, which privileged the allocation of land to 
families.103According to Kassahun Berhanu the newcomers to the area in addition to 
ex- combatants comprised returned refugees from Sudan.104
group represented over 10 % o f the total number o f Derg demobilized soldiers. Colleta et al., 1996, op. 
cit., p. 58.
99 Colletta et al., 1996, op. cit., p. 79.
100 Further insights into the increase o f internal armed opposition to the EPRDF will be provided in 
section 2.4.3 and in chapter 6. For an important scholarly contribution to the reflection on the 
complexities o f the ethnic based conception o f statehood in Ethiopia two publications stand out. James, 
W. et al. edited volume. James, W., Donham, Donald L., Kurimoto,Eisi and Triulzi, Alessandro 2002. 
'Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After'. Oxford: James Currey. Turton, D. 2006. 'Ethnic 
Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective'. Oxford: James Currey.
101 Daniel Ayalew and S. Dercon, 2000, op. cit., p. 134.
102 Africa Confidential, 22 September 1995. cited in Daniel Ayalew and S. Dercon, op.cit, p. 134.
103 Colletta et a l . , 1996, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
104Kassahun Berhanu, 2000, op.cit.
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The question of land redistribution to demobilized soldiers is critical, 
particularly within social formations where the majority o f the population is 
concentrated in rural areas and highly dependent upon agriculture. The TGE created 
favourable conditions for the allocation o f land to demobilized soldiers through a 
proclamation, at the local level, which authorised the allocation of land previously 
held by the community to the ex-combatants.105 In cases where ex- combatants did 
not have access to land they were eligible to one hectare of state land. In these cases, 
the state allowed for the local communities to decide on the distribution of land 
among ex- combatants. Interestingly enough, Colletta et al., gathered evidence 
suggesting that land redistribution did not occur in those parts of the country (Tigray, 
Gondar, Gojjam) which had been occupied for a longer period by the TPLF, prior to 
the overthrow of the Derg}06
Ultimately, only a minority o f the ex-combatants benefited from access to the 
means o f maximizing the returns which the ‘domestication’ of the prevailing disorder 
required.107 Chapter 5 will continue this theme in order to assess the question of 
which groups benefited from the closure o f the border and from substitution o f the 
Eritrean port o f Assab for other ports in the Horn o f Africa.
Pausewang and Aalen stress that, at first sight, the EPRDF government 
Defence Budget compared to the one in the Derg declined impressively. However, the 
costs o f the military forces were spread across the budgets of the Ministry o f Interior 
and the regional states, in administration and transport costs, and investments. The 
authors conclude that if  these items are added together, the benefits o f disarmament 
were, indeed, minor.108
105 InterAfrica Group, 1994, p. 9 cited in Colletta et al., 1996, op.cit., p. 56.
106 ibid., p. 56.
107 Chabal, P., and, Daloz, Jean- Pascal 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford/ 
Bloomington & Indianapolis: International African Institute/ James Currey and Indiana University 
Press, p. xix. The demonstrations by ex-combatants prior to the war already showed the resentments 
created by President Issaias Afeworky’s discriminatory treatment o f ex-combatants. While some were 
expected to continue serving on a voluntary basis, those closer to the President were moved with their 
families to the villas where the previous administrators had lived and were awarded as well with 
prominent portofolios either in the government or in the party- owned companies. Interviews in 
London, May and June 2007.
108 Pausewang and Aalen, 2002, op.cit., p. 234.
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Through the analysis o f the demobilization processes in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
this section argues that demobilization is not only a consequence but also a cause of 
variation in state formation and development.109 The emplacement of returnees and 
demobilized combatants in the periphery o f the state seemed to follow a peculiar logic 
o f extending the state’s agents and institutions into its periphery. The emplacement of 
communities close to the border can in part be understood as a purposeful logic of 
creating buffer mechanisms in the absence of the normal array o f state’s agents and 
institutions in the frontier between sovereign states.
The emplacement of ex-combatants, and other returnees, in the Ali- Ghidir 
cotton plantation (Gash- Barka in Eritrea) and in Humera (Tigray’s Region in 
Ethiopia) shows how those who had participated or supported the insurgent 
movements who captured the state, benefited from the distribution and access to 
critical resources provided by the state. In this respect, prior to the 1998-2000 war, the 
post-insurgent states’ political leaderships retained a certain degree of loyalty to their 
background as ‘popular movements’. However, as the section on the economic and 
social dimensions o f the causes o f the war highlights this legacy was increasingly 
compromised by their capture o f the state and by the ruling parties’ privileged 
ownership o f companies in key sectors in the new economic fabric in post-1991 
Eritrea and Ethiopia.
As a concluding remark, the section on the political and military dimensions 
has shown that the relations between the political leaderships, inherited from their 
alliance against the Derg, facilitated the transition in both countries. However, as 
disagreements arose in the conduct o f international relations between the 
governments, tensions from the previous period re-surfaced.
The incidents of public disruption by ex- combatants in Eritrea and the 
forceful intervention by the state’s agents already showed signs, at the time 
minimized, of the President’s increasingly authoritarian orientation. In Ethiopia, the 
continuity o f insurgency warfare waged against the government gave signs o f the
109 Campbell, 2003, op. cit., p. 114.
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failure o f the state to guarantee the monopoly o f the means of coercion and o f the 
pitfalls of the particular EPRDF/TPLF conception of Ethiopian statehood.
Finally, quite significantly, the demobilization and reintegration processes led 
to different outcomes. In Eritrea, the demobilization o f the ex- combatants was 
coupled with continuous compulsory military service. As a consequence, Eritrea 
retained an army disproportionate to its population. In Ethiopia, despite considerable 
demobilization o f the combatants of the various warring parties during the civil war, 
the military retained significant influence within the executive, and the ex­
combatants had privileged access to critical resources distributed by the state. In both 
states, the former senior military commanders for the insurgent movements retained 
key positions in the newly created party-companies. The dividends o f the successful 
capture o f the state, however, were not evenly distributed among former combatants 
in Ethiopia and in Eritrea. In Eritrea, immediately after formal accession to 
Independence, the public disruption by former combatants already provided clear 
indications o f the growing drift between the ruling party and its veterans from the 
civil war. In Ethiopia, the failure o f the Transition Government to accommodate the 
OLF already provided signs that the spoils of the capture o f the state would not be 
evenly distributed across the insurgent movements which had contributed to the 
ousting o f the previous regime.
2.4.3 Territory: state trajectories and borderland communities’ conceptions and 
practices with regard to the new frontier
Trajectories of state and nation building: conceptions of statehood, nationhood 
and of boundary maintenance
The statehood tradition o f Ethiopia could not be more contrasting with the immense 
challenge faced by Eritrea on the eve o f Independence. However, in post- 1991 
Ethiopia the ruling party introduced an original conception o f Ethiopian statehood. 
The Eritrean and Ethiopian conceptions o f statehood not only differed but had the 
potential to run into collision.
As Jacquin-Berdal argues, territory was central to the definition of Eritrea:
74
(...) Eritrea’s national identity cannot be traced to any ethnic 
substratum; instead it is territorially defined. ( ...)  The new state’s 
favourite emblem is the country’s geographical map. 110
As Clapham remarks, in sharp contrast to the Eritrean path, in Ethiopia:
(...) the constitution of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia: expressed the new relationship between nationality and 
territoriality in a way which sharply differed both from former 
Ethiopian constitutions, and from the colonially demarcated 
frontiers which defined most other African states.111
The Ethiopian Empire was a territorial state, rather than an ethnic unit, defined by the
1
people who belonged to it; a tradition reproduced by the Derg.
The introduction of a Federal model based on ethnicity corresponded to a
1 1  <1
peculiarly Tigrayan conception of Ethiopian statehood. The immediate 
consequences were soon to become visible and this process o f fragmentation 
immediately led to increasing demands on new territorial divisions corresponding to 
each o f the nationalities. Citizenship based on the new nationalities became more 
salient as it determined rights to public allocations within each o f the national 
subdivisions.114 This process led to the creation o f nationality territories within the 
Ethiopian state, and to a considerable redrawing o f Ethiopia’s domestic boundaries. 
As chapter 5 and 6 shall discuss, the ruling party’s approach to state re-making had 
domestic, as well as significant international implications.
The EPRDF/TPLF innovative approach to state building both domestically 
and with regard to its foreign policy were interwoven to such an extent that any shift
110 Jacquin-Berdal, D. 2002. Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn o f  Africa: A Critique o f  the Ethnic 
Interpretation. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, p. 136.
111 Clapham, C. 1996. 'Boundary and Territory in the Horn o f  Africa' in Nuguent, P., and Asiwaju, A.I. 
(ed.) African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities. London: Pinter, p. 246.
112 Clapham, 1996, op. cit., p. 239.
113 Clapham, C. 2001. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn' in May, R., and 
Furley, Oliver (ed.) African Interventionist States. Aldershot: Ashgate.
1,4 ibid., p. 246.
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of orientation in the political and economic policies had manifold implications both at 
the domestic and international level.
The Ethiopian government’s approach to state building, at the domestic level, 
impacted upon the relations between i) the federal state and its constituent regional 
states and ii) Ethiopia’s Regional states’ institutions and agents among themselves. At 
the international level, this approach impacted upon the relations between: i) the 
Ethiopian state and other contiguous states in the Horn o f Africa and ii) Ethiopia’s 
Regional states’ institutions and agents and other contiguous states in the Horn of 
Africa. These implications will be analysed thoroughly in the remaining components 
o f this section on the territory-related causes of the war.
Although for Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s governments, territory remained central 
to the conception o f statehood, the two cases reflect the two broad kinds of the 
relationship between a state and its boundaries. Clapham remarks that there is a 
fundamental distinction between boundaries which are created by states and states 
that are created by boundaries. In the first case, the boundaries may be adjusted in one 
direction or the other without affecting the identity o f the state which lies within them. 
In the second case, the boundaries come first, and the state is then created within 
them. Ethiopia is closer to the first process, while Eritrea is closer to the second. In 
the latter case, and paraphrasing Clapham, any change in Eritrea’s boundaries raised 
basic questions about what Eritrea was.115 In the end, the two conceptions and 
diverging approaches to state building placed the governments on a collision route. As 
Clapham argues, along with a powerful concept of boundary goes an equally powerful 
concept o f territory.116
Borderland communities’ conceptions and practices with regard to the new 
frontier
Eritrean independence was perceived differently by various groups in Ethiopia and in 
Eritrea.
115 Clapham, 1999, op.cit., p. 54.
116 Clapham, 1996, op.cit. in Nuguent, p. 239.
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Within Ethiopia different groups still looked with suspicion at Eritrea and at 
the Ethiopian ruling party because o f its role in the loss of Eritrea.
While resentment in the urban areas, and especially in the Ethiopian capital, 
was common prior to the unexpected war it was generally not vocalised until the
117outbreak of hostilities in May 1998.
Although Eritrea’s independence divided ethnic groups like the Beni Amer, 
the Kunama, the Saho, the Tigrinya-speaking communities and the Afar, three groups 
merit particular attention because o f their saliency for the understanding of the causes 
of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As the previous section has argued, it should 
remain present that the border between the two states prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities in May 1998 remained a de jure border. For all practical purposes, the lack 
o f delimitation and demarcation o f the border meant that borderland communities 
continued with usual daily business regardless o f the borderline. For the vast majority 
o f the borderland communities, living on the Ethiopian side o f the border, Eritrea’s 
independence was o f secondary importance in the face of the general sense o f security 
generated by the end of the civil war against the Derg. Despite the widespread 
satisfaction with the post- conflict context, several groups either expressed 
resentments towards Eritrea’s independence or were at odds with shifting loyalty to 
the successor state.
These three ethnic groups straddling the borders particularly affected by 
Eritrea’s secession were: i) the Afar in north-eastern Ethiopia and south-eastern 
Eritrea, ii) the Tigrinya-speaking communities in the Ethiopian northern Region of 
Tigray (both in the central and western zones) and in Eritrea, and iii) the Kunama in 
the north-western part of the Ethiopian Region of Tigray (and central areas) and in 
south-western Eritrea in Gash Barka.
The Afar in northeastern Ethiopia and southeastern Eritrea
117 The different conceptions o f the borders and o f the homeland will be discussed in chapter 3 in the 
analysis o f the historical and symbolic dimensions o f the war and the territorialization o f national 
identities.
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According to Markakis, the Afar in Ethiopia have neither forgotten nor forgiven the
1 1 o
loss o f their land, nor have they given up hope o f reclaiming it.
The loss o f land was added to pre-existing grievances. The Afars (and the 
Somalis) in Ethiopia as pastoralists have posed challenges to the state’s centralizing 
pressure. The states in the Horn of Africa and particularly the Ethiopian state have 
tended to ‘marginalise pastoralists and attempt to either assimilate them into - or 
exclude them entirely from - the state apparatus1.119
Both the Afar and Somali regions have remained at the periphery of Ethiopia’s 
state with implications with regard to the limited extension of the state’s agents and 
institutions to their territory. The post- 1991 Federal model based on ethnicity 
subscribed the devolution of a certain degree o f autonomy to the regional level of 
government; however in practice the measures to implement these significant changes 
remained in the realm of intentions. Indeed, the widespread and chronic food
1 9ftinsecurity in the Afar region is still o f paramount importance.
The long-standing marginalisation o f the Afars coupled with the loss of 
territory, with Eritrea’s secession, further fuelled Afars’ resistance to the central state. 
Indeed, one o f the Afar insurgent movements, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic 
United Front (ARDUF), conducted a guerrilla campaign against the EPRDF/TPLF 
and the EPLF/ PFDJ until the outbreak o f hostilities with Eritrea. Prior to the two-year 
war, this insurgent movement could be best described as a secession insurgency as it 
was said to pursue the unification o f a ‘greater’ Afar territory. The movement’s aim 
of unifying the Afar seems to have found limited support from more moderate Afar
191groups. As with other insurgent movements within Ethiopia, the aims of the 
ARDUF seem to defy permanent classification. In 2007 it was unclear whether the 
movement pursued secession or reformist aims with regard to the Ethiopian state.
118 Markakis, J. 2003. 'Anatomy o f a Conflict: Afar and Ise Ethiopia'. Review o f  African Political 
Economy 96, p. 447.
119 Bryden, M. January 1996. 'Situation report on Region 2 (Afar National Regional State)'. Addis 
Abeba: UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/AFARlA.htm, p. 13.
120 Philpott et al., 2005, op.cit., p. 26 The same report concludes that the education coverage in the Afar 
region is one o f the lowest in the country, p. 36.
121 Bryden, 1996, op. cit.
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The unification goal o f the Afars within a single entity could either be based upon the 
premise o f seeking self-determination for the Afar unified entity as a sovereign state, 
or as an autonomous region within the Ethiopian state. In the former case, achieving 
this aim would imply secession for Afar groups from Eritrea and Djibouti. Indeed, 
disagreement on this question has led to the emergence o f different factions within the 
ARDUF. On the ground the Afar, mainly pastoralists, viewed the borders as 
imaginary lines. Moreover, the Afars were also citizens in the neighbouring states o f 
Djibouti and Eritrea. These two layers o f identity (ethnic group identification and
122 ,, ,icitizenship) need not necessarily be perceived in mutually exclusive terms. The 
movement seems to have subsequently abandoned the aim o f unifying the Afar either
19^in a separate state or within Ethiopia.
The situation in the Afar National Regional State continued to be tense after 
the transition in Ethiopia to multiparty politics and to the constitutionally recognized 
right to create political parties on the basis o f ethnicity. The ethnicization of politics 
fuelled tension among the Afar people. Indeed, Afar insurgent movements124 and the 
Afar party within the ruling coalition - the Afar People’s Democratic Organisation 
(APDO) -seemed to pursue irreconcilable political agendas. The Ugugumo, meaning 
Revolution, can be classified as a secession insurgency. The Ugugumo was created by 
the Derg in order to prevent the extension o f TPLF’s control to this part o f the Tigray 
Province125 and hence avoid the disruption o f the traffic and the military supply line 
from the Assab port. During the civil war the most difficult area for the TPLF within
19 f%the Tigray province was south-eastern Tigray, especially the Afar areas.
122 Interview in Addis Ababa, July 2005.
123 Les Nouvelles d' Addis 15 m ars/15 mai 2007. 'Retour sur l'actualite : Afar, partenaire ou ennemi ?' 
LesNouvelles d' Addis, 56, http://www.lesnouvelles.org/P71_clxfb0r_joumal/LNA56.html.
124 According to Matt Bryden’s report from 1995, Ugugumo fighters had targeted the homes and 
property o f APDO members in the Dallol area (Zone 2) and accused the party representatives o f  
treason to the Afar cause. Bryden, 1996, op. cit.
125 According to Young, the Ugugumo was a creation o f the Derg. The movememt was initially led by 
Derg  officers and the Derg supplied arms to the movement. The Ugugumo were motivated by the 
promise o f  Afar autonomy within Ethiopia and by sharing the D erg’s opposition to the EPLF/ TPLF 
secession aims for Eritrea; which was a threat to Afar unity. The Ugugumo achieved political 
legitimacy with Afar clans, especially with those communities resident outside Tigray .Young, 1997, 
op.cit., p. 151.
I26ibid., p. 170.
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The Afar insurgent movements continued to resort to guerrilla tactics in post- 
1991 Ethiopia and Eritrea. During this period violent conflicts between Afar clans and 
Tigrayans did not decline.127
The connections between this insurgent movement and other insurgent 
movements still active in the Afar region are not clear. Similarly to the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF) it is plausible that the insurgents remained deeply
1 98entrenched within the pastoral communities. Other Afar insurgent movements and 
political parties, although not subscribing to the movement’s resort to force an 
agenda, seem to display sympathy and have conjecturally benefited from direct and 
indirect support from the Ugugumo opposition to the ruling APDO. According to 
Bryden, the Afar National Liberation Front (ANLF), which prior to the two-year war 
held the third place in the regional parliament with 10 seats, was said to empathise 
with the Ugugumo"s opposition to the ruling APDO.
In 1995 in the aftermath o f Ethiopia’s regional elections Matt Bryden reported 
that in the Afar Regional state:
( ...)  Politically, however, the situation cannot be described as stable: 
the past few months have seen sporadic outbreaks of political violence, 
and an overt struggle for power in the regional administration that has 
effectively paralysed government. Some parts o f the region, 
particularly the north-western zone (Zone 2), are reported by the 
regional administration to be disturbed and possibly unsafe for 
travel.129
In the aftermath o f the civil war and after Eritrea’s Independence, the uninterrupted 
intensity o f traffic along the Addis Ababa-Manda-Assab road hardly benefited the 
Afar.130 Indeed, as Bryden claims:
127 Young, J. 1998. Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia'. Third World Quarterly 19, p.
200.
128 As it will be further discussed in chapter 4, the Afar clans involved in the conflict with the Ise clan 
in 2002 along the Addis Ababa- Djibouti road reportedly benefited from support from the Ugugumo.
129 Bryden, 1996, op. cit.
130 Bryden, M. January 1996. 'Situation report on Region 2 (Afar National Regional State)'. Addis 
Abeba: UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/AFARlA.htm.
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The roads have evolved into a micro-economy dominated by highlanders and 
alien commercial interests: most o f the commerce - bars and hotels - 
associated with the transport sector, are owned and managed by members of 
other ethnic groups. Prostitution and alcohol flourish. Services, from room and 
board to schooling and health care, are often available only in Amharic or not
1 -i I
at all and primarily benefit migrant workers rather than the indigenous Afar.
Despite the implementation o f the new Federal model based on ethnicity and 
on the principle of devolution o f more autonomy to the regions, the Afar region 
remained largely within the periphery o f the state. Dissention, contention, violent 
conflict both among Afars supporting different political parties and/or insurgent 
movements, was magnified by the ethnicization o f politics in Ethiopia. In addition, 
violent conflict between the Afar and dominant ethnic groups from the Regions 
bordering the Afar Regional State, namely Tigray and Somali Regions continued, to a 
certain extent, fuelled by the new ethnic-based Federal model.
The tension and violent conflict between the Tigrayans and the Afar antedated 
the introduction o f the Federal Model based on ethnicity. However, contrary to the 
ruling party’s expectation and rhetoric, the ethnic, formula did not dilute conflict 
and/or diminish the grievances towards the central government.
The tension and violent conflict between Afar clans and the Ise clan from the 
neighbouring Ethiopian Somali Region was, indeed, exacerbated by the creation o f 
Regional states based on ethnicity with ill-delimited boundaries between the regions.
The violent conflict between Afar and Ise pastoralists over access to water and 
grazing land, which had previously been mainly a conflict between pastoralists has 
tended to become an ethnic conflict. This is one o f the cases which illustrate well the 
domestic implications of the EPRDF/TPLF approach to state building.
Knowledge on the Afar insurgent movements operating on both sides o f the 
Ethiopian and Eritrean border is still unsatisfactory and meagre. This state of affairs, 
prior to the 1998-2000, was in part related to the limited presence of the state’s 
institutions and agents along the frontier, in the Afar inhabited zones.
131 Ibid.
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In conclusion, it seems that besides unanimity in the resentment towards 
Eritrea’s independence, Afar clans, political parties and insurgent movements do not 
follow a similar approach and degree o f loyalty towards the Ethiopian state. The 
Ugugumo and the ARDUE seem to have similar agendas with regard to Afar
i 'X 'ynationalism. However, further research is needed on the aims of the two 
movements and on the relations between the two. The splintering o f the ARDUF, in 
the aftermath o f the 1998-2000 war, further diluted Afar militant nationalists’ claims 
for a ‘ Greater Afar’ state, which envisaged reuniting the Afar divided by the borders 
between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti.
The outbreak o f hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea significantly changed 
Afar conceptions and practices with regard to the boundaries. In addition, the conduct 
of battles within Afar territory, contributed to a rapprochement between the Afar and 
the ruling party in Ethiopia.133
The Tigrinya-speaking communities in the Ethiopian northern Region of Tigray 
(both in the central and western zones) and in Eritrea
Boundary- related problems emerged in the early 1990s. When disagreements arose 
between Eritrean and Tigrayan farmers over land claims, problems of sovereignty 
became more evident. These land disputes illustrated the problem of reconciling 
territorial sovereignty with local administration.134 This case captures well the 
complexities o f the international implications of the EPRDF/TPLF’s approach to 
state building.
As in other regions, the EPRDF failed to anticipate the implications for 
regional authorities o f the full implementation o f the redrawing of domestic 
boundaries implied by the ethnic-based Federal model. While the root causes o f this 
particular incident are germane to the conflict between pastoral communities in the
132 The two movements, Ugugumo and the ARDUF operate in the same area, which in the past led to 
ambiguity and confusions between the two. Indeed, this ambiguity highlights the sparse knowledge on 
the manifold Afar opposition movements and their political aims.
133 This will be further developed in chapter 3.
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Afar and Somali Ethiopian Regions (access to a critical resource, i.e. land) the fact 
that the communities were divided across ill- delimited and disputed state boundaries 
added complexity. Tigray’s Regional administration agents and Eritrean state agents’ 
handling o f the incident further escalated the saliency o f the border dispute.
The Kunama in the northwestern and central areas of the Ethiopian Region of 
Tigray and in southwestern Eritrea in Gash Barka.
Although the Kunama are estimated to represent only 2 per cent o f the Eritrean 
population the area where they are centred, Gash Barka has been submitted to 
increasing demographic and environmental pressure, with the potential to lead to
1 TSconflict between communities in the area. The Kunama as a whole tend to be 
identified as people who sided with the Derg during the war. The beginning o f the 
secession insurgency in the early 1960s in Eritrea exacerbated tensions between the 
Kunama and other ethnic groups in the Gash Barka region. For their survival the 
Kunama had to seek support from Ethiopia; which enabled them to resist the various
1T7Eritrean insurgent movements almost until the final years o f the civil war.
The stigma as Alexander Naty’s study confirms still persisted after Eritrea’s 
independence (and at the time o f writing still does). Decentralization in Eritrea has 
led to increased marginalization o f the Kunama. As early as 1997, external observers
134 Iyob, 2000, op.cit., p. 673.
135 Alexander Naty, 2002, op.cit., p. 574.
136 This region is the breadbasket o f Eritrea. The area was renamed Gash-Barka in the aftermath o f  an 
administrative restructuring in 1995. The former name o f  the area was Gash- Setit. According to 
Alexander Naty, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), whose leadership was dominated by the Beni- 
Amer , Tigre and to a lesser extent the Nara, mistreated the Kunama people from the very outset by 
burning their villages and killing community elders in some localities. These activities alienated the 
Kunama people, p. 574.
137 This should not be interpreted as if  there were not individual Kunama within the liberation fronts. 
There were a considerable number o f  them in the ELF; many Kunama from regions such as Ilit and 
Sokodas joined the ELF from the very beginning o f the movement. Alexander Naty, 2002, op. cit.
138 According to Lussier the stigma still persists in spite o f  the fact that the Ethiopian army numbered 
many Eritrean Tigrini in its ranks and that the Kunama’s decision was in great measure determined by 
the action o f  the ELF in the beginning o f  the liberation struggle. Indeed, Idris Awate, the celebrated 
national hero who opened the hostilities against Ethiopia in 1961, is remembered by the Kunama as 
their main executioner in the period o f  1943-1949, which occurred during the British Military 
Administration in Eritrea. Lussier, D. 1997. 'Local Prohibitions, Memory and Political Judgement 
among the Kunama: An Eritrean Case Study' in Fukui, K., Kurimoto, Eisei and Shigeta, Masayoshi 
(ed.) Ethiopia in broader perspective, Volume II, papers o f  the XHIth International Conference o f  
Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 December 1997
International Conference o f  Ethiopian Studies. Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers, p. 442.
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1 'IQwarned o f particular intensity o f military action in the area. This in turn has led to 
an increased resentment of the Kunama towards the PFDJ government.
Prior to the outbreak o f hostilities the diverging state trajectories o f Ethiopia 
and Eritrea already raised concerns for ethnic groups divided across borders. In 
particular, the Ethiopian model had the potential to gain attractiveness to communities 
north o f the Mereb River. Both Afar and Kunama’s multiple grievances towards the 
state on both sides of the border were articulated in ethnic terms. This came about, in 
part, as a consequence of Ethiopia’s ruling party’s approach to the nationalities’ 
question in Ethiopia. Domestic state building and nation building in Ethiopia had 
repercussions across borders. As Pausewang notes:
The nomadic Afar people in Eritrea were urged to integrate in the 
national entity, but when they crossed the border - which they 
regularly do in their annual movements - they became citizens of 
an Afar state with its own administration, with schools and courts 
and even a radio station broadcasting in their language. As time 
passed, the Kunama further north complained they were becoming 
a minority in their own home country as more and more refugees 
returning from Sudan were settled in their plains.When the war 
erupted, Ethiopia was quick in exploiting their discontent by 
setting up a radio programme in Kunama language across the 
border.14
Chapter 3 will show how the escalation o f the conflict further exacerbated the tension 
around the two states’ diverging paths to national identity formation and 
consolidation. If  prior to the war the question of state loyalty was important but not a 
matter o f individual security, under wartime conditions the question became a matter 
o f survival. The war contributed to cementing loyalty to the state in mutually 
exclusive terms; in a way none of the previous regimes in Addis Ababa had managed 
to accomplish.
139 Lussier stresses that: ‘ Eritrea’s growing involvement with the Sudanese civil war and persisting 
incidents at the frontier have made the western lowlands a target o f military surveillance. Deep political 
problems are masked behind the current focus on refugees/returnees from the Sudan and humanitarian 
assistance.’ ibid., p. 443.
140 Pausewang, S. 2004. 'Aborted or nascent democracy? Structural reasons for the failure of 
democratisation in Ethiopia1 in Sorbo, G.M., and, Siegfried Pausewang, (ed.) Prospects fo r  Peace, 
Security and Human Rights in Africa’s Horn. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, p. 145.
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If the borders’ conception prior to the war were not at the forefront as chapter 
4 will show, they were the portent source for mobilization and for maintaining the 
rank and file on the trenches along the border. For borderland communities the 
openness of the border was replaced by its closure and their daily lives were disrupted 
fundamentally.
With hindsight, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s speech at the ceremony which 
marked Eritrea’s independence is now reviewed with tragic irony:
Let bygones be bygones. We have commenced a new chapter. In 
this new chapter we will not build a wall at the M ereb.141
2.5 Conclusion
Several factors, often overlooked, resulted in an impressive recipe for conflict 
escalation. The different trajectories o f the states, the different conceptions o f 
statehood and nationhood and the diverging approaches to state building and nation 
building had practical and, immediate consequences, for borderland communities. 
This will be further developed in the analysis of war and state making/remaking 
(chapter 5).
Ethiopia’s Tigray regional administration’s requirements with regard to trade, 
prior to the introduction o f the new Eritrean currency, already seemed to suggest the 
ruling party’s increasing determination and concern to control the movement o f goods 
across its borders with Eritrea. These requirements were arguably introduced as part 
of an economic polity bent on protecting Tigray’s economic actors (namely party- 
owned companies) from competition from their Eritrean counterparts. In addition, the 
introduction o f the new currency was a form o f boundary maintenance, as Clapham 
suggests. These diverging approaches to economic policies raised the saliency o f the 
borders and in the meantime created an impending rivalry between the two ruling 
parties. When the incident in Badme occurred, the border dispute, combined with this
141 Alemseged Abbay 1998. Identity jilted, or, Re-imagining identity? : the divergent paths o f  the 
Eritrean and Tigrayan nationalist struggles. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, p. 230.
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preceding rivalry, escalated the crisis to a magnitude that took both protagonists and 
borderland communities by surprise.
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Chapter 3: The Conduct of the War between Eritrea and Ethiopia
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 depicted the background conditions and the various causes that led to the 
outbreak of hostilities. This chapter aims to move beyond what triggered and caused 
the conflict and focuses specifically on how the war unfolded and how it was brought 
to an end. It provides an analysis o f the period after the 6 May 1998 crisis, in which 
the border incident between the Eritrean small infantry unit and Ethiopian local militia 
and administrators led to the loss o f life on the Eritrean side.1 Eritrea’s decision on 12 
May 1998 to move its regular armoured forces to the disputed border village Badme, 
and its environs, escalated the crisis leading to the military engagement between 
Eritrean and Ethiopian regular armed forces. The move by the Eritrean Defence Force 
(EDF) triggered Ethiopia’s formal announcement in Parliament, on 13 May 1998, of 
its determination to act in defence o f its sovereignty if  Eritrean forces failed to 
withdraw from the disputed areas. The chapter covers the period from May 12, 1998 
until the December 12, 2000 Algiers peace agreement.
The first part o f the chapter conveys the way the political and military conduct 
of the war was seen from Eritrea and from Ethiopia. This strategy is followed in 
order to avoid the asymmetries of the available data on the Eritrean and Ethiopian 
accounts on the conduct of the war.
The peace negotiations did not hamper the war’s unfolding. As a result, this 
section will be linked to the one which portrays the military conduct o f the war, 
namely the first, second and third rounds o f fighting according to the dominant views 
from Addis Ababa and Asmara. This section seeks to analyse the relationship between 
the political aims of the war and the unfolding o f events on the battlefield. The 
analysis of the inter-state war’s conduct will then be expanded by assessing the 
opponents’ tactics of supporting opposition armed groups through neighbouring
1 Connell, D. Autumn 1998. 'Report from the field: From Alliance to the Brink o f All-Out War: 
Explaining the Eritrea- Ethiopia Border Crisis.' Middle East Report 208:40-42.
87
countries. The full implications o f the 1998- 2000 war for the region shall be 
discussed in the chapter 6.
The section on the social and economic dimensions will seek to understand if 
there was an element o f greed in the war rationale and if  it had any impact as a source 
o f motivation to engage, pursue and prolong military confrontation rather than engage 
with the various proposals to reach a negotiated settlement.
Finally, the section on territory seeks to understand how the divergent 
interpretations o f history on both sides of the border were fuelled by the warfare 
propaganda. In addition, this section will demonstrate that the two-year war became 
an important source o f national mythology for both states. Indeed, this state o f affairs 
bore similarities with previous wars which had opposed Ethiopia to an external 
enemy.2
The final section seeks to understand how the positions in the battleffont 
reflected the ambiguity and the different conceptions and practices of various groups 
with regard to the border between the two states.
3.2 Seen from Eritrea and from Ethiopia
3.2.1 Eritrea
The aims of the opponent seen from an Eritrean standpoint seem to have been 
depicted differently as the war unfolded.
During the first round the Eritrean army did not push beyond the territory they 
had argued fell within Eritrea’s jurisdiction. The decision on 12 May 1998 to move its 
regular armoured forces to the disputed border village - Badme - and its environs 
followed from this reasoning.
2 Clapham, C. 2001. War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Paper Presented at the Failed 
States Conference, Florence 10-14 April', p. 9.
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In line with the ‘official’ claim, the EDF pursued the offensive and occupied 
positions around three major sectors of the frontier: Badme (Western Front)/Tsorona- 
Zalambessa and Irob areas (Central Front) and Bada and Bure areas (Eastern Front).
The Eritreans depicted the subsequent escalation o f the crisis into a full- scale 
war as part o f a TPLF plan for the creation of a Greater Tigray.3
The crisis and its escalation were justified as a response to the Tigrayan 
minority practice in post-1991 Ethiopia of encroaching into land traditionally within 
the realm o f other groups. The PFDJ leadership was, arguably, persuaded that the war 
would lead to the weakening o f the dominance o f the TPLF within Ethiopia’s ruling 
party.
During the second round of fighting, the Eritrean troops’ morale remained 
high but the intensity o f the camage in the battlefield shifted Asmara’s perceptions 
about Addis Ababa’s war aims. At this point, in addition to gaining access to the Red 
Sea, Eritrea contended that Ethiopia was fighting to reassert regional hegemony. In an 
interview, President Issaias Afewerki claimed that from the Eritrean standpoint the 
war started as a border dispute. Ethiopia’s determination to fight was tied to its 
preference for another government in its former province.4 As the war unfolded, its 
main justification relied on Eritrea’s need to resort to force to survive as a sovereign 
state. From a confrontation between the Tigrinya-speaking communities on both 
sides o f the Mereb, the war was understood and justified as a continuation of the war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritreans had once again to fight for their hard-won 
independence.
The third round marked a turning point as Ethiopian troops advanced beyond 
the disputed areas and captured territory well inside Eritrea. Eritrea now depicted 
itself as the victim of Ethiopian aggression and o f invasion.
3 Gilkes, P., and, Plaut, Martin 1999. War in the Horn: The Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia: The 
Royal Institute o f International Affairs, p. 23.
4 Vick, K. February 14, 1999. 'Eritrea's 'Mosquito' Plagues Ethiopia' Washington Post, 
http://www. uvm.edu/~fgause/hom.htm.
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Finally, as the third round took the Eritreans by surprise it was perceived that 
Ethiopia’s main war aim was to annihilate the Eritrean military capabilities and 
manpower and oust the ruling party (PFDJ).
Kidane Mengisteab and Okbazgi Yohannes suggested that the gains for Eritrea 
would be quite limited. For Eritrea the war aims were subordinated to:
1) ‘The imperatives o f demarcating its borders and, eventually,
2) To enhance the stature of its President'.5
This last line o f argument gained saliency only in the aftermath o f the Peace 
Agreement. With hindsight, growing dissent within Eritrea came as an outcome o f 
disagreements over the conduct o f the war within Eritrea’s policymaking circle close 
to the President. As Paulus Tesfagiorgis claims:
The Eritrean President, ignoring his own government’s institutions and people 
with experience, and abandoning international relations and norms, made the 
war his own personal one, as he wanted to make the victory his personal one, 
with all its implications. According to him, victory was certain. He also 
seemed to have completely overestimated his military capability while 
underestimating the military might and determination o f the Ethiopians, 
especially the TPLF.6
3.2.2 Ethiopia
Seen from Ethiopia the war aims seem to have changed and oscillated as the war 
unfolded, especially during the final offensive.
The aims of the war seem to have changed especially after the victorious 
outcome of Ethiopia’s ‘Operation Sunset’. The conduct o f the war led to 
disagreements within Ethiopian policy-making circles. However, as in Eritrea, the 
greatest divergences seemed to have emerged during the final offensive.
5 Kidane Mengisteab, a., Okbazghi Yohannes, 2005. Anatomy o f  an African Tragedy: Political, 
Economic and Foreign Policy Crisis in post- Independence Eritrea. Trenton & Asmara: Red Sea Press,
p. 261.
90
Initially, the Ethiopians were convinced that the Eritreans had resorted to force as a 
display o f political and military strength. In the face o f the poor progresses of the 
Ethiopia- Eritrea Joint Border Commission, Asmara had resorted to a belligerent 
approach. As had happened in previous border disputes between Eritrea and other 
contiguous neighbouring states, the calculations, on the Eritrean side, were that the 
crisis would not significantly escalate and would lead to immediate international 
mediation. At this juncture it was common to portray Eritrea as a ‘trouble maker in 
the region’. The Ethiopians argued that the incident in Badme was just part of a 
previous pattern o f Eritrea’s foreign policy with regard to disputes over its borders: to 
use force first and, then, call for international mediation.
The TPLF/ EPRDF regime was largely convinced that the EPLF/PFDJ
o
continued to wage war as a necessary ingredient to keep Eritrea together. Ethiopia 
interpreted the Eritrean move as a breach to Ethiopia’s sovereignty.
From an Ethiopian standpoint, it seemed the EPLF/PFDJ was still convinced 
o f the invincibility of the Eritrean army. The mythology o f military triumph was 
paramount for Eritrean nationalism and for the country’s leadership.9 Moreover, 
continuous and compulsory military service in Eritrea meant that the EPLF/PFDJ 
regime could count on at least 150,000 new conscripts, trained, equipped and ready 
for deployment; whereas Ethiopia needed to recruit and train new contingents o f 
troops.10
In the aftermath o f Operation Sunset, the parties’ failure to reach an agreement 
over the OAU peace proposal led to an entrenchment o f positions. At this stage,
6 Paulos Tesfagiorgis 2004. 'A brief understanding o f  the current crisis in Eritrea: What can be done?’ 
in Sorbo, G.M., and, Siegfried Pausewang, (ed.) Prospects fo r  Peace, Security and Human Rights in 
Africa’s Horn. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, p. 153.
7 Interview , Addis Ababa, August 2005.
8 Medhane Tadesse 1999. The Eritrean- Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects: Reflections on the 
Making o f  Conflicts in the Horn o f  Africa 1991-1998. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise, p. 107.
9Clapham, 2001, op.cit., p. 13.
10 Interview, Addis Ababa, July 2005.
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disagreements over the war aims permeated the decision-making circle in Ethiopia.11 
However, the stated aims of the war remained the re- capture of the occupied areas 
and ensuring the defence of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the contested territory.12 
Uncertainties about Ethiopia’s likely attempt to advance towards the capital created 
the final pressure for Eritrea to capitulate to Ethiopia’s initial pre- condition for the 
peace negotiations, i.e., to withdraw to the positions held before the events that had 
triggered the conflict around Badme.
With regard to the Eritrean President’s claim that Addis Ababa was bent on
1 %the ousting o f the incumbent regime in Eritrea, Yemane Kidane contented that:
Issaias is hying to mobilize the Eritrean people behind him, 
because the people o f Eritrea are not happy about the border 
issue. We’ve made it crystal clear that we are concerned only 
with our sovereignty. Any change in government, is the 
responsibility o f the Eritrean people.14
However, during the final offensive, the strategic plan seemed to favour incursions 
from Eritrean insurgent movements alongside the Ethiopian armed forces. The third 
round of fighting confirmed Ethiopia’s support and cover for the infiltration into 
Eritrean territory o f the PFDJ’s main opponents. In the Western Sector, arguably one 
o f the war aims behind the occupation o f the Gash Barka region (Eritrea) and o f 
Barentu (the regional capital o f Gash Barka) was to provide support for opposition 
movements to the PFDJ, such as: the ELF faction led by Abdullah Idris’s, especially 
combatants in Adi Koto15 and the Eritrean Kunama Democratic Movement 
(EKDM).16 However, the Ethiopian forces took over Tesseney, Adi Koto and finally
11 Hansen, S. J. 11 January 2006. 'Organisational Culture at War: Ethiopian Decision-making and the 
War with Eritrea (1998-2000) ' Department o f  International Politics. Aberystwyth: University o f  
Wales.
I2Medhane Tadesse, 1999, op.cit., p. 176.
13 Yemane Kidane, at the time was a senior official in the Ethiopian government. Yemane Kidane was 
in a privileged position to interpret the opponents’ aims. Yemane Kidane was originally one o f the two 
EPLF veterans who had moved to Tigray during the early formative years o f the TPLF insurgency to 
provide training to the movement. Yemane Kidane’s field name was Jamaica. As a consequence , 
Yemane Kidane became a TPLF combatant and remained within the TPLF up to the overthrow o f  the 
Derg regime and its aftermath. Yemane Kidane is o f mixed Eritrean and Tigrayan parentage like many 
Ethiopian and Eritrean citizens. Young, J. 1997. Peasant revolution in Ethiopia : the Tigray P eople’s 
Liberation Front, 1975-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 87.
14 Vick, 1999, op.cit., p. A29.
15 Interview in Addis Ababa, July 2005.
16 Naty, A. 2001. TVlemories o f  the Kunama o f Eritrea towards Italian Colonialism'. Africa: Rivista dell' 
Istituto italianoper V Africa e I' Oriente LVI, p. 588.
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withdrew. In the Central Sector, another splinter o f the ELF (composed mainly by 
Tigrinya-speaking members) benefited as well from Ethiopian support, and went to 
Senafe (in the former Akele Guzai District).17 In the eastern sector, the ENDF 
provided support for the Eritrean Afar opposition movement.18
The main goal was the weakening o f Asmara’s regime by providing support 
to opposition movements in a position to seize power and dislodge the PFDJ and the 
President. At the time, however, Eritrean opposition movements were not in a 
position to exploit the Ethiopian advance to their own advantage.
Paulus Tesfagiorgis argued that the different ELF factions and other opposition 
groups used the war as an opportunity o f revival and to gain visibility.19
3.2.3 Peace Negotiations
During the first round, the Eritreans immediately called for international 
mediation. The first attempt came from the then Chairman o f IGAD, President 
Aptidon of Djibouti. It was immediately followed by a peace proposal by the Vice- 
President and Minister o f Defence from Rwanda - Paul Kagame and US Sub Secretary 
o f State for African Affairs - Susan Rice.
Eritrea perceived the negotiations as favouring Ethiopia. The public 
announcement in Addis Ababa that the two parties had agreed to a US-Rwanda 
brokered peace proposal, without informing Asmara in advance, justified Eritrea’s 
decision to pull back from the peace negotiations. This was the first o f a series o f 
missed opportunities for peace.
The moratorium into air imposed after the June 1998 bombings in the Eritrean 
capital- Asmara- and in the Tigray Region’s capital - Mekele - was respected by both 
parties. However, the lull was exploited by both opponents as a preparation for further 
engagements on the battlefield.
17 ibid., p. 588.
18 ibid., p.588.
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In January 1999, the UNSC passed the resolution that recognized the OAU
00peace proposal as the basis for future negotiations between the parties.
Immediately, after the beginning o f the second round of fighting and with the 
Ethiopian army’s successful recapture of Badme, in February 1999, the Eritreans 
agreed to re-open peace talks and called for a cease-fire; but to no avail.
The second round o f fighting ended with the rainy season. Between September 
1999 and May 2000 the fighting was interrupted. This truce coincided with the period 
of most intense diplomatic activity and, paradoxically, preparations for war. However, 
as the lull between the parties settled and mediations for peace intensified, one of the 
worst crises in Ethiopia since the 1984-85 famine unfolded, unnoticed by the 
international media until March 2002.21 At this juncture the media drew attention to 
the possible link between the slow international response to the drastic deterioration
of the food security situation in Ethiopia and the war. During this critical period
00estimates indicate that 10 million were in need o f food assistance. The war did not 
hit the drought affected areas in Ethiopia directly, which were mainly in the eastern
agricultural highlands and in the eastern and southern lowland pastoral areas
00(particularly in the Somali Region). However, the humanitarian response to the 
1999-2000 crisis was conditioned and disrupted by the war. Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi refused to accept any food aid shipped through the Eritrean port o f Assab.24 
The Prime Minister insisted that the war and the drought were separate issues and
OSshould not be linked to the distribution of the urgently required food aid.
19 Paulos Tesfagiorgis, 2004, op.cit., p. 152.
20 Security Council resolution 1226 (1999) on the situation between Eritrea/Ethiopia. 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm
21 Hammond, L., &, Maxwell, Daniel 2002. The Ethiopian Crisis o f 1999-2000: Lessons Learned, 
Questions Unanswered1. Disasters 26, p. 276.
22 Ibid., p. 262.
23 Ibid., p. 269.
24 Jeffrey, P. 26 April, 2000. W hy another drought in Ethiopia? (Dateline ACT/ Ethiopia 03/2000)' 
Action by Churches Together (ACT),. Addis Ababa, http://act-
intl .org/news/dt_nr_2000/dteth0300.html.
25 According to Jeffrey the Ethiopian government had recently acquired four new Russian-built Su-25 
attack jets, worth S 20 million each. ibid. The Eritrean government authorisation for international 
agencies to use the Assab port to facilitate food aid distribution is one o f the few and significant 
openings during the course o f  the two-year war.
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According to Hammond various external policymakers, including the UK 
Secretary for International Development and EU Commissioner Paul Nielsen, 
‘vocalised the view that the war was wasting valuable resources that should have been 
going to prevent humanitarian suffering’. International donors restrained then*
jn
response to the humanitarian crisis due to the unsettled armed conflict.
In the face o f mounting external pressure Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated:
jo
‘In Ethiopia, we do not wait to have a full tummy to protect our sovereignty'. The 
Prime Minister added that the Ethiopian government did not believe that ‘ (...)
JQ
protecting one’s sovereignty is a luxury for the rich'.
Finally, in May 2000, as the UN delegation and the US Ambassador to the 
UN- Richard Holbrooke flew back from their meeting with the parties’ delegations ( 
May 10, 2000) the Ethiopian government authorised the military commanders to start 
the major surprise offensive of the war two days later (on the 12th). On May 14, as 
the Ethiopians voted for regional elections, the Ethiopian Television (ETV) delivered 
news from the war front reporting the breakthrough o f the Ethiopian army into the 
various Eritrean fronts.
As the third round of fighting continued, delegates from both sides were 
meeting in Algiers. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, two days before the anniversary o f 
Eritrea’s independence, announced in Addis Abeba that in Ethiopia: ‘We shall
TOnegotiate while fighting. We shall fight while negotiating'.
As the EDF was forced to withdraw from Barentu (around the 18th May) and 
one day after the celebration o f the 7th anniversary o f Eritrea’s Independence (24th 
May), the Eritrean government announced its troops had withdrawn from all disputed 
border areas that were occupied after the 6 May incident. The cease-fire agreement
26 Hammond and Maxwell, 2002, op.cit., p. 276.
27 ibid., p. 276.According to Hammond, both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments refused to have 
their foreign policy dictated by external actors.
28 quoted in Hammond, ibid., p. 276.
29 White, P. 2005. 'Sovereignty and Starvation' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia 
and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 219.
30 CNN May 22, 2000. ‘Ethiopian, Eritrean armies in crucial border fight’ 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000AVORLD/africa/05/23/homofafrica.01/
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was signed on 18 June 2000. The Peace Agreement was finally signed in Algiers on 
12 December 2000.
3.2.4 Political and military dimensions
This section will explain how the positions on the battlefront conditioned the
international mediated negotiations to bring the conflict to a halt. More specifically, it
will address the following questions: to what extent did the engagement on the
battlefield involve only the conventional armed forces o f the two states? To what
extent did the two armies only follow conventional warfare tactics? To what extent
was armed violence directly targeted at civilians? Finally, this section will seek to
highlight how the military conduct o f the war elucidates the understanding o f the
political aims o f the war. The diverging positions with regard to the conduct of the
war reflected different understandings o f the political aims o f the war within each 
1
state’s executive and contending conceptions o f the relations between Ethiopia and
' j ' y
Eritrea, after the latter’s independence.
The first and second rounds of fighting
The first round o f fighting was submitted to Eritrea’s aim o f establishing by force 
what the Eritrea-Ethiopia Joint Border Commission had failed to achieve via the 
bilateral diplomatic negotiations. Despite having secured the upper hand, the Eritrean 
offensive halted once territorial control o f the disputed areas had been secured.
From Badme, the Eritrean forces occupied the Badumma plains. In the central 
sector the EDF came from Senafe33 reaching Maichea,34 without the sparse
31 However, the disagreements within the executives o f  the belligerent states only came to light in the 
aftermath o f the war, as chapter 4 will discuss.
32For more detailed accounts on the military unfolding o f  the war in the theatre o f operations, two 
works stand for its accuracy and precision o f details. One was produced during the war and the other in 
its aftermath, respectively: Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, op.cit. Plaut, M. 2005. 'The Conflict and its 
aftermath' in Jacquin-Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. 
Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press.
33 Senafe is located in Eritrea, 15 kilometres north o f  the border with Ethiopia and o f the contested 
border village o f Maichea.
34 Maichea is in ancestral Irob land on the border with Eritrea. The village had been under Ethiopian 
administration. This village is not to be confused with another town with similar spelling Maichew/ 
Maychew in Central Tigray, which is located southwest o f Adwa. Last, A. July August 1998. 'Villagers 
shrug o ff conflict'. Horn o f  Africa Bulletin 10, p. 5.
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population offering resistance. From there, the EDF managed to control the 
significant Aiga escarpment. Whoever controls this strategic hill acquires strategic 
control over the west, as far as the Zalambessa area. After having secured this area, 
the EDF proceeded into Alitena. In Alitena local militia provided a stronger resistance 
to the occupying forces. The EDF finally secured control o f this location. From 
Alitena the EDF proceeded into Zalambessa where a fiercer engagement occurred 
on June 3. The hostilities were brought to a lull in mid-June with Eritrea having the 
indisputable upper hand on the western and central fronts, and in the Badme and 
Zalambessa areas respectively.
The Eritrean offensive in the central sector encountered a greatly lesser 
defence on the Ethiopian side. The defence was poorly organised and the Ethiopians 
were taken by surprise. The border incident in Badme had occurred in May 6, 1998. 
By May 31 the EDF was in effective control o f the disputed areas in the Central 
sector.
According to the Ethiopian version, after the incident in the area of Badme on 
6 May 1998 and until 12 May 1998 the first incursions o f Eritrean troops into 
Ethiopian territory were only stopped by irregular armed forces. In the case o f Central 
Tigray the advance o f Eritrean troops was stopped with the immediate call to 
demobilized ex-combatants (mainly TPLF) and local militia. At this time the TPLF
'yn
had 28,000 demobilized combatants. The majority were living in Tigray. In addition 
to the demobilized TPLF combatants there were 50,000-60,000 militia combatants in 
the region. At this time the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) had only one 
Brigade in the whole o f Tigray.
During the first offensive Eritrean troops held positions as far as Zalambessa
*7Q
with shelling reaching as far as Adigrat (25 kilometres from Zalambessa).
35 A. Last estimates that the total population at the onset o f hostilities was 400. Ibid., p. 6 .
36 Ibid., p. 6 .
37 Interview in Addis Ababa, August 2005.
38 Approximately 3000 troops. The EDF units at this time were undersized. This number is just an 
estimate.
39 Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, op.cit., pp. 27-31.
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When the crisis escalated, the Ethiopian military commanders were faced with 
a double challenge: re-mobilization and the deployment of large contingents o f troops 
to the border areas. In addition, the necessary supply routes had to be ensured and the 
loss o f access to Assab imposed a further constraint.
In the aftermath of the war, its intensity led some to pursue the interpretation 
that the war had been in preparation before the May 1998 incidents.40 If  this had been 
the case it seems quite unlikely that the outbreak o f hostilities and the subsequent 
occupation o f vast stretches o f territory both around Badme and in Central Tigray, 
near the Zalambessa border town, would have occurred so close to the rain season. 
Indeed, the outbreak of hostilities came about in clear contrast with the Fronts’ 
conduct during the civil war. The EPLF and the TPLF avoided the conduct of 
insurgency campaigns during the rain season not only to avoid disruptions to the 
agricultural cycle, but also for tactical reasons. The two-year war erupted just before 
the start o f the most intense cycle o f the rain season. As a consequence, the 1998 war 
caught the peasants by surprise, and many struggled to commute between hiding 
places in caves and the fields, in order to minimize the disruption o f crop 
cultivation.41 This previous feature seems to confirm Gilkes and Plaut’s contention 
that the May 1998 incidents were the result o f a miscalculation rather than 
subordinated to a well devised strategic plan.42
The available figures on military spending, as a percentage o f GDP, seem to 
lend credence to the claim that the war took the Ethiopian side by surprise. However, 
the data should not be interpreted at face value because Ethiopia’s related military 
expenditure is likely to have been spread through various Ministries under different 
categories.43 In Eritrea, the data for 1995 also include the government’s expenditure
40 Trivelli, R. M. 1998. 'Divided histories, opportunistic alliances: Background notes on the Ethiopian- 
Eritrean war'. Afrika Spectrum 33: 257-289.
41 Behailu Abebe 2004. War stories, displacement and coping experiences o f the displaced from the 
Ethio- Eritrean war' in Pankhurst, A., and Francois Piguet, (ed.) People, Space and the State: 
Migration, Resettlement and Displacement in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University. In both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea the planting season starts in May, preceding the 3 months o f  'kramt', the intense 
rain season which lasts from the end o f June until early September. Hammond and Maxwell, 2002, 
op.cit., p. 263.
42 Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, op.cit., p. 17.
43 Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, Kjetil, Lovise Aalen 2002. ’ Ethiopia since the Derg: A Decade o f  
Democratic Pretension and Performance’. London & N .Y : Zed Books, p. 234.
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on demobilization.44 However, the data confirm that Eritrean society was, indeed, 
highly militarised; in relation to its total population and territory, and in comparison to 
its southern neighbour. In addition, the data confirm the centrality of the armed forces 
for the economy, both prior to and after the war, as chapter 5 will discuss.
Figure 1: Eritrea and Ethiopia Military Expenditure as % of GDP ante bellum45
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As Figure 1 suggests, Eritrea, from the military standpoint, was likely to have held an 
advantage over Ethiopia at the onset of the armed conflict. As chapter 4 shall discuss 
the ante bellum level of military expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, was the lowest 
in both countries since the overthrow of the Derg and Eritrea’s independence.
In terms of tactics, the first and second rounds of fighting were commonly 
characterised by external observers as germane to World War I.46 Indeed, key battles 
during the first and second rounds of fighting resembled First World War style trench 
warfare.47 The first round was characterized by division- level infantry assaults, 
backed by air strikes and artillery barrages. In the second round similar tactics were 
deployed but the levels of fire-power intensified,48 reflecting the armaments’ race
44 SIPRI 1999. SIPRI Yearbook 1999 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 322.
45 The graph was created by the author on the basis o f  the available data in SIPRI. For the data refer
to the table in Appendix 2. —  2005. SIPRI Yearbook 2005 Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security. Oxford Oxford University Press, p. 357.
46 Africa Confidential 1998. 'Eritrea/Ethiopia: Masters o f  War' 39; Africa Confidential 1998. 
'Ethiopia/Eritrea: Brothers at war' 39; Africa Confidential 1999. 'Ethiopia-Eritrea: W orld-class war' 40.
47 Jacquin- Berdal, D. June 5-11, 2000. 'Ethiopia-Eritrea: Addis Ababa's victory' West Africa, p. 24.
48 Connell, D. Spring 1999. 'Shootout in the Horn o f  Africa: A  V iew  from Eritrea’. Middle East Report: 
4-5.
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which occurred during the truce between May 1998 and February 1999. The warring 
parties fortified their positions along the disputed border areas with trenches, barriers 
and bunkers, ‘roofed with logs, stone and dirt for cover from aerial and artillery 
bombardment’.49
Between June 1998 and December 1998 both countries concentrated their efforts on 
the purchase o f armaments and transport o f hardware military equipment to the 
frontier. Ethiopia had to deal with mobilization, the training o f the new conscripts and 
the deployment o f troops along the previously ‘unmonitored’ border.
From the first round it became clear that the parties were not willing to reach 
an agreement at the diplomatic internationally mediated talks. The stalemate on the 
diplomatic front reflected the stalemate on the battlefield.
The second round was characterized by the Ethiopian counter- offensive 
launched in February 1999. This Offensive came to be known as ‘Operation Sunset’. 
The bulk o f the ENDF’s units were mobilized to Badme. The first Ethiopian attempt 
to seize Badme on 6 February 1999 failed. On 26 February 1999 after intense fighting 
Ethiopian forces broke through the Eritrean lines and captured Badme. The aim o f this 
operation was to overcome the previous stalemate. The outcome pointed to a reversal 
o f the strategic positions o f the belligerents. The operation comprised synchronization 
o f the infantry’s operations with the air force. On the ground, the infantry operations 
were supported by tank attacks. Eritrea subsequently tried to re-capture Badme but its 
three counter-offensives failed.50
During this phase one o f the fiercest battles was waged in Tsorona. Ethiopia’s 
attempt to break through the Eritrean lines failed, leading to one o f the most intense 
combat- related fatalities episode o f the two-year war. The outcome of these two 
major battles confirmed the stalemate on the battlefield. Ethiopia’s advantage in
49 Ibid., p. 5.
50 Plaut, 2005, op. cit.
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Badme was curtailed by Eritrea’s advantage in Tsorona. Up to this point the EDF was 
still convinced that it could win the war.51
Even if  this was an ‘old’ conventional war between the armed forces o f the 
two states, the destabilization through support to domestic opposition movements via 
neighbouring countries is a feature highlighted in the ‘new wars literature’ and 
increasingly salient in contemporary armed conflicts. The regional repercussions of 
this tactic shall be discussed in the chapter on the regional security architecture and in 
the epilogue on the Somalia crisis during 2006-2007.
After the first round o f fighting, Ethiopia rebuilt its relations with the 
Sudanese government. Ethiopia gradually withdrew support from the Northern 
Sudanese movements, namely the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) because of its close 
alignment with the Eritrean government. However, until March 1999 it still allowed 
the SPLA forces to use its territory. As a consequence o f Addis Ababa’s 
rapprochement with Karthoum since November 1998, the SPLA was, later, ordered 
out o f Gambella.53 According to Connell, in January 1999 Sudan launched a major 
offensive against its opposition forces (which were backed by Eritrea) in two areas 
alongside its western border with Eritrea.54 The Sudanese offensive along Eritrea’s 
western border contributed, arguably, to the EDF’s low expectations o f an Ethiopian 
offensive along this sector of the border. However, as the third round unfolded the 
ENDF benefited from an under-concentration o f Eritrean troops along this sector and 
a contingent entered Eritrean territory and reached Barentu via this ill- defended 
sector o f the border, as the next section will discuss.
The third round of fighting
The third round started on May 12 2000. In the third round the ENDF made use o f 
the difficulties o f the terrain in the western front to launch a massive surprise
51 Dan Connell claims that: ‘Most frontline fighters saw the conflict as a second battle for Eritrea’s 
survival as a nation’ . Connell, 1999, op.cit., p. 4.
52de Waal, A. 2004. 'Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa'. London: Hurst & Company, p. 
212 .
53 Young, J. 1999. ’Along Ethiopia's western frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in transition'. Journal 
o f  Modem African Studies 37, p. 332.
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offensive. The knowledge o f the enemy’s terrain contributed to Ethiopian military 
strategists’ decisive breakthrough. The soldiers advanced across the Mereb River in 
order to take over an ill-guarded mountain between the Eritrean front lines. The 
Ethiopian soldiers took over the village o f Enda Aba Simeon, which dominates this 
escarpment.55 For this operation the Ethiopian soldiers had to rely on the support of 
animal force, namely donkeys, to carry armament, supplies and other military 
equipment.56 Finally, the nature of the terrain rather than a constraint was correctly 
perceived by the war strategists as providing scope for outflanking the Eritrean 
defences57 and then for proceeding with the encirclement of the major front-lines. 
Simultaneously, the Ethiopian army opened a new front breaking through the Eritrean lines 
in the northwestern border with Sudan and Eritrea via Humera (Ethiopian territory). The 
Ethiopian troops captured Om Hajer (Eritrean territory), advancing towards Tesseney 
encountering minor resistance.58 After coordinated military engagement in this town the 
Ethiopian forces then advanced to Barentu. From Barentu, the Ethiopian army moved north­
east towards Agordat, while the main advance continued parallel to the border towards 
Mendefera.59 Finally, the breakthrough created the conditions for the Ethiopian 
offensive to be waged within Eritrean territory. The Ethiopian armed forces opposed 
the Eritrean army in the north o f Badme and pursued the offensive in Zalambessa, on 
the central front.60
The successful capture of Barentu and the surprise encirclement o f Eritrean 
troops in Badme and Zalambessa served to mask the Eritrean army’s defeat and the 
ill-planned withdrawal.61
54Connell, 1999, op. cit., p. 5.
55 Peninou, J.-L. juillet 2000. *Les Ambitions cachees d' Addis- Abeba : Ethiopie- Erythree, une paix en 
trompe l’oeiT. Le Monde Diplomatique URL http://www.monde- 
diplomatique.fr/2000/07/PENINOU/14025, p. 2.
56 Plaut, 2005, op.cit., p. 106.
57 ibid., p. 106.
58 Interview in Ethiopia, July 2005.
59 Patrick Gilkes, ‘ Free rein for Eritrean opposition’, BBC News Online: World: Africa , Tuesday, 23 
May, 2000.
60 Plaut, 2005, op.cit., p. 105.
61 Indeed, according to Plaut an entire Eritrean battalion retreated into Sudan and surrendered to 
Sudan’s authorities. Ibid , p. 105. Dan Connell provides further evidence to substantiate this claim in 
the interview conducted with Petros Solomon in Asmara in August 2001 prior to his detention, which 
continues at the time o f writing. Connell, D. 2005. 'A Conversation with Petros Solomon, August 23, 
2001’ in Connell, D. (ed.) Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners. Trenton and Asmara: Red 
Sea Press, p. 134.
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The losing o f ground to the opponent was covered internally with 
justifications that Eritrea was fighting its second war for independence, and with 
appeals to the international community to bring the Ethiopian government’s invasion 
to an end. For Asmara, the war was no longer about the border, and the threat of 
Ethiopia’s army reaching the capital seemed imminent.
For the final round, Ethiopia’s army had ensured both numerical and air 
superiority. During the civil war, Ethiopia’s Derg air superiority did not hamper the 
EPLF’s victory. As Alemseged Tesfai points out ‘eventually warplanes were 
discounted as decisive factors in the outcome o f major battlefield confrontations'. 
The outcome of the civil war confirmed the limits o f strategic airpower. However, in 
the two- year border war, during the third round ENDF engineered a close 
coordination between air and ground forces to support the army units fighting on the 
ground. The final round departed from First World War style trench warfare with a 
significant shift to mobile troops’ movements, using tactics germane to Second World 
War. The second round had showed the limits o f strategic air power. What determined 
the outcome o f the third round was not Ethiopia’s aerial superiority but the high 
commanders’ knowledge of the enemy’s terrain, their capacity to anticipate the 
opponent’s strategy and tactics and their capacity to strike exactly where they were 
least expected. In clear contrast, dissenting voices from the incumbent regime in 
Asmara suggest that the over-concentration o f decision on the President and his 
closed circle, and the sidelining o f experienced senior military commanders proved 
fatal to the Eritrean government’s conduct o f the war.
The Ethiopian government learned the lessons from the major setbacks in the 
first and second rounds, in Badme and Tsorona respectively. The shift from frontal 
attacks to bypassing and then encirclement shifted the course o f the war and its 
outcome, providing the Ethiopian government with the military upper hand and a 
decisive military victory.
62 Alemseged Tesfai 2003. 'Land and Liberation in Eritrea: Reflecting on the work o f  Lionel Cliffe'. 
Review o f  African Political Economy 96, p. 251.
63 Group Interview, London, April 2007.
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Finally, by 24 May, Eritrea’s government declared that it would agree on 
redeploying its forces to the positions held prior to 6 May 1998. 64 The Ethiopian flag 
was lifted up in Zalambessa on May 25th. 65 The intense diplomatic activity to implement 
an arms embargo during the previous round only became mandatory during the third 
round o f fighting on 17 May 2000 (UNSC resolution 1298). The mandatory one-year 
embargo covered arms transfers, military equipment, training and arms industry’s 
support for the two countries. Russia, one o f the main suppliers during the war (and a 
permanent member o f the UNSC), only implemented the embargo by the end of 
August 2000; after the parties had signed the 18 June Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement.
However, none of the peace initiatives in the periods of truce came close to 
success. The question emerges: Why a conflict fought for more modest goals than 
those o f the war for Eritrea’s independence was pursued with such intensity? Although 
there is no agreement on the number of total casualties, available estimates suggest that the 
thirty-year civil war led to 65,000 military66 and 250,000 civilian67 casualties. The two- year 
border war led to 70,000 to 100,000 military casualties on both sides.
The section on territory will illuminate how the border incident escalated into 
a border war, which raised militant nationalism’s emotional appeal into unexpected 
and extreme levels. The tragedy in the theatre o f operations was further exacerbated 
by inflammatory media coverage both in Ethiopia’s new founded private media and 
in the manifold web forums over the internet.69 Yet, for students versed in the study o f 
nationalism and in the implications o f its militant versions, the war intensity should 
come as no surprise.
64 Ibid., p. 27.
65 Jacquin- Berdal, D. June 5-11, 2000, op.cit., p. 25.
66 Pool, D. 1998. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front' in Clapham, C. (ed.) African Guerrillas. 
Fountain & Indiana: James Currey, p. 19.
67 Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Aida Mengistu, 2006. ’Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea: 
Building Multiethnic States' in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.) East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to 
Good Governance. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, p. 97.
68 Hansen, 2006, op.cit.
69 Guazzini, F. May 19-21, 2004. 'The Construction o f  Political Nationalism on the Web: Borders, 
Social Spaces and Identities in the Ethio- Eritrean Case Study' International Conference, States, 
Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa. Centre o f African Studies, University o f  
Edinburgh unpublished paper. Guazzini, F. 2001. 'Riflessione sulle Identita di Guerra nel Cyberspazio: 
il Caso Eritreo- Etiopico'. Africa: Rivista dell' Istituto italianoper V Africa e V Oriente LVI: 532-572.
104
Arguably, four crucial battles changed the course o f the war and impacted 
upon the war aims and the final military outcome: i) Operation Sunset and the 
Ethiopian army’s successful recapture of Badme (second round); ii) Ethiopia’s major 
defeat in the battle in Tsorona (second round); iii) Eritrea’s government decisions on 
the conduct o f the war in the aftermath o f the battle and withdrawal from Barentu 
(final round), and iv) the military engagement in Adi Begio (Bure Front) and 
Ethiopia’s decision not to advance toward Assab.
The outcome of Operation Sunset allowed the Ethiopian government to 
recover from the defeat during the first round o f fighting. Yet, during the second 
round, the battle o f Tsorona was a major setback for the Ethiopian army and the 
carnage in the battlefield and the remnants of the fighting in the no man’s land 
haunted protagonists and observers. In the third round there were two crucial 
moments: Eritrea’s commanders’ decision to withdraw from Barentu and Ethiopia’s 
decision makers’ option to cease hostilities when the military arguably had the upper 
hand and the Eritrean port o f Assab was within the ENDF’s reach. However, the 
Eritrean narrative o f the third round in the Bure Front seems to challenge the 
Ethiopian version o f the outcome of the major military engagement in the eastern 
front. The Assab front was near to Adi Begio (Bure Front), the theatre o f operations 
where the highest carnage of Ethiopian soldiers occurred during the final round. Reid 
refers that in Adi Quala a new town hall was named after this smaller village where 
intensive fighting took place in the third round. An elder commented that ‘Adi Beigo 
was the graveyard o f the woyane'. The Eritrean narrative o f events in the Bure Front 
seems to challenge the prevailing perception that Ethiopia’s decision not to recapture 
Assab was only politically conditioned, rather than militarily constrained. The fact 
remains that political decision makers prevented the military commanders from 
advancing toward the city port o f Assab. The military’s decision to abide could either 
have been motivated for fears o f a civil war71 or for the potential battle-related 
fatalities which such an operation would entail.
70Reid, R. 2005. 'Caught in the headlights o f history: Eritrea, the EPLF and the postwar nation state'. 
Journal o f  Modem African Studies 43, pp. 475-76.
71 Interview Addis Ababa, July 2005.
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Arguably, the conduct o f the war in the Bure Front had major implications for 
the splits in both the TPLF and the PFDJ in the aftermath o f the war, as we shall see 
in chapter 4.
3.2.5 Economic and social dimensions
This section on the social and economic dimensions o f the war looks at how the 
outbreak o f hostilities was perceived as an opportunity to bring to the surface existing 
economic and social grievances created by Eritrea’s independence. It will seek to 
understand if  there was an element of greed in the war rationale and if it had any 
impact as a source of motivation to engage and pursue military confrontation rather 
than diplomatic negotiations.
The examination o f greed and grievances as factors that keep many 
contemporary armed conflicts going is incomplete if  the historical dimension is not 
incorporated into the analysis. As a consequence, this part o f the analysis leads to the 
closing section o f the chapter, which explores the relationship between social and 
historical grievances and greed factors in explaining the intensity, the course and the 
duration o f the war.
The demobilisation processes in the two countries led to difficulties with 
regard to the re-integration o f the demobilized combatants into civilian life. It needs to 
be assessed whether among this segment some may have found appeal in joining the 
call to arms in the absence o f better alternatives in civilian life. This observation 
confirms that economic factors need to be taken into account as part o f a complex 
interaction with other grievances related to cleavages in the social formations. This 
hypothesis, however, should not overshadow the significance o f both states’ 
authoritarian apparatus and how access to critical resources at the local level was 
conditioned by one’s good performance as a committed citizen, of which military 
service was a duty.
When the Eritrean forces first entered Ethiopian territory, destruction and 
pillage followed. In the final Ethiopian offensive, May 2000, deep inside Eritrean
72 Interview London, March 2005.
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territory, destruction, pillage and looting also took place. Indeed, the tactics used by 
both belligerents correspond to common tactics of modem warfare.
The economic resentments over Eritrea’s introduction of a new currency, the 
nature o f the trade agreements with Eritrea and the perception of a clear disadvantage 
in Ethiopia’s terms of access to Assab had a clear impact on the conduct o f the war. 
Indeed, the continuing polarization o f domestic public opinion in Ethiopia around the 
army’s failure to capture Assab cannot be understood without taking into 
consideration economic/greed factors as incentives for armed violence.
For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s decision to divert all shipments due to Assab either to 
Djibouti or to Somaliland (to the port o f Berbera) heightened resentments over 
Ethiopia’s refusal to accept parity between the Nakfa and the Birr and for depriving 
Eritrea o f one o f the key sources o f government revenue, i.e., the provision o f the port 
services to Ethiopia .73
The war, in addition, brought to the surface criticisms to the privileged access 
to critical resources accorded to Eritreans and Ethiopian Tigrayans in the post-1991 
Ethiopia.
According to Assefa Negash the EPRDF’s policy- privileged members 
identified with the former insurgent movements. Positions as Vice-Director o f the 
Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority were the tenure of citizens who held 
dual nationality. Assefa Negash goes as far as to argue that this position was held by 
‘a national o f a neighbouring country, i.e., Eritrea'. The basis for this claim was the 
fact that the individual in question had voted in the Eritrean Independence 
referendum74. As a consequence of these pre-existing resentments, the war unleashed 
the debate around the nationalities’ question, as discussed in chapter 2.
The definition o f who was an Ethiopian and who was an Eritrean, in mutually 
exclusive terms, became critical with the border war. As it is well documented, the
73 Hansson, G. 2003. ’Building New States: Lessons from Eritrea' in Addison, T. (ed.) From Conflict to 
Recovery in Africa: Oxford University Press/ UNU/WIDER.
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consideration o f this key question led to massive expulsions under conditions heavily 
criticised by NGOs, both from the local emerging civil society and also from those 
with a global reach. The redefinition of citizenship prior to the war had already led to 
expulsions o f 120,000 Ethiopian citizens from Eritrea, but at the time the Ethiopian
n c
ruling party had remained silent. In contrast, by early 1999 more than 50,000 
Eritreans had been expelled or crossed the border for fear o f reprisals from Ethiopia.
Ultimately, even if  key economic and strategic motivations to continue the war 
existed, the military on both sides respected the cease-fire. The war was brought to an 
end after Ethiopia’s victorious outcome, partly for military reasons, partly for 
economic ones. The financial burden o f another year of armed conflict conditioned 
the decision to launch a final and decisive offensive that could guarantee a return to 
the status quo ante.
Despite the lack o f valuable economic resources on the western and central 
fronts the two belligerents were willing to fight over territory. This leads us to 
consider other significant dimensions of territory, as the final section o f the chapter 
will show.
3.3 Territory
As the war unfolded the symbolic and historical dimensions o f territory gained 
saliency. This section seeks to understand how the construction o f national identity 
became entrenched along the battle lines and led to the enhancement o f divergent 
interpretations o f history and o f founding national myths to mobilize ‘soldiers’ and 
‘public opinion’ on both sides of the border. Finally, the section examines the 
relationship between the borders and national/ local identities.
3.3.1 Historical and symbolic dimensions
74 Assefa Negash 1996. The Pillage o f  Ethiopia by Eritreans and their Tigreans surrogates. L.A.: Adey 
Publishing Company.
75Triulzi, A. Janeiro/ Julho 2002. 'Violence and the acknowledgement o f  tense past in the Horn : a note 
on the Ethio- Eritrean War (1998-2000)'. Cademos de Estudos Africanos 2, p. 97.
76 Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, op.cit., p. 53.
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The conduct of the war on the military front was accompanied by an increasing 
saliency o f historical grievances that had long remained silenced. On the Ethiopian 
side, three historical themes reappeared during the conflict: 1 ) the comparison 
between the victory against the Italians in 1896 in the Battle of Adwa and the victory 
against the Eritreans in February 1999 in Operation Sunset; 2) the definition of the 
Eritrean enemy dating back to the involvement o f Eritrean troops, the ascaris, in the 
Italian occupation of Ethiopia in World War II and, 3) the rehabilitation o f the 
EPRDF/ TPLF as the bearers of a long tradition of Ethiopian unity whenever the 
sovereignty o f the state is threatened by external aggression.
Badme, the spot o f the conflict, was soon to achieve the same standing as 
Adwa. Adwa, as will be further discussed, was the key location of Ethiopian 
resistance during the 19th century’s scramble for Africa by the major European 
powers. As the war unfolded the importance attached to the areas under dispute 
increased. According to Triulzi, the deliberate co-incidence o f the celebrations of the 
victory at Adwa and the Ethiopian successful re- capture of Badme reflects this 
intentional definition o f the interstate war as the ‘second Adwa’. Triulzi notes:
(...)The war helped the country to redefine an enduring site of 
memory and charge it with new symbolic meanings which were 
daily sanctioned by the conflict itse lf.77
This analogy alluded to the historical meaning o f that founding moment of resistance 
o f the Ethiopian state and o f the consolidation o f its boundaries. Badme can only be 
equated with Adwa to the extent that it represents a key event in the delimitation o f 
the colonial inherited borders in the Horn o f Africa.
The war propaganda reflected a much broader resentment against Eritrea’s 
independence. During the Federation years, immediately after the Italian occupation, 
and especially with the annexation o f Eritrea as an Ethiopian Province, any mention 
o f Eritrean collaboration with Italian troops was simply silenced. With the war the 
‘ascaris’ were again brought to the limelight as players alongside the Italian troops in 
ensuring the Italian occupation o f Ethiopia.78 In clear contrast to the Imperial regime
77 Triulzi, 2002, op.cit., p. 99.
78 ibid., pp. 95-97.
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and Derg , during the war it was common to find references in the media to the 
participation o f Eritreans in Italy’s successful campaign that led to the five-year
70
occupation o f Ethiopia.
Finally, when the war with Eritrea broke out in May 1998 the EPRDF was 
forced, by an unexpected level o f Ethiopian national sentiment, to abandon its 
previous emphasis on ethnic diversity. The demands o f the war intensified 
centralizing pressures over issues such as conscription. Meles Zenawi’s legitimacy 
decreased within the TPLF, but improved within the coalition, the EPRDF, and 
among other groups in society. Indeed, the ruling party used the war to prove its
OA
‘nationalist credentials’. Despite all internal divisions the motto ‘Ethiopia first’ 
seemed to re-emerge from the ashes of the previous regime. Indeed, this marks 
continuity in Ethiopian politics through successive regimes, since Emperor Menelik 
had managed to guarantee the borders o f the sovereign Ethiopian state during the 
European powers’ ‘scramble for Africa’.
During the final stage o f the war Prime Minister Meles Zenawi played the 
victory card successfully. The final offensive against Eritrean armed forces was 
launched during the May 2000 elections. The coincidence o f these two major events 
seems to suggest that this strategy was followed to boost the EPRDF support’s base 
throughout the country.
On the Eritrean side, one historical theme re-emerged during the conflict: 1) 
the genealogy o f the Project o f a Greater Tigray was traced back to the incursions of 
Emperor Yohannes and his commander Ras Alula in the 1870s and 1880s.81
Reid suggests that this historical parallel emerged in the late 1990s. Indeed, 
during their struggle for self-determination Eritreans rarely substantiated their claims 
in a deeply-rooted historical identity.
As Jacquin-Berdal points out:
79 Ibid., p. 97.
80 Interview in Addis Ababa, July 2003.
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Eritreans defined their nationalist aspiration as emanating from 
their shared colonial experience and presented the question of 
independence essentially in territorial and international legal 
terms, arguing that Eritrea’s right to self-determination should be 
decided on the same grounds as those o f other ex- African 
colonies.82
These developments highlight the relevance of the historical dimensions o f territory to 
understanding the centrality o f the border question in this particular war. In addition, 
these considerations point to a more significant development. As the war unfolded, 
the propaganda warfare led not only to diverging interpretations o f history but also to 
a revival of historical myths. The media and the warring parties daily fuelled these 
historical myths and, more significantly, the states constructed and sanctioned their 
revival. The subsequent section will analyse the revival of these myths to illuminate 
their role as boundary-defining mechanisms, which gained particular salience as the 
war unfolded.
3.3.2 Historical myths as boundary-defining mechanisms
Ethiopia and Eritrea and especially the Amhara and the Tigrinya- speaking 
communities north and south of the Mereb (Abyssinia) shared a common history up to
t h  0 1the 19 century, i.e., until the Italian colonization o f Eritrea. Their foundation myths 
were based upon the dynastic, as opposed to the national, principle. With the 
emergence o f nationalism in Eritrea a significant shift occurred. As Sorenson claims:
(...)while contact with Abyssinian kings to the south was 
acknowledged, Eritrean nationalists claimed that no Abyssinian 
king ruled the whole territory and that Turkish and Egyptian 
occupation contributed to the development o f a separate regional 
history.84
81 Reid, R. 2003. 'Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some observations on Eritrea and its relations with 
Tigray, From Liberation struggle to Inter-state War'. Africa 73, p. 379.
82 Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2002. Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn o f  Africa: A Critique o f  the Ethnic 
Interpretation. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, p. 86.
83 Donham, D. 1986. 'Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian empire: themes in social history' in 
Donham, D., and, James, Wendy (ed.) The Southern marches o f  Imperial Ethiopia : essays in history 
and social anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 19.
84 Sorenson, J. 1993. Imagining Ethiopia : struggles fo r  history and identity in the Horn o f  Africa. New  
Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, p. 43.
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Eritrea’s nationalism had to be pushed against the past ‘when Eritrea was inextricably 
linked to the main Abyssinian body'.85 Indeed, Eritrea’s nationalism is ‘historically 
grounded in the liberation war ‘and posed an intrinsic challenge to the myth of 
‘Greater Ethiopia'.86 This section does not examine the historical accuracy of the 
facts; its aim is to analyse how the interpretation o f history and its use by the ruling 
parties during both the civil war and the two-year war, elevated historical myths as 
boundary defining mechanisms.
The 1998-2000 war was accompanied by diametrically opposed interpretations 
o f the Italian expansion in the Horn o f Africa. While for Eritrea the colonial legacy 
remained the legitimate basis for self-determination and was used to nurture state and 
national identity formation and consolidation after 1993; for Ethiopia the legacy o f the 
state’s successful military victory over Italy’s attempt to colonize Ethiopia in the 19th 
century remained one o f the founding myths o f the modem sovereign state.
The incumbent regime in Ethiopia equated the Ethio-Eritrean war with the 
19th century armed conflict between Ethiopia and Italy. The incumbent regime in 
Eritrea equated the Ethio- Eritrean war with the armed conflict between the EPLF and 
Ethiopia.
The applicability o f Kolsto’s typology on historical myths as boundary- 
defining mechanisms to the Ethiopia and Eritrea border war acquires particular 
heuristic and analytical value because as Triulzi argues:
(...) the war itself made the border a bulwark o f national identity, the 
visible mark o f separation between the two countries. In this sense, from 
the very beginning, ‘borders were an issue which represented something 
much larger, namely nationality and identity’ and could easily become 
‘causes’ of war.
85 Reid, R. 2001. The Challenge of the past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent 
Eritrea \  History in Africa 28, p. 268.
86 Dorman, S. R. 2005. 'Narratives o f nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism’. Nations and 
Nationalism 11, p. 217. Jacquin-Berdal, D. 2000. ’State and War in the Formation o f Eritrean 
National Identity’ in Vandersluis, S.O. (ed.) The State and Identity Construction in International 
Relations. London: MacMillan Press. Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit.
87 Triulzi, A. 15-16 June 2006. ’Badme: Competing claims and symbology along a contested border 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea,’ AEGIS Conference, African Cities: competing claims on urban space. 
Centre o f African Studies: University o f Edinburgh: unpublished paper, p. 13.
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During the war, propaganda, either in the media and/or over the internet, diffused the 
Eritrean and Ethiopian versions of these historical myths and counter-myths. The 
intensity o f the war propaganda simultaneously fuelled and mirrored the bloodshed on 
the frontlines.88
This section examines how propaganda during the war played on alleged 
historical grievances, which are apprehended in a more systematic fashion with 
Kolsto’s typology.
The myth of being sui generis
In the Eritrean case, the myth o f being sui generis antedated the 1998-2000 war. The 
myths constructed on this basis are particularly important because they shed light on 
Eritrea's interpretation and sanctioning o f its own separate historical trajectory. The 
myth o f being sui generis was paramount to Eritrea’s definition of a separate identity 
with regard to: i) other insurgent movements, such as the TPLF; and ii) other post­
colonial states in Africa.
The myth of being sui generis characterized the relations between the two 
Fronts during the civil war. One o f the central sources of tension between the EPLF
O Q
and the TPLF was the latter’s initial ambiguity with regard to the insurgency’s aims. 
When the TPLF voiced its aim o f seeking self-determination for Tigray, the EPLF 
immediately resisted this trend and exerted pressure upon the TPLF leadership to 
abandon it. From the EPLF standpoint, TPLF’s attempted secession would not only 
fail to gather legitimacy internationally, but would also undermine the Eritrean case 
by stealing its singularity and specificity.90 In addition, this aim would imperil
88 Hansen, 2006, op.cit. Stig Harle Jansen’s thesis contributes to the understanding o f the evolution o f  
the public debate and decision-making before and during the war. The thesis reflects upon the opening 
up o f the press and shows how the oppositional press’ coverage o f the relations between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea after 1991 and with the outbreak o f  the hostilities constrained the EPRDF to follow a more 
nationalistic direction. Guazzini, 2004, op.cit. Federica Guazzini contributes to the understanding o f  the 
public debates on the internet. Guazzini claims that the debates reflected the different usages o f  history 
and o f the liberation war in order to make sense o f the armed conflict. Simultaneously it re-opened the 
debate on Eritrea’s relations with Tigray (and Ethiopia at a later stage) and on the relations between 
shabya (EPLF) and woyane (TPLF).
89 Young, J. 1996. The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Fronts: a history o f tension and 
pragmatism’. Journal o f  M odem African Studies 34: 105-120.
90 Marchal, R. 1993. ’L’apres-Mengistu dans la Come de l’Aftique : une stabilisation impossible ?’ 
Cultures & Conflits 8:40-63, http://www.conflits.org/document529.html, p. 10.
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Eritrea’s fight for self-determination, as it raised the suspicion o f a plea to revive the 
idea of a ‘Greater Tigray’, uniting in one territory the two Tigrinya- speaking 
communities north and south o f the Mereb. This concern was anchored on the merger 
of Eritrea and Tigray, as a Greater Tigray Province, during the Italian re-organization 
of Ethiopia within the East African Empire, which occurred between 1936 and 1941.91
EPLF’s pressure upon the TPLF to abandon the orientation toward secession 
is best understood within this purposeful and successful strategy to present the 
Eritrean case as, indeed, sui generis in comparison with the TPLF. Eritrea’s claim for 
self-determination was based on its legacy as an Italian colony. When the hostilities 
broke out, the revival of this line o f argument and suspicion followed. At the 
beginning o f the hostilities, from the Eritrean standpoint, the escalation o f the Badme 
crisis reflected the ‘woyane’ (i.e. TPLF) project to revive the ‘Greater Tigray’ aim. 
From the Ethiopian standpoint, Medhane Tadesse responded that:
( ...)  The TPLF killed the whole project once and for all when it 
declared in 1975 that the Eritrean question was a colonial
92question.
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The counter-myth to the sui generis is the myth at common descent. Indeed, the rhetoric 
in Addis Ababa and among non-Tigrinya speaking communities94 in Ethiopia is quite 
distinct from that of the Ethiopian Tigrinya speaking communities with regard to 
Eritrea. In spite o f the war, Tigrinya-speaking communities and Tigrayans, based 
either in the capital or in Tigray, insisted that:
We and the Eritreans are the same ‘people’ and now we are separated
because o f the closure of the border.95
Others, while sharing the perception o f the commonalities between the 
‘people’, would insist that the problem was between the leaderships.96
91 Gilkes, P. 1975. The dying Lion : feudalism and modernization in Ethiopia. London: Julian 
Friedmann Publishers, p. 192.
92 Medhane Tadesse, 1999, op.cit., p. 86.
93 Kolsto, P. 2005. Myths and boundaries in south-eastern Europe’. London: Hurst & Co, p. 19.
941 used the term Tigrinya- speaking communities rather then Tigrayan ethnic group because in Tigray 
people who identify with other ethnic groups also speak Tigrinya and tend to share this view.
95 Several interviews in Tigray, July 2005.
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In the end, it was not the partition of the territory and Eritrea’s independence 
that separated the Tigrinya-speaking communities in Ethiopia from their counterpart 
across the border; it was the two-year war and the closure o f the border that followed 
it.
The narrative in Asmara and among Tigrinya- speaking communities in 
Eritrea shows how Eritrea after Independence still perceived the need to strive to 
remove itself from the shadow of its larger and more powerful neighbour to the south. 
During the war and in its aftermath, Tigrinya-speaking communities in the Eritrean 
capital would use the David -  Goliath metaphor to highlight their heroic resistance to 
Ethiopia’s renewed threat to its independence:
Eritrea needed to defend itself from Ethiopia; Eritrea needed to 
defend its hard-won Independence.97
In comparison with other colonial states in Africa, Eritrea’s trajectory was sui generis 
because the areas from which it had been divided had remained formally
Q Q
independent. Eritrea s colonial boundaries had separated it from ethnically 
contiguous areas, reflecting what had happened elsewhere during the colonial 
partition o f Africa. The tensions that had punctuated the civil war were revived during 
the two-year war. Eritrea’s fears were anchored in its historically-formed separate 
national consciousness in contradistinction to Ethiopia's continuing territorial claim. 
As Halliday and Molyneux argue, the fact that Ethiopia had not undergone a 
corresponding period of colonial rule did not annul or obliterate the preceding 
territorial claim.99 The Tigrayan rulers in the 19th century had resented Menelik’s 
concession to the Italians of part o f their territory.100 Eritrea’s claim that the 1998- 
2000 war was a second war for its Independence should be understood against this 
background.
The myth of being antimurale and martyrium
97 Interview in Asmara, August 2004.
98 Halliday, F., and, Maxine Molyneux 1981. The Ethiopian Revolution. London: Verso, p. 175.
99 Ibid., p. 175.
l00Rubenson, S. 1976. The survival o f  Ethiopian independence. London.
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In the context o f the two-year war one historian promptly captured the reappearance 
o f the past in the antagonistic propaganda warfare. Triulzi was among the first to aptly 
draw attention to this function of historical myths. By equating the recapture o f 
Badme in February 1999 to a ‘second Adwa* the Ethiopian government was drawing 
upon the foundation myth of the Ethiopian modem sovereign state.101 Badme sealed
107the victory of Ethiopia over external aggression, acquiring a similar standing to 
Adwa a century earlier. Furthermore, both Adwa and Badme shared the same 
geographical location within Ethiopia: in Tigray’s region. As a century earlier, the 
region was once again portrayed as the main theatre where Ethiopia stood united 
against the threat to its territorial integrity.
This strategy successfully contributed to: i) legitimise the government’s 
conduct, ii) extend the basis of support o f the EPRDF and iii) continue with calls to 
contributions from the larger society to the war effort, either with troops and/or taxes. 
Indeed, the war forced the ruling party to downplay the saliency o f the sub­
nationalities, entailed by the Federal model based on ethnicity, and shift to revive 
skilfully ‘the old centralist interpretation o f the survival o f Ethiopian 
independence1.103
The two most common antemurale myths in Ethiopia can be traced back to the 
history of the expansion of Islam and European colonialism into the Horn o f Africa.
The propaganda warfare during the 1998-2000 conflict focused more on the 
latter. However, it is important to note that during the early period o f Eritrean 
insurgency, Addis Ababa revived the historical myth o f Ethiopia as the ‘ancient 
Christian outpost encircled by hostile Muslim forces’104 to justify its effort to defend 
Ethiopia from the threat presented by the secession insurgency in Eritrea.
101 Triulzi, 2002, op. cit.
102 Rubenson, 1976, op. cit.
103 Barnes, C. 2003. 'Sovereignty, Identity and Modernity: Understanding Ethiopia'. African Affairs 
102, p. 511.
104 Sorenson, 1993, op. cit., p. 43.
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Eritrea was depicted as a ‘foreign’ creation. Addis Ababa portrayed the 
secession insurgent movement, embodied by the ELF at that point,105 as a creation 
o f Arab states bent on the disintegration o f Ethiopia and on the transformation of the 
Red Sea into an ‘Arab Lake’.106
With the overthrow of the Emperor and the Revolution, the Derg continued to 
justify its effort, to control forcibly the Eritrean insurgency, on the basis o f its external 
creation. In continuity with the previous regime, the Eritrean insurgency was 
presented as a ‘foreign’ creation. In line with the previous regime, the historical myth 
of Ethiopia’s need to survive against ‘external aggression’ was central. This time the 
historical myth o f Ethiopia as the last outpost in Africa encircled by the European 
colonial powers was revived. But the Derg's  secular nationalism superseded the old 
nationalism based upon the dynastic principle and inextricably linked to Orthodox
107Christianity. The most common versions o f the antemurale myth in Ethiopia mirror 
the characteristics found in Kolsto’s definition.
In conclusion, during Eritrea’s insurgency, Ethiopia’s emphasis on the need to 
defend Eritrea as part o f the true ‘civilization’ was revived in two ways: i) the long 
standing medieval myth of the Orthodox Christian Kingdom in Africa: Ethiopia as the 
bulwark of Christianity against Islamic expansion, and ii) the myth of Ethiopia as the 
bulwark of independent statehood in Africa against European colonialism. In the two 
instances Ethiopia’s unity in the face of ‘external aggression’ was implicitly 
celebrated.
Finally, in the myth of being anti murale, Tigray, within Ethiopia’s historical 
trajectory, was once again the region where the defence o f territorial integrity against 
external aggression was upheld. The EPRDF/TPLF revived the historical myth used 
by the Derg to counter Ethiopia’s northern insurgencies, especially the EPLF.
While Ethiopia revived the myth o f Ethiopia’s heroic victory at Adwa against 
Italy, during the two-year war Eritrea resorted to its martyrs’ heroic resistance against
105 During the imperial era.
106 Sorenson, 1993, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
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Ethiopia’s successive regimes’ oppression, discrimination and persecution during the 
thirty-year war for independence.
Ethiopia’s historical myth o f Adwa purports to its grandeur, power and might 
as the sole state in Africa to have victoriously resisted European colonialism and 
defeated a European power. Eritrea’s historical myth, in stark contrast, reports to the 
heroic resistance o f its fighters, the martyrs, and their sacrifice to prevent Eritrea from 
remaining the target of discrimination and persecution from its neighbour.
Kolsto’s contention shows that this feature is not unique to Eritrea:
The experience o f victimization and its presence in the collective 
memory raises group awareness. Members o f the group may begin 
to think of themselves as members o f a particular nation precisely 
because they have become victims of atrocities that are afflicted 
upon them by others.108
According to an ex-combatant for the EPLF, Eritrea’s conduct during the two-year 
war was entirely justified. The ex-combatant emphasised Eritrea’s stance as reflective 
of its continuous need for self-defence in face of its powerful neighbour to the south: 
‘Eritrea just wants peace but our neighbour keeps on tempting us'.109
Finally, the analysis o f the inter-state war against the background o f the civil 
war sheds light not only on the understanding o f which historical myths were brought 
back to the fore, but also helps to understand the ones which faded away or were 
purposefully silenced in the official discourse. While the myth o f Eritrea’s 
invincibility faded as the war unfolded, especially during the final offensive, the PFDJ 
presented the ill- devised withdrawal as germane to the strategic withdrawals 
conducted during the three-decade war. Indeed, the final offensive and the military 
outcome of the two-year war led to ‘the abrupt collapse o f the myth of Eritrean 
invincibility’.110
107 Clapham, C. S. 1988. Transformation and continuity in revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, p. 195.
108 Kolst0 , 2005, op. cit., p. 21.
109 Interview in Asmara, August 2004.
1,0 Clapham, 2001, op. cit., p. 13.
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While the EPLF and the TPLF alliance in the civil war against the Derg was 
build on the common experience o f oppression and discrimination o f Eritrea and 
Tigray at the hands o f successive Ethiopian regimes111 the collective memory o f this 
common experience was totally silenced in Ethiopia during the two-year war. 
Tigray’s martyrs o f the civil war were replaced by the region's singular standing as 
the outpost o f the Ethiopian state against external aggression.
The myth of antiquitas
According to Kolsto, nationalists often misappropriate earlier state formations as their 
own to prove that the old state that controlled the territory was the one with which
\\*y
they identify. However, these earlier state formations, corresponding to pre-modem 
states, were based on a dynastic and not a national principle.113
Ethiopia could draw more openly on the myth o f antiquitas. Eritrea, on the 
other hand, relied on the counter-myth. In this respect, the Eritrean leadership was 
forced to silence the past in order to be consistent with the historical grounding o f 
Eritrean nationalism on the war for independence. Any claim o f antiquitas prior to 
Italian colonization would run counter to the entire edifice upon which the Eritrean 
nation-state had been legitimately constructed,114 but the border under dispute was 
that defined according to the colonial treaties. The borders had crystallized by 1936, 
i.e. prior to the incorporation of Ethiopia into the East African Empire. The quagmire 
was that neither the colonial state in Eritrea, nor the modem sovereign state in 
Ethiopia had fixed borders throughout their existence. Paraphrasing Kolsto: ‘the 
borders waxed and waned’ over the decades o f their political coexistence.115
While this is certainly the case when evaluated against Ethiopia’s process o f 
state formation and trajectories of state and nation building, Eritrea was bom with the 
borders inherited from the colonial period. However, these borders in contrast with
111 Especially during the D erg’s Red Terror campaign.
112 Kolsto, 2005, op. cit., p. 21.
113 Halliday and Molyneux, 1981, op. cit., p. 175.
114 According to John Sorenson ‘ Eritrean nationalist discourse rarely projects a unified identity into 
antiquity. Instead, it emphasises a decisive transformation under Italian colonialism’. Sorenson, 1993, 
op. cit., p. 42.
115 Kolsto, 2005, op. cit., p. 22.
119
other post-colonial states were not immediately recognized upon departure of the 
colonial power. Firstly, Italy’s reorganization o f the East African Empire led to the 
incorporation, under the same territorial entity, o f Eritrea and the Tigrinya-speaking 
communities south of the Mereb. During the short-lived Federation with Ethiopia, and 
during its later incorporation as a Province of the Ethiopian state, the border ceased to 
exist. Furthermore, as the insurgency escalated in Tigray and Eritrea, the movements 
expanded ‘the liberated areas’ under their effective territorial control. The borders 
were transformed into ‘no-man’s-land’ depending on which o f the opposing sides had 
the upper hand during the civil war. The opposing sides comprised not only the 
insurgent movements and the Derg, but also the insurgent movements’ internal 
opposition, as highlighted by the hostilities between the EPLF and ELF, the TPLF and 
the ELF and the later tension between the EPLF and the TPLF.
As Triulzi summarized it, the borders changed status frequently since the 19th 
century up to Eritrea’s independence. The border status shifted from mere internal- 
administrative marker, to a colonial border, to dissolution, to inter-state border during 
the one-decade Federation, becoming an internal border again, going through a phase 
o f contested no-man’s-land during the civil war and, finally, acquiring the status o f a 
national border.116
Two points related to the waning o f the border after its crystallization in 1936 
are particularly relevant. Firstly, the implications o f defeat and the period o f Italian 
occupation are not readily acknowledged in Ethiopia; with the exception of references 
to the external aggression and accompanying patriotism.117 Indeed, as Barnes notes: 
‘The Italian experience, while fleeting, was crucial for Ethiopia’s post- war 
sovereignty1.118Secondly, the TPLF alliance with the EPLF in the latter’s 
confrontation with the ELF had implications with regard to the administration o f the 
‘liberated areas’. During the two-year war not only was the alliance between the two 
silenced or re-interpreted in light o f the previous period o f tension in the 1980s, but
116 Triulzi, 2006, op. cit., p. 7.
117 Bames, 2003, op. cit., p. 513.
118 ibid., p. 513.
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also the implications of this alliance on the TPLF and ELF confrontation, which 
contributed to the expulsion of ELF combatants from Eritrea.119
The use o f historical myths to foment hatred and aggression is not unique to 
this dyad in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the Balkans with the disintegration o f 
Yugoslavia was infested with such myths.120 After the end of the Cold War, militant 
nationalism re-emerged as a potent force fuelling armed conflicts that plagued both 
the Horn of Africa and the Balkans during the last decade of the twentieth century.
3.3.3 Conceptions and practices with regard to the boundaries
Since Eritrea’s formal independence and up to the outbreak o f hostilities, the local 
conceptions o f the boundaries between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the practices o f 
borderland communities across borders had not substantially changed. The 
communities in the borderlands continued to conduct their everyday business as usual, 
but under improved conditions due to the end o f the civil war. The communities 
continued to intermarry and visit relatives on both sides o f the border, and to many the 
border was hardly noticed. Evidence collected especially in the Central Sector 
indicated that daily practices were based on decisions taken regardless o f the 
border.121
In the Central Front when hostilities broke out, many ran and sought for hiding 
places regardless o f the border, others were directed by the EDF to Eritrea. Behailu 
Abebe’s research findings suggested that ‘fleeing the area and panic was the first 
stage of reaction to the war'.122 Some went to the nearest town in Ethiopia (Adigrat) 
and others sought refuge in nearby caves and localities removed from the frontline. 
Behailu's research showed the variety o f coping mechanisms developed during
119 Jacquin-Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, 2005. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business'. Trenton 
and Asmara: Red Sea Press. Notes from participant-observation at the ‘One day Conference- Eritrean 
Initiative/ Reconciliation’. London, 21 May, 2005.
120 Kolsto, 2005, op. cit., p. 1.
121 Tronvoll, K. March 2003. 'Identities in Conflict: An ethnography o f war and the politics o f  identity 
in Ethiopia 1998-2000' Department o f  Anthropology. London: London School o f Economics and 
Political Science (LSE)/ University o f  London. Abbink, J. 2001. 'Creating Borders: Exploring the 
Impact o f the Ethio- Eritrean War on the Local Population'. Africa: Rivista dell' Istituto italiano per V 
Africa e V Oriente LVI: 447-458.
122Behailu Abebe, 2004, op. cit., p. 406.
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wartime conditions and the different experiences of those who were caught up in the
1 9^middle o f hostilities.
The situation in this border area was different from the situation in other 
border areas, especially in the western and eastern sectors, where the majority o f the 
residents did not identify with Tigrinya-speaking communities in the two states. In 
contrast, the norm in this part of Tigray, in villages around Zalambessa, was ‘fluidity 
o f identity and social boundary markers were invisible or irrelevant'.124 Humera125 
(Western Front) did not fall within the border-disputed areas, as the line in this part of 
the border is clearly drawn along the Tekezze River. However, the town was shelled 
several times during the course o f the war.126 The citizens o f this area did not escape 
the massive military recruitment campaign and were enlisted. As Hammond’s 
research shows, the new-comers to the area, mainly Ethiopians who had been living 
as refugees in Sudan until the overthrow of the Derg regime, in order to be fully re­
integrated faced similar pressure to other peripheral peoples. Although in Ethiopia 
conscription is not compulsory, ‘voluntary’ conscription was one o f the central 
components o f becoming a good citizen. With the war, the call to take up arms was 
articulated in the context of the much needed support around the national cause. These 
new-comers seldom escaped joining the local militia and/ or from carrying out their 
military ‘duties’. The family’s access to local critical resources (land and water) and 
local services (health and education) was dependent upon the head o f household and
177male member’s fulfilment of their ‘duties’ as Ethiopian citizens.
At the onset o f the war it was expected that those affected directly by the war 
were likely to be displaced not across state frontiers but within their state. Empirical 
evidence collected mainly from the Central Sector, near Zalambessa and the Irob area, 
shows that the movement of borderland communities reflected the predominant local 
conceptions and practices with regard to the border. When hostilities started, the 
borderland communities sought refuge regardless o f the border. Both Eritrean citizens
I23ibid., p. 411.
124 ibid., p. 422.
125 Humera is located in Ethiopia’s north-western border, in Western Tigray, near the border with 
Sudan and with Eritrea. The nearest village on the Eritrean side o f  the border is Om Hajer.
126Hammond, L. C. 2004. This Place will Become Home: Refugee Repatriation to Ethiopia. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press.
127 Ibid.
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fled to Ethiopia and Ethiopian citizens to Eritrea. Their return to Ethiopia either 
during the course of or after the third round o f fighting is consistent with other 
accounts 128 showing how the degree o f animosity and hatred grew exponentially as 
the third round o f fighting unfolded. For the first time, since the outbreak of 
hostilities, the Ethiopian citizens who had sought refuge in Eritrea, and waited for the 
end o f hostilities to cross the border, started to fear reprisals from the Eritrean army,
17Qto an extent which had been absent during the previous rounds o f fighting.
In the case o f Eritrean citizens and, particularly, the Kunama the growing 
sense o f hatred within Eritrea towards the Ethiopian’s armed forces’ invasion and 
Eritrean officials’ suspicions towards this group led them to fear for their safety and, 
like the previous group, cross the border to seek refuge and protection in Ethiopia.
As the war grew in intensity, and in particular after the second and third 
rounds of fighting, considerations o f personal safety led various groups to seek 
alternative routes to return to Ethiopia. This transformation shows how local identities 
were supplanted by national ones.
These events illustrate two significant transformations shaped by the war:
1) At the outbreak of hostilities borderland communities sought refuge regardless 
o f the states’ borders and, under wartime conditions, did not feel significantly 
threatened by the ‘other’ state;
2) At the end o f hostilities, and particularly in the course o f the third round o f 
fighting, citizens from borderland communities were forced by an increased 
fear of reprisals to move back to or seek refuge in the state which they 
identified as the guarantor o f their security. Their increased treatment as 
members o f the enemy state forced them to embrace the mutually exclusive 
path. The Eritrean citizens that identify themselves with the Kunama ethnic
128 Federica Guazzini’s research on cyberspace shows that the escalation o f  the systematic campaign o f  
hatred on the Eritrean part toward Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea coincided with the beginning o f the 
Third Round o f Fighting in May 2000. This shift came as retaliation for Ethiopia’s invasion o f  Eritrea. 
Guazzini, 2004, op. cit., p. 15.
129 Interview Tigray Region, July 2005.
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group were not the only group among borderland communities to seek refuge 
on the enemy state’s soil. Ethiopian citizens from other borderland areas 
followed a similar path in order to escape hostilities.
In conclusion we can observe that the outbreak o f hostilities led to different 
strategies of survival during wartime conditions. In the north-western and north­
eastern part of the Ethiopian border, the displacement occurred mainly within borders. 
In the central sector the displacement was both within and across state borders 
showing that the decision to escape was taken regardless of the borders. In the central 
sector, the presence o f the Eritrean Defence Force led many citizens to escape to 
Eritrea rather than to towns, villages and caves in Ethiopia. Up to the final round o f 
fighting there was no displacement of Eritrean citizens across the borders with 
Ethiopia. The Kunama, during the third round o f fighting, escaped to Ethiopia for fear 
o f reprisals.
The conduct o f the war impacted on the local conceptions o f the boundaries
that used to be predominantly based on their openness. The introduction o f the
Eritrean currency (Nakfa) had already started the process o f transformation of the
border. The trench lines built along the border imposed a physical marker o f the
border, which had an impact on local conceptions and practices. The boundaries
became entrenched in notions of obstruction, obstacle and interdiction. In one of the
first accounts o f the conflict, Abbink rightly claimed that the war ‘sealed the
110irreversible secession o f Eritrea from Ethiopia’. This process was effectively sealed 
with its transformation into the main theatre of the conflict and with the closure o f the 
border in the aftermath o f the cease-fire.
During the hostilities the existence of many websites and on-line forums for 
discussion allowed the mobilisation and involvement of a key external constituency o f
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the two states: the diaspora. Guazzini’s research showed how a ‘war o f words’ was 
waged over the internet. Not coincidently, the escalation o f the propaganda mirrored
130 Abbink, J. 1998. 'Briefing: The Eritrean- Ethiopian Border Dispute'. African Affairs 97, 
p. 562.
131 The chapter follows Terrence Lyons’ definition, i.e., ‘what defines a diaspora is participation in 
activities designed to sustain linkages to the homeland’. Lyons, T. 2006. 'Diasporas and homeland
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the intensity on the battlefield. During the third round when the Ethiopian armed
forces invaded Eritrea, the Eritrean websites intensified a campaign o f hatred against
1their Tigrinya counterparts south of the Mereb. This participation had implications
for the debate around the war’s background conditions and what its aims should be.
The degree and intensity of participation of the diaspora (both in financing the war 
1effort and in framing the debate around the war) should not be overlooked. Indeed, 
this is one of the key characteristics highlighted in the ‘new wars literature’ relevant 
for the understanding of this ‘old’ war.134
Lyons has developed reconciliation work with the Ethiopian diaspora and, at 
the time of writing, is developing a research project on the impact o f conflict- 
generated diasporas on homeland conflicts. The research findings show that 
members o f the Ethiopian diaspora had different conceptions of what the space 
labelled Ethiopia should be. The three groups offered competing visions o f the 
homeland.
1) One group emphasised the overarching unity of Ethiopians and 
interdependence among the Ethiopian people. To them, Ethiopia represented a 
glorious historical and territorial entity to which unity and loyalty was owed. 
For some, this conception o f Ethiopia included the entire territory o f the 
currently recognized state as well as the neighbouring state o f Eritrea.
2) For another group the territorial space occupied by ‘Ethiopia’ included 
‘Oromia’, the territory occupied by the Oromo people who awaited their 
legitimate self- determination. To them, Ethiopia merely represented a 
geographic concept rather than a source o f positive identity based on voluntary
conflict' in Kahler, M., and, Barbara F. Walter, (ed.) Territoriality and Conflict in an Era o f  
Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 113.
132Guazzini, 2004, op.cit. Guazzini, 2001, op. cit., p. 566.
133 The diaspora contribution to financing the war is discussed in chapter 5 on the section on the war 
induced taxation increase.
134As discussed in the first chapter, the ‘new wars literature’ seeks to demonstrate the role o f  diasporas, 
under the globalization o f  communications, in ‘ the funding, techniques and politics o f  wars’. Kaldor, 
M. 2005. 'Elaborating the ' New Wars' thesis' in Duyvesteyn, I., and, Angstrom, Jan (ed.) Rethinking 
the nature o f  War. London and N.Y.: Frank Cass, p. 211.
135 Lyons, 2006, op. cit.
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association. Thus, for the Oromo, Oromia rather than Ethiopia was their 
homeland, with clear territorial boundaries.
3) A third group shared the territorial definition of the homeland put forth by the 
first. However, this group shared the second group’s resentment from 
oppression from successive despotic regimes from Northern Ethiopia toward 
the peoples of southern Ethiopia.136
The research findings o f this Project, quite significantly, call attention to the fact that 
despite divergences the three conceptions had a common denominator: a vision o f the 
homeland with territorial dimensions.
The conceptions of homeland for the first group seem very similar to what is 
commonly portrayed as the conceptions o f the Ethiopian ‘public opinion’. As 
Pausewang notes:
in the urban context (...) an educated, ethnically mixed and 
socially privileged majority stands for Pan- Ethiopian nationalism.
They speak Amharic, the lingua franca o f the Empire, and want to 
feel Ethiopians without ethnic distinctions. For them, ethnic 
differences are self-destructive, and Eritrean independence is an 
amputation which they cannot easily forgive.137
More significantly, Pausewang rightly claims that a majority of the urban elite
rejected the independence o f Eritrea in 1993. With the 1998-2000 war they have
gradually accepted Eritrea’s independence but in its aftermath still hold that the port
o f Assab should have remained within Ethiopia’s sovereign territory.138 However, a
note of caution is required with regard to how far this conception reflects the
1majority’s vision o f what Ethiopia should be after Eritrea’s independence.
Without the creation of conditions for the borderland communities to adjust 
their practices across borders within the framework of peaceful inter-state relations,
136 Lyons, 2006, op. cit., pp. 124- 125.
137 Pausewang, S. 2004. 'Aborted or nascent democracy? Structural reasons for the failure o f  
democratisation in Ethiopia' in Sorbo, G.M., and, Siegfried Pausewang, (ed.) Prospects fo r  Peace, 
Security and Human Rights in Africa’s Horn. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, p. 146.
138 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
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the divergent conceptions of the various Ethiopian constituencies will remain either 
anachronistic or meaningless. Eritrea's continuity as a sovereign state remains largely 
independent from these conceptions, but the destinies o f the citizens on both sides o f 
the border remain tragically affected by them. For the borderland communities the 
war and the closure of the border led to a change of practices that, in turn, impacted 
upon the conceptions with regard to the border and, more significantly, with regard to 
the ‘other’.
Paradoxically, for the ‘urban elite’ and for constituencies within the diaspora 
the war and its aftermath provided the opportunity to voice resentment on the fait 
accompli of Eritrea’s independence and on its implications for Ethiopia.
Indeed, the analysis in this closing section shows that the war was a watershed 
for the conceptions o f Ethiopia and Eritrea, after the latter’s independence. The 
change of practices of borderland communities in the Central Sector clearly 
conditioned the transformation of conceptions with regard to the borders, and 
crystallized the different national identities of Tigrinya-speaking communities north 
and south of the Mereb. The diaspora conceptions of homeland and the ‘urban elite 
dominant opinions’ seem to converge on resentment over what Ethiopia became after 
Eritrea’s independence.
Indeed, the empirical evidence confirms that the war was about the disputed 
boundary in its relation to national identity.
3.4 Conclusion
The chapter is critical in understanding how the conduct o f the war led to a 
transformation o f the importance attached to each o f the causes o f the war. 
Furthermore, the conduct o f the war led to the transformation o f the war aims on 
various levels.
Although depicted initially from Eritrea as a conflict between Eritrea and the 
Northern Region o f Ethiopia - Tigray, the war was conducted between the armed 
forces o f the two sovereign states. The first and second rounds o f fighting followed
139 Ibid., pp. 142- 146.
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tactics more germane to World War I trench warfare- style, yet both belligerents had 
access to high- tech weapons. The third round of fighting displayed characteristics of 
World War II, such as the coordination between aerial bombardment and the troops' 
mobility. Throughout the three major rounds o f fighting both belligerents provided 
support to each others’ opposition armed movements in neighbouring countries; a 
common feature in other cases of contemporary armed conflicts, as highlighted in the 
‘new wars line o f enquiry’ and discussed in chapter 1. Although the war was a 
conventional war between the armed forces of two sovereign states, there were two 
other features common to contemporary armed conflicts, as portrayed in the ‘ new 
wars literature’: the initial support from the diaspora constituencies to the war
financing effort, and the diaspora’s participation in the debate around the war through 
on-line forums and websites. The diaspora conceptions o f the homeland reflected the 
divergences within Ethiopia’s executive with regard to the war aims.
The outbreak o f hostilities, and the intensity of the violence on the battle fronts 
during the two-year war, raised the question o f nationalities. With the national 
question at the forefront, the re-definition of citizens of both states ensued. The right 
o f Eritreans living in Ethiopia to dual-citizenship ceased and the war justified their 
expulsion under unlawful conditions. The Ethiopians from the border areas seeking 
refuge in Eritrea during the war increasingly faced discriminatory treatment to the 
point of fearing for their own safety, and were forced to return to Ethiopia during the 
final round o f fighting.
From the outbreak of hostilities until the cease- fire was finally signed, 
significant changes occurred at various levels.
Badme, from a barren strip of land, was transformed into a second Adwa, i.e., 
new symbolic meanings from an enduring site o f memory were attached to Badme. 
Furthermore, the victory in the final offensive marked the end o f a major war o f 
national identity.140
140 Clapham, C. 2003. 'Guerre et construction de 1 Etat dans la Come de L'Afrique' in Hassner, P., et, 
Roland Marchal, (ed.) Guerres et societes : Etats et violence apres la Guerre Froide. Paris: Editions 
Karthala.
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The support to each other's armed opposition groups was only possible via the 
use o f the territory o f third countries, especially Sudan and Somalia.
The extent to which the war represents the beginning o f a new cycle o f state 
formation and consolidation o f supremacy in the region of the Horn141 needs to be 
considered in greater detail and it will be the focus o f chapters 5 and 6.
The observations in this chapter show that the outcomes o f the war in its 
various dimensions can only be understood at the junctures of key decision making 
moments during the conduct o f the war, both on the political and military fronts. On 
the political front, it was argued, the US-Rwanda cease-fire/ peace proposal after the 
first round o f fighting was a missed opportunity for Eritrea. The OAU-US cease-fire 
proposal, after the second round and prior to the final round, was a missed opportunity 
for Ethiopia. Each missed opportunity for peace was followed by a tragic increase in 
the number o f casualties.
On the military front, key decisions during the war already showed major 
disagreements and diverging paths in the core o f the decision making bodies of the 
dominant factions in the two regimes. With hindsight, for Ethiopia, two key moments 
impacted upon subsequent political events: the battle o f Tsorona, in the second round 
of fighting, and the decision that prevented Ethiopian forces to advance towards 
Assab. In Eritrea, both the events that precipitated the escalation of the crisis, and the 
decision for Eritrean forces to withdraw from Barentu in the third round of fighting, 
were key sources of disagreement, which affected the course o f events both during the 
war and in its aftermath. This will be the focus o f the next chapter on the outcomes of 
the war. Once the fog of war dissipates, the time is ripe to render the war decision­
makers accountable for their decisions, even in states where civil society is prevented 
from participating in the key debates that shape its destiny.
The prevalence o f repressive state apparatus and authoritarian regimes in the 
two countries prevents any initiatives o f reconciliation emanating from the civilian 
constituencies directly affected by the war: the borderland communities and the
141 Ibid.
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Ethiopians and Eritreans with links to both countries. Without the opening up o f space 
for civil society to participate in the ‘healing of the recent past’ not only will the 
borders remain closed but the development of the two countries will be deflected from 
its original aim: to foster peace and stability, both domestically and in the region, 
through cooperation in mutually advantageous terms.
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Chapter 4: Outcomes of the 1998-2000 war: From Brothers War to Border War
4.1 Introduction
It has been almost a decade since the opposing sides signed the peace agreement. At 
the time o f writing no progress has been achieved in the normalization of relations 
between the two countries. The relations between the neighbouring states are still 
punctuated by animosity.
Chapter 4 postulates that the war aims changed as the war unfolded. The aim 
o f this chapter is to analyse the outcomes of the war in its various dimensions. The 
period of analysis draws upon the events after the Algiers Peace Agreement up to the 
events that followed the May 2005 elections in Ethiopia. However, other significant 
events, such as Eritrea and Ethiopia’s contending approaches to the 2006 Somali 
crisis, will be examined in the epilogue. The purpose of chapter 4 is to provide an 
analysis o f the outcomes of the war, against the backdrop o f the preceding chapters. It 
will, however, reverse the order of the analysis o f the various dimensions. The 
territorial dimension will be treated first; reproducing the prominence attributed to 
territory during the course of the war, and in the way the war was brought to an end. 
The second section will examine the political and military outcomes o f the war. The 
third section offers an analysis of the economic and social outcomes of the war. The 
closing section will reflect upon the regional implications o f the war.
4.2 Why Territory matters: territorial outcomes
4.2.1 Outcomes of the Peace Agreement
While the Africa Union had been charged with the settlement o f the peace 
negotiations, the United Nations was assigned the provision o f the peacekeeping 
input. The United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had the 
mandate and the means to resolve a conflict between two sovereign states. The war 
between the armed forces o f the sovereign states led to the establishment o f a ‘classic’
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1 9UN interposition force. The Peace Agreement resulted in the creation o f two 
significant Commissions: a Boundary Commission (EEBC), article 4 (2) and a Claims 
Commission (EECC), article 5 (1). The Commissions’ tasks were to delimit and 
demarcate the border (EEBC) and consider compensation claims by both sides 
(EECC), respectively.
The Peacekeeping Operation was established to monitor a 25-kilometer-wide 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) along the 1,000 km border separating the two 
countries. The initial effort of the UNMEE to define the TSZ in accordance with the 
orientations provided by the Algiers Peace Agreement signatories was met with 
difficulties. In the Agreement it was convened that the line would correspond to the 
one before the events o f 6 May 1998. Initially, the good-will line, which was 
unconditionally accepted by Eritrea, left Irob land inside the TSZ. Ethiopia’s failure to 
provide a map o f the borderline with precise coordinates led the UNMEE to include 
large swathes o f territory which had been previously administered by Ethiopia, within 
the Temporary Security Zone. After realising this inaccuracy, Ethiopia complained 
and urged UNMEE to redraw the line, placing it further north. UNMEE was later able 
to provide an operational map that already included Irob land within Ethiopia’s 
territorial jurisdiction. This redrawing o f the line according to Ethiopia’s later 
coordinates led Eritrea to protest and to claim that Ethiopia had not withdrawn from 
‘occupied territory’. Eventually, this misunderstanding raised Eritrea’s suspicions in 
relation to UNMEE’s impartiality in the dealings with both states. Finally, the TSZ 
was formally declared in mid-April 2001.4
UNMEE also had the responsibility o f chairing the meetings o f the Military 
Coordination Commission (MCC), to which both parties agreed to assign senior rank 
military officers. In addition, the UNMEE was charged with monitoring and
1 MacQueen, N. 2002. United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960. London: Pearson Education,
p. 221.
2 Algiers Peace Agreement 12 December, 2000. 'Agreement between the Government o f  the Federal 
Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia and the Government o f the State o f Eritrea,
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/eritrea/paxethioerit.pdf?link_id=&slink_id=3172&link_type= 12& 
slink_type= 13&tmpl_id=3\
3 Peninou, J.-L. juillet 2000. 'Les Ambitions cachees d' Addis- Abeba : Ethiopie- Erythree, une paix en 
trompe l'oeil’. Le Monde Diplomatique URL http://www.monde- 
diplomatique.fr/2000/07/PENINOU/14025.
4 MacQueen, 2002, op. cit., p. 230.
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implementing the activities o f the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), for 
land mine clearance. The MACC role was fundamental to creating the conditions for 
the re-settlement of the borderland communities, displaced by the war, and for the 
future demarcation of the border.
The creation and the deployment of an interposition force between two 
sovereign states seemed a straightforward task when compared with ongoing Peace 
Keeping Operations in other contemporary armed conflicts. The combatants’ status 
and the issues related to the definition of Prisoners o f War and their treatment posed 
far less ubiquitous challenges than any other ongoing conflict in Africa or elsewhere. 
However, since the signing of the peace agreement both parties used all means at their 
disposal to hamper the normalisation o f relations. Indeed, both parties purposefully 
placed unexpected constraints on the workings o f the set o f institutions and legal 
dispositions they had agreed upon in Algiers. This became particularly notorious with 
regard to the legal decision on the disputed areas along the frontier.
The creation o f the independent Boundary Commission to decide on the 
border’s delimitation and demarcation (EEBC) was set up on the premise that the 
final decision on the disputed border areas would be final and binding. The EEBC 
finally announced its decision on 13 April 2002. After the initial euphoria and claims 
o f outstanding victory by both parties, ambiguities contributed to an exacerbation of 
suspicion and animosity between the parties. The key problem was the ambiguity with 
which the award of Badme was approached. The EEBC only mentioned Badme twice 
and both parties manipulated this initial ambiguity to claim that the town had been 
awarded to itself. Badme is the place where the incident which had triggered the 
crisis had happened. In the end, the contentious situation surrounding Badme took 
precedence over the extensive areas where agreement could have been reached, and 
which offered promising areas for incremental measures towards a rapprochement 
between the parties. This initial resistance led both parties to submit their own 
observations and evidence to contest the EEBC April 2002 Decision. After revision of 
the processes submitted by the parties, the EEBC announced on 21 March 2003 the 
final and binding decision to recognize Eritrea’s legitimate sovereignty over Badme 
on the basis of the Colonial Treaty and, especially, on the basis o f the juridical line
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which had crystallized in 1935, prior to Italy’s invasion and forcible occupation o f 
Ethiopia.
The creation o f a Claims Commission implied that the parties recognized the 
centrality o f territory in the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, as Cooper notes, 
reparations represent a key component o f wars over territory.5 The EECC had the 
responsibility o f delivering the ruling on the application o f jus ad bellum and the law 
of Human Rights on the conduct between belligerent parties The most significant 
EECC decision, on jus ad bellum, was announced on 19 December 2005. The EECC 
recognized that Eritrea’s resort to force to settle the border dispute had been unlawful, 
and as a consequence it recognized that Ethiopia had resorted to force legitimately in 
self- defence.6 Indeed, Eritrea acted in violation o f jus ad bellum. According to the 
customary practice with regard to the International Law o f Armed Conflict and the 
Use o f Force, the legitimacy o f the use o f the means of coercion to settle disputes 
related to demands of due jurisdiction over contested land has been outlawed from 
international society, particularly since the Second World War.7
In the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea the absence of any enforcement 
mechanism and the inability to implement the EEBC decision on the ground 
highlighted how the devices purported to consolidate the peace agreement were 
becoming a hindrance to the rapprochement between the parties. Ethiopia and
Eritrea’s diverging approaches and resistance to the legitimate institutions set 
up to bring about the normalisation o f relations reflected their unwillingness to reach 
a consensus on the means to overcome the stalemate. The rupture of formal relations 
between the two regimes has persisted, and at key junctures the rhetoric o f animosity 
and of mutual suspicions raised the prospects o f an escalation o f the crisis into armed 
hostilities.
4.2.2 The Temporary Security Zone and contested territorial boundary
5 Cooper, R. 2004. Breaking o f  nations : order and chaos in the twenty-first century New York Atlantic 
Monthly Press, p. 14.
6 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission December 19, 2005. 'Partial Award Ethiopia's Claims 1-8 Jus 
ad bellum between the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia and the State o f Eritrea, 
http://www.pca-cpa.Org/ENGLISH/RPC/#EECC%20Awards'.
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The establishment of international devices and actors intended to implement and 
guarantee the peace process transformed the porous borders. Indeed, the establishment 
o f the TSZ was the key to the consolidation o f a frontier. The absence o f natural 
resources combined with the difficulty in overcoming the stalemate around the EEBC 
decision leads us to look more carefully at other dimensions o f the problem. As the 
stalemate around the demarcation o f the three contested sectors persisted, detailed 
scrutiny of the several components o f the relation between a state and its territory 
became paramount.
UNMEE played a central role in the consolidation of the border, indeed the TSZ 
was, perhaps, leading to the fossilization o f the frontier. The agents and institutions o f 
the states initially relied on UNMEE’s patrolling missions to maintain security in the 
aftermath of the Algiers Peace Agreement. Eritrea as the vanquished state had to 
accept the terms o f the victorious party, which led to the implementation of a 25 
kilometres buffer zone within its territory.
As the stalemate persisted, Eritrea became suspicious of the international 
community’s standards in relation to both countries. From Asmara’s standpoint, 
Addis Ababa’s continuous failure to accept the EEBC decision on Badme proved how 
international law was primarily subordinated to realpolitik.
The emplacement o f displaced communities near the border and within the TSZ 
seems to have been used by both governments as the means to create buffer 
mechanisms, which mark the division between Eritrean and Ethiopian sovereign
o
territory. However, the frontier remained infested with landmines. UNMACC offered 
an alarming estimate o f their extent.9
7 Mayall, J. 1999. 'Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self- Determination'. Political Studies 47, 
p. 489.
8 The resettlement o f both displaced people and refugees either near the border (Ethiopia’s case) or in 
the TSZ (Eritrea’s case) seems to suggest that both states follow this strategy to create buffer 
mechanisms in the borderland. In these two states, the resettlement and emplacement o f displaced 
communities o f refugees near the disputed border precedes the extension o f  the states’ required 
institutions to mark the borders. The use o f returned refugees to keep the borders is part o f a process o f  
extending state institutions in the borderlands. Hammond, L. C. 2004. This Place will Become Home: 
Refugee Repatriation to Ethiopia. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
9 In Eritrea the MACC detected an estimate o f approximately 1, 500 000 to 1, 650,000 mines and 300, 
000 unexploded ordinances. Ethiopia is contaminated with 2, 000, 000 mines. IRIN 28 April 2005.
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The Commission’s decision to award Badme to Eritrea fuelled the mistrust and 
intransigence between the parties. Badme, as the trigger o f the conflict, became the 
symbol o f the entire outcome of the war. As things stand, however, the demarcation 
of the border, especially the control of Badme, appears as an intractable problem. As 
long as the border remains contested the potential of a relapse into conflict should not 
be discarded.
Interestingly enough, the media coverage o f the 15 May 2005 elections 
reported the registration of voters in Badme, as part of the north-western zone of the 
Tigray state,10 therefore within Ethiopian sovereign territory. The registration o f 
voters in Badme for the Ethiopian elections in 2005 provided some indication of how 
the situation was likely to remain hostage to both parties’ intransigence. Ethiopia’s 
move was a device to overcome the ambiguous citizenship o f the Badme residents in 
the aftermath of the contested decision of the EEBC, and to impose its territorial 
jurisdiction in defiance of the EEBC Decision. However, the members o f the EU 
Electoral Observation Mission to Tigray rejected the votes cast in Badme and in other 
disputed areas as null, due to the pending contention between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
with regard to the EEBC 2002 Delimitation Decision.11 This significant measure 
highlighted that, in stark contrast to Eritrea’s claims, the international community had 
not favoured Ethiopia in handling the persisting stalemate between the signatories o f 
the Algiers Peace Agreement.
4.2.3 Borderland Communities
thThe June 18 ceasefire and the subsequent peace agreement between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia on 12 December 2000 ended the war. However, a humanitarian crisis caused 
by the combination o f armed conflict and drought was only later assessed and 
recognized by the international donor community. The ceasefire did not mean that 
war-displaced people and especially borderland communities could safely return to 
their homes.
'Eritrea- Ethiopia: Four injured by landmines along border'. These figures related to the legacy o f both 
the civil and inter state wars.
10 BBC Monitoring Service 22 January 2005. Eritrea: Ethiopia proves its defiance, registers voters in 
Badme'.
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Ethiopian and Eritrean troops destroyed almost everything in their path, 
including grain reserves, livestock, homes, equipment, and infrastructure. In addition, 
both Eritrean and Ethiopian troops laid landmines in areas of conflict, further 
compromising the safety of returning populations. The displaced people and expellees
1 9living inside the TSZ, and especially those living in the contested areas, bore the
brunt of the traces o f the war and of the closure o f the border. In the aftermath of the
war the total number of Eritreans in need of emergency assistance was estimated to
1 ^have reached 1,665,000 or a staggering 47.5 per cent o f the population. The Eritrean 
government, UN agencies and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) sources 
stated that 1,5 million people, about 40 per cent of the country’s population of 3,5 
million, were affected by either the war (1 million) or the drought (500,000).14
If we look at specific groups, especially the ones in the borderlands, and in 
particular pastoralists, it becomes clear how the pending territorial outcome o f the war 
still hampers the normalisation o f life.
Pastoralists on both sides o f the border were adversely affected by the 1998- 
2000 war and by its aftermath. Their livelihood practices were disrupted and the
11 Interviews in Ethiopia, July-August 2005.
12 As Donnan et al. claim governments often dislike foreign scholars, or national scholars from their 
own metropolitan centres, looking around disputed borders, especially if  the governments fear security 
breaches. Donnan, H., and Wilson, Thomas M. 1999. Borders, Frontiers o f  Identity, Nation and State. 
Oxford & N.Y: Berg, p. 14. While conducting fieldwork in Eritrea in July- August 2004, despite 
having successfully secured all the logistical support and necessary institutional arrangements to visit 
an IDP camp in Senafe, neither the University o f  Asmara nor the Eritrean Relief and Refugee 
Commission were in a position to provide me with the required official authorisation from the state. 
Indeed, without this permission not one o f the NGOs or UN agencies working on the TSZ would be 
able to provide logistical support. But the constraints on the movements o f non-nationals are not 
limited to researchers. During an extended period even the movements o f the UNMEE patrolling 
missions were severely limited by the government, especially on the Keren - Barentu road, and have 
further deteriorated at the time o f  writing. IRIN, ‘ERITREA: Restrictions on movement o f  
peacekeepers persist, UN says’, NAIROBI, 16 Mar 2004. In several interviews with members o f  
International Organizations it was clear that no permission was granted to travel North o f  Afabet. 
Interview, Asmara August 2004. IOs and NGO international staff were required to apply for 
permission to travel beyond 140 km from the capital. At the time o f writing any journey outside the 
capital involves applying for an official authorisation at least ten days in advance o f the intended 
departure date from the capital. The campus o f the University o f  Asmara has been closed and the 
ERRC has been extinguished.
13 Refugees International, ‘Eritrea: More Than 1.5 Million People at Risk’ , 07/27/2000, 
http://www.refugeesintemational.Org/content/article/detail/716/?mission=l 639
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seasonal migration across the boundary was severely restrained by the mines left 
behind by both armed forces along the frontier and by the creation o f the TSZ, within 
Eritrea, and the closure o f the border. The loss of cross border mobility has hampered 
pastoralists from securing access to critical grazing and water resources, as well as to 
key traditional markets where there is a high demand on livestock.15
Kunama and other Gash Barka borderland communities
According to Gash Barka residents the restrictions o f movements across the border 
with Ethiopia, particularly of nomadic herders, antedated the war.16 However the war 
and its aftermath further disrupted livelihood practices. The seasonal migration across 
the border in search o f fertile grazing land and water resources was hampered by the
17closure of the border and by the mines left behind as a legacy of the hostilities. The 
seasonal migration for both nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists is an important 
survival strategy for all the production systems in the region; this is the response 
developed by borderland communities to critical shortages o f pasture and water.
For Eritrean pastoralists from the western lowlands, particularly the Tigre- 
speaking Beni-Amer and the Cushitic-speaking Hdareb the closure o f the border left 
few alternatives concerning the need o f pastures for their livestock; the environmental 
degradation in Eastern Sudan means that the seasonal movements across this part o f
1Rthe border is not sustainable. The loss o f cross border mobility for pastoralists along 
the frontier was particularly disruptive o f pastoralists’ livelihoods on both sides of the 
border.19
The Kunama from Gash Barka in Eritrea were among the worst affected. 
Many o f the Kunama left in 2000 when the Ethiopian army withdrew from Eritrea. 
As of late December 2003, there were 4,141 Kunama refugees in Ethiopia, living in
14 Refugees International, ‘Eritrea: After Shooting Stops, Massive Humanitarian Aid’, 21/06/ 2000, 
http://www.refugeesintemational.org/content/article/detail/713/
15 White, P. 2005. 'Sovereignty and Starvation' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia 
and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 224.
16 Iyob, R. 2000. 'The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn o f Africa, 
1991-2000'. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 38: 659-682.
17 PENHA-NUEYS 2002. 'Eritrean Pastoralism in 2002- New Challenges and the Need to Raise 
Awareness about Pastoralist Livelihoods'.
18 ibid.
19 White, 2005, op. cit., p. 224.
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the temporary W a’ala Nihibi camp, only 20 kilometres from the Eritrean border. The
90temporary camp is located in a barren desert area o f the western zone in Tigray.
Alexander Naty challenges the view that the Kunama were or still are particularly
91loyal to the Ethiopian state. In the aftermath o f the war the Eritrean government’s 
suspicion o f this group reasserted itself. Naty argues that the Kunama suffered both at
99the hands of Ethiopian and Eritreans state authorities. Their resentment towards the 
Eritrean government contrary to the predominant rhetoric is not based on the legacy 
of the war for independence but on the forceful dispossession of their land, which was 
allocated to returnees from Sudan and to other groups from the Eritrean highlands.23 
Furthermore, Alexander Naty argues that the Ethiopian government’s use of Kunama 
grievances and support for the Eritrean Kunama Democratic Movement (EKDM) 
during the 1998-2000 war, among other Eritrean opposition groups, is mainly geared 
towards destabilising the trajectory of nation building in Eritrea.24 In this sense the 
Kunama’s position within Eritrea remains fragile and this borderland community was 
particularly affected by the war and by its aftermath. The Kunama like other 
borderland communities remain divided from their kinsmen across the border. This is 
neither unique to this ethnic group or to the borderland communities along the frontier 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Irob
9SEthiopia Irob was one o f the Ethiopian border territories invaded by Eritrean forces. 
Irob land was occupied by the Eritrean forces from 31 May 1998 until June 2000 and
9 ( \prior to this date had been administered by Ethiopia.
20 Refugees International, ‘ Forgotten People: The Kunama o f  Eritrea and Ethiopia’, 18/02/2004, 
http://www.refugeesintemational.org/content/article/detail/939/.
21 Naty, A. 2001. TVIemories o f  the Kunama o f Eritrea towards Italian Colonialism'. Africa: Rivista dell' 
Istituto italiano p er  V Africa e V Oriente LVI, p. 580.
22 ibid., p. 581.
23 ibid., p. 587.
24 ibid., pp. 588-89.
25 One member o f the Programme ‘ Indigenous Soil and Water Conservation in Africa (ISWC)’ was 
conducting research in Eastern Tigray, just south o f the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, at the end 
o f May 1998, Ann Waters-Bayer, ‘ Conflict causes suffering among the Irob people’ , Field Trip 
Report From Northern Tigrai, Mon,
03Augl998,http://www.geocities.com/~dagmawi/News/News Aug6 Tigrai.html.
26 Interviews in Ethiopia, July 2005.
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35,000 displaced people were based in Adigrat during the major offensives. 
The northern part of Irob land was occupied by the Eritrean Defence Force. Young 
Irobs were conscripted by force into the Eritrean army. The Eritrean armed forces 
were said to have been in Irob land (Ethiopia) to update their records on men and 
women o f an age to be called up for military service. At the time the elders had a 
village meeting to decide whether they should authorise the recruitment of members 
of the Irob community into the Eritrean military. They decided not to let any young 
person leave the village for the obligatory military service until the border was settled 
and their citizenship finally defined. Despite the lack o f any mechanisms to articulate 
the interests o f the local communities they resisted compliance with the Eritrean
77
demands until a final settlement was reached.
The ones who remained in Ethiopia were threatened more by the demands for 
conscription than by the occupation o f their land by the Eritrean Defence Force. With 
the third round o f fighting the ones who had sought refuge in Eritrea felt compelled to 
return to Ethiopia for security reasons. The Eritrean Defence Force’s occupation of 
the area was resented because o f the destruction and looting o f property and the 
disrespect of places of religious practice, such as churches. A sense o f security was 
recovered when the Eritrean troops were finally dislodged by the Ethiopian army. 
However, communities in the central sector still resent the persisting militarization of 
the border. The frontier has been transformed into a garrison area and the continuous 
presence o f soldiers in the region was a transformation wrought about by the war with 
significant social implications for the borderland communities in this sector.
For the Irob- Saho it was only during the conduct o f the war that the 
implications o f Eritrea’s Independence were acutely perceived. The initial difficulty 
in establishing the good will line raised Irob’s awareness o f the implications o f the 
TSZ and their loyalty was expressed toward the state that had administered the area 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities, i.e., Ethiopia. However, the initial ambiguity with
27 Interviews in Eritrea July 2004 and in Ethiopia July 2005. Peninou, J.-L. Decembre 2001. 'Tensions 
regionales et guerre contre le terrorisme: Un redeploiement strategique dans la Come de L'Afrique'. Le 
Monde Diplomatique http://www.monde-diplomatique.ff/2001/12/PENINOU/l 5940.
140
regard to the creation of the TSZ created resentment towards the Ethiopian 
government for having mishandled the defence o f Irob’s interests.
Afar
The conduct of the war seems to have led to a rapprochement between Afar insurgent 
movements and the EPRDF/TPLF. However, in the aftermath o f the war the closure 
o f the border became particularly disruptive to Afar borderland communities, 
especially to those based in Zone 2, which directly shares borders with Eritrea. 
Indeed, the government in Ethiopia has not ensured the monopoly of coercion in this 
zone o f the Afar Regional State and non-residents in the area are discouraged from 
travelling to this zone.
In addition, with the outbreak o f hostilities and in the aftermath of the war the 
main nerve o f the transport traffic was displaced from the Addis Ababa-Assab road to 
the Addis Ababa-Djibouti road. While the disruption o f traffic to the Assab port did 
not directly affect the Afar as they hardly benefited from the traffic to Assab, the 
intensity o f traffic along the road to the Djibouti port was accompanied by increasing 
tension between the Afar and the Ise.30 According to Markakis, the Afar and Ise 
clans’ conflict antedated the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As in other regions in 
post-1991 Ethiopia, the Federal government defined the regions’ boundaries without 
precise coordinates with regard to the administrative territorial jurisdiction o f each 
region. The emergence o f internal boundary disputes between regional states of the
o -I
Ethiopian Federation was left for the regional authorities to settle. In this respect, the 
Afar loss of land was two-fold. To the north they lost Assab to Eritrea, to the south 
they lost land to the Ethiopian Somali region to the Ise. Although this was not an 
ethnic conflict at the onset, as the confrontation opposed one Somali clan to several 
Afar clans over access to grazing land and water, the politicization of ethnicity in 
post-1991 Ethiopia contributed to the saliency of the ethnic dimension of the conflict.
28 Abbink, J. 2001. 'Creating Borders: Exploring the Impact o f the Ethio- Eritrean War on the Local 
Population'. Africa: Rivista dell' Istituto italianoper I'Africa e V Oriente LVI, p. 457.
29 Bryden, M. January 1996. 'Situation report on Region 2 (Afar National Regional State)'. Addis 
Abeba: UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, 
http://www.alfica.upenn.edu/eue_web/AFARlA.htm.
30 Markakis, J. 2003. 'Anatomy o f a Conflict: Afar and Ise Ethiopia'. Review o f  African Political 
Economy 96: 445-453.
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Indeed, as Markakis claims: ‘The role of the ethnic factor is illustrated by the 
intervention of the Ugugumo on the Afar side, undoubtedly motivated by ethnic 
solidarity'.32
The major clash between Afar and Ise pastoralists occurred in the Afar 
Region’s Zone 3 during 2002. The casualties of this forceful encounter led to the 
closing o f the road between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. While the Afar favoured the 
return to the status quo ante, the Ise favoured a referendum to delimit the internal 
boundaries between the two Regions (Afar and Somali). The EPRDF policy in the 
aftermath of the war with Eritrea was to lower barriers between regions and decrease 
the saliency previously attributed to ethnic groups.33 The government’s main concern 
in the region was related to the maintenance o f undisrupted flow o f traffic along the 
Addis Ababa- Djibouti road. The military presence along the stretch o f the road that 
goes through the Afar region’s zone had increased and the army was ordered to 
enforce the state’s authority if  any armed civilians came near the road and refused to 
lay down their arms.34 Rather than fostering mechanisms o f conflict resolution, the 
EPRDF policy remained one o f minimal interference as long as the conflict did not 
escalate and/or impact on the movement of goods along the major transport route to 
the Djibouti port.
The EPRDF/TPLF capitalized on Afar resentment for the loss o f Assab port 
and mobilized their support for the war effort. The outbreak of hostilities between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea allowed the Afar to pursue their aim o f recovering lost territory, 
namely the Assab port. In this respect, the war led to a rapprochement between the 
Afar insurgent movements and the ruling party in Ethiopia. After the war, insurgency 
continued in the Ethiopian Afar region, particularly in Zone 2. The Afar in this zone 
resented the closure o f the border, as their daily practices were disrupted. The Afar 
used to move across the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea through zone 2 on their 
way to the major livestock market in Djibouti. Their livelihood and practices were 
disrupted by the closure of the border and they are now forced to travel further south
31 Ibid., pp. 448-50.
32 Ibid., p. 453.
33 Ibid., p. 451.
34 Ibid., p. 452.
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in Ethiopia to reach Djibouti through the main road that links the Ethiopian capital to 
this neighbouring country.
For the Afar, prior to the war, the border was conceived just as an imaginary 
line; with the war, and particularly in its aftermath, the border is now perceived as a
1 c
fortress.
The civil war against the Derg and the inter-state war have left borderland 
communities in the Northern frontier particularly exposed and affected by armed 
conflict. However, the border war led to the closure of the border. Even during the 
civil war the borderland communities continued to move across the areas controlled 
by the state’s forces and by the insurgent movements. During the civil war the 
hostilities and check- points restrained the movements o f civilians across the 
provincial territorial jurisdictions but did not hamper or totally obstruct the movement 
of peoples and goods. Indeed, the closure of the border in the aftermath o f the 1998- 
2000 war has imposed a decisive shift in the conceptions and practices of the 
borderland communities in this sector; to a scale which the previous regimes failed to 
achieve.
Furthermore, the closure o f the border disrupted borderland communities’ 
practices, namely the previous pattern of access to preferred markets regardless o f the 
borders. As Markakis highlights, this practice was not exclusive to the Northern 
frontier with Eritrea. Indeed, prior to the war the markets for borderland communities, 
namely pastoralists, in other regions, were respectively:
The markets for the Ogaden in Ethiopia are in northern Somalia, 
for the Ethiopian Afar in Djibouti, for the Eritrean Beni Amer in 
eastern Sudan.36
In addition to these, the markets for the Tigray region in Ethiopia used to be in 
southern Eritrea and those in the Eritrean capital. The markets for Eritrea were in 
Northern Ethiopia, mainly in Tigray. In addition, the markets for north-western 
Ethiopia (mainly Tigray region and north western Amhara region) were in south­
35 Interview in Addis Ababa, July 2005.
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western Eritrea and in eastern Sudan. The closure o f the border forced exporters and 
grain producers to travel further, and enhanced the costs o f transport to reach the 
markets in eastern Sudan.
The conflicts over grazing land and water have long permeated the relations 
between Ethiopian Tigrayans and Ethiopian Afars. Indeed, during the final years o f 
the TPLF insurgency and their hold of territory in the Tigray province, the leadership 
had decided to give legitimacy to the Abagore, a traditional institution used by the 
two groups to resolve the conflicts arising over the access to critical resources: water 
and land. Despite the introduction of this measure by the TPLF, violent struggles
nn
between the Tigrayans and the Afar had not declined prior to the war with Eritrea.
4.2.4 The territorial boundary and ius solis and ius sanguinis principles of 
Citizenship
In Ethiopia prior to the implementation o f the ethnic-based Federal model the rules 
governing the acquisition o f citizenship dated from 1930 and were based on a 
combination o f the ius solis principle (law of the soil) and on the ius sanguinis 
principle (law of the blood). According to the ius solis principle citizenship is derived
•JO
from birth in the territory of the country. The ius sanguinis principle is based upon 
descent from a national of the country in question. The interpretation o f the two 
principles meant that Ethiopian law regarding citizenship granted both ius solis —  
those bom in Ethiopia were Ethiopian —  and ius sanguinis —  those bom to two
TOEthiopian parents were Ethiopian.
The state did not allow dual nationality. It should be noted that Ethiopia 
considered Eritrea as a Tost Province’ during Italian colonialism (1890-1941) and 
British Administration (1941-1952); as a result, any Eritrean entering Ethiopia and 
wishing to acquire Ethiopian citizenship was entitled to do so. With the Federation 
(1952- 1962) and, especially, with its dissolution Eritrean nationality was
36 Markakis, J. 1998. Resource Conflict in the Horn o f  Africa. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: 
PRIO and SAGE Publications, p. 173.
37 Young, J. 1998. 'Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia'. Third World Quarterly 19,
p. 200 .
38 Koser, K. 2007. International migration : a very short introduction. Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 22.
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relinquished. All citizens in Eritrea or those o f Eritrean origin residing in Ethiopia 
acquired Ethiopian citizenship. Indeed, Eritrean nationality ceased to exist. Eritreans 
who fled during the war for independence (1961-1991) were registered upon arrival in 
host countries as Ethiopians.40
With Eritrea’s independence and the EPRDF’s own conception o f Ethiopian 
statehood and nationhood the situation changed significantly with serious 
international and domestic implications.
The EPRDF conceptions o f statehood and nationhood had ill- considered 
implications for the international and ‘domestic’ nationalities of those ethnic groups 
who straddle state borders.
At the level o f the criteria for Ethiopian nationality, the Transitional 
Government o f Ethiopia (TGE) continued the earlier practice o f not recognising 
claimants to dual ‘international’ nationality. Ethiopian nationality was mutually 
exclusive o f other ‘international’ nationalities. At the level o f the domestic criteria for 
Ethiopian citizenship, the state defined citizenship according to the ethnic identity. 
This conception, in practice, created a dual identity: an international Ethiopian 
national identity and a domestic Ethiopian ‘national’ identity subordinated to the 
ambiguous definition o f ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ promulgated in Article 
39 o f the 1995 Constitution. The domestic Ethiopian ‘national’ identity was defined 
through the ethnic identity, which was also mutually exclusive. The TGE rendered the 
definition of the Ethiopian citizens’ ethnic identity obligatory. This rule, again, had 
serious implications for various groups within Ethiopia. For children o f mixed 
parentage it was compulsory to choose between ethnic identities and to keep only the 
identification with the ethnic group o f one o f the parents.41 For those urban residents 
who related to a Pan-Ethiopian identity, it forced upon them an externally imposed 
identification with an ethnic group. Abbink suggests that:
39 Terrazas, A. M. 2007. 'Beyond Regional Circularity: The Emergence o f  an Ethiopian Diaspora'. 
Washington, DC: Migration Information Source, http://www.migrationinformation.org.
40 Koser, K. 2003. 'Mobilizing New African Diasporas: An Eritrean Case Study' in Koser, K. (ed.) New
African Diasporas. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, p. 112.
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(...)  people were forced to make an often impossible choice as to 
their ethnic identity and mother-tongue in the educational 
system.42
However, for those Ethiopians o f Eritrean origins the rules governing the 
acquisition of Eritrean or maintenance o f Ethiopian citizenship were not clearly 
defined. The rules for acquiring citizenship and, especially, the rules governing the 
citizenship of Ethiopians of mixed parentage (Ethiopian and Eritrean) and/or of those 
who chose to vote in the 1993 Eritrean referendum for independence remained 
ambiguous. At the level of the criteria for acquiring citizenship, in practice, this group 
o f citizens enjoyed dual nationality, i.e., Ethiopian and Eritrean.43 During this period, 
those Ethiopian citizens who qualified to acquire Eritrean citizenship and who 
decided to keep their residence in Ethiopia (rather than going back to Eritrea) 
registered to vote in the referendum and were awarded Eritrean identity cards. Until 
the outbreak o f hostilities, this group could leave and enter Ethiopia without 
bureaucratic requisites of visa applications or foreign currency payment upon 
departure.44 In addition, according to Iyob, many of those who voted in the 1993 UN- 
referendum for Eritrea’s independence also voted in all Ethiopian elections.45 The 
Ethiopian law had only clearly stated that those who decided to take on the citizenship 
o f the successor state had to relinquish the nationality of the predecessor state, i.e., 
Ethiopian nationality.46 In addition, it should be noted that when they voted in 1993, 
Eritrea’s status as a sovereign state was still dependent upon the outcome of the 
referendum. By voting, this group of Ethiopian citizens o f Eritrean origin did not 
formally relinquish Ethiopian citizenship. The Provisional Government of Eritrea’s 
(PGE) citizenship rules further contributed to the ambiguity of the nationality of those 
who had voted in the referendum.
The citizenship rules defined in the first Proclamation o f citizenship by the 
PGE in 1992 aimed to embrace a population dispersed territorially, attributing
41 Abbink, J. 1998. 'New Configurations o f Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge o f the South, To the 
memory o f Jacques Bureau 1947- 1998'. Northeast African Studies 5, p. 63.
42 ibid., p. 65.
43 Iyob, 2000, op.cit., p. 664.
44 ibid., p. 671.
45 ibid., footnote 18, p. 680.
46 Human Rights Watch January 2003. The Horn o f  Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality 
Issue (June 1998- April 2002)'. vol. 15, No.3 (A): HRW, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ethioerit0103/ethioerit0103.pdf, p. 7.
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Eritrean nationality via matrilineal and/ or patriarchal descent (ius sanguinis) or 
naturalisation. Those who registered to vote for the Referendum (both within Eritrea 
and abroad) were issued with identity cards, which ascribed them the right to vote for 
or against independence.47 The criteria for acquiring Eritrean citizenship were 
birth, naturalisation and/or adoption. Indeed, ‘any person bom to a father or mother o f 
Eritrean origin in Eritrea or abroad’ was entitled to become an Eritrean citizen and to
A O  #
acquire voting rights, regardless o f the country o f residence. This conception of 
nationhood granted equal rights to those living in Eritrea and outside. If the host 
country allowed dual nationality, the Eritrean conception o f nationhood posed no 
problems. However, this definition had the potential to create an ambiguous status for 
those who qualified to acquire Eritrean citizenship but who had acquired the 
citizenship of states in which only a single nationality was permitted. The PGE’s 
conception created a Pan- Eritrean identity with a transnational component. However, 
as Iyob highlights:
After Independence, Eritrea failed to establish legal terms of 
reference to legitimise transnational citizenry and protect them 
under international law.49
The outbreak o f hostilities in 1998 led to the expulsion o f 60,000-75,000 
Ethiopians o f Eritrean origin and Eritreans from Ethiopia.50 The Ethiopian 
government’s expulsion o f Eritreans and/or of Ethiopians o f Eritrean origin was not 
unprecedented. In 1991 the Provisional Government o f Eritrea expelled 50,000 
Ethiopians residing in Eritrea encompassing traders, workers in the port o f Assab, 
industry and services workers and Ethiopian state’s agents, such as army personnel 
and administrators.51
However, the Ethiopian government’s largely arbitrary expulsions had major 
implications both with regards to the state’s new defined criteria for acquiring 
Ethiopian citizenship and for the group o f citizens who was unduly caught up in the
47 ibid., p. 663.
48 Iyob, 2000, op.cit., p. 671.
49 ibid., p. 664.
50 Koser, 2003, op.cit., p. 112.
51 Abbink, J. 1998. 'Briefing: The Eritrean- Ethiopian Border Dispute'. African Affairs 97, 
p. 560.
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process.52 The Ethiopian state unilaterally outlawed the earlier practice o f accepting 
the dual nationality of those Ethiopians of Eritrean origins on the basis that the 
decision to vote in the referendum had been an affirmation o f Eritrean nationality. For 
those citizens expelled from Ethiopia on the basis of this claim their legitimate right to 
choose was denied. The mutually exclusive Ethiopian and Eritrean nationalities were 
imposed upon this group of Ethiopian citizens regardless o f their preferences and, 
more significantly, o f their rights and without due process of the law. As one 
Ethiopian of mixed parentage notes: ‘Before the recent war I wasn’t even conscious 
that I was Eritrean'.53
In the aftermath of the war, Ethiopia had to redefine the rules governing the 
acquisition o f citizenship which applied to its diaspora. Although dual nationality is 
not permitted, since 2002 the government has attributed Ethiopian Origin Identity 
cards to Ethiopians who hold another citizenship.54 In 2003, the government’s 
revision o f the earlier rules governing citizenship resulted in Proclamation 
No.378/2003 on Ethiopian Nationality. The previous proclamation on Ethiopian 
nationality dated from 1930 and had been amended in 1933.55 The 2003 proclamation 
aimed to address and update the rules governing the acquisition o f Ethiopian 
citizenship. This much needed revisionist stance, however, neither implied a 
rectification of the situation o f those expelled during the war, nor was it retroactive. 
One year after the new proclamation on nationality had come to effect, the Security 
Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority issued the Directive on Residence for 
Eritrean Nationals in Ethiopia.56
4.3 Political and military outcome
52 Amnesty International 21 May 1999. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Human Rights issues in a year o f  armed 
conflict'. AI Index: AFR 04/03/99.; Human Rights Watch, 2003, op. cit.
53 Interview in London, September 2006.
54 Terrazas, 2007, op.cit. In practice, the cards entitle the holder to the same rights as Ethiopians with 
exclusive nationality and residence in Ethiopia, except for the right to vote.
55 Barnes, C. 2006. 'Ethiopia: A Sociopolitical Assessment': Writenet/ UNHCR. Since the EPRDF had 
came to power the official position, although introducing slight changes to the 1930 Proclamation, was 
not binding. The official position with regard to Ethiopian Nationality enshrined in the 1995 Federal 
Constitution permitted those bom o f both or either national parents to acquire citizenship (ius 
sanguinis). This position also permitted foreign nationals to acquire citizenship.
56 Barnes, 2006, op.cit., p. 39.
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4.3.1 Political Outcome
We need to look at the domestic implications of external combat. When Tekeste 
Negash and Tronvoll wrote ‘Brothers at W ar’ they could only look at the extension 
of fighting at the sub-state level, internally, through each government’s assistance to 
its opponent’s armed opposition movements. In the aftermath of the war, it became 
necessary to look at the domestic repercussions of external combat, especially in the 
understanding o f national politics and the impact on both the internal and external 
legitimacy o f the two ruling parties. Interestingly, the war impacted adversely on 
both political leaderships. President Issaias, like many other African nationalist 
leaders, started with a great stock o f legitimacy derived from the war for
CO
independence. Prime Minister Meles was forced from the onset to include other 
groups in the ruling coalition. This strategy was forged in order to compensate for the 
TPLF’s reduced legitimacy in the wider society and among significant constituencies. 
In addition to this reduced domestic legitimacy, post-1991 Ethiopia seemed to reflect 
a wider continental trend defined by Chabal as a period o f ‘popular challenge’. During 
this period various segments o f African societies voiced claims for greater 
representation, ultimately leading to the call for multi-party democracy.59 In the 
aftermath of the war Meles Zenawi’s legitimacy decreased within the TPLF but the 
Prime Minister was able to efficiently rely on the support within the EPRDF, and 
among other groups in society unleashed by the 1998-2000 war. This happened 
during the final stage o f the war when the Prime Minister played the victory card 
successfully in launching the final offensive against Eritrean armed forces during the 
May 2000 elections. The coincidence of these two major events lends credence to the 
claim that this strategy was followed to boost the EPRDF’s support base throughout 
the country.60
57 Tekeste Negash & Tronvoll, K. 2000. Brothers a t War: Making Sense o f  the Eritrean- Ethiopian 
War. Oxford and Athens: James Currey and Ohio University Press.
58 Patrick Chabal, refers to this first period in the history o f political legitimacy in the post-colonial 
order as the post- nationalist period, during which the legitimacy o f  the African regimes stemmed from 
their nationalist antecedents. Chabal, P. 1992. Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation. 
London: Macmillan, p. 138.
59 ibid., p. 138-39.
60 Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, Kjetil, Lovise Aalen 2002.' Ethiopia since the Derg: A Decade o f  
Democratic Pretension and Performance'. London & N. Y : Zed Books.
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In this section, we highlight how President Issaias’s legitimacy decreased with 
the war. The Algiers Peace Agreement had been signed only in December 2000, and 
the end of the war showed its effects on the leadership o f the core groups at the helm 
o f the states. In both cases, while there were differences over policy and ideology 
among the leadership, of equal importance was a contest over power.
In Eritrea, in 2001 a group of fifteen, composed mainly o f party leadership 
veterans, was publicly charged with committing crimes against the nation’s security 
and sovereignty.61 In Eritrea signs of growing discontent and more authoritarian 
tendencies were indicated by this decision to arrest the signatories o f the letter, which 
contained strong criticism of Issaias Afewerki. One of them, the Minister of Defence, 
was forced to stay abroad in order not to join his co-signatories in prison.
The imprisonment of the group o f politicians that openly criticized the 
President for delaying both the constitution’s implementation and the conduct o f 
elections, revealed a fundamental split within the ruling party. In the aftermath o f the 
border war two axes emerged within the ruling party and society. One was marked by 
a split between civilian politicians and army leaders. The other axis delineated a 
growing inter-generational divide between those who fought during the liberation 
struggle (or the three decade long civil war) and those who fought during the border 
war. Furthermore, in Eritrea the situation o f the media demonstrates the authoritarian 
nature of the regime. The focus of the media coverage o f the war sheds light on 
similarities between the international and domestic policies o f the countries. In Eritrea 
if  one reads the official newspaper in English, Eritrea Profile, the same themes 
dominated before and after the war. Before the war Sudan’s threat tended to 
dominate. After the war there were copious accusations against Ethiopia.
What is happening in Eritrea is not unique. We can learn from the experiences 
in Eastern Europe, especially from the lesson that authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes 
rather than changing because o f external pressures, tended to implode. The same 
might happen in Eritrea.62
61 Connell, D. 2001. Inside the EPLF: The Origins o f the 'People's Party' & its Role in the Liberation o f  
Eritrea'. Review o f  African Political Economy 89: 345-364.
62 Roland Marchal, Interview in London, 30/06/04.
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In Eritrea, it may well be the case that the closing o f public political space, the 
shutdown of the private press, the arrest and indefinite detention of key figures from 
the liberation struggle, and the imposition of a coercive regime on the population will 
raise serious challenges to the ruling party’s ability to remain at the helm of the state. 
Indeed, with the decrease of the legitimacy of the ruling party, both internally and 
externally, opposition is likely to increase. In fact, from 18-22 January 2005 
Khartoum was again the stage for a meeting of Eritrean opposition forces. They set up 
an alliance called the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA). The secretariat was 
composed of seven members. This umbrella organization aimed to bring together 
Eritrean opposition forces. EDA acknowledged the Sana’a Cooperation Grouping 
(which included: Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen) and reiterated the common 
goal shared by this grouping and the EDA: the removal of the current Eritrean regime 
o f the PFDJ.64
The war brought national identity and loyalty to the state to the surface in 
Ethiopia. Given the post- 1991 prominence of sub-national ethnicity, this re- 
emergence o f Ethiopian nationalism came as an unexpected outcome.
In 2001, the TPLF Central Committee split. The seeds for the crisis in the 
TPLF were sown during the 1998-2000 war.65 In the case o f Ethiopia, core elements 
who had been advocates of Tigrayan nationalism were dismissed from the ruling 
coalition. Among them, the regional representative for Tigray, the party’s number 
two, and one o f the founding leaders o f the TPLF.66
The war allowed Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to rally support around the 
ruling party; this was epiphenomenal rather than a trend and ceased in the aftermath 
o f the war. It certainly had an impact on the May 14, 2000 Elections, but as the May
63 Hussein Khalifah; Ahmed Nasir; Ibrahim Mohammed Ali; Tewelde Gebreselassie; Abdelaziz 
Khiyar; Ali- Kemelios Osman; Hamid Turki.
64 ‘ Eritrean Opposition groups set up new alliance’, Sudan Tribune, Monday January 24th, 2005. http: 
//www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=7687.
65 Medhane Tadesse and, Y., John 2003. TPLF: Reform or Decline?’ Review o f  African Political 
Economy 97: 389-403. Dismissal o f Ato Seeye Abraha Ex- Defence Ministe. Deki Alula( doc. 
Accessible) http://www.dekialula.com/articles/casesiyel.pdf
66 Gebru Asrat and Ato Seeye Abraha were prominent figures within the TPLF who were dismissed 
after the 2001 split in the TPLF.
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15, 2005 elections showed, the aftermath of the war and the combination o f both 
domestic and foreign policies o f the EPRDF/ TPLF eroded the short- lived 
widespread legitimacy of the ruling party as the bearer o f the Ethiopian polity 
tradition o f national unity in the face o f external aggression.
This is not a novel pattern to Ethiopian politics. Internal contention was 
suspended in order to concentrate effort in containing and defending the country and 
its territorial integrity against what was perceived as external aggression.
4.3.2 Military Outcome
The World Bank had planned to disburse US$ 60 million at the onset o f the 
Demobilization and Reintegration Project for Eritrea to support the demobilization of 
60,000 troops out of a total o f 300,000 armed forces in the aftermath of the 1998-2000 
war, i.e., 10 per cent o f the population. As o f 2006 only 23.6 per cent of the total Fund 
had been disbursed. The government has suspended demobilization since the due 
starting date in October 2001. As a consequence the World Bank, other international 
organizations and bilateral donors have not contributed with further funding in 
support o f the long expected demobilization.69 Following on from this, Eritrea ante 
bellum levels of military expenditure changed. Prior to the war the military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP also included the government self-funding o f the 
demobilization process. In Ethiopia’s case, as discussed in chapter 2, the data should 
also be interpreted as a mere indicator, as the hidden economic burden o f military 
activities is not accounted for.70The comparison o f the two countries military 
expenditure prior to the war is misleading for these reasons. Despite this qualification,
67 World Bank August 2006. 'Country Brief: Eritrea, Development Progress 2006': World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.0rg/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ERITREAEXT/O,,menu 
PK:351396~pagePK: 141132~piPK: 141107~theSitePK:351386,00.html.
68 UNDP-Eritrea supported the National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration in Eritrea 
(NCDRE). As o f November 2006, the agency o f the IO claims to have supported the demobilization o f  
104,400 soldiers. In this respect any progress in the demobilization from the 1998-2000 war armed 
forces is neutralized by the continuous compulsory national military service, which lasts officially for 
two years but in reality fails to discharge draftees within the legally defined period. UNDP November 
2006. 'Project Fact Sheet, Project Title: Technical Assistance to Demobilize Soldiers': UNDP Eritrea, 
http://www.er.undp.org/recovery/docs/pj-demob-06-fs.pdf.
69 US Department o f  State October 2006 'Background Note: Eritrea': US Department o f  State, 
Bureau o f African Affairs, http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2854.htm.
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as figure 2 shows Eritrea’s military expenditure in comparison to its population 
remained disproportionately high. The graph also shows that both countries reached a 
peak during the hostilities and while peace negotiations were underway. This feature 
is associated with the costs of war and the armaments purchases. Although there are 
no definitive figures of the cost of war to both countries, SIPRI states that the cost 
was over US$ 300 million for both countries.71
Figure 2 Eritrea and Ethiopia Military Expenditure as % of GDP 1991- 200372
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The graphs (figures 3 and 4) on the evolution of military expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP in the two countries clearly confirm the peak during the war. Despite a 
decrease in the aftermath of the war, both the graph for Eritrea and Ethiopia show that 
the war had a negative impact in the continuous militarization of the two countries 
and essential resources continue to be channelled to the military sector. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the war the military expenditure as a percentage of GDP has not 
decreased to ante bellum levels. Prior to the 1998-2000 war Ethiopia was undergoing 
a reduction of military expenditure; this trend was particularly compromised by the 
border war.
70 SIPRI 1999. SIPRI Yearbook 1999 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 274.
71 —  2000. SIPRI Yearbook 2000 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 295.
72 The graphs were conceived by the author on the basis o f  the available data published by SIPRI. For 
the data refer to Table 1 in appendix 2.
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Figure 3 Eritrea Military Expenditure as % of GDP73
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Figure 4 Ethiopia Military Expenditure as %  of GDP74
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Furthermore in Eritrea the military recruitment and compulsory military service has 
continued unabated and the persecution and consequences for draft-dodgers were 
amplified in the aftermath of the war, as chapter 5 will discuss in further detail.
According to a study conducted by Tadesse Berhe et al. in the Northern 
Region of Ethiopia along the border, Tigray, the war engaged the armed forces of the 
two countries and the civilians comparatively to other contemporary armed conflicts
73 ibid.
74 For the data refer to Table l in Appendix 2.
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were not directly targeted during hostilities. In spite o f the lack of widespread local 
disintegration and widespread sexual violence the war and its aftermath transformed 
the region’s social and economic landscape. The convergence of a very large army 
and the accompanying influx o f Commercial Sexual Workers (CSW) impacted upon 
social relations. In addition, this transformation was coupled with a growing problem 
of orphans and street children. Economically the region was also further affected by 
the increase of the military’s presence in contrast to earlier periods. The profitable 
trade route through Tigray, from Maychew, to Adigrat and then across the border to 
Eritrea was halted by the closure of the border. On its place, the state’s extension and 
its authorities acquired a predominantly military character. In this sense, the aftermath 
of the war disrupted the flourishing movement o f goods and people across the border 
since the overthrow of the Derg and instead led to a militarization of the frontier with 
an impact to the region.
As one interviewee explained to this author:
The borderland communities suffered the consequences o f the war. The 
war disrupted their lives and the soil is not totally cleared of mines. Prior 
to the war they were not aware of the border, they weren’t even conscious 
about its existence. The war and its aftermath transformed this region into 
a garrison area; with all the problems that followed from the presence of 
large contingents of soldiers, to the problem of HIV/AIDS.76
Chapter 5 will examine in further detail the relationship between the war and 
the extension of the states’ institutions to peripheral areas along the border.
4.4 Economic and social outcomes
As discussed in chapter 2, at the time o f Eritrea’s Independence, Ethiopia did 
not consider any alternative routes o f transit to the sea. The pitfalls of dependency on 
one sea outlet were not at the forefront o f the ruling party’s concerns at that point.
75 Taddesse Berhe, H. G., &, de Waal, Alex , 2005. 'War and HIV Prevalence: Evidence from Tigray, 
Ethiopia'. African Security Review  14: 107-114.
76 Interview in Ethiopia, 8/08/05.
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This section will first consider the alternative and supplementary corridors to 
Assab and will then analyse the irregular movement o f goods and people (irregular
77migrants) to Berbera and Bossaso in the aftermath of the war.
With the outbreak of hostilities one of the immediate outcomes was the 
cessation of freight movements to the Eritrean port, the diversion o f vessels with 
cargo for Ethiopia to the Djibouti port and the termination o f Ethiopian Airlines 
flights to Assab. Indeed, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission was asked to decide 
on Ethiopia’s claim on the illegal appropriation by the Eritrean state agents of 
Ethiopia’s goods. The EECC concluded that Eritrea’s decision to halt cargo 
movements was pursued according to international law and common practice between 
belligerent parties during the twentieth century. On these grounds, the EECC
70
dismissed Ethiopia’s claim.
Even if  this measure did not constitute a breach to international law, it was 
very similar to a previous incident which had created tension and resentment between 
the insurgent movements in the mid-1980s. Indeed, most o f the cargo stranded at
70
the Assab port consisted of development assistance and humanitarian aid. In the 
mid- 1980s due to disagreements between the EPLF and the TPLF, the former 
decided to halt the movement o f development assistance and humanitarian aid coming 
from Sudan to Tigray, via EPLF controlled territories. Between m id-1985 and early 
1988, the EPLF and TPLF suspended cooperation and ceased formal communication.
OA
What happened in 1998 bore similarities to what had happened in the mid-1980s.
During the war all movement of goods and humanitarian aid to Ethiopia was 
channelled either via the Djibouti port or (to a lesser extent) via the Berbera port.
Addis Ababa- Djibouti corridor
77 These routes antedated the closure o f  the border with Eritrea and have, in fact, been used since the 
pre-colonial period. Its accrued prominence resulted, in part, from the disintegration o f the Somalia 
state in 1991. The closure o f the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea contributed to an increase in the 
movement o f both people and goods along these routes.
78 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 19 Dec., 2005. ’Final Award - Ports - Ethiopia's Claim 6 
between the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia and the State o f Eritrea': The Hague.
79 Ibid., p. 1.
80 Duffield, M., & Prendergast, John 1994. Without troops & tanks : the emergency relief desk and the 
cross border operation into Eritrea and Tigray. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Chapter 2 on the 
background and causes o f the war provides further details.
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The Addis Ababa -  Djibouti corridor comprises three routes: 1) the railway which
o  1
links the Djibouti port to the capital via Dire Dawa along 781 kilometres; 2) the 
road which links the port to the Ethiopian capital via Galafi along 910 kilometres, this 
road meets the Assab-Addis Ababa road and carries the bulk o f the traffic along the 
corridor 3) the road via Dwenle, which runs parallel to the railway until Dire Dawa, 
and has a total length o f 844 kilometres.
From the beginning of the war with Eritrea, Ethiopia's annual cargo traffic to 
the Djibouti port grew from 1.7 million tonnes in 1997, to 3.1 million tonnes in 1998. 
By 2002 Ethiopia’s traffic freight movements via Djibouti reached 4.8 million tonnes 
per year. Ethiopia's cargo accounts for 83 per cent of the total cargo traffic at the 
port.83
Local conflicts in the southern stretch of the road that goes through the Afar 
Region led to its closure in the spring o f 2002. The local conflict was originally 
related to disputes over the delimitation o f territorial boundaries between Ethiopia’s 
Afar Region (Region 2) and the Somali Region (Region 5). In addition, access to 
pasture and water (namely to the Awash River) had opposed Afar pastoralists to Ise 
pastoralists,84 from the Somali Region. The definition o f Regions along ethnic lines 
further reinforced the ethnic saliency o f the conflict between pastoralists in this stretch 
o f the Djibouti corridor.85 The conflict escalated into such intensity that the
Federal authorities were forced to close the road. This incident disrupted the traffic 
along the Djibouti corridor and increased the ruling party’s efforts to diversify transit 
routes to the sea.
81 The railway was inaugurated in 1897 when Djibouti was a French colony.
82 Cabanius, P. 23-27 June 2003. 'Improvement o f  Transit Systems in the Horn o f  Africa, Sixth 
Meeting o f Governmental Experts from Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries and 
Representatives o f  Donor Countries and Financial and Development Institutions'. New York 
UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3633&lang=l, p. 2.
83 The Reporter (Addis Ababa) Jan 21, 2006. Ethiopia's Search for a Port'. 
http://www.ports.co.za/didyouknow/article_2006_01_2 l_3058.html.
84 The Ise are the second clan in widest proportion, after the Ogadeni, in Ethiopia’s Somali Region. The 
Ise have moved freely among their kin across Ethiopia’s borders with Somalia and Djibouti.
85 Markakis, 2003, op. cit.
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Indeed, in July 2002 one of the first visits of the new Somaliland President, 
President Ryale, was to the Ethiopian capital. One o f the major issues on the table was 
Ethiopia’s use of the Berbera port.
Addis Ababa-Berbera corridor
By 1997, 65 per cent o f the trade through the Berbera port was destined for Ethiopia. 
During the war with Eritrea, in early 1999 the EU started to use the Berbera port for
07
the transhipment of humanitarian aid to Ethiopia. However, the Berbera corridor 
was not perceived as an alternative route either to the Assab or to the Djibouti routes. 
The Berbera corridor is indeed an additional transit route to the sea.
The Berbera corridor has a length o f 854 kilometres. It proceeds via Hargeisa 
(160 kilometres), reaches the border between Ethiopia and Somaliland in Togwajale 
(230 kilometres), continues to Jigjiga88 in Ethiopia’s Somali Region (336 kilometres), 
from there it continues via Harare, Dire Dawa (472 kilometres) and finally reaches 
Addis Ababa (854 kilometres). On the Ethiopian side the Dire Dawa-Jigjiga stretch is 
being rebuilt with EU funding, and the repair work o f the stretch which links Jigjiga
QQ
to Togwajale will follow.
However, formal demand along the corridor is still relatively low and this 
corridor potential is linked with increases in the export o f livestock. The 
disintegration o f the Somali state and Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of
86 President Egal passed away in May 2002 and Ryale succeeded him in office. Although Somaliland’s 
aim is to provide Ethiopia with a more competitive port service than Djibouti, from an Ethiopian 
standpoint the transit via Berbera comes as an additional corridor to the Djibouti one, and not as an 
alternative port. After the war with Eritrea, it seems unlikely that Ethiopia will rely on an exclusive 
transit point to the sea for the bulk o f its international trade and other cargo.
Yusuf Abdi Gabobe July 27,2002. 'Editorial: Somaliland: Transit Shipment Corridor To Ethiopia?' The 
Somaliland Times. http://www.somalilandtimes.net/Archive/Archive/00002800.htm.
87 Ibid.
88 Jigjiga became the capital o f  the Somali Region o f Ethiopia ( Region V) in 1995. The capital o f the 
Ogaden used to be Godey. Hagmann, T. 2005. 'Beyond Clannishness and colonialism: understanding 
political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991- 2004’. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 43, 
p. 527.
89 Cabanius, 2003, op. cit., p. 3. In addition, the EU selected Louis Berger SAS and Afro-Consult to 
assess the feasibility o f upgrading the port and transportation links supporting it, including the Berbera 
Corridor Highway, the Berbera and Hargeisa Airports and the Ethiopia-Somaliland border crossing 
facilities. Retrievable 8/03/07 http://www.louisberger.com/berger/world/2005q2/mnindex.php.
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Independence may explain, in part, why formal demand is characterized as low. 
Indeed, Peter D. Little claimed that:
The absence or presence o f a state in Somalia has not had a major 
effect on cross-border trade because i) it is an unofficial business 
and ii) the previous political regime so mismanaged the economy 
that the exchange rate instability actually increased volatility and 
risks for herders and traders.90
Indeed, cross- border livestock trade between Somalia (Somaliland included) and 
contiguous neighbouring countries (mainly Ethiopia and Kenya) is the most legitimate 
trade sector.91 The cross- border livestock trade has been lucrative to Eastern Ethiopia.
But the disintegration o f Somalia’s state did not compromise cross- border 
trade between eastern Ethiopia (Ethiopia’s Somali Region) and Somaliland. In 
addition to the movements prior to 1991, Ethiopia redirected its exports from southern 
Somalia and the capital to the Bossaso and Berbera ports. The bulk o f Ethiopia’s 
exports to Somalia consisted o f small stock and camels. Ethiopia’s exports’ major 
destination became the Middle Eastern markets. According to available estimates, 50 
per cent to 60 per cent of the small stock exported via the Berbera port comes from 
Ethiopia. Significantly, cross-border commerce in livestock earns $ 12.6 to $ 15 
million annually for eastern Ethiopia.92 As the data seem to indicate, the exports of 
livestock from eastern Ethiopia to the Middle Eastern Markets mainly via the Berbera 
port has been o f paramount importance to Ethiopia’s Somali Region.
Another outcome of the closure o f the border with Eritrea and o f the loss of 
free access to the Assab port has been the increase in unofficial trade to the Djibouti 
port. The unofficial movement o f people (mainly irregular migration) and goods to 
the Djibouti port, to the Berbera (Somaliland-Somalia) and Bossaso (Puntland/ 
Somalia) ports has further increased since the closure o f the border with Eritrea.
90 Little, P. D. 2001. 'The Global Dimensions o f  Cross- Border Trade in the Somalia Borderlands' in 
Ahmed, A.G.M. (ed.) Globalisation, Democracy, and Development in Africa: Future Prospects. Addis 
Ababa: Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), p. 198.
91 Ibid., p. 198.
92Ibid.,p. 194.
93 Markakis, 2003, op. cit., p. 448.
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With regard to the movement o f goods, informal trade has increased 
substantively. As Markakis claims, the closure of the border with Eritrea on the one 
hand, and the porosity o f the borders with Djibouti and Somalia, on the other hand, 
meant that:
Contraband, an old trade, now acquired new dimensions (...). A 
veritable common market emerged along the eastern and southern 
sections o f the Ethiopian periphery, where people and goods move 
freely without benefit o f passports, visas or customs checks. The 
few customs post that exist are easily evaded. Contraband trade 
flourished, bringing manufactured goods from many parts o f the 
world, especially China, through the ports o f Djibouti, Berbera in 
Somaliland and Bossasso in Puntland. 4
According to Markakis the Ise, who can move freely across the borders of the three 
states among their kin were the first to benefit from this increase in the informal 
movement o f goods. One of the main posts along the Addis Ababa- Djibouti road is 
Gadamaitu. The Ise work closely with other Ethiopian ‘highlanders, many o f them 
Tigrayans who operate in the same towns'.95 Anecdotal evidence has it that the 
military stationed in the town to control the illicit trade have also benefited from the 
increased informal/ unofficial movement o f goods.96
With regard to the increase in the informal movement of peoples the increase 
has been mainly directed to the Bossaso port, and to the Berbera port to a lesser 
extent. Indeed, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports the 
increased movement o f people across borders. The origins o f the irregular workers 
vary, but the majority come from North East Ethiopia, a small number from the 
Tigray Region (Maychew) and a more limited proportion from the southern zones o f 
Bale and Arsi in the Oromya Region. The final destination of the irregular migrant 
workers is Saudi Arabia. Their trip involves crossing from Ethiopia, through 
Somaliland to reach the Bossaso port (Puntland) and then crossing the Red Sea to the
94 Markakis, J. 2003. 'Anatomy o f a Conflict: Afar and Ise Ethiopia'. Review o f  African Political 
Economy 96, p. 448.
95 Ibid., p. 449.
96 Ibid., p. 449.
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07Arabian Peninsula. The successful journey normally encompasses the irregular 
movement o f people across Ethiopia, the two northern regions o f Somalia, Yemen and 
finally Saudi Arabia. However, the increasing number of failed cases and the 
proportions of Ethiopian citizens stranded in the Bossaso port have raised concerns 
about the organization o f the irregular movement o f migrant workers along this route. 
Normally, the migrant workers are approached in the Ethiopian capital by a ‘broker’ 
responsible for the organisation of the transport to the port in Puntland/ Somalia. The 
irregular migrants are usually requested to pay considerable amounts to guarantee 
their safe arrival in Somalia without detection by the state’s agents in Ethiopia, 
Somaliland and Puntland. However, increasing cases o f irregular workers’ failure to 
arrive safely at their coastal destination before reaching the Arabian Peninsula have 
been reported. According to the IOM report the irregular migrant workers are 
abandoned in the desert between Burro (Somaliland) and Bossaso (Puntland), with 
their money and identity cards having been stolen by the informal transport operators. 
The IOM conducted in-depth interviews with Ethiopian irregular migrants stranded in 
Bossaso. These accounts add to the numerous under-reported cases o f abuse, robbery 
o f all possessions, including identification documents, and other infringements of the 
irregular migrants’ basic human rights by the network o f smugglers involved in the 
transit from Ethiopia to the Bossaso port. This increase in the movement of irregular 
migrants from Ethiopia is a source o f concern because o f the dangers and 
misdemeanours of the operators behind this flourishing illicit enterprise. This is a 
thriving smuggling business conducted at the expense of those who are misled by the 
false appeals and copious promises of the smugglers. Indeed, the IOM reported that:
The pattern indicates a well- organized smuggling network 
beginning from Addis Ababa running up to Burro (Somaliland).
There are also indications that the police and law enforcement 
officers might be aware o f the operations and might even benefit
Q O
from it through bribes.
This evidence suggests that the closure o f the border with Eritrea, coupled with the 
disintegration of the Somali state, the Addis-Ababa-Assab route has been replaced by
97 Yitna Getachew Yitna November 2006. Tield Mission Report: Stranded Ethiopian Migrants in 
Bossasso, North East Somalia/ Puntland'. MRF Nairobi: International Organization for Migration, pp. 
7-13.
98 Ibid., p. 17.
161
the Addis Ababa-Bossaso route. This is indeed an indirect consequence of the war. 
This route is sought after by aspirant irregular migrant workers on their way to Saudi 
A rabia."
In the aftermath of the war with Eritrea the Afars in zones 4 and zone 2 were 
deprived o f access to Eritrea’s and Djibouti’s markets. Due to the closure o f the 
border and the creation of the Temporary Security Zone the Afar practice o f moving 
freely across borders has been disrupted. In addition, the Afar used to straddle the 
border between Ethiopia and Eritrea on their way to markets in Djibouti. Both traders 
and pastoralists used to follow this route for practical reasons to avoid travelling far 
greater distances. Since the closure o f the border, pastoralists from the Afar Region’s 
zone 2 have needed to travel far greater distances to reach the markets within the 
region, Yallo (Zone 4) and Chifra (Zone 1) markets.100
Addis Ababa-Port Sudan corridor
Although the distance from Port Sudan to the Ethiopian capital totals 1881 
kilometres,101 the shorter distance from Ethiopia’s Northern Regions offer interesting 
comparative advantages to traffic o f exports and imports from and towards these 
regions.
This corridor offers comparative advantages as a supplementary route to the 
sea (or indeed it could well serve as an alternative to the Assab and Djibouti ports) for 
grain producers’ exports from northern and north-western Ethiopia (mainly the Tigray 
region and north-western Amhara region) to the Sudanese market, and to exports via 
port Sudan to other markets.102 This route also offers comparative advantages for food 
imports into Northern Ethiopia, for reasons of geographical distance when compared 
to the routes to the Djibouti or to the Berbera ports. Indeed, the total length o f the road
"Ibid., p. 17.
100 Philpott, J .,; Asnake Abera,; Kassaye Hadgu, February 2005. 'Livelihoods/ Emergency Assessment 
in Afar Region'. Oxfam GB: Oxfam International, p. 15.
101 The Reporter Jan 21, 2006. 'Ethiopia's Search for a Port' The Reporter. Addis Ababa, 
http://www.ports.co.za/didyouknow/article_2006_01_2 l_3058.html.
102 The TPLF owned company retaining de facto monopoly o f  agricultural commodities exports from 
Humera, the Guna Trading House (thereafter referred to as Guna), in 2002 used Port Sudan for the first 
time to export sesame to Turkish markets. Hammond, L. February 2003. 'Obstacles to Regional Trade 
in the Horn o f Africa: Borders, Markets and Production': USAID/OFDA,
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacs368.pdf, p. 26.
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from Humera (in North western Tigray) to Port Sudan is 880 kilometres. The only 
route from Humera to Sudan, it reaches the border between Ethiopia and Sudan at 
Lugdi. The road then proceeds via Gedaref (180 kilometres) and then continues to 
Port Sudan (700 kilometres). However, if  a bridge were to be built across the Tekezze 
River at Hamdayat (the distance from Humera to this village is 130 kilometres) the 
total distance from Humera to Port Sudan would be reduced to a total of 728 
kilometres.104
Hammond’s research findings on prospects and constraints for cross-border 
trade between Sudan - Ethiopia - Eritrea in the aftermath of the 1998-2000 war suggest 
that:
Ethiopian traders believe that Port Sudan is an attractive 
alternative or supplement to Djibouti because of the lower 
transport costs, as well as the fact that port charges are 
favourable.105
4.5 Regional Outcome
In this section we look at the regional level to bring to the fore the shift o f the regional 
alignments before and after the war.
The section raises the question of how, in the Eritrean case, one can explain 
the succession of wars: with Yemen over the Hanish Islands; unreported disputes in 
the border with Sudan; and finally the interstate war with Ethiopia. The explanation is 
to be found at three levels of analysis. The first is to do with the international context 
that Eritrea as a new state had to face. The impact o f globalisation on the state had 
implications for sovereignty, not with regard to national political autonomy, but with 
regard to national political economy.106 Following on from this, as chapter 2 has
103 Humera is located within the Mazega fertile area. This fertile land comprises north-western 
Ethiopia, south-western Eritrea and eastern Sudan. The area has been an important producing area o f  
sorghum (for local and regional markets) and o f sesame (for exports to extra- regional markets) since 
the mid- 1960s. L. Hammond further highlights that ‘Commercial agriculture has historically 
stimulated significant regional trade and labour opportunities for migrant workers coming from food- 
insecure parts o f  all three countries’. Ibid., p. 1.
104 Ibid., p. 25.
105 Ibid., p. 25.
106 Mayall, J. 2000. World Politics: Progress and its limits. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 77.
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shown, the economic rivalry between Eritrea and its southern neighbour appears at 
first sight as anachronistic. In the current juncture of world politics, Mayall contends 
that ‘self-determination is more likely to be interpreted as the right to compete in the
107deregulated market for inward investment’. However, ultimately neither Eritrea nor 
Ethiopia applied this approach strictly in their bilateral economic relations. While 
Eritrean economic actors competed in Tigray with Ethiopian economic actors for 
access to markets and commodities, Ethiopia decided to enact a set o f protectionist 
measures to protect its actors and nascent industries in Tigray from competition from 
its northern neighbour. In addition, these measures were played out against the 
particularly deep structure of politics and the political economy within the Horn of 
Africa.
Eritrea’s creation occurred under particular circumstances and its successful 
108resistance to any interference in its internal affairs led to its isolation on the 
international stage. The persistence o f militarism, among the leading members o f the 
PFDJ government meant that the belief in the inevitability o f war prevailed. The 
transition o f the ex-guerrilla fighters into state builders had not been completed and 
the search for external as well as internal enemies continued. Both neighbouring states 
and national citizens who did not fully support the regime were promptly classified as 
enemies o f the state.
Eritrea’s government became increasingly contested and isolated, and so was 
its leadership. However, it is important to highlight that President Issaias Afewerki 
was never placed under similar pressure to that of Robert Mugabe. It seems plausible 
to argue that the ‘war on terror’ reduced US willingness to openly antagonise Issaias 
Afewerki due to Eritrea’s strategic location.109 Indeed, as Rita Abrahamsen and Ray 
Bush argue, Eritrea had been a keen regional candidate to replace Turkey as a safe 
haven for US new foreign policy in the Middle East. Donald Rumselfd, US Defence
107 ibid., p. 77.
108 Almost all o f  the expatriates interviewed in Asmara argued how Eritrea’s resistance to any external 
influence in its internal affairs has been counterproductive for the country. A complete list with the 
names and posts o f those interviewed was annexed for the purposes o f the examination. Otherwise, the 
anonymous status o f all those interviewed is fully respected by the author.
109 Kaplan, R. D. April 2003 'A Tale of Two Colonies'. The Atlantic Monthly, 
http://www. theatlantic. com/doc/200304/kaplan.
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Secretary, visited Asmara in December 2002110 and General Tommy Franks, 
commander in chief of the US military’s Central Command (USCENTCOM) was also 
a frequent visitor both before and after 9/11. Eritrea also sent its military 
commanders, namely the Minister of Defence Sebhat Ephrem, to Washington and 
employed the services of Washington lobbying firm Greenberg Traurig (at an 
estimated $ 50,000 a month) to stress the importance of Eritrea’s geo-strategic position 
for the war on terror.111 However, this state o f affairs was substantially eroded in the 
aftermath o f the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia and, more recently, with Eritrea’s 
support for the Somali militant Islamist movement, the Islamic Courts Union, and for
119the defecting members o f the Transitional Federal Institutions in 2006 and 2007.
Despite mediation o f both the UN and the AU, the prospects for the 
consolidation o f peace remain uncertain, with both parties failing to agree over the 
control of Badme. The territorial dispute still remains open, and it is not possible to 
ascertain whether the strong conditions imposed by international donors will be 
effective in preventing a resumption o f the conflict, or whether the US ‘war on terror’ 
will shift the agenda for the Horn o f Africa states as it did during the Cold W ar.113
The pattern o f continuous insurgency against various regimes and the ousting 
o f regimes by force have meant that at one point or another the previous enemies o f 
the state become part o f the ruling party and have to face the daunting challenge o f 
reconciliation and accommodation with past opposing sides.
Several examples of warfare and its aftermath suggest that mutual suspicion 
between different insurgent movements, ruling parties and ethnic groups is in part 
understood against this background; which characterizes the domestic and regional 
security architecture o f the states in the region. Depending on with which of the
110 Garamone, J. 10 December 2002. 'Eritrea Could Teach U.S. Much to Combat Terror'. US 
Department o f  Defense, American Forces Press Service, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42407.
111 Abrahamsen, R., and, Bush, Ray 2003. War & the Forgotten Continent'. Review o f  African Political 
Economy No. 96, p. 182.; Committee to Protect Journalists 2002. 'Attacks on the Press in
2002: Eritrea, http://www.cpj.org/attacks02/africa02/eritrea.html'.
112 The fell out between Asmara and Washington in the course o f Somalia’s 2006 crisis will be 
discussed in the Epilogue.
113 International Institute for Stategic Studies 2002. 'Ethiopia- Eritrea shaky peace, domestic challenges' 
Stategic Survey 2001/2002: Oxford University Press, pp. 340-43.
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opposing sides a movement decided to align itself (either the ruling party or 
insurgency movement) its prospects of access to critical resources distributed by the 
state will vary. The destinies o f regions and ethnic groups are conditioned by its 
representatives’ mobilization, sympathy and/or identification with opposing sides in 
the manifold conflicts.
After the 1977-78 war the Derg nurtured suspicion towards the Somali 
communities o f the Ogaden. They were inevitably suspected of either having 
harboured the WSLF or o f having sided with the Somali army.114
In addition, the Derg was also suspicious o f the Tigrinya- speaking 
communities in Tigray and Eritrea for their alleged support for the TPLF and EPLF 
respectively.
In addition to the Somali and Tigrinya-speaking communities, the Derg was 
also suspicious of, and followed, more often than not, a forceful approach to, Afar 
pastoralists because o f their long-standing livestock trade with the Eritreans.115 After 
the overthrow of the Derg, mutual suspicions were reversed.
The Eritrean state became suspicious o f the Kunama’s loyalty to the Eritrean 
state. The Kunama were often accused of having sided with the Derg against the 
secession insurgencies o f the ELF, and then o f the EPLF. The Kunama are thus 
perceived as having opposed the current ruling party’s long-standing insurgency to 
fulfil Eritrea’s self-determination claim.116 Although, Kunama were also mobilized 
and fought on behalf o f the EPLF against the Derg, suspicion, and this perception o f 
Kunama loyalty to the Ethiopian state, has not been dropped. Indeed, the aftermath o f 
the war has revived this prejudice and has led to increased marginalisation and 
suspicion .117
114 Samatar, A. I. 2004. 'Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region'. Third 
World Quarterly 25: 1131-1154.
115 Young, J. 1997. Peasant revolution in Ethiopia : the Tigray P eople’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 149.
116 Alexander Naty 2002. 'Environment, Society and the State in Western Eritrea'. Africa 72: 569- 597.
117 Ibid.
166
In Ethiopia, several segments of society (diaspora, urban communities and 
rural communities) nurtured resentment and suspicion o f the TPLF for its support for 
the EPLF separatist insurgency and secessionist aim. For several groups, and not only 
Ahmara or Oromo who identified with the previous regime, the TPLF, through their 
alliance with the EPLF to overthrow the Derg, contributed to the dismemberment/ 
loss o f a part of the Ethiopian state.
In the Somali Region o f Ethiopia the divide between highlanders and 
lowlanders still tends to permeate the relations between pastoralists and the Federal 
and Regional agents o f the state. The EPRDF/TPLF, despite the contributions o f 
communities from the Somali region both to the war effort in the frontline and with 
‘patriotic contributions to the troops’ during the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, are still 
suspected of providing support to regional insurgent movements, namely the ONLF 
and to other movements crossing from Somalia. According to Samatar, the Somali 
clan elders claim that:
(...)  An item in the SPDF ‘s programme states that the 1977-78 
Somali-Ethiopian war was an illegitimate and irredentist Somali 
attack. (...)  The public surmised that this was EPRDF propaganda 
and not a single Somali had joined the Mengistu army to fight the 
Western Somali Liberation Front and the Somali army. 
Furthermore, they pointed out that a similar item condemning the 
TPLF’s support for Eritrea’s war o f liberation should be inserted 
into the TPLF party programme.118
The Derg's creation and support o f an Afar insurgent movement, the 
Ugugumo, fuelled tension, violent conflict and suspicion between Tigrayans and Afar. 
The Derg's support for this group envisaged preventing the TPLF from extending its 
control to the eastern part o f the Tigray Province, particularly to the area within 
Tigray mainly inhabited by Afar (Dalol/currently Zone 2 within the Afar Region). On 
the other hand, the Derg was suspicious o f other Afar political movements and Afar 
pastoralist communities for their trade in livestock with the Eritreans. In post- 1991 
Ethiopia, Afar clans and particularly the ALF, ARDUF and the Ugugumo, were still 
on a collision route with the two states because o f the loss o f considerable portions o f 
Afar land to Eritrea and to other regions within Ethiopia, mainly Tigray Region
118 Samatar, 2004, op.cit., pp. 1147- 148.
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(Region 1) and Ethiopia’s Somali Region (Region 5). On the Eritrean side, the main 
insurgent movement, which articulates its grievances and dissention towards the 
state around an Afar ethnic identity, is the Afar Red Sea Democratic Front (ARSDF). 
However, this movement was set up in late 1998 with Ethiopia’s support and in the 
context of the ongoing armed conflict between the two countries.119
The relations between the Ethiopian state and different communities have been 
predominantly based on an authoritarian culture.
The handicap of Ethiopian politics continues to be its resistance to political 
accommodation, the lack o f compromise and negotiation.120 This pattern of pervasive 
domestic and regional insurgency by nurturing suspicion between opposing sides, 
supporters and/or sympathisers further exacerbates the authoritarian culture of the 
state in its relations with communities at the periphery.
4.6 Conclusion
President Issaias Afewerki was determined to establish the borders o f Eritrea as an 
independent state in a turbulent region. Eritrea’s geographical map became the 
favourite emblem of the country. The lines that draw the borders o f the country are 
filled with the blood of the ‘martyrs’ o f the recent war.
Evidence shows that Eritrea’s economic position was much better at 
independence than in the aftermath o f the war. In the case of Ethiopia, the sense o f 
national unity generated by the call to arms to defend the country from external 
aggression did not eliminate internal dissention and conflict. Commanders and 
political decision- makers must understand the nature o f war in which they are 
intervening, or considering intervening; to avoid making mistakes that ultimately 
could cost lives and unnecessarily prolong the conflict.121
119 Abbink, J. 2003. 'Ethiopia- Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects o f Peace in the Horn o f  Africa'. 
Journal o f  Contemporary African Studies 21, p. 413.
120 Clapham, C. 2006. 'Ethiopia' in Clapham, C., Herbst, J., and, Greg Mills, (ed.) Big African States. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press, p. 20.
121 Duyvesteyn, I.a.A., Jan 2005. 'Rethinking the nature o f  War'. London and N.Y.: Frank Cass, p. 3.
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The UNMEE presence and patrolling o f the 25 kilometres buffer zone, along 
the 1,000 kilometres border, has not only guaranteed the non escalation o f incidents in 
the borderlands, but also the fossilization o f the border. In this sense, the characteristic 
porosity o f the border has been modified. The establishment o f a TSZ has led to the 
transformation o f the disputed boundary into a de facto frontier between the two 
countries.
Unless the territorial dispute is brought to an end, implying an agreement over 
delimitation and the beginning o f the implementation o f the border demarcation, the 
current stalemate will persist. So far the EEBC has failed in its central task of ending 
the border dispute between the parties. The peace process is at a critical stage because 
o f continuous intransigence between the parties. The current situation could lead to 
the escalation of minor incidents at the border to a fully-fledged conflict, as happened 
in 1998.
The delimitation and demarcation o f the borders need not remain hostage to 
the intransigence o f both parties. The delimitation and demarcation will inevitably 
happen, otherwise the border will remain a fortress and the movements of goods and 
people will remain frozen.
It is the political leaderships’ responsibility to find a consensual solution out o f 
the quagmire o f the ill-delimitated and demarcated borders. It goes without saying 
that the agreement on this crucial matter is paramount to restoring the indispensable 
element of political trust in order to renegotiate the rules o f citizenship, the rules o f 
access to both countries markets and products and, finally, to renegotiate the rules o f 
access to the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa.
The greatest tragedy o f nationalism lies in the paradox of providing a sense o f 
belonging in mutually exclusive terms. What is one to do with those caught in the 
middle of the irreconcilable state trajectories; caught in this paradox? As one 
interviewee, o f mixed parentage, starkly comments:
‘I’m both Eritrean and Ethiopian. Should I be cut in half?’122
122 Interview in London, July 2006.
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Chapter 5: War and state making/remaking in Eritrea and Ethiopia
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will argue that the relationship between war and the process of state 
formation is central to the understanding o f contemporary projects of state and nation 
building. However the process o f state formation of the two countries needs to be 
understood within the broader dynamics o f state consolidation in Africa.1 As the 
evidence collected will show there are no short-cut answers.
The chapter is based on the premise that the relationship between war making, 
state making and, finally, nationalism are central to understanding state trajectories 
towards consolidation or, in the other extreme, towards state disintegration. Although 
the argument places the sources of state and nation building activities in the domestic 
realm, the international implications of the two projects should not be overlooked.
The first part o f the chapter will consider domestic and international features 
o f the state and nation building projects in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The relationship 
between war and the state needs to be considered separately in the two cases because 
of three fundamental differences between these states’ trajectories.
1) the different historical circumstances o f the emergence o f the state (the 
Ethiopian process which successfully resisted colonialism - except for the 1936-1941 
Italian occupation - and the legacy o f both Italian colonialism and British 
administration in the case of Eritrea);
2) the differential longevity o f the process o f state formation in Ethiopia and 
its newness in Eritrea with clear implications with regard to the legacies o f previous 
conceptions and trajectories o f statehood and, finally;
1 The case study allows testing some o f the central theoretical propositions advanced by Herbst on his 
scholarly work on the process o f state formation in Africa. Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
2 The regional implications o f state building and different conceptions o f statehood will be further 
discussed in chapter 6.
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3) The divergent conceptions o f statehood and nationhood and the trajectories 
o f the two states after the overthrow of the Derg and Eritrea’s independence.
Finally, the second part will analyse the three state- making activities induced 
by war: taxation, conscription and extension of the state institutions to the entire 
territory under the jurisdiction of the state. Herbst claims that the three activities 
identified by Tilly (with regard to the process o f state formation in Europe) serve as
‘j
indicators o f the consolidation o f state power. This will lead the chapter into the 
examination o f the question whether the 1998- 2000 war has reinforced the 
trajectories o f the states towards consolidation or disintegration.
5.2 Conceptions and trajectories of state and nation 
building
The first part o f the chapter looks specifically at the trajectories o f the nation-state in 
the two countries and seeks to understand how the aims o f achieving and defending 
domestic and international sovereignty were pursued.
The confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea needs to be understood in the 
context o f structural differences in terms o f how each state was conceptualized, after 
1991, as a nation-state.
5.2.1 The trajectories of state and nation building in Eritrea and Ethiopia
The creation o f Ethiopia as a nation-state during the nineteenth century (and early 
twentieth century) was characterised by an inherently expansionist dynamic and 
through subordination and incorporation o f the periphery into the northern highlands 
historic core.4 This territorial expansion coincided with the rise into eminence o f the 
Shoan core.5 The peripheral groups from contiguous southern and western regions,
3 Herbst, 2000, op.cit., p. 23.
4 Clapham, C. 2006. Ethiopia' in Clapham, C., Herbst, J., and, Greg Mills, (ed.) Big African States. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press, p. 19; Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Aida Mengistu, 2006. 
'Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Building Multiethnic States' in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.)
East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance. Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, p. 84.
5 Clapham, C. 1972. 'Ethiopia and Somalia'. Adelphi Paper : Special Issue on African Conflicts 364, 
p. 2. The Shoan core refers to the former central Ethiopian province. The political system was
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which had few links with the core, tended to resist the centralizing pressures for state 
building. The process o f contention between the centralizing forces and the peripheral 
loci o f power (centrifugal forces)6 is central to understanding state formation in the 
developing w orld.7 Clapham in the 1970s already emphasised the tension which 
permeated the Ethiopian state between the centripetal pull o f Ethiopian nationalism, 
assimilation and administrative control, and the centrifugal pull o f neighbouring
O
countries over the Ethiopian state’s periphery. Clapham argues that the outcome was 
determined by the strategies followed by the groups in the midway between the 
periphery and the core.9
Herbst contends that wars of territorial conquest were central to the formation 
o f particular types of states in Europe because they created ‘ ( ...)  a life and death 
imperative to raise taxes, enlist men as soldiers, and develop the necessary 
infrastructure to fight and win battles against rapacious neighbours'. I0Lewis claims 
that the Ethiopian political unit was based on conquest, however *(•••) power of the 
centre over the periphery waxed and waned over the centuries'.11 Ethiopia was faced 
both by external threats to its territorial integrity and by insurgencies o f varying 
strengths which challenged not only the state’s monopoly o f the means of coercion 
but also managed to control territory far from the capital.
The recognition o f Ethiopia’s modem sovereign boundaries by the colonial 
powers came in the aftermath of Ethiopia’s successful victory at Adwa (1896) over 
the invading army of Italy. The Ethiopian state withstood the test o f successfully
dominated by representatives o f  this province, which contributed with 60 per cent to 70 per cent o f  
high-ranking central government officials, the imperial family and the seat o f government in the 
capital. Ibid., p. 3.
6 ibid., p. 43.
7 Bradburd, D. 1996. 'Towards an understanding o f the fate o f  modem pastoralists: Starting with the 
state'. Nomadic Peoples 38, p. 42.
8 Clapham, 1972, op.cit., p. 3.
9 ibid., pp. 3-4. With hindsight, this analysis already identified the contours o f  the post- 1991 context 
and is still applicable. Indeed, the Ethiopian groups in the midway between the core and the periphery 
played a crucial role in the secession o f Eritrea after the overthrow o f  the Derg  in 1991. The alliance 
between the TPLF and the EPLF was crucial for Eritrea’s prompt international recognition as a 
sovereign state. Pool, D. 1998. 'The Eritrean People's Liberation Front' in Clapham, C. (ed.) African 
Guerrillas. Fountain & Indiana: James Currey. p. 19.This contention, however, does not diminish the 
legitimacy o f Eritrea’s claim for self- determination and/or the significance o f  the victorious outcome 
o f the war for independence.
10 Herbst, 2000, op.cit., pp. 13-14.
11 Lewis, I. M. 1980. A modem history o f  the Som ali: nation and state in the Horn o f  Africa London & 
N.Y.: Longman, p. 249.
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resisting the Italian external threat to its territorial integrity. This victory was revived 
at key junctures to mobilise the citizens around the nationalist appeal to defend the 
state’s sovereignty.
The tension between the centripetal and the centrifugal pulls was played out 
when the Italian colonial power invaded Ethiopia in 1935 at a key juncture when the
1 7centre was perceived as weak and vulnerable. Until this crisis, the unity of the nation 
was assumed and largely unquestioned; McClellan contends that this juncture exposed 
the fragility o f the loyalty of various groups at the periphery to the Empire. As a
1 3consequence, McClellan argues that the myth of Adwa was shattered. McClellan 
claims that during the war Ethiopians did what was necessary to survive and this 
strategy forced difficult choices, leading many to shift sides depending upon their 
particular circumstances.14
The war divided the country, and in its aftermath it was paramount to control 
factionalism.15 After the Italians were ousted in 1941, the national question occupied 
centre stage in Ethiopia. The Emperor promulgated two national holidays in a tribute 
to the Patriots and to mark the restoration o f the state: 19 February was established as 
Martyrs Day and 5 May as Liberation Day.16 In addition, Public Monuments were 
built to commemorate episodes of the resistance war and national heroes.17
McClellan’s interpretation o f the war runs counter to the official interpretation 
and to the nationalist narrative to be found in Ethiopian textbooks from this period. 
The patriotic indoctrination o f the future generations implied highlighting the war as a 
great national effort to end the drama of foreign occupation. The shifting allegiances 
of many Ethiopians during the war and the peripheral groups’ different allegiances 
during the Italian occupation were silenced from the nationalist narrative.18 As Barnes
12 McClellan, C. 1996. 'Observations on the Ethiopian Nation, Its Nationalism, and the Italo- Ethiopian 
War'. Northeast African Studies 3, p. 63.
13 Ibid., p. 57.
14 ibid., p. 62.
15 ibid., p. 65.
16 ibid., p. 85. Martyrs Day paid a tribute to the slaughter o f  thousands in the capital after a failed 
attempt o f assassination o f  the Italian Governor Grazziani in 1937. The Liberation Day was the day o f  
the Emperor’s return to the country.
17 ibid, p. 66 . These Monuments included the statue to Abuna Petros, Sidist Kilo and Arat kilo.
18 McClellan, 1996, op.cit., p. 61 and p. 66.
173
claims the regime was ‘tinged with an amnesiac and aggressive chauvinism that did 
not admit the complexity of this recent history’.19
As an outcome of the defeat against the Italian troops, Emperor Haile Selassie 
concentrated efforts on the implementation and reinforcement o f the nationalist 
project.20 Building a centralized modem government to pursue ‘Greater Ethiopia’s’
91 *national interests (domestic and international) was central to this project. Within this
process ‘amharization’ o f the society occupied centre- stage and access to education,
22work and power were dependent upon assimilation into the core’s dominant ethos. 
The restoration o f the imperial prestige was pursued by ‘firming up external 
sovereignty’ especially with regard to the status o f the former Italian colony: Eritrea; 
which was first incorporated as part o f the Federation and, then, as one o f Ethiopia’s 
Provinces. However, Bames highlights that the unfinished modem project o f domestic 
sovereignty was fatally neglected; the revolutionary regime would exploit this 
weakness and upon take-over of power defined domestic sovereignty as one o f the 
central features of its state building project.23
One o f the initial concerns o f the revolutionary regime was the ‘nationalities 
question’. The debate around the nationalities question had emerged within the 
Students’ movement in the 1960s and flared up divisions both within the movement 
and the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) or Derg. Gilkes claims 
that the splits arose among Ethiopian student exiles in Europe and in North America 
but their divisions were only played out domestically when they returned to Ethiopia 
in the 1970s 24 The debate over the national question, indeed, mirrored the conflicting
9Snature o f the centre- periphery relations in a multi-ethnic centralised state.
19 Bames, C. 2003. 'Sovereignty, Identity and Modernity: Understanding Ethiopia'. African Affairs 102, 
p. 513.
20 Bames, C., and, Thomas Osmond, Octobre 2005. 'L' Apres Etat- Nation en Ethiopie: Changement de 
forme plus que d'habitudes?' Politique Africaine 99, p. 9.
21 Ibid., p. 9.
22 Ibid., p. 9.
23 Bames, 2003, op.cit., p. 513.
24 Gilkes, P. 1983. 'Centralism and the Ethiopian PMAC' in Lewis, I.M. (ed.) Nationalism and Self- 
Determination in the Horn o f  Africa. London: Ithaca Press, footnote 1, p. 209.
25 Triulzi, A. 1983. 'Competing views o f national identity in Ethiopia' in Lewis, I.M. (ed.) Ibid.
London: Ithaca Press, p. 115.
174
The PMAC in its April 1976 National Democratic Revolution Programme 
(NDRP) formally accorded each nationality full-right to self-government, regional 
autonomy in internal affairs, and recognized the multi-linguistic character o f the 
Ethiopian polity. This was a significant departure from the imperial regime’s 
Amharic only-policy and led to recognition o f language rights to other ethno- 
linguistic groups (termed nationalities). Indeed, both the PMAC and Ethiopia 
Revolutionary Information Centre (ERIC) used Stalin’s definition o f a nation. The 
degree o f autonomy and the question whether secession would be permissible, or not, 
provoked a heated debate; which ultimately resulted in the view from the Political 
Office for Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA)29 prevailing. The POMOA firmly 
opposed secession and, instead, favoured regional autonomy. The idea o f the 
Institute for Ethiopian Nationalities (IFEN) emerged from this debate. In addition, the 
Derg pledged for the cultural emancipation of ethnic groups and implemented a mass 
literacy campaign in local languages.31 In the 1980s, the IFEN conducted a study on 
the territorial distribution o f languages in Ethiopia. The study concluded that out o f 
the 580 woreda (districts) only 30 woreda were mono-linguistic, only 5 per cent of 
the districts were homogenous with regard to language.32 Most of the districts were 
multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic. As a consequence, the project o f using language as 
the criterion for administrative divisions was postponed indefinitely because o f the
l')
concerns over this measure’s potential to fuel conflicts.
The Derg’s approach to the national question confirmed that although not 
ignored, the policies to address it were not implemented; ultimately, sub-nationalities 
were placed under the umbrella o f ‘reactionary narrow nationalism’, which was
26 Education, as the next section will discuss in further detail, played a central role in these processes. 
Gilkes, 1983, op.cit., p. 196.
27 McNab, C. December 1990. 'Language Policy and Language Practice: Implementing Multilingual 
Literacy Education in Ethiopia1. African Studies Review  33, p. 66.
28 ibid., p. 199.
29 The POMOA was the body in charge o f political education in 1976-1979.
30 ibid., p. 200.
31 Vaughan, S. 2007. T e federalisme ethnique et la democratisation depuis 1991' in Prunier, G. (ed.) 
L'Ethiopie contemporaine. Addis Ababa & Paris: CFEE/ Karthala, p.373. The mass literacy campaign 
was implemented in the context o f the National Work Campaign ( zemacha) wherein students from 
schools and institutes o f higher education were sent to the countryside to participate in the campaign 
against illiteracy. McNab, 1990, op.cit., p. 68 .
32 ibid., p. 375.
33 ibid., p. 376.
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portrayed as a threat to the Ethiopian progressive party.34 The Derg, despite its 
rhetoric of recognizing regional self-government, in continuity with the legacy from 
the imperial regime, pursued not only the process o f nationalisation but also that o f 
centralisation of government.35
The strategy that followed post-1991 to address the tension between national 
and sub- national identities should be understood against the backdrop of these earlier 
projects. The ethnic-based Federal model implemented by the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was inspired by the Soviet Constitution and purported 
a unique conception of the Ethiopian state. The trajectory o f state and nation building
or
should be understood as part of the TGE project of remaking the Ethiopian state. 
However, continuities with the previous regime policy on the nationalities question 
should not be overlooked.
The p o st-1991 Ethiopian constitutional model led to the redrawing of the 
administrative territorial subdivisions of the country on an explicitly ethnic principle. 
However, as the section on Education will show, the linguistic criteria were, indeed, 
paramount within this project. Ultimately, the Constitution recognized the right to 
self- determination, including a right to secession.
In Eritrea, the PFDJ/ EPLF conception rested on forging homogeneity through 
the consolidation of a sense o f ‘Eritreaness’ that would embrace and supplant all other 
sub-national identities.
Along with the Eritrean definition o f nationalism in terms of colonial
n n
territoriality, the PFDJ also implemented its own conception of Eritrean statehood 
which led to a redrawing of the administrative units. However, in contradistinction to 
the EPRDF’s ethnic-based Federal model (which ascribed saliency to sub-national 
identities and led to the redrawing o f the domestic boundaries between regions along 
ethnic lines), the PFDJ restructuring o f the administrative units was aimed at diffusing
34 Gilkes, 1983, op.cit., p. 208.
35Bames and Osmond, 2005, op.cit., p. 9.
36 Keller, E. J. 2005. 'Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia' in Laremont, R.R. (ed.) 
Borders, nationalism, and the African state. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
37 Clapham, 2006, op.cit., p. 235.
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sub-national identities and at subordinating these to the national one. The regional 
boundaries were redrawn to form the new administrative units (zobas) which cut 
across old regional units. As Conrad highlights, the PFDJ state-building project was 
aimed at *(.•••) erasing regional identities, i.e. loyalty to one’s region (awraja) and the 
village (adi)\ 38
The creation of multi-ethnic administrative regions was pursued in order to
" IQ
prevent the emergence o f territorially based ethnic opposition. However, as Conrad 
claims, this attempt to erase regional identities created resentment and seems to have 
‘( . ..) contributed to a growing disengagement from the national project and reinforced 
deep- seated local and regional affiliations’. 40 However, in order to understand the 
potential divisive role o f regionalism for domestic politics since Eritrea’s 
independence, the legacy o f the 1973 crisis should not be overlooked. After the 
merger o f two of the splintering factions of the ELF, the People’s Party 1 & 2, Issaias 
Afewerki assumed command. In 1973 the leadership was faced with opposition from 
within its ranks: from the menqa faction (ultra-leftist former university students) and 
yamin (right wing). During the crisis within the ranks o f the future EPLF (which was 
allegedly only officially formed at the First Congress in 1977), one o f the dissenting 
factions led by Solomon Woldemariam claimed to represent the fighters from the 
Akele Guzai province and was aimed at overcoming the lack o f representation of this 
province within the new leadership (which was dominated by fighters originally from 
Hamasien).41 This regionally-based grievance was on a clear collision route with the 
leadership’s focus on the need to overcome any ethnic and/or regional- based 
divisions. The current Eritrean President is originally from Hamasien region. 
President Issaias Afewerki, among others, had fiercely opposed ethnic, regional 
and/or religious based affiliations and, instead, focused on the subordination o f all 
sub- nationalities to the overarching cause of Eritrea’s plight for self-determination
38 Conrad, B. 2006. 'Out o f  the 'memory hole': Alternative narratives o f the Eritrean revolution in the 
diaspora'. Afrika Spectrum 4, footnote 23, p. 261.
39 Fouad Makki 1996. 'Nationalism, State Formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991- 96'. Review 
o f  African Political Economy 23, p. 484.
40 ibid, p.261. Historically some regions within Eritrea, such as Akele Guzai, had closer links to Tigray, 
than with other kebesa within Eritrea, such as the districts o f Seraye and Hamasien. According to 
Alemseged Abbay the trans- Mereb ties (i.e. across the river which separates Eritrea from Tigray) were 
still alluded to after Eritrea’s independence. Alemseged Abbay 1997. 'The Trans- Mereb Past in the 
Present'. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 35, pp. 324-25.
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and independence. The decision to eliminate by force the opposition factions during 
the 1973 crisis is still a controversial matter which resonates in Eritrean politics since 
Independence.42 Perhaps the disappearance of the Akele Guzai province with the 
creation o f the new administrative units (zoba) was not the outcome of a mere 
coincidence.
These contradictory conceptions o f statehood divided the leaderships of both 
states and their intransigence coupled with their divergent orientations influenced 
their foreign policies. Asmara exchanged accusations with Addis Ababa stating that 
the Ethiopian ruling party was determined to undermine its survival as a sovereign 
state. For Eritrea the legitimacy o f the thirty-year war for independence was based on 
the colonial treaties signed between Ethiopia and Italy. Affirming that ideological 
basis remained important for the Eritrean leadership and, in the absence of 
democracy, nationalism became the major defence against ethnic, language and/or 
region-based sub-nationalism.
Although the post-1991 Ethiopian and Eritrean conceptions o f statehood had 
domestic sources, their implementation had significant international implications and 
was pursued in the regional arena.43
5.2.2 Monopoly of Education: language, history and national identity formation
The divergent trajectories of the two states’ nation building projects becomes even 
more salient when we turn to the analysis o f the educational systems in relation to the 
states’ aim of achieving domestic sovereignty. This section looks first at the legacies 
from the colonial period in the Eritrean educational system and, finally, at the PFDJ’s
41 Pool, D. 2001. From guerrillas to government: the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Oxford & 
Athens: J. Currey & Ohio University Press, footnote 24, p. 76.
42 Although the information on the 1973 crisis is sparse all Eritrea scholars allude to its significance 
both to understanding the formation o f  the EPLF and domestic politics since Eritrea’s independence. 
Iyob, R. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle fo r  Independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism 1941- 
1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 116-117; Pool 2001, op.cit., p. 76 and p. 86. 
Connell, D. 2001. 'Inside the EPLF: The Origins o f the 'People's Party' & its Role in the Liberation o f  
Eritrea'. Review o f  African Political Economy 89, pp. 352-53.
Connell, D. 2005. 'A Conversation with Petros Solomon and Berhane Gebreghzabhier, August 2,2001' 
in Connell, D. (ed.) Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea 
Press, pp. 85- 90.
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policy with regard to Education and, specifically, to language. The analysis of the 
educational systems elucidates the divergent nationalist projects o f the two 
governments. Finally, this section will reflect upon the transformation wrought about 
by the EPRDF ethnic- based Federal model with regard to the politicisation of 
language.
Education in Eritrea
In the Eritrean case, according to Jacquin-Berdal, whilst the Italian colonial 
authorities left a minimal form of education, the numerous missions of various 
Christian denominations may have contributed to the creation of a sense of ‘Eritrean- 
ness’. The learning o f history played an important role in this respect. The textbooks 
used by Catholic missions in Eritrea depicted it as a cohesive entity. Moreover, 
Eritreans educated in the missions acquired a unitary conception of Eritrea and o f its 
particular history, distinct from other countries in the region. These textbooks 
contained maps o f Eritrea which provided the necessary visual support to the 
formation of an imagined community.44
The period o f British Administration (1941-1952) triggered the politicisation 
o f Eritreans around a nationalist project. According to the same author the British 
Administration enhanced the educational system and established political parties.
The importance of the educational legacy from this period was raised during 
an interview, in August 2004, while conducting fieldwork in Asmara. The British 
Administration left an important legacy in the educational system. Under the British 
Administration, at the primary school level, all the course books were in Tigrinya. 
From this period remains a great wealth o f literature in Tigrinya. Most o f the books 
were subsequently burnt but some remain as part of private collections.45 Alongside 
Tigrinya, Arabic text-books were obtained from Egypt and the Sudan. However, 
Arabic was never so widespread as to substantiate claims that it was a second official
43Chapter 6 analyses in further detail the divergent conceptions o f statehood and their implications not 
only to the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also with other regional actors.
44Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2000. ’State and War in the Formation o f Eritrean National Identity' in 
Vandersluis, S.O. (ed.) The State and Identity Construction in International Relations. London: 
MacMillan Press, p. 59.
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language.46 Paradoxically, it was the British later project to partition Eritrea that 
unified the new political elite in the preservation of Eritrea’s territorial integrity. 47
With the incorporation of Eritrea as the Fourteenth Govemorate of the Empire
48of Ethiopia, Amharic became the dominant medium of instruction in Eritrea.
Throughout the civil war with Ethiopia the EPLF developed an underground 
primary level education system which transmitted to the fighters and local 
communities in the newly liberated territories the idea o f an Eritrean nation.49
After independence, the national educational policy is based on the use o f 
mother languages as the medium of instruction in all public schools. Tekle M. 
Woldemikael carried a study o f the government policy in this area from 1991 to 1996. 
This study is even more important, as to date there has been no census with precise 
percentages o f speakers for each of the 9 languages. The mother-tongue policy has 
been a form of social engineering that emphasizes: ‘( ...)  one state, one nation, and 
many languages'.50
In addition to the mother language, all elementary school students are required 
to take Tigrinya and/ or Arabic. Beyond the primary school level the main medium o f 
instruction in all schools is English. These additional requirements show that in 
practice three languages tend to dominate: Arabic, Tigrinya and English. Indeed, 
these are the state’s working languages.
The government-controlled newspapers fully reproduce this policy orientation. 
Haddas Eritra is published in Tigrinya, Eritrea al-Haditha is published in Arabic and
45 Interview in Asmara, 2/08/04. This is a field in need o f further research but it remains beyond the 
scope o f this dissertation.
46 Jacquin- Berdal, 2000, op. cit., p. 61.
47 ibid., p. 63.
48 Interestingly enough, during fieldwork in August 2004 in Asmara, several people anecdotally 
mentioned that if  caught listening to Amharic music they had to pay a fine o f 5 Nakfa. This measure, 
quite significantly, had been implemented in the aftermath o f  the 1998-2000 war to create a further 
marker between Ethiopians and Eritreans, reviving earlier resistance to the ‘Amharization’ project 
implemented by the Emperor Haile Selassie.
49 Jacquin- Berdal, 2000, op.cit., p. 65.
50Tekle M. Woldemikael 2003 (April). 'Language, Education, and Public Policy in Eritrea'. African 
Studies Review  46, p. 122.
180
Eritrea Profile is published in English. However, at the level of government- 
controlled radio programmes the PFDJ seems to be committed to the policy o f one 
Eritrea, many languages. Minority ethnic groups have a number of programmes in 
their native languages.51 The extent to which this is a counter-reaction to the effects 
of Ethiopia’s own focus on ‘nationalities’ on Eritrean minorities located in the 
borderlands, is difficult to determine.
Tekle Woldemikael claims that in many cases there is grass-roots resistance to 
the policy o f use of the mother tongue in Eritrean schools. This has to do with the 
economic and political rewards wrought by the knowledge o f regional and 
international languages such as Arabic and English.53 Since English, Tigrinya and 
Arabic are widely used in official communication, a person knowing all or a 
combination o f these languages has an advantage in gaining economic and political 
opportunities in the modem sector o f Eritrean society. Those who command 
languages spoken only by minority ethnic groups are unlikely to have equal access to 
the state. Interestingly enough one can function effectively in the lower official circles 
of the Eritrean government knowing only Tigrinya. The same might not happen if  an 
Eritrean speaks only Arabic and/ or English. Indeed, Tigrinya is the language o f 
military training and communication.
According to the author, the government is fully aware that Arabic, as an 
international language and as the language of neighbouring countries, may eclipse 
Tigrinya, which is only a regional language.54
In Eritrea the work of the Eritrean Research and Documentation Centre 
(ERDC) is fundamental to educational and historical development. The goal is to 
develop the sources to create a national archive and further support it in the future 
with the creation of a national library. Richard Greenfield claims that: ‘( ...)  without
51 Interviews in Asmara, July-August 2004.
52 Ethiopia’s ethnic- based Federal model led to the creation o f radio programmes in local languages. 
This was particular significant for Afar and Kunama divided between the two countries. This is another 
area for future research with borderland communities, which, however, lies beyond the scope o f the 
present dissertation because o f the constraints to field work discussed in chapter 1.
53 Tekle M. Woldemikael, 2003, op.cit., p. 135.
54 ibid., p. 134.
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these tools proper interpretation of history and politics will be difficult'.55 The ERDC 
in Asmara holds a valuable collection o f documents from the period of the war for 
independence. The ERDC is closely linked to the ruling party. This in turn, further 
confirms Jacquin-Berdal contention that the EPLF, after its victory in 1991, imposed 
its own definition of Eritrean national identity ‘( ...)  one in which the war for 
independence had become the founding myth'.56 The teaching and learning of 
languages and history seem to confirm the state’s monopoly o f the educational system 
and its central role in the PFDJ state and nation building project.
The PFDJ has also attempted to maintain monopoly o f education among the 
diaspora. According to Conrad, the teaching of history, culture and mother-tongue to 
children in the diaspora mirrors the government’s policy o f inculcating through the 
educational system its own version of the nationalist narrative.57
During the border war any divergence from the PJDF narrative o f the war for 
independence and the historical obligation to defend this hard- won achievement was 
viewed as an act o f treason; Conrad suggests that this perception was shared both 
domestically and among the diaspora communities.58 This should be understood 
against the backdrop o f the government’s trend to conflate ‘the identity o f the 
nationalist movement and its political manifestation, the PFDJ’ to a point that they 
‘are near indistinguishable from that o f the state’. 59
The PFDJ regime interpretation of the war for independence was already 
contested prior to the 1998-2000 war. While the PFDJ had defined the 20th June as a 
public holiday to pay tribute to the Martyrs of the state o f Eritrea, the former ELF 
(RC) celebrate Martyr’s Day on the 1st December.60
55 Shaebia Interview by Yoseph Takle (Asmara University) with Professor Richard Greenfield. ‘ Eritrea 
is in a Strong position on the Border ruling’. Voice o f  Eritrea. 25/01/05. 
http://www.homofafrica.de/engIish/l ian2005 eng/jan25-l eri.htm
56 Jacquin- Berdal, 2000, op.cit., p. 67.
57 Conrad, 2006, op.cit., footnote 18, p. 257. The PFDJ narrative o f the liberation war is purported as 
the official one and excludes any dissenting narrative or diverse interpretations o f  the war for 
independence.
58 Conrad, 2006, op.cit., footnote 5, p. 251.
59 Dorman, S. R. 2005. 'Narratives o f nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism'. Nations and  
Nationalism 11, p. 207.
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The defeat in the border war led to the public voicing o f discontent with regard 
to the PFDJ military and diplomatic conduct of the war. Quite significantly, the 
aftermath o f the war led many to question the regime’s legitimacy and ‘opened a 
Pandora’s box of interpretations of the past’.61
Education in Ethiopia
As the section on the trajectory o f state building in Ethiopia has shown, Language and 
History occupied centre-stage in the different regimes’ policy for Education.
The first Population Census was conducted in May 1984, under the auspices 
o f the Derg, and the second in 1994 under the auspices of the TGE. The third 
Population Census for most o f the country reportedly started in May 2007, while that 
o f the Somali and Afar regional states was scheduled to take place in November 
2007. The 1984 Population Census was the first effort to collect data on language 
affiliation in Ethiopia.
The Derg's departure from the imperial regime Amharic only-policy was 
marked with the launching o f the literacy campaign in 15 languages in 1979. 
English was maintained as a second language o f government, for external 
communications, and for secondary and higher education. The National Literacy 
Campaign was conducted in the three major languages, i.e., Amharic-Oromo and 
Tigrinya and in 12 other minor languages. During the preparation stage of the literacy 
campaign the languages which qualified were all transcribed to the Geez script (the 
basis of Amharic and Tigrinya). The post-revolutionary change in language policy 
was curtailed by several problems and did not foster a radical change in teaching 
methodologies.64 Indeed, Amharic remained the undisputable national lingua franca 
during the imperial and socialist regimes.
60 Conrad, 2006, op.cit., footnote 22, p. 260.
61 ibid., p. 251.
62 Fekadu Beshah 22 May 2007. Ethiopia: Commission to Purchase Satellite Equipment for Upcoming 
Census' Addis Fortune. Addis Ababa, http://allaffica.com/stories/200705220692.html.
63 McNab, 1990, op.cit., p. 66 .
64 ibid., pp. 67-73.
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In April 1994, the Transitional Government o f Ethiopia proclaimed its 
Education and Training Policy (EETP) with regard to languages:
Cognisant of the pedagogical advantage o f the child in learning in 
mother tongue and the rights o f nationalities to promote the use of 
their languages, primary education will be given in nationality 
languages.65
As a result, at present primary education is offered in twelve languages.66 This policy 
was fiercely criticised on the grounds that it would erode unity and contribute to the 
dismemberment o f the country. As Tekeste Negash notes ambiguities on the divisions 
between the central and the regional departments dealing with Education were 
pronounced and undermined the implementation of the policy by local authorities.
The saliency o f language became relevant for domestic politics. The TGE 
restructured the provincial boundaries of the state according to ethnic and linguistic 
criteria. Ultimately languages became the predominant criteria because ethnic 
geography is not consolidated territorially. Indeed, the EPRDF re-drawing of 
domestic boundaries was based on the broad distribution of languages, rather than on 
ethnicity.69 ( ...)  Federalism in Ethiopia, therefore, might well be termed ‘linguistic’ 
rather than ‘ethnic’.70
This policy posed problems to citizens who identified with a certain ethnic 
group but who neither spoke the mother-language associated with that group, nor 
lived in the region where the ethnic group with whom they identified was 
concentrated. Cohen remarks that in Ethiopia language and ethnicity are unreliable
71markers o f identity because of the overlapping borders, the mingling between ethnic 
groups and the linguistic diversity o f the country. Moreover, in Ethiopia people of
65 Tekeste Negash 1996. Rethinking Education in Ethiopia. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p. 97.
66 Ibid., p. 82.
67 Ibid., p. 85.
68 Ibid., p. 16.
69 Cohen, G. 2006. 'The Development o f Regional and Local Languages in Ethiopia's Federal System' 
in Turton, D. (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: 
James Currey, p. 171.
70 Cohen, 2006, op.cit., p. 172.
71 Ibid., p. 171.
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various origins have adopted Amharic, as their own language, regardless o f their
77ethnic background.
According to Assefa Fisseha the second phase o f the EPRDF project for state 
and nation building began with the outbreak o f hostilities with Eritrea and led to a 
shift from diversity into unity and from decentralization into a more centralized 
federal system.73 The combined unexpected outburst o f nationalism (and patriotism) 
and ‘( ...)  the need to run an efficient military campaign led to the re-channelling of 
resources and manpower to the centre'.74 As a consequence, the motto o f earlier 
regimes o f Ethiopia’s unity in face o f external aggression re-emerged from the chains 
o f the ethnic-based Federal model.
5.3 War making and making/ remaking State and 
Nation in Eritrea and Ethiopia
This section will look into the three key activities o f the state associated with war 
highlighted by Tilly: taxation, conscription and extension o f the state institutions -  
administration to the entire territory. The section will reflect upon how the war related 
to these activities, and whether in its aftermath the war-induced effects relapsed to 
the ante bellum situation or, on the contrary, contributed to the consolidation of state 
power. As discussed in chapter 1, the state-building ramifications of conflict in
n c
relation to the war nationalist appeal should not be overlooked.
This section argues that there is a strong relationship between war and the 
formative period o f statehood. The data seem to suggest that for Eritrea the war was 
the second act o f the process of national identity formation. The three-decade civil 
war served as a catalyst for nation-building and the two-and-a-half-year inter-state 
war was caused by Eritrea’s profound territorial conception of nationalism. However,
72 Cohen, 2006, op.cit., p. 172.
73 Assefa Fisseha 2006. Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation o f Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism' 
in Turton, D. (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: 
James Currey, p. 147.
74 ibid., p. 147.
75 Herbst, J. 2003. 'State and War in Africa' in Paul, T.V., Ikenberry, G. John, Hall, John A. (ed.) The 
Nation- State in question. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 176.
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the analysis of the relationship between the border war and state making in Eritrea 
confirms the law of diminishing return o f war, as this section will show.
5.3.1 Taxation in Eritrea and in Ethiopia
The role played by diaspora in the homeland’s politics is a significant transformation 
within current world politics and this section will analyse how the mobilisation of this 
key constituency was critical for the Eritrean state extraction activities.
Taxation in Eritrea
In the initial period o f the war, the available evidence confirms one of the central 
processes identified by Tilly, i.e., the war increased the ability o f the Eritrean state to 
extract funds from this transnational constituency: the diaspora.76 When the war broke 
out in 1998, the state promptly and efficiently mobilised the Eritrean diaspora. The 
Eritrean state intensified its effort to raise funds from the diaspora via taxation and via 
the issuing of bonds and grants. There is not an overall estimate o f the total revenues 
raised among the different diaspora communities and even the size of the Eritrean 
diaspora is likely to be underestimated.77 However, scholarship on different Eritrean 
diaspora communities confirms that the diaspora contributions were critical to 
financing the 1998-2000 war.
The diaspora already contributed with 2 per cent o f their annual income for the
78EPLF during the war for independence. As Bernal notes, this strategy was actively
continued after independence by the EPLF/PFDJ.79 The contributions were voluntary
and Eritreans did not resent the state’s demand, but also perceived it as a sign o f their
80own national commitment to the Eritrean state. Indeed, the diaspora remittances 
represented an annual movement o f US$ 250-350 million.81
76 Koser, K. 2003. 'Mobilizing New African Diasporas: An Eritrean Case Study' in Koser, K. (ed.) New 
African Diasporas. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
77 Koser, 2003, op. cit., p. 113.
78Bemal, V. February 2004. 'Eritrea Goes Global: Reflections on Nationalism in a Transnational Era'. 
Cultural Anthropology 19, p. 11.
79 ibid., p. 18.
80 ibid. Koser, 2003, op. cit., p. 114.
81 Bernal, 2004, op. cit., p. 19.
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Plaut claims that the Eritrean government was able to raise an estimated 
US$150 millions from Eritreans living abroad in defence o f the nation.82 Bernal’s 
study findings are illuminating of both the government’s capacity to mobilise the 
diaspora and the diaspora’s readiness to contribute financially to the defence o f the 
nation. In June 1998, Eritreans in Denmark (Copenhagen) pledged a one-off payment 
of US$ 1,000 per household. In Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) the pledge comprised one 
month’s salary. In Canada (Edmonton) at a single meeting the Eritrean diaspora 
community raised US$ 2,600. In the US the St. Louis community pledged US$ 
55,000 at a meeting. According to Bernal, the Eritrean government set up a national
o->
defence bank account and the donations ‘flowed in'.
Koser reached similar conclusions with regard to the diaspora’s critical role in 
financing the war. Eritreans in the UK were asked to contribute additionally with an 
extra £1 GBP per day (US$ 2) plus with a one-off payment o f £500 GBP (US$ 1000) 
in 1999. In Berlin, Eritreans were asked for an amount o f 30 DEM (US$ 21) per 
month and a one- off payment o f 1000 DEM (US$ 688). 84
Hepner’s study shows how in the US, the Chicago community raised nearly 
US$1 million for the Eritrean government’s Defence budget.85 From Hepner’s study it 
also emerged that although formally voluntary, failure to contribute to the state’s 
demands tended to create obstacles for participation in Eritrea’s domestic economy, 
such as buying or selling property.86
According to Styan, the level o f bonds issued to the diaspora reached 3.1 per 
cent o f GDP in 1999 and grants amounted to 3.2 per cent o f GDP in 2000.87
82 Plaut, M. 2005. 'The Conflict and its aftermath' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 109.
83 Bernal, 2004, op. c it ., p. 3.
84 Koser, 2003, op. cit., p. 115.
85 Hepner, T. R. 2003. 'Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society in the Eritrean diaspora'. 
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 10, footnote 14, p. 290.
86 ibid., p. 290.
87 Styan, D. 2005. Twisting Ethio- Eritrean Economic Ties: Misperceptions o f War and the Misplaced 
priorities o f Peace, 1997- 2002' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: 
Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 186. According to Koser, the Eritrean 
diaspora communities in North America, Europe and the Middle East by July 1999 had purchased an 
estimated US$ 55 million worth o f bonds. Koser, 2003, op. cit., p. 115.
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The government’s substantial requests for money were not developed in 
conjunction with a policy of granting the diaspora an opportunity to participate in 
domestic politics. Despite having paid the extra contributions demanded by the state,
OQ
as Koser noted they had ‘( . . .) absolutely no say in any decisions about the conflict'.
Social pressure both from the state and family members in the ‘homeland’ also 
seems to function as an efficient means of guaranteeing that the diaspora continues to 
meet the demands of the state and remains loyal to its country of origin. This loyalty 
becomes tangible in terms of payment of taxes to the state and o f regular remittances 
to family members. Furthermore, Hepner suggests that the diaspora’s contribution to 
the state served as an indicator of national commitment.89
This pattern was in continuity with the diaspora’s previous contribution to 
financing the separatist insurgency against the Derg.90 However, as the 1998- 2000 
war increased in intensity, the willingness o f this political constituency to contribute 
to the Eritrean state’s war effort decreased91 and criticism of the ruling party emerged.
Despite rising criticism of the PFDJ, the state nationalist appeal achieved its 
aim and the diaspora mobilised to protect Eritrea’s hard-won independence. The 
readiness of this constituency to meet the demands o f the state clearly indicates the 
complex relationship between globalization, transnationalism and nationalism. 
Criticism of the regime sharply increased, its legitimacy was compromised, but 
loyalty to the state seems to be preserved by the majority. Although the projects of 
permanent return have been compromised by the increasingly authoritarian measures 
of the government, loyalty to the state does not seem to have waned.
The Eritrean state policy on recognizing dual nationality contributes, in part, 
to the continued attractiveness of holding onto Eritrean citizenship for those who have
88 Koser 2003, op. cit., p. 120.
89 ibid., p. 290.
90Jacquin- Berdal, 2002, op. cit., p. 119.
91 Indeed, according to IMF estimates, private remittances totalled 2500 million Nakfa in 1997, 
decreasing to 1820 million Nakfa in 1998 and with a slight increase to 1960 million Nakfa in 1999. The 
decrease was registered despite the Eritrean state external agents’ effort to mobilise contributions from 
this key constituency during the war. Styan, 2005, op. cit., footnote 15, p. 199.
92 Koser, 2003, op. cit., p. 121.
93 Interviews in London, May 2007.
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never lived in Eritrea and who may never do so.94 As the next section on conscription 
will show, the situation for those living in Eritrea has undergone a significant 
transformation exacerbated by the 1998-2000 war. To the domestic citizens, the 
attractiveness o f Eritrean citizenship is subordinate to a different set of obligations 
and constraints; which the government is not in a position to impose upon Eritrean 
citizens who have acquired other citizenships.
Taxation in Ethiopia
On the Ethiopian side, the links between the state and the diaspora followed a 
different trajectory. Those who acquired the nationality o f other countries had to 
relinquish Ethiopian nationality. The criteria of exclusive Ethiopian citizenship 
created a different legal framework for those citizens o f Ethiopian origin and/or 
whose descent could be traced from Ethiopian nationals.
When the crisis escalated into full-scale war, the government met the demand 
o f increasing revenue to finance the war with an intensification o f the pressure to raise 
revenues domestically. The financing o f the war was met via domestic taxation and 
borrowing from domestic banks.95
The state exerted pressure on its citizens at the level of conscription and 
taxation. The patriotic contributions, as they were named, evolved along the rally to 
all ‘nationalities’/ethnic groups to contribute to the defence of the state’s territorial 
integrity in the face o f external aggression.
In the rural areas, the communities were called upon to contribute with men to 
the Ethiopian National Defence Force, and with goods. The regional governments, on 
behalf o f the Federal government, solicited funds from the public.
94 With Independence it was common for those who had spent most o f their adult lives or who had been 
brought up in the diaspora to make plans o f going back and (re-) starting their life in Eritrea. However, 
the government requirements o f completion o f the national military service to set up businesses (or for 
any other dealing with the state administration) and other constraints to any entrepreneurial 
undertakings in the private sector discouraged many from effectively settling in Eritrea. Interviews in 
London, May 2007.
95 Styan, 2005, op. cit., p. 185.
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In Ethiopia’s Region 5 (Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State), the regional 
authorities required each rural community to contribute with a specified number o f 
livestock, mainly sheep.96 This campaign was conducted at a time when the region 
was burdened by a severe and prolonged drought, which had devastating
Q7
consequences for the livestock economy.
In the urban areas all employees, especially those working for the state, were 
subordinated to a new tax, which was nominally voluntary, called ‘Patriotic
ORContribution'. Although the patriotic contributions were allegedly voluntary, both 
urban and rural communities had little space to resist the authorities’ request.
5.3.2 Monopoly of coercive violence: conscription and patriotic education
Conscription has tended to occupy centre stage in the trajectories o f state and nation 
building in the two countries.
In Eritrea allegations of threats from neighbouring countries have tended to 
dominate the official discourse. First, the threat o f Sudan, and then the threat of 
Ethiopia provided the required justification to reorganize a national military, capable 
o f defending national sovereignty. This led to a gradual expansion of military- 
building activities into the realm o f state building. Callahan’s research in the case o f 
Burma shows that the building of a modem army should be understood as part o f the 
project of creating the state.99 However, this feature o f state building was 
accompanied by intra-elite stmggles over different visions o f national defence. In 
Eritrea the state builders’ dominant concern was to remake the citizenry. Conscription 
and Education were defined as two complementary means to achieve this end. Indeed, 
the compulsory military service and patriotic education were two central features, 
paraphrasing Callahan, of ‘the project o f creating a durable national state in the 
territory that the Italian had mapped into Eritrea a century earlier'.100
96 Samatar, A. I. 2004. Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region*. Third 
World Quarterly 25, p. 1147.
97 ibid., p. 1147.
98 Styan, 2005, op. cit., footnote 14, p. 199.
99 Callahan, M. P. 2003. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, p. 173.
100 Callahan, 2003, op. cit., p. 173.
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In Ethiopia during the Derg compulsory military service was introduced in 
1983 by Proclamation no. 236. All men and women aged 18 to 30 were liable for a six 
months’ military training and a two-year period of compulsory military service, with 
the obligation to remain in the reserves until the age o f 50.101 Eritrea’s system after 
independence reproduced this measure.
In 1994 the government of Eritrea promulgated a national service 
proclamation,102 which was mandatory (and still is at the time of writing) on all 
citizens between the ages 18 and 40. The national service proclamation mandates an 
eighteen month period o f service. Six months o f service consist o f military training in 
a training camp in Eritrea’s western lowland: in Sawa. After military training, the 
National Service trainees are dispatched to different parts of the country and serve for 
12 months.
In Eritrea compulsory military service remains central to the organisation o f 
society. The period although legally defined for eighteen months can be extended. In 
the aftermath o f the war with Ethiopia, the compulsory military service was tightened. 
Indeed, national service has become full military service and has been extended 
indefinitely. Those who have completed national service, along with ex-combatants 
during the war for national independence, are subject to recall and reserve duties. 
There is no exemption for conscientious objectors. So far it is estimated that more 
than 200,000 Eritreans have gone through the national service, and conscription 
continues unabated.103
The state’s continuous demand for extended conscription has contributed to 
the widening o f the generational divide between those ex-combatants from the war 
for independence and those who fought in the 1998-2000 war.104 At the time o f 
writing, those who fought in the border war are either still serving in the military or at
101 http://wri-irg.org/co/rtba/ethiopia.htm
102 National Service Proclamation No. 82/95, October 23, 1995, Articles 8, 9, as cited in Global Report 
2001 .
,03Eritrean Anti-Militarism Initiative.
http://www.connection-ev.de/eritrea/HS_rechts.html#EAI_English
104 Reid, R. 2005. 'Caught in the headlights o f history: Eritrea, the EPLF and the postwar nation state'. 
Journal o f  Modem African Studies 43, p. 474.
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civilian jobs on a pecuniary wage.105 The national service conscripts tend to be 
engaged in development work within the warsay-yikealo initiative.106 This initiative 
aims to bring together the warsay (those recruited to the new Eritrean army after 
Independence)107 and Yikealo (the ex- combatants from the liberation war).108 In 
addition, those undergoing the compulsory military service were used in PFDJ- linked 
corporations; this practice brought undeniable benefits to the party-owned 
corporations through the use o f ‘conscript workers’ as cheap labour.109 This policy 
and the open-ended military service have generated much political discontent among 
youth.110
From the government’s perspective, Sawa should be understood as the 
military training centre par excellence and also as the ‘national finishing school'.111 
The national military centre has contributed to the construction of a new myth of the 
Sawa Tigers, in distinction to the draft- dodgers portrayed as the ‘Coca- Cola 
generation’ for their lack o f willingness to sacrifice for the nation and for their poor
I 1 9
display of patriotism. Indeed, in Eritrea, as Bascom notes ‘sacrifice is considered 
normative in times of peace or war'.113 In addition, the national military centre’s role 
was critical to the passing on of the core values o f the nation to the post-liberation 
war generation.114 Others, on a more critical note, suggest that the focus on the 
military training of the generation with no direct experience of the liberation war was 
part and parcel of the President’s attempt to silence any dissenting voices (both from 
within the Front and from without) and to create his own personal army.115
During field work in Asmara, in July 2004, the interviews conducted with 
those in the age-group targeted for compulsory military service, suggested that
105 Dorman, 2005, op. cit., p. 211.
]06 ibid., p. 214.
107 Conrad, 2006, op. cit., footnote 21, p. 260.
108 ibid., footnote 32, p. 267.
109 Dorman, S. R. 'Born Powerful? Post- Liberation Politics in Eritrea and Zimbabwe': University of 
Edinburgh, unpublished work, p. 14.
110 Dorman, 2005, op. cit., p. 214.
111 Reid, 2005, op. cit., p. 479.
112 This label is the one used by President Issaias Afeworky to characterise the lack o f  patriotism 
displayed by those who have either evaded compulsory conscription and/or who have fled the country 
without fulfilling their military service obligations. Conrad, 2006, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 267.
113 Bascom, 2005, op. cit., p. 177.
114 Reid, 2005, op. cit., p. 479.
115 Interview in London, May 2007.
192
frustration at the open- ended military service predominates. The diverging 
perceptions towards the military component of National service reflect the tension 
between the youth and the leadership (mainly composed by ex-combatants from the 
war for independence close to the President) with regard to both the recent war and, in 
particular, with regard to the indefinite compulsory military service. The generational 
divide between the youth and the ex-combatants seems to be widening. This should 
come as no surprise to those who had experienced the effects o f the Derg's approach 
to conscription. In effect, as Luckman and Bekelle note ‘the compulsory conscription 
law introduced in 1983 in Ethiopia drove many young men into exile as refugees or 
into the guerrilla movements’.116 Perhaps it is not too surprising that the indefinite 
compulsory military service is diminishing the attractiveness o f Eritrean citizenship. 
The many reported attempts, both failed and successful, o f Eritreans to escape the 
country to avoid military service attest to increasing resistance towards the
117militarised state and the less appealing nature o f Eritrean citizenship.
Eritreans who fled the country were forcibly returned by Malta in 2002 and by 
Libya in July 2004.118 According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) Malta 
forcibly deported over 220 Eritreans and the Libyan authorities were reported to have 
forcibly returned over 110 people.119
Those fleeing Eritrea were handled as ‘illegal’ migrants by Malta and were 
treated as part o f the growing problem that Malta faces with irregular migration. This 
group of Eritrean citizens was eligible to apply for asylum status as they were 
escaping political and/or religious persecution in their country o f origin; their 
inalienable right was denied without due process. According to CSW upon arrival in 
Eritrea they were detained in Adi Abeito prison, tortured and subsequently moved to
1,6 Cited in D. Jacquin- Berdal, 2002, op. cit., footnote 155, p. 126.
117 This contention is based upon the empirical evidence provided by UNHCR with regard to the trends 
in the period 1996-2005 on Refugees and Asylum seekers from Eritrea. Refer to the graphs in the next 
section which substantiate this claim.
118 From Malta: http://www.timesofmalta.com/
From Libya: Eritrea: Refugees Involuntarily Repatriated from Libya, Letter to President Issayas 
Afewerki, Human Rights Watch, August 3 2004. 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/03/eritre9178.htm
119 Hobson, A. 8 December 2004. Written evidence submitted by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (+ 
Annex 1) to Foreign Affairs Select Committee, House o f Commons, UK': Christian Solidarity 
Worldwide, www.parliament.uk.
193
19ftthe maximum-security prison in the Red Sea island o f Nakhura. Malta as one o f the 
Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was 
obligated by the ECHR and additional protocols to act in conformity with 
international standard procedures for granting asylum and conferring refugee status on 
this group of Eritrean citizens. Malta, more so than Libya, was expected to comply 
with the set of norms enshrined in the ECHR and in the additional Protocols. On other 
occasions, EU states have reportedly questioned Malta over its failure to apply 
international conventions and rules in its dealings with refugees and asylum 
seekers.121 The creation o f Frontex, the EU border security agency,122 per se, is 
unlikely to prevail over the disagreements between EU member states on how to 
handle irregular migration and/or on how to share the burden o f asylum seekers and 
refugees from Africa and other parts o f the world. The political situation in Eritrea 
further enhances the need to discriminate on a case-by-case basis between irregular 
migrants, rather than treating all as part o f illegal migration and depriving an ever- 
widening share of citizens originating from the ‘South’ of rights which are enshrined 
in international conventions and rules.
Libya’s decision to deny asylum to a group o f 80 Eritrean draft dodgers 
coincided with the author’s field research in Eritrea in July-August 2004. At the time 
all were deported back to Eritrea. Tension was high and a local informant could not 
avoid letting slip one o f the few critical comments on the present government that I 
was able to collect while in Asmara: ‘I only wish that all the young people could 
escape the country'.123 Another Eritrean drew my attention to the youth situation:
(...)  I do know that with this government (...) look at the youth, because
they do not have a future ... always fighting.124
120 ibid.
121 Bilefsky, D. June 12, 2007. T U  nations refuse to split up refugee burden' International Herald 
Tribune, www.iht.com. ; Kubosova, L. 6 July 2007. 'Malta turning into 'detention centre', warns 
minister' EU Observer. Malta, http://euobserver.com.
i22FRONTEX is a recently created agency which has a legal mandate to coordinate the operational 
cooperation between Member States in the field o f border security and to proceed with the 
implementation o f  integrated border management in the EU borders, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/
123 Interview in Asmara, July-August 2004.
124 Interviews in Asmara, August 2004.
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Several incidents point to a continued draft-dodging strategy. According to 
Amnesty International on 4 November 2004 thousands o f people arrested on 
suspicion of evading military conscription and held at Adi Abeto army prison were 
thought to be at serious risk of torture and ill-treatment. Prisoners have reportedly 
been shot dead and many more were wounded following a disturbance at the 
prison.125 In November 2004 Yemeni security forces arrested 10 Eritrean army 
deserters after they illegally entered Yemen from the Red Sea.126 In February 2005 in 
Manda, in the eastern sector, 20 kilometres inside Ethiopian territory (on the road 
from the port of Assab to Ethiopia) the Ethiopian armed forces killed two Eritreans 
and imprisoned five. The Ethiopians alleged they belonged to the Eritrean armed 
forces. Bearing in mind the current tendency in Eritrea to escape from the compulsory 
military service the scenario tends to suggest that these were Eritrean citizens evading 
military service, rather than a breach of the peace settlement disposition. This 
situation was reported to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE) leading to an increase in tension near the border.
The aftermath o f the war and the continuous focus on militarization of the 
society have contributed to the state’s ability to pursue conscription, however this 
orientation has significantly undermined the Eritrean government’s legitimacy. While 
it may well be argued that the civil war had a positive impact in the consolidation o f a 
sense o f ‘Eritreaness’, the cost of the 1998-2000 war and the continuous militarism of 
the ruling party has undermined the legitimacy of the regime and perhaps decreases 
the attractiveness of Eritrean citizenship, especially for those within the age group of 
compulsory military service. As a consequence, national identity may start to unravel.
The available data on the number o f asylum seekers and refugees both from 
Ethiopia and Eritrea further confirm the findings o f scholarly studies which suggest
125 Amnesty International Urgent Action, ‘ Eritrea: Fear o f torture / Incommunicado detention/Arbitrary 
killings: Thousands o f people held at Adi Abeto army prison’ , AI Index: AFR 64/008/2004,9 
November 2004,http://web.amnestv.org/Iibrarv/Index/ENGAFR640082004?open&of=:ENG-2AF; 
see also: Eritrea: Army rounds up draft evaders / Connection e.V. releases booklet on Eritrea 
http://www.wri-irg.Org/pubs/upd-0412.htm#Eritrea: Army rounds up draft evaders .
126 Sanaa, Yemen, Nov. 13 (UPI) . ‘ Eritrea army deserters seized in Yemen’ , Washington Times, 
November 13,2004.
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that as the governments have embarked upon a more authoritarian path, their
127legitimacy has decreased and their citizens have been forced to seek asylum abroad.
The Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
study on global trends with regard to new individual asylum applications during 2005- 
2006 lends credence to the claim that an ever widening range of Eritreans are fleeing 
the country. Quite significantly, the UNHCR reported that by nationality Eritreans 
ranked fourth with the highest number of new filled individual asylum claims during 
2005-2006, with a total o f 19,400 new claims.128 Between June 2005 and June 2006, 
2,500 Eritreans lodged individual asylum applications in the UK. Indeed, Eritrea is
1 90among the top ten asylum producing countries for the UK. According to the 
UNHCR during 2005-2006 the majority o f Eritrean asylum applications were lodged 
in Sudan (8,700), in the UK (2,700), in Ethiopia (2,700) and in Switzerland (1,200).130
As figure 5 will show the increase in the overall number o f new asylum 
applicants from Eritrea should be understood not only in relation to the domestic 
constraints mentioned above, but also in relation to international and regional 
constraints.
127 Bascom, 2005, op. cit.; Conrad, 2006, op. cit.; Dorman, 2005, op. cit.; Hepner, 2003, op. cit.; Jacquin- 
Berdal and Aida Mengistu, 2005, op. cit.; Koser, 2003, op. cit.; Reid, 2005, op. cit.; Connell, 2005,
op. cit.
128 Leading countries o f  origin o f new asylum applicants in 2005-2006: Somalia ranked first with 45, 
600; Iraq ranked second with 34,200; followed by Zimbabwe with 22,200; then Eritrea (19,400) ; 
immediately followed by China with 19,300 new claims and in the 6,h position came Rwanda with 
19,200 new individual claims. UNHCR June 2007. '2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum- Seekers, 
Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons': UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/, p. 
10.
129 The UK Refugees Council places the total number o f Refugees and asylum seekers originating from 
Eritrea at 147,628. http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/supportourwork/whereonearth/topten/eritrea.htm
130 UNHCR, 2006, op. cit., p. 10.
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Figure 5: Asylum applicants from Eritrea131
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Figure 5 shows a steady increase during the war and up to 2001. The unexpected peak 
in 2002 is then followed by a significant decrease in 2003 and culminates in an 
increase in 2004 and 2005.132 The peak in 2002 should be interpreted against the 
backdrop of the UNHCR’s announcement that Eritreans living in Sudan would no 
longer receive prima facie  refugee status after 31 December 2002 and that its long­
standing programme for humanitarian assistance in eastern Sudan would be phased 
out.133 Indeed, since the border war ended in 2000 only 29,000 of the Eritrean 
refugees in Sudan from the thirty-year war have returned to Eritrea; the remaining 
270,000 decided not to return when the main repatriation was conducted in the 
1990s.134 Bascom suggests that:
This inaction cannot be ignored; both examples suggest that 
Eritreans in exile believe the risks and vulnerabilities associated 
with reintegration outweigh the perceived benefits of returning 
home.135
131 UNHCR 2005. ’2005 UNH CR Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea'. UNHCR 324-325 , 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/, p. 325.
132 All the graphs were conceived by the author on the basis o f  the available statistics published by 
UNHCR. For the data o f  figure 5 refer to Appendix 3, table 2.
133 Bascom , J. June 2005. 'The lo n g ,' Last Step' ? Reintegration o f  Repatriates in Eritrea'. Journal o f  
Refugee Studies 18, p. 177.
134 Ibid., p. 179.
135 Ibid., p. 179.
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As the graph below further suggests the decrease in the number of Eritrean refugees in 
Sudan since 2002 is likely to have been conditioned by the UNHCR announcement. 
Since 2000 the number of Eritreans who have been conferred the status of refugees in 
Ethiopia has been steadily increasing. Indeed, the number of Eritrean refugees in 
Ethiopia increased from 3,276 in 2000 to 10,700 in 2005.136
Figure 6: Refugees from Eritrea: Countries of Asylum137
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Figure 6138 clearly shows that up to the 2002 UNHCR announcement the majority of 
Eritrean refugees were concentrated in Sudan (as an outcome of the thirty-year war 
for independence) and just a minority in other countries. The 1998-2000 war and 
particularly its aftermath did not hamper Eritreans from seeking refuge in Ethiopia 
rather than returning to Eritrea, as one might have expected. Figure 7, below, further 
confirms the increase of Eritrean refugees during the 1998-2000 war.
136 For the years in the interval, the number o f  Eritreans conferred with refugee status in Ethiopia was : 
4, 212 in 2001; 5 ,126 in 2002; 6 ,754 in 2003 and 8,719.U N H C R  2005. '2005 U NH CR Statistical 
Yearbook: Ethiopia’. UNHCR 328-329 , http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/.
137 —  2005. ’2005 UNH CR  Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea’. UNHCR 324-325,
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/, pp. 324-25.
138 For the precise data o f  figure 6 refer to table 3 in Appendix 3.
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Figure 7: Refugees from Eritrea139
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The graph on refugees from Eritrea shows that the significant decrease in the number 
of Eritrean refugees after the 2002 UNHCR announcement has not been sustained. 
The number of Eritrean refugees seems to be on the rise again since 2004.
In contrast to Eritrea, the available data on Ethiopia seem to suggest a decrease 
in the number of asylum seekers and refugees from Ethiopia since the overthrow of 
the Derg. However, the 1998-2000 border war, similarly to what happened in Eritrea, 
led to an increase in the number of refugees from Ethiopia. Moreover, the available 
data on the new Ethiopian asylum applicants in Eritrea (in particular in 2005, as 
discussed before) and on Ethiopian refugees in Kenya suggest that the May 2005 
elections may have partially reversed the previous trend for the decrease of asylum 
seekers and refugees from Ethiopia. Quite significantly, in 2005, a significant shift 
occurred with regard to asylum applicants of Ethiopian origin in Eritrea as figure 8 
suggests.
139 For the data refer to appendix 3, table 4.
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Figure 8: Refugees and Asylum seekers in Eritrea140
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The increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Eritrea for the year 
2005 is related to the increase of new individual applicants from Ethiopia. In 2002, 
only 5 asylum applicants from Ethiopia lodged their claims in Eritrea; in 2004 
Ethiopian asylum applicants in Eritrea totalled 248 and in 2005 the number increased 
sharply to a total of 1,218 new claims.141 The increase was sharp and the number 
lends credence to the claim that the reason behind this shift was related to the 
increasingly authoritarian path pursued by the EPRDF in the run-up to and in the 
aftermath of the May 2005 elections.
The graph on asylum applicants from Ethiopia, below, suggests that the 1998-2000 
border war was behind the sharp increase in individual asylum applicants from 
Ethiopia in 1999.
,40 UNHCR 2005. ’2005 UNH CR Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea'. UNHCR 324-325, 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/., for the original data refer to table 5 in Appendix 3.
141 ibid., p. 325.
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Figure 9: Asylum applicants from Ethiopia142
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In 1998 the number of asylum applicants from Ethiopia was 7,204, in 1999 the total 
increased to 11,845 and in 2000 to 13,837. In the aftermath of the war the number 
decreased again with a rise in 2003 and in 2005.
The number of refugees from Ethiopia, as figure 10 suggests, has been 
increasing in Kenya particularly since 2001.
Figure 10: Refugees from Ethiopia: Country of Asylum143
Refugees from Ethiopia
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0 n i . n - i f c ]
1996  
□ 2002 
□ 2005
Kenya Sudan US Germany Canada 
Country of Asylum
other total
142 For the original data refer to table 6 in appendix 3.
143 For the original data refer to table 7 in appendix 3.
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The graph shows some developments worth noting. The number o f refugees and 
asylum seekers from Ethiopia in the southern contiguous neighbouring country 
(Kenya) has been steadily increasing since 1996 (4,053) up to 2002 (11,202); 
furthermore, in 2005 the increase was sharp reaching 14,862. Again, in May 2005 the 
authoritarian measures taken by the government during the election campaign and in 
the aftermath of the 2005 elections are likely to have been the major driving force 
behind this shift. The final graph, figure 11, shows the increase of refugees from 
Ethiopia during the two-year border war. In 1999 the total was 71,055 reverting 
partially the previous trend for the decrease of refugees from Ethiopia.
Figure 11: Refugees from Ethiopia144
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In conclusion, the graphs for Eritrea and Ethiopia although with significant 
differences suggest a similar conclusion: as the PFDJ and the EPRDF increased 
authoritarian measures the proportion of asylum seekers and refugees originating from 
these two countries increased.
In Eritrea the return of refugees from the thirty- year war proceeded at a 
slower pace than in Ethiopia. The two-year border war with Ethiopia further 
undermined the prospects of return for many and the extended compulsory military 
service seem to have led to an ever-widening number of Eritreans fleeing the country.
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The numbers more than anything else confirm the claim that as the PFDJ has tended 
to increase authoritarian measures its legitimacy has eroded and Eritreans are 
forcefully led to seek alternative strategies o f survival in asylum countries because the 
current government, the PFDJ, through the set o f specific obligations imposed upon 
its citizenry has deprived Eritreans of any political and civil rights. In this sense, the 
state making activities induced by the war have been undermined by the open-ended 
military service and by the climate of political repression. The data confirm that the 
two-year war has eroded significantly the wealth of legitimacy inherited from the war 
for independence.
With regard to Ethiopia, the more promising indicators o f political 
liberalization since the EPRDF had assumed power related positively with the 
proportion o f those refugees (from the civil war against the Derg) willing to return to 
Ethiopia. However, the authoritarian turn o f the EPRDF since the May 2005 elections 
seems to have eroded its legitimacy more so than the two-year border war. This seems 
to stand in contrast to Eritrea. The data further confirm a contrasting outcome for both 
countries: while in Eritrea the two-year border war and the 2001 political crisis led to 
an erosion o f the regime’s legitimacy, in Ethiopia the two-year border war did not 
erode the EPRDF’s legitimacy. However, the data suggest that the authoritarian path 
since the May 2005 elections has significantly eroded the ruling party’s legitimacy 
and has created further loci o f contention and insurgency to the EPRDF.
Finally, with regard to both taxation and conscription it may well be argued 
that the 1998-2000 war has undermined the legitimacy capital o f the PFDJ. The 
increasing blurred line between the party and the state poses a further danger to state 
consolidation.
In Eritrea the national service has effectively led to the extension of the state’s 
institutions and agents to the entire territory. The gains in this area, however, were 
(and at the time of writing still are) undermined by the stalemated peace process 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the closure of the border in the aftermath of the war. 
Any attempts by the state to extend its military presence beyond the outer limits o f the 
TSZ are in breach of the dispositions agreed by the parties in Algiers. The envisaged
144 For the final graph’s data refer to table 11 in appendix 3.
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dividends o f National Service for the extension of the state’s institutions within its 
entire territorial jurisdiction are thus neutralized by the aftermath of the war and the 
persistence o f the stalemate on the border delimitation and demarcation. 
Paradoxically, the TSZ has been used by the PFDJ to enhance the link between 
identity documentation and movement restrictions both to its citizenry, IO employees 
and visitors. The internal checks on documentation and the requirement of 
authorisations to travel outside the capital serve two related purposes: the 
centralization of the state control over its citizenry and territory and the enforcement 
o f the compulsory component o f national military service. However, at the level of 
nation building the authoritarian measures of the PFDJ and the extended military 
service have generated discontent and opposition.
The widening of the generational divide seems to suggest that the PFDJ’S 
appeal to the ethos of the liberation war in order to advance its state-building project 
is likely to fade as the government enhances authoritarian measures and insists on the 
open- ended military service. As Coker noted, in relation to past attempts to re-invent 
the nation elsewhere, resistance was likely to increase to: *(...) a manufactured 
national history when it failed to inspire those who had inherited it, when it was more 
life denying than life affirming’.145
5.3.3 Extension of the state’s institutions
The state and nation building international features should be understood as part of 
one o f the central activities o f state making highlighted by Tilly: the extension o f the 
state’s institutions over its territory.
The persisting stalemate over the territorial boundary arguably has 
undermined the extension o f the state’s institutions to the entire territory; this has 
been particularly the case in Eritrea. As an outcome o f the war, Eritrea had to abide by 
the creation o f the TSZ within its territory monitored by UNMEE until demarcation of 
the borders had been completed. The government’s attempt to settle by force the 
border dispute back in May 1998 backfired as the war and its aftermath have been
145 Coker, C. 1997. Twilight o f  the West. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, p. 136.
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further disruptive to the state’s attempt to extend its authority over the territory. In this 
sense, in the Eritrean case, war making was disruptive of state making.
The legal dispositions agreed by the parties, as an outcome of the war, in the 
Algiers Peace Agreement undermined the state’s attempts to maximize authority over 
territory. In addition, customary international law has outlawed forceful attempts to 
settle border disputes and/or acquire territory.146 This is a significant difference in 
contemporary international society which was absent during the process o f state 
formation in Europe. As a consequence on 19 December 2005 the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission (EECA) delivered its ruling with regard to jus ad bellum 
recognizing that Ethiopia recurred to armed force in self-defence.
With the pervasive animosity between the parties and deterioration o f the 
relations between the Eritrean government and UNMEE by mid-December 2005 an 
estimated 130,000 Ethiopian troops faced 250,000 Eritrean troops.147 The tension 
along Ethiopia’s northern border with Eritrea has increased. The April 2007 report o f 
the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council portrayed worrying trends, with 
the build up of troops and military equipment and armaments inside the Temporary 
Security Zone (TSZ) in Eritrea and in the adjacent areas along the frontier on the 
Ethiopian side.148 Any clash or incident along the border could have the potential to 
trigger a major confrontation.
With regard to the currency exchange mechanisms the chapter on the causes o f 
the war has shown how failure to agree on the exchange modality and rates after 
Eritrea’s introduction o f its own currency increased rivalry and heightened tensions 
between the two executives. Furthermore, the introduction of the new currency led 
Ethiopia to redefine the terms of trade. These mechanisms should be understood both
146 As a result o f the prevailing customary practice in international society the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims 
Commission delivered its ruling with regards to ju s ad bellum recognizing that Ethiopia recurred to 
armed force in self-defence.
147 Barnes, C. 2006. 'Ethiopia: A Sociopolitical Assessment1: Writenet/ UNHCR, p. 19.
148United Nations Security Council 30 April 2007. 'Progress report o f  the Secretary-General on 
Ethiopia and Eritrea: S/2007/250': UN Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm.
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as integral components o f boundary politics149 and as a form of boundary 
maintenance, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2.150
As discussed in chapter 4, the thesis findings further confirm that citizenship 
rules need to be understood as buffer institutions and as an integral component o f 
boundary politics. Indeed, the war showed how the two political leaderships’ 
divergent trajectories o f nation building collided. In its aftermath, Ethiopia revised the 
outdated Proclamation on Ethiopian nationality and restored some rights to those 
citizens living in the diaspora who qualified for acquisition o f Ethiopian citizenship in 
case they wished to relinquish their other nationality. Although the EPRDF did not 
change the earlier practice of recognizing only a single nationality it extended some 
rights to the diaspora in order to re-enforce the diaspora’s links to the homeland. In 
this respect, the war led to revisionism of the earlier EPRDF nation building project 
with regard to its citizens within Ethiopia and to its transnational constituency. 
Although ethnicity continued to be critical for the participation in the political arena 
and for access to critical resources granted by the state, at the federal, regional and 
local (zones-woreda-kebele) levels, two significant shifts occurred: towards a more
centralized federal system and to the forceful control of ‘the manipulation o f ethnic 
identity for parochial purposes'.151 As an outcome o f the war, the EPRDF was able 
momentarily to build upon the outburst of Ethiopian nationalism to justify the revision 
o f its nation building project based on Diversity. Although not altogether abandoned 
the real steps towards the devolution and decentralization o f power to the regional 
level were reversed and marred by the political crisis in the aftermath of the war. In 
this respect, the resurgence o f nationalism in Ethiopia from the strains of the ethnic- 
based Federal model led to a resurgence of loyalty not to the regime but to the 
Ethiopian state.
In Eritrea, the war induced activities o f nation building were undermined by 
its aftermath. Indeed, the PFDJ continuous focus on compulsory military service and 
the proliferation of cases o f incommunicado detentions undermined the Eritreans
149 Herbst, 2000, p. 25.
150 Clapham, C. 1999. 'Boundaries and States in the New African Order1 in Bach, D.C. (ed.) 
Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Desintegration. Oxford: James Currey, p. 55.
206
loyalty to the state, as a consequence of the PFDJ symbiosis between itself and the 
Eritrean state. The PFDJ nation-building project was marred by a resurgence o f sub­
national identities in opposition to the regime’s redrawing of the domestic 
administrative territorial subdivisions of the state.
The war in relation to nation building activities had divergent outcomes for the 
two political leaderships: while in Ethiopia loyalty to the state overcame generalised 
opposition to the EPRDF, in Eritrea the strong identification between the PFDJ and 
the Eritrean state meant that those who opposed the regime were left with few 
options: to acquiesce to assimilation or in case o f opposition either face repression or 
exit from the state.
5.4 State consolidation or disintegration?
With the outbreak o f hostilities the war reinforced nationalist feelings; Jacquin- 
Berdal suggests this was one o f the few unambiguous contributions o f the war to the 
consolidation of statehood.152 However, the conduct of the war (particularly on the 
Eritrean side) and its aftermath have undermined the legitimacy o f the two 
governments, as the previous section discussed.
The 1998-2000 war, the increasingly authoritarian stance of the government 
and its emphasis on extended compulsory military service eroded the national 
legitimacy of the PFDJ as the embodiment o f Eritrea’s hard won independence. 
Perseverance on this path is likely to render Eritrean citizenship less, rather than more 
attractive.
In Ethiopia it was not a case o f state building because state survival was not at 
stake. After the ousting o f the Derg the challenge was to re-make the state. Although 
Ethiopia’s definition after Eritrea’s secession was not at the forefront o f the EPRDF’s
151 Assefa Fisseha 2006. Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation o f  Ethiopia's Ethnic 
Federalism' in Turton, D. (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford: James Currey, p. 147.
152 Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2005. 'Introduction: The Eritreo- Ethiopian war’ in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, 
Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 
xix.
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concerns, the war forced the redefinition of Ethiopia as a country (its landlocked 
status was finally realised) and o f its citizens, particularly o f those located in the 
borderlands. The solidarity between the Tigrinya-speaking communities North and 
South o f the Mereb faltered in the aftermath of Eritrea’s independence and was 
disrupted by the border war.
The war impacted upon the state-building project o f the EPRDF. In this sense, 
the proposition to address is how the war affected the EPRDF project o f remaking the 
state along ethnic lines?
In Ethiopia the soviet-inspired model on nationalities was implemented to address and 
countervail the trend towards the multiplication of loci o f contention and insurgency 
at the periphery o f the state. The Federal model based on ethnicity, however, failed to 
meet its stated aim o f solving the ‘nationalities questions’. Ultimately the model 
elevated sub-nationalities over the national identity. This trend was disrupted by the 
1998-2000 war and in its aftermath the emphasis on diversity and decentralization 
(which had never left from the level of policy design to that o f political 
implementation) was increasingly substituted by the focus on unity and on a revived 
and more salient centralizing trend. The emphasis on sub-nationalities subsided while 
the war lasted. The EPRDF’s earlier emphasis on sub-nationalities was revised and 
its saliency diminished.
Ethiopia’s federal model led to a redrawing o f domestic boundaries between 
regions based on the criteria o f ethnicity and language. This attempt to ascribe a 
particular ethnic group and language to a region encountered manifold problems and 
led to a proliferation o f domestic boundary disputes between the new administrative 
units. The outbreak o f the war allowed the citizens to voice resentment towards the 
ruling party’s own conception of statehood. In addition, the EPRDF was forced to 
abandon its emphasis on diversity and revive the motto o f ‘One Ethiopia’ to mobilise 
support for the defence of the territorial integrity of the state against external 
aggression.
The focus on the need to defend the territorial integrity of the state was critical 
in raising revenues from peripheral areas, such as the Somali region and the Afar
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regions. Whereas the trajectory o f the Afar region shows that the Afar tend to escape 
the state’s control, the fact that Afar land had been divided by Eritrea’s independence 
meant that their support for the EPRDF was more likely than ever. With regard to 
Ethiopia’s Somali region the communities contributed both with men for the 
battlefront and with goods for the troops, such as sheep; at a particularly difficult 
moment when the drought in the region had already depleted the livestock economy. 
In this regard, the 1998-2000 war led the peripheral regions to display their loyalty 
towards the Ethiopian state. As a consequence, the EPRDF acquired its nationalist 
credentials through victory on the battlefield.
In the aftermath of the war, the Ethiopian government toned down the saliency
o f ethnic politics and criticised those who manipulated ethnicity for parochial
1purposes or used nationalism in a narrow way. This rhetoric shift marked the turn 
towards a more centralized Federal system.
Eritrea had to put to the test its nationalist credentials and bring into 
implementation its long withheld claims that Eritrea was a viable political and 
economic independent unit. The PFDJ perceived ethnic and/or regional solidarity as a 
hindrance to state and nation building. The Eritrean government diminished the 
saliency of all solidarities at the sub- state level and subordinated them to the 
overarching national identity.
With regard to the relationship between war and nationalism, both the PFDJ 
and the EPRDF skilfully mobilised support from their citizens and diaspora 
(particularly the PFDJ) around the need to protect the country. The PFDJ rallied 
support around the need to protect the country’s hard-won independence and the 
EPRDF rallied support around the revival o f the need to unite all Ethiopians against 
an external threat to the state’s territorial integrity. While the PFDJ revived the 
founding myth o f the war for independence, the EPRDF revived the myth of the unity 
o f Ethiopia in the face o f external threats to the state’s sovereignty. In this regard both 
leaderships were successful while the war lasted. However, as the war was brought to
153 Assefa Fisseha, 2006, op. cit., p. 147.
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an end the increasingly authoritarian stance of the two governments eroded the 
support which the war had momentarily raised.
In Ethiopia the end o f the war was accompanied by a resurgence o f sub­
nationalist conflict. In Eritrea the aftermath of the war and the political crisis154 that 
ensued ‘generated antagonism to the state-led national project among those who have 
borne its brant'.155 Quite significantly, Dorman highlights that the 1998-2000 war 
generated increasing political opposition to the Eritrean government and led to a re- 
evaluation of the nationalist legacy.156
Finally, with regard to the three activities induced by the war and which serve 
as indicators o f the consolidation of the state the conclusions are outlined below. In 
the Eritrean case the war allowed the PFDJ to raise its revenues sharply. In this sense 
the collection o f funds was not conducted domestically but at the transnational level. 
This case highlights how globalisation and transnationalism have altered the stage 
within which the relationship between war making and state making should be 
analysed. Indeed, globalization in this respect seems to have widened the 
constituencies of the sovereign state. However, as the war unfolded and as the 
diaspora communities had no say in the diplomatic and military conduct o f the war 
and/or in the political debate which followed Eritrea’s defeat, the diaspora’s 
contributions decreased to ante bellum levels and in some cases diminished 
significantly. Before the war even opposition members perceived their 2 per cent 
contribution to the state as a sign of national commitment. The war eroded the 
legitimacy of the PFDJ as the sole bearer o f the legacy o f the war for independence. 
In addition, the state’s accrued needs to raise revenues to finance the war depleted the 
government o f its fiscal resources.157 In the Ethiopian case, the war allowed the state
154 The political crisis in the aftermath o f the war led to the imprisonment o f  a group o f  15 PFDJ’s 
members who wrote an open-letter criticising the President for the diplomatic and military conduct of 
the war and calling upon the President to implement the Constitution and hold long due elections. Not 
only were most o f  the signatories o f the letter immediately imprisoned, but also various journalists. The 
private media were banned and cases o f imprisonment, disappearances and arbitrary arrest o f  those 
perceived as dissenters abound. Conrad, 2006, op. cit., footnote 7, pp. 251- 52.
155 Dorman, 2005, op. cit., p. 217.
156 ibid, p. 204.
157 Forrest, J. 2004. Subnationalism in Africa : ethnicity, alliances, and politics. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, p. 139.
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to raise revenues from peripheral groups both in the borderlands with Eritrea and far 
removed from it, as was the case with the Afar and Somali respectively.
The ex-combatants’ criticism of the government should not remain unheeded 
at the peril o f compromising not only the government’s hold on power but also the 
survival o f the state. Indeed, as several ex-combatants and those from the diaspora 
who committed time, financial resources and their skills to the war for independence
1 S8tend to repeat: ‘ We didn’t fight for this’ or they simply share one ex-combatant’s 
sense of frustration and disillusionment: ‘I fought so that my children wouldn’t have 
to '.159
Finally, in contradistinction to what Herbst seems to suggest, the weakness o f 
the state in Africa cannot be solely explained on the basis o f the absence o f inter-state 
war.160 In this case we are faced with this type o f war. The main contention of this 
chapter is that as the war unfolded it allowed both governments to sharply raise the 
revenues and rally support around the nationalist appeal. However, the aftermath o f 
the war showed that the war-induced elements o f state consolidation were only 
epiphenomenal and ceased as the war was brought to an end. The 1998-2000 war has 
been further disruptive to the process o f state consolidation. In the short term the war 
has led to the opposite161 outcome. In its aftermath internal opposition to the 
governments increased162 and in Ethiopia’s case was maintained fuelling, indirectly, 
further loci and support for opposition groups to the EPRDF-TPLF.
5.5 Conclusion
The first part o f the chapter showed on the one hand how the war reinforced the 
state’s determination in achieving domestic sovereignty, and on the other hand
158 Group Interview in London, May 2007.
159 Dorman, 2005, op. cit., p. 218.
160 Tilly claims that wars o f territorial conquest were central to the formation o f  particular types of 
states in Europe. According to Herbst ‘ the consequential role that war played in European state 
development was not replicated in Africa. Herbst, 2000, op. cit., p. 21.
161 Clapham and Jacquin- Berdal’s analysis o f the war suggests that the outcome has been quite the 
reverse or, at the best, ambiguous in face o f the erosion o f the legitimacy o f  both leaderships. Clapham, 
C. 2003. 'Guerre et construction de 1 Etat dans la Come de L'Afrique' in Hassner, P., et, Roland 
Marchal, (ed.) Guerres et societes : fctats et violence apres la Guerre Froide. Paris: Editions Karthala. 
Jacquin- Berdal 2005, op.cit., p. xix.
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showed how the limited gains in state and nation building activities were undermined 
as the war unfolded and, especially, in its aftermath. The intensity o f the activities o f 
taxation and conscription during and after the war clearly contributed to a decrease in 
the vast amount o f legitimacy the regime had enjoyed at Independence.
The chapter argued that at least in the short term there are no straightforward 
answers to the claim that war induces state making.
The evidence collected corroborates the claim that war both makes and breaks 
the state. Indeed, in Ethiopia and Eritrea the 1998- 2000 war had contradictory 
impacts on state and nation building. Particularly in Eritrea, the 1998-2000 war 
against Ethiopia meant a relapse in nation building and fundamentally undermined the 
regime’s capital o f legitimacy inherited from the war for independence.
With regard to taxation, although the war caused an increase in revenue it did 
1
not produce a ratchet effect and the war undermined the diaspora’s willingness to 
contribute to the PFDJ state-building project for Eritrea’s sovereign state. Indeed, the 
contributions from the diaspora have decreased in the aftermath not only o f the war 
but, especially, after the PFDJ implementation o f increasingly authoritarian measures 
in 2001.
Ironically, the 1998-2000 war provided the ruling party in Eritrea with the 
justification to pursue its state building activities based on mass conscription and 
patriotic education. For how long the state will be able to pursue this military 
orientation remains to be seen. The evidence produced by this study tends to confirm 
that the increasing generational tension inside Eritrea and the growing external 
opposition from the diaspora fundamentally de-legitimise the ruling party’s 
militarised orientation both to domestic politics and to foreign policy making.
The compulsory military service has had a pervasive effect on the 
attractiveness o f Eritrean citizenship and on the development o f a private space for
162 This is the subject o f chapter 4.
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economic activities. Not only is the majority o f the working force o f the population 
serving in the military, but is also used for party-controlled business activities.
As Bascom contends:
In face of an increasingly repressive and authoritarian state, both 
the remarkable solidarity that characterised those mobilised in the 
war for independence and the euphoric optimism of achieving it164 
are gradually fading from collective memory.165
As a consequence, Eritrean citizenship is lacking in attractiveness, especially to those 
who have either resisted or who were forced to undergo the military service for an 
extended period beyond the official one ascribed by law.166
The regime is increasingly authoritarian and is run as a de facto one-party 
state. Indeed, the PFDJ equals the state. In this context, opposition to the regime has 
led to a resurgence of sub-national identities along ethnic, religious and, most
1 fflimportantly, regional cleavages.
The symbiosis between party and state suggests that loyalty to the state has 
waned as opposition to the regime is on the rise, particularly among the diaspora.
In Ethiopia, the war further compromised the state’s ability to guarantee the 
monopoly of coercive violence.
Interestingly enough the explanatory power o f this case- study challenges one 
o f the central tenets o f Herbst’s argument. In this case, we witnessed an inter-state 
war where the external rivalry led to the escalation o f the crisis into a conventional 
war. In line with what is defended by different authors, in the short term the war has 
not substantively induced state building activities that contribute to state
163 The ratchet effect caused by wars refers to a situation ‘whereby revenue increases sharply when a 
nation is fighting but does not decline to the ante bellum level when hostilities have ceased.’ Herbst, 
2003, op. cit., p. 170.
164For an earlier and already cautious interpretation o f the potential and constraints o f  the PFDJ in 
leading state and society toward the democratization path refer to. Iyob, R. 1997. The Eritrean 
Experiment: a Cautious Pragmatism?' Journal o f  Modern African Studies 35: 647- 673.
l65Bascom, 2005, op. cit., p. 178.
166 Dorman, 2005, op. cit., p. 211.
167 Conrad, 2006, op. cit., p. 252.
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1consolidation, rather the opposite. In its aftermath internal opposition to the 
governments, in Eritrea’s case has increased and in Ethiopia’s case continues fuelling, 
opposition and insurgency against the EPRDF-TPLF. The aftermath o f the war 
showed that the widespread support for the ruling party during the war with Eritrea 
was epiphenomenal.
168 Clapham, 2003, op. c it .; Jacquin-Berdal, 2005, op. cit.
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Chapter 6: The Regional security architecture
6.1 Introduction
The Horn o f Africa continues to be predominantly portrayed as an endemic region of 
warfare, cyclic drought and famine, among other inter-linked tragedies that punctuate 
the lives of its peoples.
The region’s geo-strategic location facing the Arabian Peninsula and on the 
juncture of the Strait Bab el Mandab, which allows entry o f oil shipments from the 
Gulf towards the Mediterranean sea, has over different periods attracted external 
powers. Its peculiar geo-strategic location led to rivalry and competition among the 
superpowers in order to gain influence over the Horn o f Africa’s states.
Aside from extra-regional actors’ influence, these states are linked in a 
multitude o f ways. Both the patterns o f international relations and the security 
dynamics in the region tie the domestic, international and regional levels of each o f 
the constituent units in the region. For the purposes o f this chapter the Horn o f Africa 
refers to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Uganda is also o f 
relevance to the analysis, as a member o f the regional organization: the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Egypt also plays a major role 
in the regional politics, but like extra-regional actors its influence in the region is 
linked to its own interests; in Egypt’s case to the key factor o f securing its continued 
privileged access to the waters o f the Nile.1
The contention o f this chapter is that the region’s security dynamics must be 
understood within the deep structure o f politics, which binds these states together. 
Both Egypt and other extra-regional actors’ influence enhance and exacerbate these 
dynamics, which mainly originate at the domestic and regional levels. Their foreign 
policies towards the individual states and towards the region, build upon the structures 
and processes created since the Second World War by the regional states. Extra-
1 de Waal, A. 2004. 'Prospects for peace and security in the Horn o f Africa' in Sorbo, G.M., and, 
Siegfried Pause wang, (ed.) Prospects fo r Peace, Security and Human Rights in A frica’s Horn. Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, p. 14.
215
regional actors’ influence and the outcomes of their foreign policies add another layer 
o f complexity to the multiple crises and constraints faced by regional actors.
The first part of the chapter will specifically analyse the relationship between 
divergent conceptions o f statehood and their implications within the regional structure 
o f international relations. The aim of this part is to reflect upon the broader processes 
o f state formation and different trajectories of the political units. The trajectories o f 
state formation included cases o f state creation and state disintegration in the 
aftermath o f the Cold War. By trying to understand how the diverging conceptions of 
statehood were pursued and played out in the regional arena, the chapter will argue 
that state building and nation building, although defined domestically, had regional 
implications. The blurring line between domestic and regional politics is related not 
only to the deep structure of regional relations, but also to the role of frontiers for 
each o f the units.
The key question to investigate is the relationship between processes o f state 
creation, disintegration and state and nation building activities, which in turn resulted 
in a re-configuration of regional security dynamics in the Horn o f Africa. The causes 
and the outcomes o f different types of war in the Horn of Africa will be singled out in 
accordance with their regional repercussions and with the regional patterns o f warfare. 
The region's security dynamics will finally be analysed against the backdrop o f the 
patterns resulting from the intervening actors’ conduct with regard to neighbouring 
states and non-state actors.
The second part o f the chapter will analyse extra-regional actors’ interference 
in the region to reflect on how their influence exacerbated tensions, the sources of 
which need, nonetheless, to be located within the Hom of Africa’s political landscape. 
This section will build upon the patterns identified in the section devoted to the 
regional structure o f international relations. Finally, the regional organization’s role in 
forging the regional security architecture will be analysed. The final section aims to 
assess the constraints and potentials o f a regionalist approach to security to overcome 
the destructive impact o f one o f the main causes o f conflict in the region, namely 
militant nationalism.
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6.2 Regional repercussions of a diversity of state trajectories
6.2.1 The creation of a new state and new borders
Territorial disputes in the Hom of Africa have persisted throughout the post- colonial 
period. The nature of the process o f creation of colonial borders sowed the seeds for 
future disputes. Four major players were involved in this process: Ethiopia and three 
external powers - Britain, France and Italy.
Despite the consensual acceptance of uti possidetis principle in Africa, as laid 
down in the OAU border resolution of 1964, ambiguities in the colonial treaties with 
regard to the delimitation o f borders led to territorial disputes. At the height o f 
independence territorial disputes happened among the new contiguous neighbouring 
countries: Kenya, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia was the only state in the 
Hom o f Africa that had been at the centre o f the crafting o f colonial boundaries. One 
o f the striking contrasts between the Hom of Africa and West and Southern Africa is 
with regard to the type o f war in which they have engaged. Inter-state territorial 
disputes in West Africa and Southern Africa have not escalated into inter-state wars.2 
This is particularly remarkable because it is widely acknowledged that territory was 
one o f the major causes o f inter-state wars.3 In contrast, the Hom of Africa has been 
the theatre o f two inter-state wars over borders, namely, the 1977-1978 war between 
Somalia and Ethiopia and the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.4
Although Eritrea’s Independence did not challenge uti possidetis, its newly 
acquired sovereignty led to changes in the length o f shared borders between 
contiguous neighbouring countries. The figure below illustrates this new 
configuration and, significantly, draws attention to the fact that Ethiopia continued to
2Komprobst, M. 2002. 'The Management o f border disputes in African regional sub- systems: 
comparing West Africa and the Hom o f Africa'. Journal o f  M odem African Studies 40: 369-393.
3 Kocs, S. A. 1995. Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945- 1987'. The Journal o f  Politics 57: 
159- 175. Vasquez, J. 1995. W hy do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality'. 
Journal o f  Peace Research 32: 277-293.
4 Buzan, B., and Ole, Waever 2003. 'Sub- Saharan Africa: security dynamics in a setting o f  weak and 
failed states' in Buzan, B., and Ole, Waever (ed.) Regions and Powers: The Structure o f  International 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemke, D. 2002. Regions o f  War and Peace. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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be the state with which all the other contiguous neighbouring states shared the widest 
length of their land boundaries.
Figure 12: Hom of Africa’s states and length of their boundaries with Ethiopia5
HQA states and length o f their boundaries with 
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Figure 12 also shows that in both cases of interstate wars contiguity was paramount in 
the escalation of the border disputes. If we look from Somalia and Eritrea’s 
standpoints, Somalia shares 68.7 per cent of its boundaries with Ethiopia and Eritrea 
56 per cent,6 respectively. Looking from Djibouti the length of shared boundary with 
Ethiopia is 66.3 per cent, from Kenya the value drops to 24.1 per cent and from Sudan 
to 20.9 per cent.7 Even after Eritrea’s secession, Ethiopia remained the country with 
which neighbouring states, especially Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti (and Sudan to a 
lesser degree) shared the widest length of their land boundaries.
Figure 13 shows the contiguous neighbouring countries to Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. The graph draws attention to the fact that prior to the war Ethiopia’s major 
concerns with regard to territorial boundaries emerged not from Eritrea but from 
Somalia, followed immediately by Sudan.
5 Refer to Appendix 4  for the table with the original data.
6 Anderson, E. M. 2003. International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas. London: TSO.
7 ibid.
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oFigure 13: Eritrea and Ethiopia and their contiguous neighbouring countries
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Figure 13 shows Ethiopia shares 30.6 per cent of its boundaries with Somalia, 
followed by 30.2 per cent with Sudan, 17.2 per cent with Eritrea, 15.6 per cent with 
Kenya and finally just 6.4 per cent with Djibouti. Eritrea shares 56 per cent of its land 
boundaries with Ethiopia, 37.1 per cent with Sudan and 6.9 per cent with Djibouti. 
While Ethiopia shares only 17.2 per cent of its boundaries with Eritrea, Eritrea shares 
more than half of the total length of its boundaries with Ethiopia. In absolute terms 
this corresponds to a boundary of 1,000 kilometres.
With Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia the potential for border disputes 
between the new state and neighbouring states was overlooked, in particular with its 
southern neighbour. Indeed, any changes in Ethiopia’s territory were significant to the 
contiguous neighbouring countries. As a consequence, its role in the Hom of Africa 
remained pivotal for regional peace and security.
After independence Eritrea was immediately involved in border and maritime 
disputes with its neighbours, namely Sudan (1994) Yemen (1995), Djibouti (1996)9 
and, finally, the border dispute with Ethiopia (1998), which escalated into full- scale 
war.
8 Refer to Appendix 4 (table 9) for the original data.
9 Connell, D. 2005. Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea 
Press, p. 69.
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One must seek to understand why Eritrea’s other militarized disputes over 
territory did not escalate into full- scale war. One key difference between these 
disputes and the one with Ethiopia was the degree o f rivalry between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia before the outbreak o f hostilities. In the three other disputes in which Eritrea 
was engaged rivalry was less salient when compared to the increasing rivalry with 
Ethiopia, which was related to economic and political issues, namely terms of trade, 
access to the ports, and currency regimes, as discussed in chapter 2 .10 It is worth 
noting, however, that the relations between the ruling parties had been much closer 
during the pre- independence period. Indeed, the alliance between the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) was 
crucial for Eritrea’s international recognition as a sovereign state.11 In addition, 
although an inter-state war, the 1998-2000 war displayed some characteristics o f a 
civil war, including the fact that civil wars tend to be less prone to de-escalation and 
more intense.
The comparison o f Eritrea’s foreign policy towards its neighbouring states
confirms the theoretical claim that the interaction between contested territory,
12 *contiguity, and rivalry results in an impressive recipe for conflict escalation. This 
combination may in part explain why the dispute with Ethiopia escalated into full- 
scale war; in clear contrast with the other disputes in which Eritrea was engaged over 
its borders.
Eritrea’s foreign policy meant as well that the neighbouring states were 
predisposed to act as safe havens for Eritrea’s insurgent movements. It does not 
appear to be an accident that the only cases of deportations o f Eritrean draft-dodgers 
happened not from neighbouring states but from non-contiguous states. The 
deportations were conducted from Malta13 and from Libya14 and not from Djibouti,
10 —  2005. 'Eritrea: On a Slow Fuse' in Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) Battling Terrorism in the Hom o f  Africa. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts & Washington, DC: World Peace Foundation & Brookings Institution 
Press, p. 8 .
11 This contention, however, does not diminish the legitimacy o f Eritrea’s claim for self- determination.
12 Rasler, K. A., and, Thompson, William R. March 2006. 'Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and 
Conflict Escalation'. International Studies Quaterly 50, p. 159.
13 Amnesty International. 19 May 2004. ERITREA ‘You have no right to ask’ Government resists 
scrutiny on human rights’ (AI Index: AFR 64/003/2004)
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR640032004ENGLISH/$File/ AFR6400304.pdf.
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Sudan or from Ethiopia. However, the deportations from Ethiopia during the war fall 
under a different category. The latter can only be understood in the context of the 
border war and its outcome with regard to the redefinition of national identity and 
citizenship rules in Ethiopia, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
In addition, Eritrea’s foreign policy can only be understood in the context of 
the prevalence o f a militarist ethos in the realm of domestic politics. Eritrea’s 
leadership, at the helm o f the post- insurgent state, persisted on state building 
activities that contributed to the militarization o f state and society. In this sense, 
Eritrea’s foreign policy mirrored domestic politics and both were embedded in the 
same continuum of state building. It can plausibly be argued that what happened with 
neighbouring states was not intended to divert attention from internal opposition; 
Eritrea’s foreign policy resembled an extension of the state’s relation with its own 
domestic opposition. Indeed, all opposition to the ruling party’s conception of 
Eritrean statehood, either domestic or international, justified the incumbent regime’s 
forceful intervention. Consequentially, any citizen that opposed the state became an 
enemy, and any state or movement in neighbouring states that opposed the regime, 
and its leadership, became an enemy of the state. In a context where foreign policy 
making is personality driven, any opposition to the regime is perceived as a threat to 
the state itself.15 The domestic constituencies (both within the territory o f the state and 
in the diaspora) that opposed the regime became enemies o f the state. This domestic 
and foreign policy orientation led to the isolation of the regime by neighbouring states 
during and in the aftermath o f the war with Ethiopia. Eritrea was forced to forge 
alliances increasingly outside the region. In February 2005 Saudi Arabia signed a 20 
million US dollar loan agreement with Eritrea.16 Indeed, despite Saudi Arabia’s 
previous support for Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) factions, which opposed the 
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice / Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
14 Human Rights Watch. August 3, 2004. ‘Eritrea: Refugees Involuntarily Repatriated from Libya: 
Letter to President Issayas Afewerki’. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/03/eritre9178.htm;
Human Rights Watch. July 22, 2004 . ‘Eritrean Refugees in Danger o f Deportation from Libya: Letter 
to Mu'ammar al-Gadaffi’ http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/22/libya9127.htm.
15 Paulos Tesfagiorgis 2004. 'A brief understanding o f  the current crisis in Eritrea: What can be done?' 
in Sorbo, G.M., and, Siegfried Pausewang, (ed.) Prospects fo r  Peace, Security and Human Rights in 
Africa’s Hom. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Connell, 2005, op. cit.
,6BBC Monitoring Service, 8 February 2005. Title: ‘Eritrea Saudi Arabia sign 20m US dollar loan 
agreement’, (last accessed: 14/02/07) http://www.eritreadaily.net/news/article380205002.htm
221
(PFDJ/EPLF) regime,17 the isolation o f the regime in part explains this significant 
shift o f alliance. As will be discussed in the epilogue, paradoxically, the 2006-2007 
Somalia crisis diminished Eritrea’s isolation within the region and with extra- 
regional actors, namely Middle Eastern states and the European Union.
The creation o f a new state in a volatile and conflict prone region posed 
specific challenges to contiguous neighbouring states. With regard to Eritrea’s 
creation and its subsequent foreign policy towards the region the key lesson to retain 
is the need to pay particular attention to border delimitation and demarcation at the 
time of state creation and recognition. This feature acquires particular significance to 
mitigate and eliminate potential tensions arising out o f border disputes. As the war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea confirms, once established, borders are only changed at 
great cost.18
6.2.2 The disintegration of a state in the Horn of Africa
After the ousting o f Siyad Barre’s regime in 1991, the Somali state succumbed to the 
centrifugal forces of segmentation within society and disintegrated. In order to 
advance their claims to the spoils o f the state the various political factions 
manipulated clan and sub-clan rivalries. With the disintegration of the state economic 
rivalry between factions of the same clan/sub-clan came; inter-clan alliances were 
forged and changed, sometimes in contradiction with the kinship principle, fuelling 
lawlessness in the country and with spill-over effects across borders.
Without a government at the helm of the state, Somaliland unilaterally 
declared independence (1991). Jacquin-Berdal claims that the subsequent unilateral 
declaration of Independence in the former British Somaliland territory suggested that, 
after all, the Greater Somalia ideal was not deeply ingrained.19 Jacquin-Berdal 
contends that ‘Pan-Somalism should be viewed as an essentially Southern Somali
17 Clapham, C. 1995. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: the politics o f post- insurgency' in Wiseman, J.A. (ed.) 
Democracy and Political Change in Sub- Saharan Africa. N. Y: Routledge, p. 126.
18 Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2002. Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Hom ofAfrica: A Critique o f  the Ethnic 
Interpretation. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, p. 219.
19 Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit., p. 165.
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90ambition’. President EgaFs origins as a Northerner and abandonment of the Greater 
Somalia ideal in 1967, and Somaliland’s unilateral declaration o f Independence in 
1991 provided credence to Jacquin-Berdal’s assertion. However, Somaliland, in 
contrast with Eritrea, despite its achievements in political liberalisation and 
democratization, remains hampered from achieving full sovereignty unless a 
government in Mogadishu finally emerges and is willing to recognize Somaliland’s 
independence, like the one in Addis Ababa vis-a-vis Asmara. The contrasting 
trajectories o f the former Italian colony (Eritrea) and the former British Protectorate 
(Somaliland) confirm that international society is less inclined to support unilateral 
declarations of Independence. Another o f the Somali Northern Provinces, Puntland, 
established itself as an autonomous region (1998) but did not seek to secede from
91Somalia. The disintegration o f the state further aggravated the pre-existing 
permeability o f Somalia’s borders, rendering it vulnerable to incursions from 
neighbouring states. For contiguous neighbouring countries, namely Ethiopia and 
Kenya, the breakdown of the state, in part, froze challenges to their territorial 
integrity. For Ethiopia the major threat to its territorial integrity from its south eastern 
border with Somalia was suspended.
The remnants o f Somalia, i.e. the capital, central and southern Somalia were 
ravaged by armed conflict between shifting factions. The disintegration of the state 
and Somalia’s increased porous borders rendered it more prone to breaches to its 
sovereignty, as the section on the structure o f regional relations will discuss.
6.2.3 Regional implications of diverging conceptions of statehood: a two-level 
understanding
20 ibid., p. 165.
21 The disintegration o f  the state created notable changes and the former Somali Republic split up into 
at least three ‘self-governing units’, to use Mayall’s and Lewis’s term. Lewis, I. M. 2002. A modem  
history o f  the Som ali: nation and state in the Horn ofAfrica Oxford: James Currey, footnote 24,
p. 333. In 1991 Somaliland declared independence on the basis o f its colonial past as the British 
Somaliland Protectorate. In 1998 Puntland declared its autonomy but did not seek to secede. The 
central and southern regions remained tied to the capital; ravaged by lawlessness and divided by clan- 
based factions and by leaders o f various groups. In 2002 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) 
splintered seriously. The faction o f the head o f the RRA, Hasan Shatigud, opposed the factions o f Aden 
Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade. The bone o f contention was their diverging positions 
toward the establishment o f the South West State o f Somalia. Hansen, S. J. Fall 2003. 'Warlords and 
Peace Strategies: The Case o f Somalia'. Journal o f  Conflict Studies XXIII, footnote 79, p. 78.
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As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, the peculiar Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front/Tigray People’s Liberation Front (EPRDF/TPLF) conception of 
statehood led to a significant redrawing o f the domestic administrative territorial 
jurisdiction o f each Regional State within the Ethiopian Federation. The attempt to 
match the ethnic group in majority proportion in each region (or nationality according 
to the new Ethiopian Constitution parlance) and the territorial jurisdiction o f each 
newly created regional state had unintended external implications. While the Eritrean 
and Sudanese conceptions o f centralised statehood implied a complementary notion of 
hard frontiers, the post- 1991 Ethiopian Federalism, based on ethnicity, led to a 
softening o f the frontiers. Clapham argues that this process occurred at two levels. It 
affected the relations between groups across frontiers, with clear implications for 
Ethiopia’s northern, eastern and western borderland communities, those located in the 
borderlands with Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan respectively. Concurrently, the model of
j'y
ethnic-based Federalism favoured the state’s engagement in cross-border politics, 
namely hot pursuit missions across the northern and south-eastern border in pursuit o f 
insurgent movements.23
While Jacquin-Berdal draws our attention to the external implications of the 
redrawing o f Ethiopia’s Northern Region’s administrative territorial jurisdiction, 
Lyons alludes to the external implications of the same process for the south- eastern 
Region. While the former had implications for Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea, the 
latter had implications for its relations with Somalia. However, the implications were 
different in part due to the different conceptions of statehood of Eritrea and Somalia 
vis-a-vis their frontiers with contiguous states, among which Ethiopia stood 
prominently. Arguably, the contrasting state trajectories of Eritrea and Somalia after 
1991 led to their different positioning vis-a-vis Ethiopia. While Eritrea’s insurgents 
emerged victorious in the aftermath o f the Cold War and successfully established 
themselves at the helm o f the newly created sovereign state, Somalia’s insurgents 
failed to find a solution to accommodate the different factions within the Somali 
polity, and the result was the disintegration o f the state. Eritrea emerged as a ‘strong
22 Clapham, C. 2001. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn' in May, R., and 
Furley, Oliver (ed.) African Interventionist States. Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 126.
23 Specific details o f  these incidents will be described in the section devoted to the structure o f regional 
relations.
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state’ rigidly attached to the frontiers established by Italian colonialism and 
established territoriality as the basis of statehood.
The Somali state, divided by clan and sub-clan rivalries, succumbed to the 
centrifugal forces o f fragmentation within society and disintegrated. Without a 
government at the helm of the state, the self- declaration o f Independence by 
Somaliland and the establishment o f Puntland as an autonomous region, the Somali 
entity was far more vulnerable in the face of the regional implications of Ethiopia’s 
state building activities.
Lyons contended that the EPRDF/ TPLF (at the time of this occurrence acting 
as the Transitional Government of Ethiopia) had proposed a new provincial map for 
the Southern region based on ethnic lines, including a Somali province that 
incorporated parts o f the old areas of Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo.24 This measure is 
best understood against the protracted nature o f insurgent movements mobilized 
around Somali identity in the Ogaden.
In addition, after the border war broke out, Eritrea accused the administration 
o f Tigray o f being responsible for the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. According to the Eritrean government, Tigray’s regional administration 
issued a map in which the boundaries between the two countries had been modified 
without prior notification.25 These two examples draw our attention to the importance 
of considering the regional implications o f domestic state building activities. Indeed, 
the Ethiopian model of Ethnic Federalism had not only significant domestic 
implications but also - as the war with Eritrea confirmed - unexpected regional 
implications.
Ethiopia’s state building activities had implications for its south­
eastern and northern contiguous neighbouring countries. The analysis o f the regional 
dynamics against the backdrop of the deeply embedded structure o f regional relations
24 Lyons, T. 1994. 'Crises on Multiple Levels: Somalia and the Hom o f Africa' in Samatar, A.I. (ed.) 
The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, footnote 10, p. 206.
25 Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 84.
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shows the importance o f regional politics to the understanding of state building 
trajectories. Indeed as Clapham suggests:
(...) domestic state- building was too closely associated with the 
regional politics for the two to be kept apart, and though in 
somewhat altered form- familiar patterns o f external
9 f\involvement reasserted themselves.
Somalia’s conception o f statehood continued to challenge the territorial 
arrangements inherited at the time o f independence. Somaliland’s self-declaration of 
Independence in 1991 undermined Somalia’s conception o f statehood and nationhood. 
The idea of a Greater Somalia, reuniting the Somalis divided across the three 
Somalilands o f the colonial period, the Ogaden region o f Ethiopia, the Northern 
Frontier District of Kenya and the Somali- speaking areas o f Djibouti, is still a potent 
force underlying Somali nationalism. However, the disintegration of the Somali state 
further aggravated the pre-existing permeability o f its borders, rendering it more 
prone to incursions from neighbouring states.
The two instances o f inter-state war in the Horn o f Africa confirm the trend for
97the ‘regionalization o f conflicts over sovereignty and borderland communities’.
Despite the different conceptions of statehood and their implications with 
regard to frontier zones, territorial integrity at the formal level remains a key 
component o f sovereignty for the regional states. However, the formal rigidity of 
territorial integrity has not been tied with increasing control or surveillance o f the 
frontier. Indeed, the state’s attachment to the territorial integrity norm does not 
preclude the irregular movement o f people and goods across national borders. At the 
informal level the porous international boundaries mean that national boundaries are 
only minimally controlled by the states. This informal understanding of the business 
o f regional politics is only suspended when the interests o f a given state are at risk; as 
the outbreak o f hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea confirms.
26 Clapham, 2001, op. cit., p. 125.
27 Deng, F. M., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., Zartman, William I. 1996. Regional Dynamics' 
in Deng, F.M., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., Zartman, William I. (ed.) Sovereignty as 
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, pp. 155-57.
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The maintenance of porous international borders in turn leads to two other 
phenomena with implications for state building trajectories and for the regional 
security architecture: the relative ease with which people and goods cross the borders.
7o
The overall number of refugees in the region reaches 1.4 million and the 
numbers o f Small Arms and Light Weapons that circulate across borders reaches 3 
million.29
The Horn of Africa figures amongst the regions with most widespread groups 
of pastoralists. The Horn of Africa states rank among the top 10 states worldwide in 
terms of pastoralist population size. Sudan comes first, Somalia third, Ethiopia fifth 
and Kenya 6th.30 In Ethiopia pastoralists account to 10 to 12 per cent o f the total
' i  I
population, that is, 7-8 million. They are concentrated especially in the Afar and 
Somali regional states, in the Borana zone of Oromia regional state and in the South 
Omo zone o f the Southern regional state.32 The pastoralist habitats make up the 
largest part of each state’s territory, 100 per cent in Djibouti, 75 per cent in Somalia, 
72 per cent in Kenya, 70 per cent in Eritrea, 66 per cent in Sudan and 52 per cent in 
Ethiopia.33
The pastoralists are among the groups more inclined to resist states’ pressures 
for centralisation and control o f citizens’ movement across national boundaries34. The 
regional states have often met the pastoralists’ attempts to resist the extension o f the 
state’s centralizing institutions with increased political marginalization and/or forceful
28 Lomo, Z. 2006. 'Refugees in East Africa: Developing an Integrated Approach' in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.) 
East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance. Colorado and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, p. 38.
29 Kiflemariam Gebrewold, a., Byrne, S. 2006. 'Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn o f Africa' 
in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.) Ibid. Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 21.
30 The Statistical data on pastoralists in the region should be interpreted as indicators and not as precise 
figures. Markakis, J. 1998. Resource Conflict in the Horn o f  Africa. London, Thousand Oaks, New  
Delhi: PRIO and SAGE Publications, p. 41.
31 — 2004. 'Pastoralism on the Margin'. UK: Minority Rights Group International.
32 Ibid., p. 15.
33 — 1998. Resource Conflict in the Horn o f  Africa. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: PRIO and 
SAGE Publications., p. 41.
34 Ibid., p. 45.
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control35. Pastoralists continue to straddle the borders of the sovereign states in search 
for critical resources for their livelihoods: water and pastures. The key resources for 
their survival span across international boundaries. The state’s control of territorial 
boundaries interferes with the pastoralists strategies for survival which require 
seasonal movement across states’ boundaries.36 Ultimately most pastoralists disregard 
international boundaries and ‘consider them non-existent*. The diverging 
conceptions o f boundaries have been exploited differently by various groups in their 
competition for access to critical resources. This trend has resulted in considerable 
attrition and conflict between pastoralists and the state. Conflict has also been a 
common occurrence among pastoralists leading competing groups to support either 
state or non-state actors depending on their group’s strategy; with significant spill- 
over effects across borders. Ultimately, this feature has had a significant impact on 
the region’s security dynamics as the next section will discuss.
6.3 The structure of regional relations and the region’s security dynamics
The norms that bind the African state system into a regional sovereign society of
TOstates are uti possidetis and the non-interference norms. At the formal level of 
international relations the consensus is generally accepted. Within the realm of 
informal international relations the practice confronts the norm o f non-interference. 
The analysis of the conduct o f international relations, both at the formal and informal 
levels, provides a complex picture. Indeed, even if  tacit compromise over the respect 
for the borders inherited at the time of independence informs the relations between 
contiguous neighbouring states, at the informal level each provides support to 
insurgent movements. Within the realm of formal relations such covert support is 
denied. What goes on at the informal level challenges the formal consensus around 
the norm of non- interference and hence undermines the respect for the domestic
35 Doombos, M. 1993. 'Pasture and Polis: The Roots o f Political Marginalization o f Somali 
Pastoralism1. London: MacMillan Press with the Institute o f  Social Studies, pp. 116-19.
36 Amutabi, M. N. 2005. 'Transient, Mobile 'Nations' and the Dilemma o f Nationhood in the Horn of 
Africa: Interrogating Nomadic Pastoralists, Insecurity and the Uncertainty o f Belonging' in Yieke, F.A. 
(ed.) East Africa. In Search o f  National and Regional Renewal. Dakar: CODESRIA, p. 122.
37 ibid., p. 122.
38 Markakis, 1998, op. cit., p. 15.
39 Deng, F. M., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., Zartman, William I. 1996. 'Regional Dynamics' 
in Deng, F.M., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., Zartman, William I. (ed.) Sovereignty as 
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, p. 157.
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sovereignty o f neighbouring states. This is a practice deeply embedded in the 
structure o f regional relations and poses a serious challenge to international order. In 
the Horn o f Africa the consensus, on uti possidetis and non-interference norms, 
was never widely accepted.40 As Clapham notes:
The recent history of intervention has thus reflected not the 
breakdown of previously respected conventions o f state 
sovereignty, but a continuation of the complex interactions 
between political forces in the region that reach back decades, 
indeed centuries, into the past.41
The Horn o f Africa is characterised by a combination o f a pattern o f mutual 
interference in each other’s domestic affairs with a shifting pattern of alliance 
formation wherein, to follow Martin Wight’s definition o f the pattern o f power, the 
power on the opposing side to the neighbouring country becomes the natural ally.42
The next sections will discuss these patterns of mutual interference and of 
power, as they are played out on the Horn of Africa. Against the backdrop o f the deep 
structure o f regional relations, the following questions arise: as the war unfolded how 
did the relations among the two and with other ruling parties and factions in the 
region evolve? Did the course and the intensity o f the war lead to a prolongation of 
the conflict? When the crisis escalated neighbouring states and non-state actors 
benefited from the conflict differently. Against the region’s security dynamics this 
section seeks to understand how both parties exploited ongoing armed conflicts in 
neighbouring states to pursue their strategy of weakening the regimes in Addis Ababa 
and Asmara through: i) support to each others’ opposition movements based in 
neighbouring countries (contiguous to both belligerents and non- contiguous at least 
to one) and ii) through a significant shift in the alliances between the former allies 
with the major actors (both state and non-state actors) in ongoing armed conflicts, 
especially in Sudan and in Somalia. Moreover, this strategy contributed to 
heightening internal conflict in Djibouti. Neighbouring countries, for their part,
40 Clapham, 2001, op. cit., p. 121.
41 Ibid., p. 119.
42 Bull, H., and, Carsten Holbraad 1995. 'Power politics / Martin Wight'. New York: Leicester 
University Press, p. 158.
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shifted alliances and followed contrasting strategies vis-a-vis the warring parties, as 
the section on the pattern of power will discuss.
6.3.1 The pattern of mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs
The breaches to the consensus around the norm of non interference should be 
considered in a continuum. International relations in the Horn o f Africa 
(encompassing both state and non-state actors) seem to undermine and pose different 
challenges to this norm. Indeed, even if  the consensus does not hold when evaluated 
against common practice, the degrees o f interference substantiate different 
conceptions of where the limits o f acceptable interference lie. The public discourse of 
denial o f interference in neighbouring states’ internal affairs is informed by this 
common conduct o f regional relations.
In the long run and in various instances (as the history o f international 
relations in the Horn o f Africa since the Second World War shows) this practice has 
indeed increased the likelihood of escalation of disputes into full- scale war. A case in 
point was the prelude to the 1977-1978 war between Ethiopia and Somalia. Although 
other factors played a role in the escalation of the crisis, Somalia’s covert support to 
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) clearly conditioned the successful 
outcome of the movement’s insurgency campaign in the Ogaden. In turn, the 
achievements o f the insurgent movements in the Ogaden enhanced the degree of 
Somalia’s forcible interference in Ethiopia’s domestic affairs, short of declaring war. 
The Somali regime’s aim was the incorporation o f the Ogaden Region within a united 
Somalia. Somalia’s covert support to the insurgent movement paved the way for its 
forceful intervention in Ethiopa’s domestic affairs. Somalia continuously denied 
involvement in the Ogaden region but in August 1977 it was clear that Ethiopia’s 
previous claims to the contrary were accurate.43 As a consequence, the Soviet Union 
suspended its military assistance to Somalia.44 By the end o f September 1977 Somalia 
had indeed successfully occupied most o f the Ogaden region.45
43 Gorman, R. F. 1981. Political Conflict on the Horn o f  Africa. New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 65.
44 Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit., p. 170.
45 Ibid., p. 170.
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The analysis of the structure of regional relations shows that at one extreme of 
the continuum lies forcible interference, short o f declaring war.46 Indeed, as Martin 
Wight claims: ‘This is the twilight region where domestic and international politics 
become indistinguishable’.47
At the other extreme o f the continuum lies covert interference in neighbouring 
states' domestic affairs. During Mengistu and Barre’s regimes, support for each 
other’s dissidents continued unabated. During Mengistu’s regime, the two northern 
opposition movements to Siyad Barre, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) 
and the Somali National Movement (SNM) organised their guerrilla operations inside
A O
Somalia from bases in Ethiopia. Members o f the two northern Ethiopian Provinces 
insurgent movements, the TPLF and the EPLF, were regularly provided with Somali 
passports.49 Indeed, as the cited examples show, the practice o f mutual interference in 
each other’s internal affairs, through support to dissidents from neighbouring 
countries, has long been an established feature o f the political landscape in the Horn.50 
One state’s interference in the other’s internal affairs fuels a tit-for-tat strategy, 
reproducing this pattern of mutual interference.
Furthermore, between unofficial and underhand forcible interference and 
mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs lies the conduct o f incursions or 
hot-pursuit missions of insurgent movements within the territorial jurisdiction of 
contiguous neighbouring states. This practice is common currency in the relations 
between a state and its own opposition movements hosted by neighbouring countries. 
The following, more recent, instances are two cases in point to illustrate facets o f this 
practice.
46 Bull and Holbraad, 1995, op. cit., p. 198. According to Wight’s classification Somalia’s forcible 
interference was offensive in the sense that it aimed at changing the status quo.
47 ibid., p. 198.
48 Lewis, I., and, Mayall, James 1996. ’Somalia’ in Mayall, J. (ed.) The New Interventionism 1991- 
1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, form er Yugoslavia and Somalia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 104.
49 Ibid., p. 100.
50 Ibid., p. 100.
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The first instance was Ethiopia’s hot pursuit missions o f Al Itihad AI 
Islamiya’s (AIAI) members in Gedo region in Somalia from 1996 onwards. In 1996 
the Somali militant islamist movement AIAI, translated as the ‘Islamic Union’,51 
conducted a series of terrorist attacks on Ethiopian soil. The rise o f the AIAI in 1991 
was deeply related to domestic developments in Somalia during the early 1970s, but 
its operations in Ethiopia were only significant during 1996 and raised legitimate 
security concerns over the rise o f militant Islamist movements in Somalia. AIAI 
operations in Ethiopia were primarily conducted as an expression o f ethnic solidarity 
with the Somalis in the Ogaden. However, it remained unclear the extent to which the 
AIAI mobilized support within Ethiopia’s Somali region. The Islamist imperative also 
played a role but its primary aim was to incorporate Ethiopia’s region V (Ogaden) in 
Somalia. As a response, from 1996 onwards Ethiopia embarked upon a series o f hot 
pursuit missions of AIAI members in Gedo region. Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia 
culminated with the destruction o f the movement’s base and military training camp in
STLuq and Buulo Hawa. This incursion into Somalian territory was justified as a 
response to al- Itihad support for the Ogaden insurgent movement, the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF), and for its involvement in terrorist attacks in 
Ethiopia.54 According to Ethiopian sources, the Ethiopian-Somali movements (the 
Ogaden National Liberation Front included) issued a communique condemning the 
AIAI attacks.55
The second incident was Ethiopia’s hot-pursuit mission of the Afar 
Revolutionary Democratic United Front (ARDUF) in the Bada area in Eritrea in 
August 1997. This incident culminated with letters of protest from the Eritrean 
President to the Ethiopian Prime Minister. This incident came to be known as the Adi
51 Reuters. http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=7db/crisisprofiles/EE_BOR.htm.; Reuters. 
http://www.alertaet.org/printable.htm7URLWdb/crisisprofiles/EE_BOR.htm.
52For an Ethiopian perspective on the rise o f the AIAI refer to: Medhane Tadesse 2002. AJ-Ittihad 
Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia: Religion, Money and the Struggle fo r  Supremacy over 
Somalia. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise. For a more neutral account refer to: International 
Crisis Group 12 December 2005 'Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report N °100,'. Nairobi/ Brussels.
53 Marchal, R. 2004. Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali civil war. Before and after 9/11' in de 
Waal, A. (ed.) Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn o f  Africa. London: Hurst & Company, p. 128.
54 These included bomb explosions in several Hotels in Ethiopia and failed and successful 
assassinations targeting government members and International Organizations’ international staff. For 
more details refer to: Bryden, M. 2003. 'No quick fixes: coming to terms with terrorism, Islam and 
statelessness in Somalia'. Journal o f  Conflict Studies 23, pp. 31- 2.
55 SWB 16 January 1997. Two groups in Somali region to unite against Islamic Union'. Horn o f  Africa 
Bulletin 1/97.
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Murug incident and was mentioned both in the ‘Proposals for a Framework 
Agreement for a Peaceful Settlement o f the Dispute Between Ethiopia and Eritrea/ 
19/11/1998 and in ‘The Agreement between the Government o f the Federal 
Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia and the Government of the State o f Eritrea/ 
12/ 12/2000'.56
For the reasons outlined above both forceful intervention and hot-pursuit 
missions can not be treated independently because these incidents pose serious 
challenges to the regional order. In the long run, the pattern of mutual interference in 
each other’s internal affairs has rendered the terrain propitious for hot pursuit 
missions or incursions into neighbouring state’s territory, and ultimately has escalated 
into forceful interventions. The two occurrences o f interstate war have had wider 
regional implications. As discussed in chapter 3, the conduct of the 1998-2000 war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea had ramifications in neighbouring countries, especially 
through Eritrean and Ethiopian interference in neighbouring countries’ internal 
affairs. This strategy was followed either to support each other’s opposition 
movements, with bases in these countries, or just to tip the balance o f forces in their 
own favour. Indeed, in addition to the regionalization o f conflicts over sovereignty 
and borderland communities, the belligerents’ aim to weaken each other’s regime 
after the outbreak of hostilities further enhanced this trend.
In Ethiopia’s case the conflict with Eritrea led it to form alliances with 
regional states in order to bring about a forceful change o f Eritrea’s policy towards the
c n
region. Finally, this pattern o f international relations in the Horn o f Africa is further 
aggravated by a shifting pattern o f alliances. The analysis of the frequent dramatic 
shift o f alliances will contribute to clarifying how these strategies were pursued.
56 The text was maintained in both documents. In the Proposal it appeared as article 7 and in the Peace 
Agreement it appeared as article 3,1). The content o f the article clearly establishes a link between the 
escalation o f the dispute into full-scale war in May 1998 and the previous incident in July/ August 
1997. The text reads: ‘ In order to determine the origins o f the conflict, an investigation be carried out 
on the incidents o f  6 May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have 
contributed to a misunderstanding between the two Parties regarding their common border, including 
the incidents o f July- August 1997. Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, 2005. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: 
Unfinished Business'. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 257.
57 Deng et al., 1996, op. cit. The authors claim that one o f the features o f  the structure o f  regional 
relations has been the regionalization o f conflicts to change policies.
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6.3.2 The Region’s Pattern of Power
In order to understand the regional ramifications o f the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea it is important to bear in mind the alliance between Addis Ababa and Asmara 
in the region until the outbreak of hostilities in 1998 (as discussed in chapter 2). When 
the crisis escalated neighbouring states benefited from the war in different ways. This 
section provides an overview o f how the belligerent parties provided support to each 
other’s armed opposition movements and how these changes led to a shift o f previous 
alliances. In understanding this strategy it is important to consider neighbouring 
countries’ own relations with the new state in the Horn of Africa.
Both parties exploited ongoing armed conflicts and dissention in neighbouring 
countries to pursue their strategy o f weakening each other’s regime and of isolating 
the other vis-a-vis neighbouring states.
This strategy was pursued through a significant shift o f alliances with the 
major protagonists in ongoing armed conflicts, especially in Sudan and in Somalia, 
and to a lesser degree in Djibouti.
Eritrea’s foreign policy record o f territorial disputes with contiguous countries 
and the outbreak o f hostilities with Ethiopia led the other states to join Ethiopia. 
Eritrea’s conduct challenged the peculiar regional compromise between the formal 
respect for the principle o f uti possidetis and the practical maintenance o f porous 
borders. Eritrea’s previous foreign policy towards contiguous neighbouring states had 
worked against its interest. Indeed, Eritrea positioned itself at odds with the two key 
contiguous neighbouring countries: Sudan and Ethiopia.
Prior to the outbreak o f hostilities, the Sudanese government went as far as to 
portray the Ethio-Eritrean alliance as a coalition against Islam. The reason for this 
claim was the support provided both by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments for 
the major insurgent movement in southern Sudan: John Garang’s Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM). Sudan’s accusations should also be understood against 
the backdrop o f the superpower’s policy towards the region since the ascendancy o f 
the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan; as the final section will discuss further.
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Indeed, the US provided support for the consolidation o f the axis of the new African 
Renaissance leaders, namely: President Issaias Afewerki, Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi and President Yoweri Museveni, to contain the rise of political Islam in a 
militant version in the region and, especially, that of the NIF.
Egypt intervened in the controversy in defence o f Ethiopia and Eritrea to 
dissipate the Sudanese government’s accusations that the two neighbouring countries 
had a specific agenda against Islam, or indeed Islamism, and/or were responsible for 
the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
With Eritrea’s forceful occupation of the disputed areas under Ethiopian 
administration, Sudan took advantage o f this key opportunity to shift roles with 
Eritrea in the region. Sudan re-aligned with Ethiopia, in a move to be followed up by 
the other aggrieved states.
Sudan was, arguably, the state that benefited the most from the escalation of 
hostilities between the two former allies. Alex de Waal claimed that in the case o f 
Sudan:
The war (between Ethiopia and Eritrea) was a political gift for 
which Khartoum could never have dreamed. Hassan al Turabi was 
jubilant, saying that Allah had intervened and the weapons 
provided by the Americans to Ethiopia and Eritrea were now being
r o
used by these countries against each other.
The other neighbouring states changed their alliances according to the conjectural 
interests unleashed by the war between the two former allies. After the first round of 
fighting, Ethiopia rebuilt its relations with the Sudanese government.
The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea also weakened the strategic position of 
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) within Sudan.59
58 de Waal, A. 2004. The Politics o f  Destabilisation in the Horn, 1989-2001' in de Waal, A. (ed.) 
Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn o f  Africa. London: Hurst & Company, p. 211.
59SIPRI 1999. SIPRI Yearbook 1999 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
235
With hindsight this transformation is significant because it brought an end to 
the Sudanese government’s isolation in the region.
Prior to the war with Ethiopia, President Issaias Afewerki continuously 
accused the Sudanese government of fomenting and o f providing support for Eritrean 
militant Islamist movements. While President Issaias Afewerki faced the threat o f the 
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) across Eritrea’s western border with Sudan, 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi faced the threat o f bombings in the Ethiopian capital 
perpetrated by the Somali Islamist movement AIAI. Both executives had to deal with 
militant Islamist movements at this juncture and were united in their common goal of 
containing the rise of militant Islamism in the region. But even at this key juncture, 
the movements’ aims were different in nature. While the EIJM’s insurgency had 
reformist aims, the insurgency led by AIAI had secessionist ones which were aimed at 
supporting the incorporation o f Ethiopia’s region V into Somalia.
The war between the two former allies led to a major realignment o f alliances. 
More significantly, it brought to an end the concerted efforts of Uganda- Ethiopia and 
Eritrea to weaken the NIF. Incursions into the Eritrean western border with Sudan 
continued unabated, as did Eritrea’s support for Sudanese opposition movements.
Ethiopia assured the Sudanese government that domestic Sudanese insurgent 
movements’ use o f Ethiopian bordering areas to organize operations against the 
regime would no longer be tolerated. Ethiopia also sought a rapprochement with 
Yemen and Djibouti. The selection o f these two states was in part determined by their 
previous border disputes with Eritrea. The Sudanese government re-aligned with 
Ethiopia against Eritrea, in a move similar to other aggrieved states. The Sana’a Axis 
was forged during the 1998-2000 war and brought together Addis Ababa-Khartoum- 
Djibouti and Sana’a’s leaderships against the contiguous neighbouring state with a 
proven record o f hostility towards the region’s porous borders. The emergence o f the 
Sana'a grouping was based on their common suspicion of Asmara. Ethiopia’s foreign 
policy towards the region was designed and implemented in order to isolate Eritrea 
and curtail its regional ambitions.
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Ethiopia and Eritrea’s shift from a common approach to militant Islamism to a 
collision route, as the inter-state war unfolded dramatically, shifted the balance of 
forces in the region. Ethiopia supported Eritrean armed opposition movements based 
in Sudan or Ethiopia, and Eritrea in a tit-for-tat tactic supported Ethiopian armed 
opposition movements based in Somalia, Kenya or Eritrea.
According to Klein, during the war, Eritrea channelled arms to the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) via Somalia, and extended its support to the Somali faction 
led by Hussein Aideed. In turn, Ethiopia supported the Somali Rahanwein Resistance 
Army (SRRA).60
The interference of Eritrea in Somalia’s internal affairs can only be understood 
against the backdrop o f these previous developments. With Eritrea’s support for 
Ethiopian insurgent movements based in Somalia, support for the opposing faction to 
the one Addis Ababa was supporting followed. When Ethiopia opposed the 
Transitional National Government (TNG), Eritrea supported factions within the TNG. 
When the TNG failed and was replaced by a new interim government, which Ethiopia 
supported, Eritrea once again supported the opposing side to Ethiopia. Addis Ababa’s 
rationale for interference in Somalia’s internal affairs was informed by fears o f revival 
of the idea o f a Greater Somalia and of any executive in Somalia that would be prone 
to support further insurgency in Ethiopia’s Region V. Eritrea had no similar concerns 
to motivate its interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. Indeed, Eritrea’s gradual 
interference in Somalia’s internal affairs can only be understood as an indirect means 
to undermine Ethiopia’s regional standing and, simultaneously, weaken the regime in 
Addis Ababa. Hence, Eritrea’s support to the factions within Somalia meant they were 
more likely to support insurgency within Ethiopia, namely in Ethiopia’s Somali 
regional state. Ultimately, this tactic was followed in order to weaken Ethiopia’s 
military presence along the border with Eritrea by supporting those with an interest in 
creating further tension in another border area. As a consequence o f the ramifications 
into Somalia, the Ethiopian National Defence Force had to build a permanent military 
presence along the border with Somalia to prevent armed incursions by non-state
60 Klein, A. 2002. The Horn o f Turbulence: Political Regimes in Transition ' in Debiel, T., with Axel 
Klein, (ed.) Fragile Peace: State failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions. London, New  
York, Bonn: Zed Books with The Development and Peace Foundation, p. 158.
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actors, conducted either by Ethiopian domestic insurgent movements or by Somali 
ones.
The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea produced a shock wave in 
Djibouti’s internal affairs. The Eritrean government did not wait long before 
providing support for the Afar opposition movement, Front for the Restoration of 
Unity and Democracy (FRUD), which was conducting an insurgency campaign 
within Djibouti. As a retaliatory measure the Ethiopian government assisted Djibouti 
in its efforts to bring to a halt the FRDU destabilizing operations in the Northern 
borders o f Djibouti.61
These strategies reinforced the regional trend towards the regionalization of 
conflicts. Indeed, the regional pattern o f shifting alliances enhances the trend towards 
the regionalization o f the conflicts, both intra and inter-state. The regionalization of 
conflicts to bring changes o f regime and policies was fostered by Ethiopia and Eritrea 
vis-a-vis each other’s regime.
In conclusion, this section has confirmed that in the aftermath o f the Cold War 
the pattern of shifting alliances was reproduced.Between 1995 and 1998, the regional 
politics were dominated by the Renaissance leaders Axis against Sudan. The three 
post- insurgent states: Ethiopia-Eritrea-Uganda composed the Axis. During this period 
the alliance was formed around the common denominator o f containing the Islamists’ 
rise and isolating the NIF regime. In addition, at the regional level the Renaissance 
axis sought to contain the ascendancy and export of militant Islamist movements from 
Sudan into the region. Between 1998 and 2006 the Sana’a Group, formed by Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Yemen, and later by the Somali-TFG, dominated the regional politics. The 
alliance was formed around the common denominator of isolating the PFDJ regime. 
At the regional level the Sanaa’a group sought to contain the rise o f militant 
nationalism and contain Eritrea’s offensive foreign policy towards contiguous 
neighbouring states. As the epilogue will discuss, militant nationalism seems to be a 
recurrent challenge to regional peace and stability.
61 Abbink, J. 2003. 'Ethiopia- Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects o f  Peace in the Horn o f  Africa'. 
Journal o f  Contemporary African Studies 21, p. 415. Anonymous 2005. 'Positive Neutrality:
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6.3.3 The regionalization of political space
The nature of the regimes in the region and the resistance to alternation in power via 
elections has meant that domestic politics tend to be pursued outside the target state. 
As Deng et al. rightly point out this feature has led to a regionalization o f political 
space62. In the four types o f insurgency identified by Clapham63 we can find examples 
o f each in the Horn o f Africa. In the scope o f this chapter only reformist and 
secessionist insurgencies receive particular attention. These movements more often 
than not have pursued their aims from bases outside the target state and with 
neighbouring countries’ support. The nature o f the regimes in the region forces 
opposition to conduct its activities and guerrilla campaigns from outside the target 
state. The elimination of any space for legitimate contestation has contributed to the 
transformation of opposition forces into insurgencies. The domestic politics in 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea, and the nature of the regimes, contribute to the 
regionalization of the political space, as the circumstances described below confirm.
In Eritrea after the 1993 Independence referendum for Independence, the 
Constitution was never implemented and elections were postponed indefinitely. 
Private press is not allowed and in the aftermath o f the war both journalists and the 
opposing faction within the ruling party were detained and held incommunicado. 
Indeed, the PFDJ - the ruling party - equals the state, and the state is run as a one-party- 
de facto state. Members o f opposition movements in Eritrea have either joined the 
diaspora or have reorganized their agenda firstly with Sudanese support and then with 
Ethiopia’s support. Indeed, Ethiopia started a rapprochement with Eritrean opposition 
forces and created conditions for them to set up bases and operate from its territory.64
Djibouti' in Jacquin-Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. 
Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, pp. 172-74.
62 Deng et al., 1996, op. cit., p. 149.
63 As already discussed in chapter 1 on the analysis o f the patterns o f warfare in Africa, Clapham 
identifies the following types o f insurgency: Liberation insurgencies; Separatist insurgencies; Reform 
insurgencies and Warlord insurgencies. Clapham, C. 1998. 'African Guerrillas'. Fountain & Indiana: 
James Currey, pp. 5-9.
64 Ibid., p. 5.
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As the 1998-2000 war unfolded Ethiopia provided support to Eritrea’s opposition 
movements, namely to the Alliance of Eritrean National Forces (AENF).65
Sudanese opposition movements have also benefited from the tense relations 
between Sudan and Eritrea. When the two governments fell out in 1997 Eritrea 
awarded the Sudanese Embassy in Asmara to the Sudanese National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA).
In Ethiopia the post-1991 political landscape seemed to be entering the path 
o f political liberalization and the process of democratization was underway. The May 
2005 elections and the events that followed have consistently confirmed the ruling 
party’s trend towards criminalization of dissent. This has had negative consequences 
on democratization and internal conflict and members of the opposition parties and 
insurgent movements, which prior to the elections had differing agendas, have now 
come together as the Ethiopian National Alliance (ENA). Eritrea has offered safe 
haven and provided support for the movements within the ENA.
With regard to each other’s policies, Ethiopia’s bid to isolate Eritrea in the 
region envisaged a change to Eritrea’s foreign policy. Eritrea’s support for opposing 
factions to the one Ethiopia was supporting in Somalia envisaged forging alliances 
with Ethiopia’s enemies, both domestic insurgent movements and/or regional 
insurgent movements.
This pattern o f relations between regional states is neither specific to Africa nor can it 
be defined as a new characteristic of states’ behaviour after the end o f the Cold War. 
Indeed, in the Middle East one can observe a similar pattern wherein the regional 
states interfere in each other’s internal affairs.66
In addition, this pattern of mutual interference challenges the approaches that
filtend to place the primacy of security dynamics in Africa at the domestic level. Even
65 Gilkes, P., and, Plaut, Martin 1999. War in the Horn: The Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia: 
The Royal Institute o f International Affairs, p. 73.
66 Halliday, F. 2005. The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 39.
67 Buzan, B., and Ole, Waever, 2003, op. cit.
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if  the sources of the armed conflicts are to be found internally, the struggles are 
played out in the regional arena. State and nation building activities in addition to 
their regional implications are also pursued in the regional arena. In conclusion, both 
domestic and international factors shape the outcomes, contributing to the complex 
influx-like security architecture, which characterizes the region.
6.3.5 Regional Organizations and security
The late creation o f the first regional organization in 1986 must be understood in the 
light of the historical record of regional relations in the Horn of Africa.
Ultimately, the natural conditions, especially the cycles of drought that plague 
the countries in the region, led the states to create the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development and Drought.
The stalemate that persisted between Ethiopia and Somalia was the first 
instance to test the regional organization’s leverage on questions related to regional 
security. At the time o f the Ogaden War o f 1977-78 an OAU good-offices committee
fL O
was set up but it failed and the dispute was temporarily settled on the battlefield.
The summit that led to the formal establishment o f the regional organization 
also marked a turning point and major breakthrough in the stalemate between Ethiopia 
and Somalia. As Keller notes:
Ironically, the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia 
achieved a tentative resolution through the facilitation of the 
subregional technical organization, The Intergovernmental 
Authority on Drought and Development. At the first IGADD 
summit in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin direct 
talks to resolve their border problems.69
The IGAD initiative, at the time, was a very important step towards bringing the two 
leaderships to the negotiation table. A peace settlement was finally reached in April
68 Keller, E. J. 1997. 'Rethinking African Regional Security' in Lake, D.A., and, Morgan, Patrick M. 
(ed.) Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, p. 312.
69 ibid., p. 312.
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1988. Quite significantly, the peace accord signed by Mengistu and Siyad Barre in 
1988 obliged each side to stop supporting the other’s dissidents.70 Perhaps, IGAD’s 
experience in mitigating the tension between the two belligerent parties in the first 
Horn o f Africa interstate war should be put to good use in order to overcome the 
current stalemate between the two belligerent parties in the Horn of Africa’s second 
inter-state war.
With regard to regional security the organization has set up mechanisms to 
tackle the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and to counter-terrorism. 
Its intervention as a broker between belligerent parties in intra-state wars acquired 
saliency with the Sudanese and Somalia peace processes, both o f which were 
designed under IGAD’s aegis and reflected regional efforts and support for a new 
regional security architecture.
Despite the shortcomings of the peace processes under IGAD’s aegis, the 
outcomes show how regional initiatives, if  given support by extra-regional and other 
regional actors (AU), are suitable to foster and implement regional peace.
The Sudanese peace process shows the shortcomings of the regional 
organization in the face of other states’ determination to dispute prominence as peace 
brokers in the region. The Egyptian-Libyan peace proposal for Sudan emerged as a 
counterweight to the IGAD initiative, undermining its credibility and limited 
achievements at the time. Since the onset o f the Sudanese peace process, Egypt, a key 
player in the Horn o f Africa’s international relations, had been accorded observer 
status. The limited role ascribed to Egypt undermined IGAD’s efforts to bring 
hostilities to an end in Sudan. Egypt’s direct involvement in the Horn o f Africa’s 
international relations, and particularly in Sudan, has been motivated by its 
dependence on the Nile waters. This instance shows that Egypt’s national interests are 
too crucially linked with the Horn o f Africa’s states for its influence and role in the 
regional security dynamics to be overlooked.
70Lewis and Mayall, 1996, op. cit., p. 105.
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IGAD did not intervene during the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in part 
due to the failure of its Chairman’s immediate attempt at mediation. Indeed, the 
regional organization was paralysed by the fall out of the two former allies. In 
addition, its responsibilities as a broker in the two other mentioned peace processes 
were, in part, curtailed and compromised by the end o f the alliance between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea.
Because of its standing in the region and past experiences, IGAD is in a 
privileged position to develop a monitoring facility on existing boundary disputes 
between contiguous states, and on local disputes in the frontier zones between the 
state and borderland communities. In addition, a close monitoring of rivalry between 
contiguous states should be given paramount attention, especially on political, 
military, economic, social and regional issues. As the evidence collected shows, the 
combination of contiguity, territorial disputes and rivalry is an explosive combination, 
likely to disrupt regional order. IGAD is also lacking of a mechanism with which to 
address the problem of refugees in the region, who pose a further challenge to 
regional order.
However, as Ethiopia and Eritrea’s interstate war has shown and the Sudanese 
and Somali processes have confirmed, the regional organization tends to be by-passed 
by interstate relations. In addition, the pattern o f mutual interference in each other’s 
internal affairs at the informal level of international relations undermines the regional 
organization’s achievements. This pattern coupled with the reproduction and 
reinforcement o f the motto ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’ undermines the regional 
organisation’s initiatives. Indeed, a pattern of power still prevails. The limited scope 
and density o f regional governance at the formal level of inter-state gives space for 
non-state actors to play a large role in determining the regional security dynamics.
6.4 Extra- regional actors and the structure of regional relations
Historically, the Horn o f Africa has been a cockpit for several 
strategic power games, in which control of territory counted for 
more than the rights and aspirations of its inhabitants.71
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The international relations o f states and non-state actors in the region cannot be 
understood without taking into account the three periods o f superpower(s) 
involvement in the region, namely: a) the post-World War II and Cold W ar periods; 
b) post-Cold War and c) post-9/11. For the purposes o f this chapter the focus will be 
mainly in the post-Cold War period.
At the height of the Cold War superpower rivalry was informed by the need to 
secure access to key strategic locations within the region. The aftermath of the Cold 
W ar was punctuated by a lack o f interest from the only remaining superpower 
towards the region. The creation of a new state in the region was in part influenced by 
the international environment in the aftermath o f the Cold War. The debacle o f the 
UN Somalia operation further compromised US willingness to get involved in the 
regional politics of this part o f the world. The return o f the remaining superpower to 
the region, especially after the bombings o f the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya 
(August 1998), culminated with the definition of the Horn of Africa as a Front Line 
region in the ‘war against terror’ in the aftermath o f 9/11. In this context, the war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea was a major setback to the US support for the new 
African Renaissance leaders, namely the leaders from Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
US support increased their determination to counter the rise of militant Islamists in 
the region and destabilise the NIF regime in Sudan; especially after the failed 
assassination attempt on President Mubarak in 1995 while in Addis Ababa.
With Ethiopia and Eritrea on the brink of an all out war the US investment in 
these two countries as the main pillar for stability in the region was derailed. President 
Issaias Afeworki in his visit to Washington in April 1998 had expressed some 
reservations with regard to the prospects of this pillar but in such a way that it was 
indiscernible for any observer to pick up the increasing drift between the two former 
allies.73
71 de Waal, 2004, op. cit., p. 13.
72 Peter Woodward provides a well-informed and historically grounded analysis o f the evolution o f  US 
foreign policy towards the Horn o f Africa. Woodward, P. 2006. US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f  
Africa. Aldershot & Burlington: Ashgate.
73 Africa Confidential May 29,1998. 'Eritrea/Ethiopia: Murder in the Family’ 39, p. 3.
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The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea led to a major realignment of alliances 
between states and non-state actors in the region. As will become clear, the previous 
pattern of shifting alliances remained a key characteristic o f regional politics. 
However, this practice of submitting foreign policy making to the pattern o f power 
based on the motto 'my enemy's enemy is my friend’ further compromised the 
emergence o f regional security architecture. As in the past, external actors continued 
to exert their influence in the region.
At times extra-regional actors exploited patterns o f rivalry and reinforced 
them; at other times extra-regional actors became involved in the regional dynamics. 
The indirect support or cooperation with one regional state is likely to lead to 
suspicion from the opposing side. In the first case the superpower exploited the 
enduring rivalry between Sudan and Ethiopia to further its interests in the region 
without directly intervening. In the aftermath of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
the privileged relations between Addis Ababa and Washington led to suspicion on the 
part o f Asmara. This outcome shows that the superpower’s close association with one 
regional actor undermined leverage and relations with the opposing side (in this case 
Eritrea). Indeed, Washington’s relations with Asmara at the formal level are 
practically maintained to a bare minimal presence. The motto underlying alliance 
formation in the region also applies to extra-regional actors: ‘my enemy’s friend is my 
enemy.’
The domestic politics and international relations o f Ethiopia and Eritrea can 
only be understood in the context of these regional and extra-regional dynamics. 
External actors were also dragged into the patterns o f enmity and rivalry among 
regional actors. But as the Epilogue will discuss, extra-regional actors’ engagement in 
the region also magnified the region’s patterns of power and warfare.
6.5 Conclusion
As the preceding sections on the regional security dynamics have shown, the interplay 
between domestic, international, regional and extra-regional processes and actors 
impacted upon the security architecture in the region.
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Boundary disputes under the banner o f nationalism have characterized 
international relations o f the Horn o f Africa’s states. Indeed, this pattern o f relations 
has led to two inter-state wars, which by itself has been an uncommon pattern o f 
warfare in Africa. Secessionist insurgencies, under the banner o f a separate national 
identity and the corresponding claims to separate sovereign statehood have abounded, 
both within the Ethiopian and the Somali polities. In both circumstances the inter­
state wars impacted beyond the borders of the concerned dyads.
The process o f state formation in the region has been accompanied by armed 
conflict. The extension of the state’s agents and institutions has sparked off resistance. 
The groups in the borderlands (pastoralists and/or ethnic groups divided by the state’s 
borders, among others) and other groups within the state have resisted the attempts o f 
the central state to homogenise local economies and identities under the banner o f the 
extension o f its institutions and the process o f national identity formation and 
consolidation.
More significantly, the centralizing pressures o f state formation, and 
consequently the state’s use o f the means o f coercion to eliminate peripheral loci of 
power have sparked further local resistance. This latter characteristic of the process 
should not be overlooked. As Bradburd claims ‘local resistance shapes the trajectory 
of state formation in a variety o f ways'.74
The mutual interference of the Horn of Africa’s states in each others internal 
affairs is of particular relevance to understanding non-state actors’ enduring resistance 
to the state’s centralizing pressures. Although this characteristic is not unique to the 
region, the ability o f non-state actors to benefit from neighbouring countries’ support 
as safe havens, as bases for setting up military training facilities and other military 
support contributed significantly to their survival and to the launching of successful 
insurgency operations.
74 Bradburd, D. 1996. 'Towards an understanding o f the fate o f  modem pastoralists: Starting with the 
state'. Nomadic Peoples 38, p. 43.
246
The superpower rivalry during the Cold War led the regional leaderships to 
guarantee outside patrons’ military support and, thus, magnified their ability to deploy 
force in their quest to guarantee the elimination o f resistance. In the aftermath o f the 
Cold War, the amount of well trained demobilized ex-combatants and weaponry in 
the region further increased regional instability and the states’ inability to guarantee 
the monopoly o f the means o f coercion over the entire extension of the state’s 
territory.
This latter trend coupled with authoritarian regimes has left local insurgencies 
unabated and has contributed to the creation o f new grievances, around which 
disenfranchised communities are mobilised to resist the state.
The inability o f the states’ agents in the region to guarantee the monopoly of 
coercion throughout their entire territory means that frontiers are permeable. 
Furthermore, the practices of groups living at the border reflect the limited presence 
of the state’s agents and institutions along the frontiers. As we have learned with the 
Ethiopian experience in chapter 2, it is not uncommon for states to use the 
emplacement of returned refugees in frontier zones; this applies up to a point to 
Kenya, as well. This process is, perhaps, best understood as a state’s strategy to create 
buffer mechanisms at its periphery without incurring additional costs, which the 
extension o f the states agents’ and institutions to areas removed from the capitals and 
regional centres of decision-making would imply. However, the minimal presence of 
the state along the frontier has implications for the regional security architecture as 
the section on the regional implications o f the diverging conceptions of statehood has 
shown.
In the Horn o f Africa, states’ leaderships since Independence were all 
confronted with different types o f armed conflict with different causes. Like in other 
regions, the spill over effects of internal conflicts has been a key threat for regional 
and international security. The common causes o f armed conflict in the Horn o f 
Africa’s context, like in other regions, translate grievances and cleavages related to 
nationalist, ethnic, religious, territorial, economic and political factors. One o f the 
common causes o f armed conflict in the region has been militant nationalism. 
Indeed, nationalism in its various dimensions - national identity formation and/or 
fragmentation, the profound territorial nature o f nationalism and the definition of
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economic priorities subordinated to nationalist aspirations and tendencies has been a 
portent force o f instability in the region. Religion and ethnicity as sources o f identity 
are of paramount importance to understanding the multiple sources of identity and 
cleavages within the multinational states in the Horn o f Africa. With the exception of 
Somalia, none of the states in the region corresponds neatly to a single nation. In 
multinational states various sources of identity were mobilized, manipulated and 
gained saliency according to the states’ leadership’s grand design for social 
engineering. The question of how to accommodate nationalism and regionalism in 
order to contain the destructive impact o f its militant version remains a central 
challenge to the Horn o f Africa states and to IGAD.
The outbreak o f hostilities between the two former allies contributed to a new 
wave o f instability in the region and the stalemate only confirms how the complex 
relationship between the domestic, the regional and external dynamics is a key 
challenge to build a security architecture based on a regionalist approach.
As the case- study confirms, the importance o f territorial integrity was 
perceived as a key asset for the survival o f the states. However, this norm did not 
prevent repeated interference o f Horn of Africa’s states in each other’s internal 
affairs, as long as hot- pursuit missions did not challenge the existing borders.
The ability of neighbouring countries to influence the course o f events was 
entirely dependent upon the warring parties. This interference played a secondary 
role. Indeed, the disputes over the ill- defined nature o f borders in this sub- region 
tend to lead to high intensity interstate wars (Somalia-Ethiopia and Eritrea-Ethiopia) 
or interstate disputes Djibouti-Eritrea and Yemen-Eritrea. As the war unfolded, 
domestic and regional politics affected the course o f the interstate war. The 
regionalization o f the conflict by the intervention o f neighbouring states is likely to 
happen not only when the conflict is being fought over control o f government, but 
also over territory.
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Epilogue: Somalia’s crisis, the stalemate concerning Eritrea- Ethiopia’s 
boundaries’ demarcation, and regional implications
In the post- 9/11 international relations era the dominant perception is anchored on the 
premise that weak and ‘failed’ states could serve as safe havens to militant Islamist 
movements, from where attacks on US interests could be planned or effectively 
launched.1 The pre and post-September 11 terrorist attacks in the region led the Bush 
Administration to define the Greater Horn of Africa as a front- line region in the ‘war 
against terror'.2 The prospects of a shift towards militant Islamism in Somalia raised 
concerns due to the links of some o f the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)’s senior leading 
members to transnational Islamist movements, namely al-Qae ’da.
The rise o f the ICU in Somalia was particularly significant for Ethiopia, as it 
had the potential to revive Pan-Somali solidarity. The idea o f Greater Somalia aimed 
to incorporate Somali-speaking areas o f present-day Ethiopia’s ‘Region V ’, o f 
Kenya’s Northern District and o f Djibouti in a unified Somali state.
The rise o f the ICU brought some order and stability to areas previously 
ravaged by ‘anarchy'.4 Since the overthrow of the Somali dictator, Siyad Barre, in 
January 1991 the situation in the capital Mogadishu and in the southern and central 
regions has been characterized by the disintegration o f the ‘central government, 
lawlessness and armed conflict'.5 The ICU six-month period o f effective control o f 
the capital and o f vast swathes o f southern Somalia’s territory was too limited to 
understand its long-term ideological and political programme for Somalia.
1 Stevenson, J. Winter 2003-04. 'Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance'. Survival 45: 153- 172.
2 Lyman, P. N., and, Morrison, J. Stephen January/ February 2004. 'The Terrorist Threat in Africa'. 
Foreign Affairs 83: 75- 86.
3 Lewis, I. M. 1989. 'The Ogaden and the Fragility o f Somali Segmentary Nationalism'. African Affairs 
88, p. 576.
4 International Crisis Group 10 August 2006. 'Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, Africa Report 
N°116'. Brussels.
5Menkhaus, K. 2004. Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat o f  Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364.
Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, p. 49.
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Ethiopia and Eritrea, during their two-year border war (1998-2000), ascribed 
divergent approaches to the crisis in Somalia. The persistent enmity between the two 
neighbouring states raised fears o f a regionalization o f the conflict.6
Ethiopia’s forcible intervention in the follow-up to the invitation issued by the 
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in December 2006 led to the ousting 
o f the ICU from the capital by the combined forces of Ethiopia and o f the Somali 
interim government. The immediate outcome of the Ethiopia-backed TFG offensive 
was the recapture of the territory previously controlled by the ICU. The United 
Nations Security Council authorised the African Union Mission in Somalia, 
AMISOM, under a Chapter VII Resolution (UNSC/RES/1744) on 20 February 2007.7 
The African Union (AU) deployed the first contingent of peacekeepers in the capital 
on 6 March 2007. However, insurgency waged by the remnants o f the ICU, and by 
Islamist movements (which gained saliency in the aftermath o f the Ethiopia-backed 
TFG offensive) has continued and has intensified after the routing and 
dismemberment o f the ICU.
Seen from Addis Ababa, it seems unlikely that the call for a jihad per se 
would have been enough to trigger its forcible intervention, in the follow-up to the 
invitation issued by the interim government, in Somalia. Calls for jihad  against 
Ethiopia have been recurrent from Somalia. When Ethiopia dismantled the Al-Itihad 
Al Islamya (AIAI) base in Luuq (Gedo region) similar calls sprang from various 
groups in Somalia.8 The key trigger was the ICU revival o f the ‘Greater Somalia’s 
ideal’.
The factor o f contiguity also played a role. Ethiopia shares 30.6 per cent o f its 
borders with Somalia.9 Somalia shares 68.7 per cent of its border with Ethiopia.10
6 Lyons, T. 2006. 'Avoiding Conflict in the Horn o f Africa: U.S. Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea '. 
Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations. ; Healy, S., and Plaut, Martin 2007. 'Ethiopia and 
Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion'. London: Chatham House.
7 United Nations Security Council 21 February 2007. XJN SC Resolution 1744'. 
www.securitycouncilreport.org/.
8 Reuters 8 November 2007. 'Eritrea-Ethiopia border: At a glance'.
http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/db/crisisprofiles/EE_BOR.htm.
9 Calculated on the basis o f  borders’ length between Horn o f Africa countries as indicated by 
Anderson, E. M. 2003. International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas. London: TSO, p. 268. For the 
original data refer to Table 9 in Appendix 4.
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There was a precedent of armed conflict over border disputes in the 1960s and a war 
in 1977-78; in which Somalia resorted to force to incorporate the Ethiopian Ogaden 
and Haud regions. The final factor was the Eritrean and Ethiopian insurgent 
movements - namely the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) - support for the ICU.
Seen from Washington, the rhetoric o f jihad  was the major trigger. In addition,
the ICU’s political programme of creating a government based on Shari’a also raised
suspicions and antagonised the US Administration. The prominence achieved by
Skeih Hassan Dahir Aweys and other members o f ALAI within the ICU was critical.
The movement was on the US list o f terrorist organizations since September 23,
200l . n The ICU also benefited from support from businessmen linked with Al-
Barakat. This major Somali financial enterprise had been placed on the US list of
organizations funding terrorist activities on November 7, 2001 and, subsequently, had 
1 ^
its assets frozen. The US air campaign in Somalia in the area o f Ras Kamboni 
allegedly to track the masterminds13 behind the bombing o f the US Embassies in East 
Africa (which occurred in August, 1998) had important political ramifications. This 
air campaign inexorably tied Ethiopia’s forcible intervention to the Bush 
Administration.14
The combination of the idea o f Greater Somalia with calls for jihad  at the 
current juncture o f p o st-9/11 international relations were fatal for the ICU and 
undermined its international standing. Perhaps, Ethiopia in a different international 
climate would not have been able to advance towards the Somali capital. But its 
involvement was neither determined by, nor subordinated to, US broader interests in 
Somalia and/or in the region. Ethiopia skilfully resorted to the dominant rhetoric of
10 ibid., p. 733.
11 International Crisis Group 12 December 2005 'Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report N °1 0 0 ,'. Nairobi/ 
Brussels, p. 3.
12 Marchal, R. 2004. Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali civil war. Before and after 9/11' in de 
Waal, A. (ed.) Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn o f  Africa. London: Hurst & Company, p. 140.
13 The key individuals accused o f having organised the August 1998 bombings and o f  being the main 
al- Qaeda operatives in East Africa are Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abu Taha al-Sudani and Saleh 
Ali Saleh Nabhan. The US air campaign in Ras Kamboni was justified under the premise that the ICU 
harboured al- Qaeda operatives, namely the aforementioned individuals.
14 Voice o f  America 9 January 2007. De Capua interview with Kenneth Menkhaus: US Air Strikes in 
Somalia Have Political Ramifications Washington, http://www.voanews.com/.
251
the ‘war against terror’ to gamer support and legitimacy to pursue its own aims in 
Somalia and allegedly hamper further threats to its territorial integrity.
The outcome of the Ethiopia-backed TFG offensive and the ONLF claimed 
attack on a Chinese oil extracting company operating in Ethiopia’s Region V were not 
unrelated events. The attack on April 24, 2007 attained unprecedented proportions. Its 
scale suggested that the ONLF may have benefited from support from neighbouring 
actors. However, it is difficult to assess whether the ONLF benefited from support 
from the Eritrean government or from Somalia’s militant Islamist activists, from 
Somali warlords or from other armed factions in Somalia, who oppose Ethiopia’s 
continued presence in Somalia. Against the backdrop o f the history o f relations 
between Ethiopia and Somalia it seems more likely that the ONLF benefited from 
support from ‘insurgents’ in Somalia. However, it is not possible to determine 
whether the ICU's earlier call for a jihad  against the TFG and Ethiopia’s armed forces 
led its militant elements to carry jihad  on the international stage. However, the 
precedent o f AIAI’s terrorist attacks in Ethiopia sustains this hypothesis.
The Ethiopian opposition parties did not endorse the Prime Minister’s decision 
to intervene in Somalia in support for the TFG and to defend Ethiopia against the 
ICU’s call for jihad . The media coverage indicates that the Ethiopian soldiers are 
faced with an increasingly difficult theatre of operations.15 In addition, the ‘enemy’ 
has been able to hide among the civilian population. Somalis both within the country 
and in the diaspora disapprove o f Ethiopia’s forcible intervention and resent the 
occupation o f their country by Ethiopian forces. The opposition parties who had 
largely condemned the EPRDF’s decision to intervene forcibly in Somalia are likely 
to rally support around the increasing casualties inflicted on the Ethiopian National 
Defence Force.
The regional organization, Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), had been divided on the TFG’s request for an interposition force. Earlier 
plans to create an IGAD Peacekeeping operation for Somalia (IGASOM) failed due to
15 A case in point was the killing, mutilation and burning o f  the corpses o f soldiers (who belonged to 
the TFG and to the ENDF). Associated Press Writers By Mohamed Olad Hassan and Elizabeth A. 
Kennedy March 21, 2007. 'Somali Gunmen Bum Slain Soldiers' http://www.guardian.co.uk/ ’
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a lack of consensus among its member states on the composition of such force. Sudan, 
Eritrea and Djibouti at the time opposed contributions from contiguous neighbouring 
countries to Somalia.
The ICU and some members of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) had 
as their common denominator the opposition to the deployment of foreign forces in 
Somalia. The current coverage indicates that civilians in Mogadishu continue to be 
hostile to the presence of both Ethiopian troops and AMISOM peacekeepers. In 
addition, the disproportionate use o f force by the warring parties has placed civilians 
in the middle o f hostilities inflicting major casualties on non-combatants.16 This state 
o f affairs has increased resentment both o f Ethiopia and the TFG, and has revived the 
worst memories o f the intense fighting between faction leaders in the early 1990s. The 
US air campaigns have further fuelled resentment against US interference in 
Somalia’s domestic affairs.
Tension along Ethiopia’s northern border with Eritrea has increased. The 
2007 reports o f the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council depicted 
alarming trends, with the build up of troops and the movement o f military equipment 
and armaments inside the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) in Eritrea and in the 
adjacent areas along the frontier on the Ethiopian side.17 Any clash or incident along 
the border could have the potential to trigger a major confrontation. After the IGAD’s 
last summit and its public recognition o f Ethiopia’s sacrifice for regional peace in 
Somalia, Eritrea decided to suspend temporarily its membership with the regional 
organization.18
IGAD countries divergences vis- a- vis the Somali crisis have further 
increased. In addition to the Ethiopia-backed TFG offensive, Kenya closed its border 
with Somalia in order to hamper ICU members from escaping and mingling unnoticed
16 Economist 26 April 2007. 'It just gets worse : War again, holy and unholy'.
I7United Nations Security Council 30 April 2007. Trogress report o f the Secretary-General on Ethiopia 
and Eritrea: S/2007/250': UN Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm. United 
Nations Security Council 18 July 2007 'Progress report o f the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and 
Eritrea: S/2007/440 ': UN Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm.
18Sudan Tribune 23 April 2007. 'Eritrea suspends its membership in IGAD over Somalia, 
http://www.sudantribune.com'.; Eritrea Ministry o f Information 21 April 2007. Eritrea suspends 
membership in IGAD. http://www.shabait.com.
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with the Somali-speaking communities. Kenya handed in to the US one o f the prime 
‘terrorist suspects’ , allegedly for his involvement in the Mombassa 2002 hotel 
bombing and for his links with the al- Qaeda East Africa Network.19
The limited scope and density o f regional governance at the formal level of 
inter-state relations within the Horn of Africa gives space for non-state actors to play 
a major role in determining the region’s security dynamics. Sudan and Djibouti, 
Ethiopia’s former allies on the Sanaa’s axis, have tended to support Eritrea, rather 
than Ethiopia, on their colliding approaches to the Somali crisis. The opening o f the 
Sudanese-Eritrean border in October 2006 was the outcome o f a gradual
91rapprochement between President Issaias Afewerki and President Omar Beshir. 
However, this positive development removed tension from Eritrea’s western border 
with Sudan and, arguably, allowed for an increased concentration o f forces on its 
southern border with Ethiopia.
The Somalia crisis confirmed that the influence of the regional organization 
tends to be by-passed by bilateral inter-state relations. In addition, a shifting pattern of 
alliances has characterized the region contributing to the reproduction and 
reinforcement of the motto ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend.’ Indeed, both the 1998- 
2000 war and the 2006-2007 Somali crisis further re-enforced the pattern o f power
99within the Horn of Africa. The influence o f extra-regional actors rather than 
obliterated has magnified the shifting alignments within the region.
The EU seems to have distanced itself from the Ethiopia-backed Somali 
interim government in order to engage with other regional actors and diffuse
9^1
tensions. EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel,
19Reuters by Roberts, K. 26 March 2007. U.S. moves Kenya terror suspect to Guantanamo, 
http://www. reuters. com/.
20 For more details on the Sana’a axis refer to chapter 4 and to the section on the region’s pattern o f  
power in chapter 6 .
21 Sudan Tribune . Friday 27 October 2006. ’Sudan opens border with Eritrea’. In 
http://www.sudantribune.com/.
22 Bull, H., and, Carsten Holbraad 1995. Power politics / Martin Wight’. New York: Leicester 
University Press, p. 157.
23 European Commission DG Communication 4 May 2007. 'EU - Eritrea: Issaias Afewerki, President 
of Eritrea, visits Commissioner Louis Michel and extracts from the joint press briefing’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/.\ Reuters 8 November 2007. 'Eritrea-Ethiopia border: At a glance'. 
http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/db/crisisprofiles/EE_BOR.htm.
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conducted a meeting with President Issaias in order to engage constructively with the 
main regional contender to Ethiopia’s forcible intervention in the Somali crisis.24 
President Issaias Afewerki rapprochement with the EU could contribute to de-
9Sescalation of tension in the border with Ethiopia. At the current juncture the EU 
could develop its leverage over the various parties.
This initiative came as a positive move to curtail the isolation o f the PFDJ on 
the international stage. Since the Somali crisis this isolation diminished in relation to 
the region and the Middle East but contributed to the deterioration o f the relations 
between Asmara and Washington. The US warned Eritrea that its inclusion in the US 
list o f states that sponsor terrorism is eminent in case Asmara does not stop providing 
support for the militant Islamists engaged in the insurgency in the Somali capital.
The United Arab Emirates President, Sheik Khalifa Bin Zaid Al-Nahyan, 
invited President Issaias Afewerki for a visit to discuss bilateral trade and regional 
issues. President Sheik Khalifa lauded the Eritrean President for his role in calling for
96peace and stability in the Horn o f Africa.
If  the past is any guide, perhaps Meles Zenawi and Issaias Afewerki should 
draw lessons from Siyad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam’s belated decision to 
resort to the negotiation table and to cease providing support for each other’s 
insurgents. The continuous interference o f these two countries in Somalia further 
aggravates the increased vulnerability o f a civilian population who have survived the 
past sixteen years in a context where lawlessness and impunity prevail. The civilians 
have bom the bmnt of the most recent appalling upheavals in the Horn o f Africa.
The stalemate in the boundaries demarcation process in the aftermath o f the 
EEBC 2002 Decision on Delimitation of the Border and the Demarcations 
Directions reached a key juncture in 2007. The EEBC concludes its work in
24 EU 2007, op. cit.
25 United Nations Security Council 30 April 2007, op. cit.
26 Khaleej Times Online by Abdullah, A. 10 May, 2007. 'Eritrea woos United Arab Emirates 
investors', http://www.khaleejtimes.com. ; Eritrea: Ministry o f  Information 7 May 2007. Eritrea: 
President Isaias Holds Talks With UAE Counterpart, http://allaffica.com/stories/200705071617.html'.
27 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission April 13, 2002. 'Decision on Delimitation o f  the Border 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=l 150'. Eritrea-Ethiopia
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November 2007. Ultimately, the territorial boundary will be delimited on the map 
regardless o f any objections by the parties. Since 2005 Eritrea has incrementally put 
in place obstacles to the UNMEE fulfilment of its Mission as defined in the Algiers 
Agreements. More recently, and in particular during 2007, Eritrea increased 
movement o f troops and of heavy military equipment to the Temporary Security Zone 
(TSZ) and Ethiopia has scaled up military forces on its side of the border (in areas 
adjacent to the TSZ).28
Paradoxically, the further deterioration of the political and military conditions 
during 2007 has prompted Ethiopia to reiterate in June 2007 its willingness to abide
90by the EEBC Decision without pre-conditions. As a result of this opening, the 
President o f the EEBC agreed to convene a meeting on September 6, 2007. The 
convening o f international meetings between the representatives o f the two 
governments since the Algiers peace process is not without precedent.31
The ramifications of the Somalia crisis seem to confirm that regionalism 
provides no clear-cut answer to new ways o f accommodating and taming the 
destructive impact of militant versions of nationalism. Chapter VII o f the Charter had 
envisaged regional organizations acting in support o f the world body. At the start o f 
the twenty-first century, it seems more likely that, in future, the order will be
Boundary Commission June 24,2002. Decision Regarding the ‘Request for Interpretation, Correction 
and Consultation’ Submitted by the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia on 13 May 2002, 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/filesDecision24June2002.pdfEritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission 
November 7, 2002. Determinations 7 November 2002, http://www.pca- 
cpa.org/upload/filesDeterminations071102.pdf.
28 As o f  August 2007 Eritrea had moved 4,000 troops along with supporting artillery and armor into the 
TSZ. Eritrea maintains a further 120,000 troops in the adjacent areas, while Ethiopia has deployed 
about 100,000 troops along the border. James Swan Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
August 4, 2007. U .S. Policy in the Horn o f Africa ' 4th International Conference 
on Ethiopian Development Studies. Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, August 9, 
2007, http://www.state.gOv/p/af/
29 United Nations Security Council 18 July 2007, op. cit.
30 ibid., p. 19.
31 On 10 March 2006 the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission convened a meeting in London, 
followed by a second one on May 17,2006, including representatives from both countries as well as 
international mediators. However, this initiative did not achieve any noticeable progress. Furthermore, 
Eritrea refused to send its representatives to the two remaining meetings scheduled to take place in 
June and August 2006.United Nations Security Council 13 March 2006.' Update report no.2: Ethiopia 
and Eritrea,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.Org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1482697/k.EEABDpdate_report_no2br 
Ethiopia_and_Eritreabrl3_March_2006.htm'. United Nations Security Council 19 September 2006. 
'Report o f the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea: S/2006/749': UN Security Council, 
http://www.un.orgDocs/sc/sgrep07.htm.
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'X'yreversed'. Indeed, the creation of AMISOM to tackle the challenges created in the 
aftermath o f the Ethiopia-backed TFG offensive further confirms this emerging trend. 
However, as the regional organization’s humanitarian intervention has been marred 
by increasing difficulties, the escalation of the crisis demands the world body to 
contribute to enforce the regional organization’s mission and enforce the sparse 
contingent o f peacekeepers in the theatre o f operations.
The same factors that led to the fall o f the ICU also led to a permutation o f the 
crisis. The previous dynamic of factionalism re-asserted itself. The intervention of 
regional actors escalated the crisis. Somalia’s civil war acquired important 
international dimensions. Ethiopia’s past relations with Somalia and its forcible 
intervention further undermined the prospects o f Somalis acceptance o f a 
peacekeeping force. In addition, the Ethiopian and Eritrean rivalry further exacerbated 
the impending crisis.
With the escalation o f hostilities and the increasingly civilian casualties, the 
best alternative seems to be the withdrawal o f Ethiopian troops and Eritrea’s retreat 
from supporting the splintering factions of the ICU and defecting members o f the TFI. 
Other regional countries are in a better position to mediate between the parties.
Despite the warring parties’ fierce opposition to the deployment of 
peacekeepers, the reinforcement of AMISOM and its eventual replacement by a UN 
peacekeeping force emerge as the only alternative to halt the intensity o f violence and 
its consequences for civilians.
Having forcibly intervened in Somalia, international actors have a 
‘responsibility to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict'.
32 Mayall, J. 2000. World Politics: Progress and its limits. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 146.
33 Wheeler, N. J. 2000. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. New  
York: Oxford University Press, p. 190.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion- A Re-Appraisal of Territory and state trajectories in the
Horn of Africa
This concluding chapter addresses three sets of questions:
1) Why did the literature on the case study, with some exceptions, overlook the 
territorial dimension of the 1998-2000 war, and what are the implications o f the 
thesis’ findings in understanding territory and the boundary politics1 between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea?
2) What can the case-study tell us about the globalization perspectives that argue that 
the trend towards the deterritorialization o f politics in the international system 
signalled a future borderless world and the withering away o f the state’s 
sovereignty? How have the changes associated with globalization affected the 
relationship between war and state making and remaking in this region?
3) How have the 1998-2000 war and the regional ramifications o f the conflict 
challenged the normative framework that binds the African state system into a 
regional sovereign society of states?
These questions have far broader theoretical implications than this thesis alone can 
address. However, the case-study findings contribute substantively to identify some of 
the principal points of contention and to illuminate the paradoxes o f the normative 
framework of international society in its interplay with the Horn o f Africa’s structure 
of politics. The first part o f the chapter will derive conclusions from the analysis of 
the various dimensions o f territory in relation to the 1998-2000 war in order to clarify
1 The boundary politics refer to a set o f buffer institutions used by the state to mediate political 
pressures from the international system and maximize its authority over territory, as defined by Herbst. 
Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 25. 
This thesis analyses the two states’ use o f the set o f buffer institutions (as defined by Herbst) in the 
following chapters: the currency exchange mechanisms (chapter 2); the territorial boundary (chapters 2 , 
3 and 4) and the rules governing citizenship (chapter 4).
2Van Creveld, M. 1991. The Future o f War' in Van Creveld, M. (ed.) The Transformation o f  War. N.Y: 
The Free Press. ;Kaplan, R. D. February, 1994. The Coming Anarchy’. Atlantic Monthly, p. 23.
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why territory still matters for international order and stability. The second part will 
discuss the findings o f the thesis concerning the relationship between war and state 
making and remaking to assess the question o f whether war leads to state 
consolidation or disintegration in the context o f globalization. Finally, the chapter will 
discuss the implications o f the thesis’ findings for re-examining the consensus around 
the uti possidetis and the non-interference norms, and the values o f self- 
determination, human rights and democratization within the Horn of Africa.
7.1 Does territory refer to mere lines on a map?
This thesis claims that territory does matter in understanding not only the 1998-2000 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea but also contemporary armed conflicts. The 
recognition o f the central role played by territory in the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea shows that territory should not be understood in a myopic sense, i.e., a one­
dimensional approach. Indeed, the central purpose o f the thesis is to broaden our 
understanding o f the relationship between territory and armed conflicts.4 In order to 
achieve this aim this thesis shows the need to consider the complex ways in which 
territory is related to sovereignty, nationalism and self-determination. The central 
arguments put forward in this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1) The analysis o f the relationship between territory and different types of 
armed conflict (both inter-state and civil wars) is central to understanding 
contemporary patterns of warfare and the trajectories o f state and nation 
building in the developing world [this is the central argument o f the thesis as 
whole].
2) Territory comprises more than the territorial boundary; this thesis 
shows that we need to look at the multi-dimensional nature of territory5, that is
3 Held, D., Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and, Jonathan Perratan 1999. The Territorial State and 
Global Politics' in David Held, A.M., David Goldblatt and, Jonathan Perratan, (ed.) Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Oxford: Polity, p. 32.
4 Various meetings with Dr. Dominique Jacquin- Berdal in the course o f  the PhD Programme.
5 Penrose, J. 2002. 'Nations, states and homelands: territory and territoriality in nationalist thought’. 
Nations and Nationalism 8, p. 280.
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its politico- military, economic-social and historical dimensions, and at the 
boundary politics of the state6 associated with it [chapters 2, 3 and 4].
3) Not only is territory an integral component of the sovereign state but 
the territorial sovereign state is based upon popular sovereignty, and the 
holders of sovereignty, the people, still retain a powerful attachment to
n  #
territory, which may or may not coincide with the state’s boundaries 
[chapters 2, 3 and 5],
4) The symbolic and historical dimensions o f boundaries play a central 
role in nationalism [chapter 3].
5) Territory is associated with the boundary politics of the state 
concerning the arrangements and the implementation of a set o f buffer 
institutions used to mediate political pressures from the international system 
and to maximize the state’s authority over territory, such as currency exchange
* omechanisms, the territorial boundary and the rules for acquiring citizenship 
[chapters 2 ,4  and 5].
6) The analysis of the relationship between territory and the nation-state 
shows that globalisation does not lead to the withering away of sovereignty, 
and hence the territorial integrity upon which it rests is upheld by 
globalization; in addition, globalization and nationalism interact in mutually 
re-enforcing ways, as the Eritrean diaspora’s role in the homeland politics 
confirms, and this in turn changes the relationship between war and state 
making and remaking [chapter 5].
7) Territorial integrity is critical to the norms that bind the African state 
system into a regional sovereign society o f states, in particular uti
6 Herbst, 2000, op.cit., p. 25.
7 Mayall, J. 1999. ’Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self- Determination'. Political Studies 47, p.
501.
8 Herbst, 2000, op.cit., p. 25. Cowen, D., and, Gilbert, Emily 2008. 'War, Citizenship, Territory'. New  
York & London: Routledge.
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possidetis (the strict adherence to the colonial boundaries) and the non­
interference norms [chapter 6],
The recognition o f the features of the problem is not only crucial in releasing from 
ambiguity the understanding o f the 1998-2000 war but also in contemplating the 
lessons from this war for the debates on the nature, prevention, management and 
resolution o f contemporary armed conflicts, and on the trajectories o f state and nation 
building projects in the developing world. The thesis findings contribute to the 
literature on the relationship between territory, sovereignty, nationalism and 
contemporary armed conflicts. In addition, in light o f the case-study’s findings the 
thesis contributes to understanding the relationship between war and state making in 
the context of globalization. Finally, this thesis contributes to the debate on the 
question of whether Africa’s territorial boundaries should be re-drawn.
7.1.1 Territoriality and international order 
Boundary disputes and the probability of war
In accordance to realist assumptions, boundary disputes figure amongst the top causes 
o f crisis’ escalation between states.9 This thesis confirms that territorial disputes 
increase the probability o f war. This probability should not be under-estimated 
because any forceful attempt to change territory is a threat to international order and 
has broader regional implications, as the 1998-2000 war shows.
In the aftermath o f the Second World War this recognition led to the 
enforcement o f the prevailing consensus around the international legal norm which 
outlawed wars o f territorial aggrandizement or conquest.10 To a certain extent the 
Cold War superpowers’ rivalry ‘ironed out’ regional rivalries.11 This meant that
9 Vasquez, J. 1993. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 124. Vasquez 
however claims that ‘it is territoriality (that is, the tendency for humans to occupy and, if  necessary, 
defend territory) rather than the struggle for power that is the key for understanding interstate war’. 
Perhaps as this thesis shows power rivalries have an object and in this case the combination o f  
increasing rivalry between the political leaderships with the pre-existing territorial dispute resulted in 
an impressive recipe for conflict escalation.
10 Mayall, 1999, op. cit., p. 489.
11 Bull, H., and, Carsten Holbraad 1995. 'Power politics /  Martin Wight'. New York: Leicester 
University Press, pp. 159-60.
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during the Cold War the world’s political map remained frozen; that is, the creation o f
new states was suspended. However, previous boundary disputes and conflicts (both
between and within states) were not ironed out by the Cold War. The Green Lines and
the Line of Control created as buffer zones between Israel and Palestine, Turkish and
Greek communities in Cyprus and between India and Pakistan to diffuse tension over
their contested sovereignties over Kashmir confirm that claims o f sovereignty over
12the same territory bring about the ‘most intractable type of political dispute'.
A new wave of state creation followed the end of the Cold War. From the 
dismemberment of the Soviet empire new states emerged. The wave o f state creation 
was replicated within the Balkans and the Horn of Africa. However, the theoretical 
assumption that boundary disputes were matters o f inter-state relations fed into the 
dominant interpretation that territory as a major cause o f war had significantly 
decreased as a consequence o f the trend towards the decline o f inter-state wars. 
Following on from this, the potential of territory as a cause o f war was de-emphasised 
and the dominant literature concerning contemporary armed conflicts barely 
addressed it because o f its central concern with civil wars, new wars and their 
regional implications.
Territory matters economically: the combination of territorial disputes, 
contiguity and rivalry increases the probability of war
One key difference between Eritrea’s militarized disputes with other neighbouring 
countries over land and maritime boundaries and the conflict with Ethiopia was the 
degree o f rivalry which accompanied the outbreak o f hostilities. The boundary
1 Tincident in Adi Murug, in the Bada area, although handled in cordial terms, set the 
precedent. As discussed in chapter 2, a contingent o f the Ethiopian National Defence 
Force (ENDF) was involved in a hot-pursuit mission of an insurgent movement that 
occupied an area within Eritrea’s territorial jurisdiction. This did not constitute a 
territorial dispute in a substantive sense because it did not lead to final occupation o f 
the area. However, this incident increased the urgency to demarcate the territorial
12 Bose, S. 2007. Contested lands : Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 2.
13 Iyob, R. 2000. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn o f Africa, 
1991-2000'. Journal o f  Modem African Studies 38, p. 665.
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boundary and the likelihood of the two governments resorting to power political 
behaviour.
The heightened rivalry between Eritrea and Ethiopia over terms o f trade, 
access to the Eritrean ports, and the currency exchange regime was related to their 
divergent boundary politics. The disagreement over these issues ‘raised the saliency 
o f their imprecise mutual boundary’.14 These issues of contention show that 
boundaries matter economically15 independently o f being endowed with natural 
resources o f economic value, in contrast to what the literature of contemporary armed 
conflicts seems to suggest.
This conclusion supports the theoretical claim that the interaction between 
contested territory, contiguity, and rivalry results in an impressive recipe for conflict 
escalation.16 In Eritrea’s dispute with Yemen, rivalry was less intense and the dispute 
was over the maritime boundary, that is, the contiguity factor to the homeland 
territory was lacking for both sides in the dispute. Perhaps the absence o f these two 
factors, rivalry and contiguity, helps us to understand why once international 
arbitration settled the ambiguities surrounding delimitation and demarcation of the 
maritime boundary, the outcome was accepted by both parties and ‘( . . .)the probability 
o f war [became] very unlikely'.17
This should be interpreted as a positive precedent because it confirms the 
parties’ willingness and respect for the binding nature o f the legal settlement. Perhaps 
the precedent offers Eritreans and Ethiopians with an incentive to embrace the Eritrea- 
Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s decision. However, unless the parties agree to 
addressing the problems related to the boundary politics, rivalry is unlikely to 
dissipate and the delimitation and the demarcation o f the territorial boundary per se
14 Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2005. Introduction: The Eritreo- Ethiopian war' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, 
Martin Plaut, (ed.) Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press, p. 
xiv.
15 Bach, D. 1999. 'Regionalism versus regional integration: the emergence o f a new paradigm in Africa' 
in Grugel, J., and Hout, Wil (ed.) Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State strategies and 
globalization. London and New York: Routledge, p. 152.
16 Rasler, K. A., and, Thompson, William R. March 2006. 'Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and 
Conflict Escalation'. International Studies Quaterly 50: 145-167.
17 Vasquez, J. 1995. W hy do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality'. Journal o f  
Peace Research 32, p. 283.
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cannot solve the problem. Negotiations concerning the broader boundary politics o f 
the two states are indeed critical in overcoming the stalemate. Against this backdrop, 
Eritrea’s position has been consistent with regard to its insistence that the EEBC 
Decision was final and binding. Ethiopia’s belated unconditional compliance with the
1 REEBC ruling is a positive breakthrough. However, this is but a first-step towards 
restoring incrementally the indispensable element o f political trust between the 
parties. Eritrea also needs to move forward and open negotiations in order for the 
parties to produce a mutually acceptable solution without resorting to force. The 
boundary politics of the two states need yet to be established through mutual 
accommodation and diplomatic agreement in order to supersede the enduring 
rivalry.19
Territory matters for the nation-state: the sacralization of territory under 
conditions of popular sovereignty
90 .. iAny threat to a segment o f a state’s territory is a threat to its sovereignty. This
21should come as no surprise as political communities are territorially bounded.
The sovereign society of states is quintessentially based upon the principles o f 
territorial sovereignty and self-determination. The latter is only meaningful insofar as 
it is linked to the notion o f sovereignty.22 The state embodies these two principles. 
Indeed the territorial integrity o f a state remains a key component o f sovereignty. 
Rather than having been subverted, globalization seems to have strengthened the 
sovereign territorial ideal. In addition, the nation-state is premised upon popular 
sovereignty, that is, the members o f the political community hold sovereignty within a 
state. Following from this, territory is held to belong to the people.23 As we have seen, 
territory matters for states, but ultimately it matters also to the people.
18 United Nations Security Council 18 July 2007 'Progress report o f  the Secretary-General on Ethiopia 
and Eritrea: S /2 0 0 7 /4 4 0 U N  Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm.
19 Vasquez, 1993, op.cit., p. 147.
20 Giddens, A. 1985. The Nation- State and Violence Volume Two o f  a Contemporary Critique o f  
Historical Materialism. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 291. Cowen and Gilbert, 2008, op.cit., p. 1.
21 Jacquin, D. 1999. 'Nationalism and self-determination in the Horn o f  Africa: A Critique o f  the Ethnic 
Interpretation' Department o f  International Relations, LSE. London: University o f London, p. 260.
22 Ibid., p. 268.
23 Mayall, J. 2000. World Politics: Progress and its limits. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 77.
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This should come as no surprise because as Genevieve Nootens remarks, ‘the 
sovereign territorial ideal lies at the heart of the modem state'.24 Far from an ideal, as 
Mayall argues, the tragic implications o f this conception for citizens living in 
disintegrated states, as well as for national minorities stranded on either side o f the 
boundaries expose:
(...)in  an uncomfortably public and dramatic form the fiction that the 
contemporary world order is built on nationality. It is not. It is built on the 
separate territorial state, which may or may not preside over a society in 
which national sentiment is strongly felt.
But territory plays a central role in nationalism.26 Indeed nationalism is a profoundly
onterritorial phenomenon. The symbolic importance o f territory to nations cannot be 
de-emphasised just because the territory under dispute has no tangible material or 
strategic value. A strand o f the case-study literature reflecting the predominance o f 
the ‘greed vs. grievances’ debate in understanding contemporary armed conflicts 
places the focus on the economic dimensions of the 1998-2000 war. Because o f this, 
these accounts dismiss the importance o f territory in the face o f the lack o f resources 
o f any economic potential in the areas under dispute. In addition, the accounts that de- 
emphasise territory overlook how Ethiopian nationalism was deeply engrained in the 
territorial integrity of the state and how Eritrean nationalism was derived from 
colonial territoriality.28 Indeed the 1998-2000 war confirms the central role that 
territory plays in nationalism. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the war was about 
the disputed boundaries. Jacquin-Berdal correctly argues that: ‘( ...)  insofar as 
boundaries represent a key element o f nationhood, their symbolic significance should 
not be underestimated'.30
24Nootens, G. 2006. 'Liberal nationalism and the sovereign territorial ideal'. Nations and Nationalism 
12, p. 35. It should be noted however that Nootens contribution is geared towards loosening the 
importance o f the implications o f the symbiotic relationship between sovereignty and territory for the 
definition o f  the nation. Instead Nootens argues that ‘nationality is to be granted through a free, 
individual and extra- territorial declaration o f nationality’, ibid., p. 42.
25Mayall, J. 1990. Nationalism and international society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
122.
26 Penrose, 2002, op.cit., p. 291.
27 ibid., p. 294.
28 Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2002. Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn o f  Africa: A Critique o f  the Ethnic 
Interpretation. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press. Clapham, C. 2006. 'Ethiopia' in 
Clapham, C., Herbst, J., and, Greg Mills, (ed.) Big African States. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
29 Penrose, 2002, op. cit., p. 291.
30 Jacquin-Berdal, D. 5 th -11th June 2000. 'Ethiopia- Eritrea: Addis Ababa's victory' West Africa.
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In addition, the historical importance of territory for nations is reflected in 
myth making as boundary-defining mechanisms. The myths o f antiquitas are 
particularly important whenever disputes over control of specific swathes of territory 
emerge. The myth of antiquitas provides the political leadership with credence to put 
forward claims of pre-existing title. On the one hand, Ethiopia could draw on the 
myth of antiquitas and on evidence of historic administration o f the areas. On the 
other hand, Eritrea relied on the historical grounding o f its origins as a nation during 
Italian colonial rule. Eritrean myths were forged during the war for independence. The 
heroic resistance of its fighters, the martyrs, and their sacrifice to prevent Eritrea from 
remaining the target o f discrimination and persecution from its neighbour provided 
the ruling party with the myth of martyrdom to justify its legitimacy at the helm o f the 
state. Any claim o f antiquitas prior to Italian colonization would run counter to the 
entire edifice upon which the Eritrean nation and nation-state had been legitimately
o 1
constructed but the border under dispute was that defined according to the colonial 
treaties. The borders had crystallized by 1936, that is, prior to the incorporation of 
Ethiopia into the East African Empire. According to the principles of treaty 
devolution neither the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, nor the later Federation and its 
subsequent unilateral abrogation by Ethiopia met the legal requirements to invalidate 
the international agreements defining the boundaries o f Eritrea’s territory, that is, the 
colonial treaties. Indeed, the boundaries treaties were binding for both Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. The 1998-2000 war further confirms the centrality o f the principles o f treaty 
devolution and o f uti possidetis for the definition o f boundaries in the region. Indeed 
Eritrea’s use o f myths was consistent with its claims for independence. Both the 
myths o f origins and its interpretation o f self-determination re-enforced its legal case 
and ultimately entitled Eritrea to international recognition o f its right to self- 
determination as a former overseas possession of the Italian Empire in Africa.
31 According to John Sorenson ‘ Eritrean nationalist discourse rarely projects a unified identity into 
antiquity. Instead, it emphasises a decisive transformation under Italian colonialism’. Sorenson, J. 
1993. Imagining Ethiopia : struggles fo r  history and identity in the Horn o f  Africa. New Brunswick, 
N.J: Rutgers University Press, p. 42.
32 Kocs, S. A. 1995. Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945- 1987'. The Journal o f  Politics SI, 
p. 164.
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As a consequence, these accounts overlook two critical features o f territory: i) 
the centrality o f territoriality for the nation-state and ii) its symbolic and historical 
dimensions in relation to states’ trajectories o f nation making and remaking.
The way in which the 1998-2000 war was conducted enhanced the symbolic 
and historical dimensions of territory.
For those who argued that the border incident was not sufficiently serious to 
escalate the crisis, Giddens’ remark comes as a potent reminder:
Unlike in the case of traditional states, a threat to a segment of the 
territory o f the modem state is a potential challenge to its administrative 
and cultural integrity, no matter how barren or ‘useless’ that segment of 
territory may be.33
7.1.2 Territory, nationalism and armed conflicts
Territory, Nationalism, and inter-state wars in the Horn of Africa
In the Horn o f Africa, as elsewhere, the spill-over effects o f internal conflicts have 
posed a threat to international order. One of the most powerful causes o f armed 
conflict has been nationalism. Indeed, nationalism in its various dimensions- national 
identity formation and consolidation, its profound territorial nature, and the definition 
o f economic priorities as dictated by national interests has remained a potent source of 
instability in the region. The inter-state wars in the Horn o f Africa lend credence to 
the conclusion that the political leaderships have attempted to prove their nationalist 
credentials through military victories on the battlefield. Religion and ethnicity are also 
important to understanding the expedient mobilization o f cleavages in the societies for 
political purposes. However, nationalism in the two cases o f inter-state war 
superseded other sources of mobilization.
The opposing conceptions o f nationhood and statehood in the region have led 
to one interstate war (1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia war) and played a significant role in 
a second war (1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia war). In the 1977-78 war the idea o f 
‘Greater Somalia’ was used to mobilize support around Pan-Somali solidarity. From
33 Giddens, 1985, op. cit., p. 291.
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this ideal sprang Somali’s version o f militant nationalism, i.e., ‘the idea that political 
and cultural maps o f the world should be congruent'.34 This collided with the OUA 
consensus on the principle of uti possidetis, that is, that the boundaries inherited at the 
time o f independence were binding upon the successor post-colonial states.
Ethiopia’s version of militant nationalism, i.e., the idea that the state’s 
territorial integrity was non-negotiable, further reinforced the crystallization o f uti 
possidetis norm. Ethiopia’s nationalism remained deeply embedded in the defence of 
its sovereignty against any external threat and challenges to its territorial integrity. 
Any forcible challenge to its territorial integrity was a serious breach o f its 
sovereignty and justified the call to arms to defend the ‘multinational’ state.
The opposing conceptions o f nationhood led Somalia to support irredentist 
movements in Ethiopia’s Somali-speaking region and triggered a full-scale war. The 
1977-78 war led to an estimated 20,000 fatalities on the Ethiopian side and to 25,000 
fatalities on the Somali side.35 In addition to the fatalities, the war led to a major 
movement of refugees from the Ethiopian Ogaden region to Somalia. The threat o f 
nationalist conflict to regional order and security became all too evident.
In the 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea militant nationalism 
played a significant role as the war unfolded. The two-year war led to estimated 
80,000-100,000 fatalities on both sides.37 The fact that the PFDJ and the EPRDF 
mobilized support and committed troops to the defence of a disputed border town
34 Mayall, J. Spring 1992. 'Nationalism and international security after the Cold War’. Survival: The 
International Institute fo r  Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 21.
35According to Gebru Tareke, three documents from the Ethiopian Ministry o f National Defence 
provide different figures. Gebru suggests that the 1977-78 war led to 20,563 fatalities on the Ethiopian 
side and 9, 137 fatalities on the Somali side. Gebru Tareke 2000. ’The Ethiopia-Somalia War o f  1977 
Revisited’. International Journal o f  African Historical Studies 33, p. 637. Ahmed Samatar 
suggests a higher estimate for the 1977-78 combat-related fatalities on the Somali side. Ahmed 
Samatar places the estimated fatalities around 25,000 out o f a population o f 5 millions at the time o f the 
war. Samatar, A. I. 1988. Socialist Somalia : rhetoric and reality. London: Zed, p. 137.
36 The figures on war induced refugees are discrepant, ranging from 500,000 to 700,000. Mayall, J. 
1978. 'The battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and international diplomacy'. World Today 34,
p. 343 ; Samatar, A. I., 1988, op. cit., p. 139; Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit., p. 170.
37 Tekeste Negash & Tronvoll, K. 2000. Brothers at War: Making Sense o f  the Eritrean- Ethiopian 
War. Oxford and Athens: James Currey and Ohio University Press, p.99; Steves, F. 2003. 'Regime 
Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation o f the Ethiopia- Eritrea Conflict'. Cambridge 
Review o f  International Affairs 16: 119- 133.
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with no known valuable economic resources puzzled observers. Once Eritrea 
resorted to force to occupy the disputed areas, the EPRDF promptly abandoned the 
previous trend towards softening o f the frontier and warned the PFDJ of the 
impending consequences o f the unlawful occupation o f Ethiopia’s sovereign territory.
•3Q
The EPRDF was caught by surprise by the outburst of Ethiopian nationalism. The 
government rallied support under the banner o f nationalism to defend the territorial 
integrity of the state against an external threat.40 Indeed, the two-year border war 
shows that territorial integrity remains a profound component o f Ethiopia’s 
sovereignty. The major cause o f the war was the collision between Eritrea’s and 
Ethiopia’s versions of militant nationalism, one based on colonial territoriality and the 
other one based on territorial integrity, respectively. In this respect, the case-study 
demonstrates that ‘nationalism is a profound territorial phenomenon’ for both Eritrea 
and Ethiopia 41
Territory, nationalism and civil wars
The resurgence of nationalist conflicts in the aftermath o f the Cold War led many to 
conclude that the causes, conduct and outcomes o f civil wars had regional dimensions 
and implications.42 However, the studies of contemporary armed conflicts overlook 
the profound territorial nature o f nationalism and hence dismiss its importance in 
relation to each region’s security dynamics. First, in civil wars non-state actors are 
driven by the aim to acquire, if  necessary by force, effective control o f territory. This 
attribute tends to be overlooked as long as it does not pose a challenge to the 
territorial integrity o f the sovereign state. As a consequence o f the prevailing 
normative framework within Africa’s sovereign society of states, the insurgents are 
not able to challenge the legitimacy of their domestic governments at the international
38 According to Clapham, the EPRDF was taken by surprise by the resultant outburst o f  Ethiopian 
nationalism in the aftermath o f  Eritrea’s occupation o f this small disputed frontier zone in May 1998. 
This confirms that substantial sections o f the population are committed to the Ethiopian state and 
determined to defend it. Moreover, the commitment to national identity and the territorial integrity o f  
Ethiopia is not ‘ merely the property o f a single ethnic group.’ Clapham, 2006, op. cit., p. 25. Domestic 
and external observers overlooked the attachment o f substantial sections o f the population to the 
territorial integrity o f the state and hence dismissed the centrality o f territory in understanding the war.
39 Clapham, 2006, op. cit., p. 25.
40 Assefa Fisseha 2006. Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation o f Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism' 
in Turton, D. (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: 
James Currey, p. 147.
41 Penrose, 2002, op. cit., p. 294.
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level. The extent to which this feature has persisted in the aftermath o f the Cold War 
is further reinforced by the outcomes of the 2006 crisis in Somalia, as discussed in the 
epilogue. In addition, even in cases o f state disintegration the control o f the capital is 
paramount; paraphrasing Lemke, the capital symbolizes the very existence o f the 
nation.43 Both state and non-state actors aspiring to the status of legitimate state 
representatives, and trying to mobilise support around some sense of residual nation, 
will attempt to vindicate their nationalist credentials through acquiring effective 
control o f the capital. However in these circumstances, the insurgents’ ability to 
challenge the legitimacy of their domestic governments at the international level 
seems to be dependent upon the levels of engagement of extra-regional actors’ in the 
region’s security dynamics.44 Yoweri Museveni, Issaias Afewerki and Meles Zenawi 
seized the capital as insurgents on their way to capture the state; however their rise to 
power coincided with the power vacuum in the aftermath o f the end o f the 
superpowers’ rivalry in the Horn of Africa. Perhaps at a different juncture o f world 
politics their fates could have been similar to that of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and 
Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys of the Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU).45
In Somalia’s case, the ICU despite having secured control and managing to 
pacify the capital for the first time since the disintegration o f the state, lacked 
international legitimacy. President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi retained the upper 
hand as legitimate state representatives o f the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), whose creation had been sanctioned internationally. However, their survival as 
state representatives was undermined by their inability to establish the seat o f the 
Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) in the capital o f the disintegrated state, 
Mogadishu. In the aftermath o f the invitation issued by the TFG, Ethiopia forcefully 
intervened in order to back the TFG seizure o f the capital. This shows that even in a 
case o f state disintegration the capital still retains symbolic importance.
42 Pfetsch, F., and Rohloff, C. 2002. National and International Conflicts, 1945-1995: New empirical 
and Theoretical approaches. London and N.Y: Routledge, p. 23 ; Kaldor, M. 1999. New and Old 
Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 29-30.
43 Lemke, D. 2002. Regions o f  War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, footnote 10, 
p. 79.
44 Kaldor, 1999, op. cit.
45 The Epilogue provides further details on the 2006 Somalia crisis.
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The resurgence of nationalist conflict shows how state and non-state actors 
mobilize, manipulate and ascribe saliency to various sources of identity according to 
political aims. Nationalism remains a potent force in the region’s politics. As 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Aida Mengistu claim:
Ever since the early 1960s, nationalism has figured critically in the 
politics and international relations of the Horn o f Africa, regimes 
have toppled under its impact, boundaries have been challenged on 
its behalf, and states have emerged in its name.46
7.1.3 Territory and the boundary politics of the state
The analysis of the conduct and o f the outcomes of the war further demonstrates how 
the war magnified in complex ways the importance o f territory and of the boundary 
politics associated with it.
The belligerent parties vindicated by force the new dispensations with regard 
to the boundary politics, namely the territorial boundary, the currency exchange 
mechanisms and the citizenship rules. The conduct o f the war with regard to the 
broader boundary politics resulted in considerable injustice in particular to those 
citizens who were not accorded the right to decide on the acquisition o f the citizenship 
o f the predecessor state. They were forced, through expulsion, to fully embrace the 
citizenship of the successor state and were deprived not only o f their right to decide 
on which citizenship to acquire but also o f their possessions in the predecessor state 47 
This group of citizens was deprived of formal and substantive legal rights associated 
with Ethiopian citizenship. This measure further confirms that ‘it is through the 
nation-state that the rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship are
A O
distributed'. Indeed, as the war unfolded, formal citizenship became interchangeable 
with nationality.49
46 Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Aida Mengistu, 2006. 'Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea: 
Building Multiethnic States' in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.) East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to 
Good Governance. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, p. 81.
47 Amnesty International 21 May 1999. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Human Rights issues in a year o f  armed 
conflict’. A l Index: AFR 04/03/99; Human Rights Watch January 2003. The Horn o f Africa War: Mass 
Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 1998- April 2002)’. vol. 15, No.3 (A): HRW, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ethioerit0103/ethioerit0103.pdf.
48 Co wen and Gilbert, 2008, op. cit., p. 16.
49 ibid., p. 2 .
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Moreover, as this thesis demonstrates, this ad hoc punitive measure o f the 
Ethiopian state towards Ethiopian citizens o f Eritrean origin should be understood 
against the backdrop o f the PFDJ and the EPRDF trajectories of nation making and 
remaking. Ultimately, the divergent trajectories of their state and nation building 
projects collided because the two domestic projects affected external relations.50 In 
this sense, the causal relationship between war making and state making seems to 
have been reverted. The case-study shows how the EPRDF trajectory o f state and 
nation re-making increased the probability o f war exponentially. Indeed the case study 
shows that the international implications o f the trajectories of state and nation 
building projects should not be overlooked.
In general, previous studies overlook the relationship between boundary 
politics and the collision route o f the PFDJ and the EPRDF’s trajectories o f state and 
nation building projects. The international implications of domestic politics are either 
overlooked or simply dismissed. Clapham is among the few to draw attention to the 
international implications o f the EPRDF’s conception o f Ethiopian statehood and 
nationhood, in particular the enshrinement in the Constitution o f the right to secession 
to all nationalities in Ethiopia and of the redrawing of the internal administrative 
boundaries o f the state along linguistic and ethnic criteria.51 Abbink promptly 
acknowledged the internal implications of the EPRDF policy o f re-drawing the 
domestic administrative boundaries along these lines, particularly in peripheral areas 
and in the South. Paradoxically, while Abbink was ready to draw our attention to the 
potential of this policy o f boundary creation along ethnic lines for triggering conflict 
over internal boundaries between and within regions, particularly between zones and
e 9
woredas, the author dismissed the importance of territory as either a cause or a 
trigger of the 1998-2000 war.54
50 Clapham, C. 2001. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn1 in May, R., and 
Furley, Oliver (ed.) African Interventionist States. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 125-126.
51 Ibid. In particular refer to pp. 125- 26.
52 Abbink, J. 1998. TNfew Configurations o f  Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge o f  the South, To the 
memory o f Jacques Bureau 1947- 1998'. Northeast African Studies 5, pp. 71-73.
53 Ibid., p. 73.
54 — 1998. 'Briefing: The Eritrean- Ethiopian Border Dispute'. African Affairs 97, p. 552.
Abbink, J. 2001. 'Creating Borders: Exploring the Impact o f the Ethio- Eritrean War on the Local 
Population'. Africa: Rivista dell' Istituto italiano per V Africa e V Oriente LVI, p. 448.
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The domestic politics o f each state and the divergent paths followed after the 
overthrow of the Derg to accommodate ethnicity and the divergent criteria to acquire 
citizenship are critical to understanding the 1998-2000 war. This thesis shows the 
significance o f boundary politics in understanding how the war erupted and unfolded. 
Indeed, the 1998-2000 was a watershed for citizenship. In its aftermath the rules 
governing the acquisition o f citizenship, particularly in Ethiopia, were significantly 
revised as chapter 4 discussed.
The territorial boundary is related to the definition o f currency exchange 
mechanisms. Indeed Eritrea’s introduction of its own currency should be interpreted 
as a mechanism of boundary maintenance,55 and this measure increased the saliency 
of the territorial boundary.56 These findings show how the interpretation of self- 
determination as a once-and-for all act o f decolonization displaced boundary politics 
from the critical negotiations between the predecessor and successor state upon 
recognition of Eritrea’s sovereignty. As Iyob argues, the poorly institutionalised 
relations, between the PFDJ and the TPLF, namely with regard to the boundary 
politics o f the two states, had serious implications for the conduct o f their relations at 
the international level as state authorities.57 This thesis shows that the ill- 
institutionalised relations between the two ruling parties, more than the legacy o f
C O
mistrust from their faltering alliance during the civil war, seems to have played a 
crucial role in the escalation o f the crisis.
Territory cannot be de-emphasised. The territorial boundary and the boundary 
politics o f the state are far too serious a matter to insist on a path that excludes 
negotiations until reaching a mutual acceptable solution to both parties. Instead this 
thesis shows that persistence on this path will only be a hindrance to overcoming the 
stalemate. Indeed, territory does not refer to mere lines on a map.
7.2 War and state making in the context of globalization
55 Clapham, C. 1999. 'Boundaries and States in the New African Order' in Bach, D.C. (ed.) 
Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Desintegration. Oxford: James Currey, p. 55.
56 Jacquin- Berdal, 2005, op.cit., pp. xiii-xiv.
57 Iyob, 2000, op. cit.
58 Abbink, 1998, op.cit., p. 552 and pp. 559-61.
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The Territorial sovereign state matters in the context of globalization
It seems clear from the evidence provided by the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
that scholars working within the globalization approach59 proclaimed too early the 
death of traditional forms o f sovereign statehood, and especially the centrality o f 
territory and boundaries to the definition o f the sovereign state. As Kahler and Walter 
argue, territory remains a potent source o f conflict between states, and one that has 
continued in the context of globalization.60
As this thesis shows, territory is not only a constitutive element o f sovereignty 
and statehood but also of nationhood. Indeed territory and nationalism cannot be 
separated or treated as independent variables.
In the context o f globalization the emergence o f transnational non-state actors 
was too readily equated with the loosening o f the citizens’ loyalty and identification 
with the historic homeland. The diaspora’s significant role in world politics and 
particularly in the homeland governments’ politics was also often overlooked. 
Diasporas’ role in civil wars is perhaps more readily acknowledged, especially their 
support for separatist insurgencies.61 While this is certainly the case, this thesis shows 
how diaspora constituencies are not only important to understanding the unfolding of 
civil wars62 but also inter-state wars.
Significantly this thesis shows how a diaspora can be mobilised by the state in 
pursuit o f its own state-and nation-building projects.63 The Eritrean case also shows 
the constraints on a diaspora’s participation in the homeland politics in two ways. 
Although the diaspora’s contributions to financing the 1998-2000 war were critical, 
its members had no influence and/or participation in the decision-making process
59 Held and others claim that:’ the contemporary era is marked by a deterritorialization o f  politics , rule 
and governance, although new forms o f  territorialization, such as regionalism, are evident as well’. 
Held et al., 1999, op.cit., p. 32.
60 Kahler, M., and, Barbara F. Walter, 2006. 'Territoriality and Conflict in an Era o f Globalization'. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10.
61 0stergaard- Nielsen, E. 2001. 'Diasporas in World Politics' in Josselin , D., & Wallace, William 
(ed.) Non-state actors in world politics Basingstoke: Palgrave.
62 Lyons, T. 2006. Diasporas and homeland conflict' in Kahler, M., and, Barbara F. Walter, (ed.) 
Territoriality and Conflict in an Era o f  Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
63 0stergaard- Nielsen, E. 2001, op. cit., pp. 225-26.
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concerning the conduct o f the war.64 Furthermore, the government’s suppression o f all 
domestic opposition is also reflected in its relations with various diaspora’s 
constituencies. Rather than the diaspora mobilising itself in order to bring about 
change in the homeland government, the Eritrean state has effectively hampered the 
opposition constituencies in the diaspora from influencing domestic politics and 
subverting its political authority. In order to achieve this aim, the Eritrean state has 
resorted to similar measures identified by 0stergaard-Nielsen in her analysis o f the 
relations between other governments and their diaspora’s constituencies.65 Such 
measures in the Eritrean case include: surveillance by the intelligence service (in 
particular via the diplomatic missions abroad), creation o f obstacles for access to the 
state’s issued licences and other permits in the homeland, and permanent fear o f 
harassment o f relatives remaining in the homeland.66
In conclusion, this thesis confirms the symbiotic trends o f nationalism and
(\ 7globalization brought to the fore by Mayall and Anderson. The Eritrean case further 
demonstrates how the two may be mutually reinforcing. Globalization and the 
continuing attachment of a diaspora to the homeland confirm that territory and
iTQ
nationalism cannot be separated because of its profound territorial nature. The 
analysis o f a diaspora’s conceptions o f the homeland shows that these tend to be 
territorially based, even if  the territory to which the group is attached may or may not 
correspond to the territory o f the sovereign state, or indeed span across states’ 
boundaries. The analysis of Eritrean and Ethiopian diasporas’ conceptions o f the 
homeland show how these transnational non-state actors may both attempt to subvert 
or, instead, consolidate the existing state’s authority and the de facto  recognised
64 Koser, K. 2003. Mobilizing New African Diasporas: An Eritrean Case Study' in Koser, K. (ed.) New 
African Diasporas. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, p. 120.
65 0stergaard-Nielsen, E. 2001, op. cit., p. 226.
66ibid. Interviews in Britain, 2002-2007.
67 Mayall, J. 1995. 'Globalization and the Future o f  Nationalism' The End o f  the Century. The Future in 
the Past. Tokyo, New York and London: the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, 
Kodansha International, cited in Jacquin 1999, op.cit., p. 272. Anderson, B. Winter 1994. 'Exodus'. 
Critical Inquiry 20: 314-327. Refer to chapter 1 for the discussion on Anderson’s concept o f long­
distance nationalism and how globalization reinforced its saliency and the implications of the 
diaspora’s role in world politics for the domestic homeland government.
Anderson, B. 2002. The New World Disorder' in Vincent, J. (ed.) The anthropology o f  politics : a 
reader in ethnography, theory, and critique. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Schiller, N. G., and, 
Fourou, Georges 2002. 'Long- Distance Nationalism Defined' in Vincent, J. (ed.) The anthropology o f  
politics : a reader in ethnography, theory, and critique. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
0stergaard- Nielsen, E. 2001, op. cit.
68 Penrose, 2002, op. cit., p. 294.
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territorial boundaries o f the existing states. The thesis further confirms that 
nationalism is not only a domestic phenomenon - its international dimensions need to 
be considered. 69 The role o f the diaspora in the 1998-2000 war further demonstrates 
the need to consider the transnational dimension of nationalism.
Despite changes in modem government, and the transformation o f
70sovereignty, this thesis confirms Mayall’s contention that:
As territorial borders become more easily penetrated by trans­
national economic flows and other forces, territory itself appears 
paradoxically to have become if  anything more rather than less 
sacred. This is primarily, no doubt, because it is held to belong to 
the people. ( ...)  The territory over which they preside- and the 
popular emotions that are identified with it- remain stubbornly 
beyond their control.71
War and State making
The analysis o f the relationship between war and state making and remaking, in 
Eritrea and Ethiopia respectively, does not support Tilly’s contention that war making 
leads to state consolidation. Between 1998 and 2000, certain war-induced activities 
seem to have contributed to state consolidation. For instance, the war made it possible 
for governments to increase revenues through the collection o f taxes and patriotic 
contributions from their citizens and (particularly in Eritrea’s case) from diaspora 
constituencies, to mobilize their citizens in the defence o f the state against the enemy 
and to extend their institutions into the periphery. However, post-war these activities 
were reversed and decreased bellow ante bellum levels. Taxation and conscription 
levels were only maintained in Eritrea by forceful authoritarian measures, and left 
citizens and diaspora’s constituencies with only one option: to exit from the state or 
withdraw their support.
Eritreans increasingly exercise this exit option because o f the ideology 
embraced by the PFDJ and the policies implemented in its pursuit. Despite this, the
69Jacquin, 1999, op. cit., pp. 266-67.
70 Mayall acknowledges the shrinking o f sovereignty in particular with regard to the ideal o f national 
political economy but not in relation to the appeal o f national political autonomy. Mayall, 2000, op. cit., 
p. 77.
71 ibid., pp. 76-7.
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citizens’ attachment to the homeland has not diluted, though neither should it be taken 
for granted.
The extension of the states’ institutions was undermined by the outcomes of 
the war, the creation o f a Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) within Eritrea and the de 
facto closure o f the territorial boundary. Paradoxically, the TSZ allowed the PFDJ to 
enforce the requirements and checks on identity documentation and, as a 
consequence, the Eritrean government incrementally enforced the restriction of 
movements both o f its citizens and non-citizens.
In Ethiopia the increased legitimacy o f the EPRDF was epiphenomenal, 
lasting only for the duration o f the war. While the Prime Minister was forced by the 
outburst o f Ethiopian nationalism to vindicate his nationalist credentials on the 
battlefield during the border war, his legitimacy was boosted only when concern for 
the unity and defence of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity should displace all other 
sources o f contention and grievance towards the ruling party.
The Ethiopian government’s war-derived nationalist credentials were short­
lived and the May 2005 elections results, as discussed in chapter 5, suggested 
mounting opposition to its project o f remaking the Ethiopian state. Furthermore, the 
increasingly authoritarian path of the government substantially eroded its legitimacy 
in the aftermath of the elections.
While the relationship between war and state formation is central to our 
understanding of state trajectories, the evidence from this inter-state war in Africa 
tends to emphasize two contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, war induces state 
building activities in the short term, but on the other hand the legitimacy o f the 
political leaderships at the helm of the state is clearly undermined, and in the long 
term the relationship between war and state making seems to be subordinated to the 
law of diminishing return. In the Eritrean case the war of national liberation was the 
catalyst for national identity formation and the main source o f legitimacy o f the 
EPRDF/PFDJ; however the two-year border war significantly eroded the ruling 
party’s legitimacy and in its aftermath mounting opposition to its state and nation
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10building projects show that national identity ‘should not be taken for granted'. 
Indeed, national identity may unravel.
This relationship needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis. The attempts 
to draw historical parallels between the central role played by war in the European 
experience o f state formation and the ongoing simultaneous trajectories towards state 
consolidations and state disintegration in Africa suggest that war in the latter context 
has led to more cases of state fragmentation and ultimately state breakdown than state 
building and ultimately consolidation.
In Ethiopia and Eritrea the political leaderships relied on the shared experience
of war in order to create symbols o f national unity and demand the exclusive loyalty
o f their citizens to one or other o f the states, especially for borderland communities
that straddled the borders. The findings confirm Herbst’s contention that ‘those
African states that can legitimately claim to be threatened by their neighbours have
1^had some notable successes in mobilizing their populations for war'. While the war 
lasted, the clusters o f historical myths, discussed in chapter 3, were revived and 
combined as mutually reinforcing myths and counter-myths. Paraphrasing Kolsto, 
each national group developed more than one sustaining myth.74 However, the war- 
induced activities that contributed to the consolidation of nation building during the 
war have led to fragmentation in its aftermath.
The blurring o f the distinction between the domestic and international arenas 
means that the causes o f this fragmentation are to be found in both realms. In the 
Ethiopian state, despite its long tradition of statehood and nationhood, a paradox is 
apparent from the ruling parties’ ability to maintain their grip on power over various 
regimes, despite the lack o f internal accountability and their decreased ability to 
guarantee the monopoly of the means of coercion in a Weberian sense. Sovereignty in 
its juridical sense has been a guarantor o f state survival despite the failure o f those at 
its helm to fulfil the challenges posed by empirical sovereignty. At the current 
juncture o f world politics although the state’s survival is not challenged, the political
72 Mayall, 1999, op. cit., p. 477.
73 Herbst, J. 2003. 'State and War in Africa' in Paul, T.V., Ikenberry, G. John, Hall, John A. (ed.) The 
Nation- State in question. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 166.
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leaderships need to prove their democratic credentials; their citizens have a stronger 
audience with International Organizations and external governments in denouncing 
human rights’ abuses, as chapter 5 discusses. In the Eritrean case, the increased 
blurring o f the distinction between the ruling party and the state, combined with the 
PFDJ’s ability to resist demands for either external or internal accountability, seems 
to be leading in the long term to the dilution o f the citizens’ loyalty towards the state. 
Without a combination of external and internal accountability, cases of disintegration 
should not take us by surprise. In difficult transitions from authoritarian to democratic 
forms of government, the role and influence of international and transnational actors, 
such as International Organizations and diaspora, are vital to protect the citizens from 
the continuity of authoritarian practices under the guise o f frail commitments to 
democratization and political pluralism.
These findings further lend credence to Clapham’s contention that African
nr •
governments tend to be accountable to external actors, especially to International 
Organizations and external governments, rather than domestic constituencies. The 
increasing importance o f diaspora communities and their permanent links to citizens 
living within the territorial jurisdiction o f the homeland state makes this diversified
7 ftexternal- constituency, central to understanding politics in African states. However 
at the current juncture diaspora constitute a political constituency whose support, 
more than accountability, African states’ leaderships and opposition movements seek 
to mobilise.77
In the trajectory of state and nation building, a combination of internal and 
external accountability again is vital to ensure that the process does not derail into 
extremes and the legitimacy derived from the war for independence is not mishandled 
and used to justify the continuation of a military ethos indefinitely, as the Eritrean 
case demonstrates. The analysis o f war making and state making in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia suggests that this relationship is subordinated to a law o f diminishing return.
74 Kolsta, P. 2005. 'Myths and boundaries in south-eastern Europe'. London: Hurst & Co, p. 17.
75 C. Clapham, ‘ The extemalisation o f political accountability’ in Clapham, C. 1996. Africa and the 
International System: The Politics o f  State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 187- 
207.
76 Lyons, 2006, op. cit.
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As Jacquin-Berdal argues:
As history reveals, war is only one o f the factors, and not always a 
necessary one for that matter, that facilitates the process of state 
making. More important is the extent to which the state and its 
representatives are perceived as legitimate by the people 
concerned.78
Hence the legitimacy of the political leaderships seems increasingly to take priority 
over war-induced activities in pursuit of nation making and remaking projects.
7.3 The role of international norms and values and state sovereignty in the Horn 
of Africa
International norms and values
I have argued in this thesis that territory was both the trigger and the cause of the 
conflict. However several regional scholars initially maintained that the territorial
n  q
dispute and its escalation were a reflection o f realpolitik considerations. These 
accounts privileging the political dimension found a plausible understanding o f the 
war in the complexity o f the past relations between the two insurgent movements. 
According to this line of reasoning the civil war left a legacy o f enmity and, as a 
consequence, a lack o f the indispensable element o f trust between the political 
leaderships of the two countries. This, ultimately, contributed to the escalation of the 
crisis. It followed that the border dispute and its escalation were a mere symptom of
o n
the struggle for power and regional hegemony between the EPLF and the TPLF. 
This strand of the case-study literature fits well within a realist framework of analysis
O  1
of international relations. Quite significantly, however, other factors, such as 
international norms and values, and International Organizations, did play a role. In 
addition, rational calculations and prudence worked as constraints and contributed 
significantly towards bringing the hostilities to an end.
77 ibid.
78 Jacquin- Berdal 2005, op. cit., p. xix.
79 Iyob, 2000, op. cit.
80 ibid.
81 As noted by Kocs realists have viewed legal disputes as pretexts for actions which in reality are 
motivated by realpolitik considerations. Kocs, 1995, op. cit., p. 160.
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Even if the legacy of the relations between the EPFL and the TPLF during the 
civil war should not be overlooked, the alliance between the two was critical for 
Eritrea’s international recognition. Furthermore, the conduct of the war lends 
credence to the claim that neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea embarked upon a war of 
territorial aggrandizement. Ultimately, Ethiopia did not take over the port o f Assab. 
Although violating the jus ad bellum, Eritrea after the end o f the first round o f 
fighting did not advance deeper into Ethiopian territory and insisted on the need to 
call for international arbitration. Its crucial mistake remains the decision to resort to 
force in order to settle the territorial dispute, and its insistence on holding on to both 
disputed and non-disputed swathes o f territory it had forcefully gained until a legal 
settlement was obtained.82 Ultimately, the parties’ conduct of the war shows their 
willingness to settle legally their territorial jurisdiction over the disputed areas but 
only at great cost.
Ethiopia’s belated decision to abide by the EEBC Decision should be 
understood against the contingent origins o f the boundaries which led to ambiguities 
in the boundary treaties.83 In effect, the difficulty in overcoming the demarcation’s 
stalemate illustrates well one o f the key paradoxes of international society’s approach 
to territorial boundaries:
Because there is no satisfactory a priori criterion for settling state 
boundaries, international society has settled for investing those 
that actually exist with an absolute status which belies their 
contingent origins. It also belies the fact that, in those cases where 
boundaries do change, the new map quickly becomes as sacred, 
and consequently as nonnegotiable, as the old.84
It was not rare for many to find plausibility and even frustration in the explanation
O f
that the war was fought (and intensified) to regain control over Assab port. In the
82 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission December 19, 2005. Partial Award Ethiopia's Claims 1-8 Jus 
ad bellum between the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia and the State o f Eritrea, 
http://www.pca-cpa.Org/ENGLISH/RPC/#EECC%20Awards', p. 5.
83 Guazzini, F. 1999. Ea Geografia Variabile del Confine Eritreo- Etiopico tra Passato e Presente'. 
Africa: Rivista dell' lstituto italianoper V Africa e V Oriente LIV: 309-348. Abbink, J. 2003. ’Badme 
and the Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Back to Square One?
' <http://www.erpic.ors/perihelion/wps/ethopia.htm>
84 Mayall, 2002, op. cit., p. 64.
85 Steves, F. 2003. 'Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation o f the Ethiopia- 
Eritrea Conflict'. Cambridge Review o f  International Affairs 16, p. 121.
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aftermath o f the war, opposition in Ethiopia criticised the EPRDF’s political 
leadership for its lack of determination to capture the Assab port, both during the 
2001 internal TPLF crisis and during the May 2005 elections campaign. Eritrea’s 
independence and its major consequence - Ethiopia’s new status as a landlocked 
country - created grievances within Ethiopia and among diaspora constituencies. In 
Ethiopia, while some resisted the idea o f Ethiopia without Eritrea altogether; others 
were willing to entertain the idea o f an Ethiopian homeland without Eritrea, as long as 
the former was entitled to retain territorial jurisdiction over the Assab port. Again, the 
profound territorial nature of various segments’ conceptions o f their homeland was 
overlooked by those who de-emphasised the importance o f territory in explaining the 
1998-2000 war. Eritrea’s secession created resentments for various groups: for some 
o f the borderland communities because o f the loss o f the Assab port; and for urban 
and diaspora constituencies because o f the attachment to Ethiopia’s territorial 
integrity. Upon independence, Eritrea had inherited the boundaries o f the Italian 
colony, which had included the Assab port. Indeed Ethiopia did not cede the Assab 
port to Eritrea.
Ultimately, political considerations prevailed over military and economic aims 
and over grievances and greed concerning the loss o f Assab port. Significantly, the 
Ethiopian political leadership defined its position by reference to international legal 
norms-namely that it had resorted to force in self-defence against the unlawful 
occupation o f areas within its territorial jurisdiction. The decision not to advance and 
forcefully re-capture Assab port suggests that the EPRDF’s rational calculations 
prioritised legal and customary norms o f international society over its military 
commanders’ aims and those citizens who favoured the status quo ante over the new 
dispensation. Under international humanitarian law Ethiopia had resorted to force in 
self-defence and under the principles of treaty devolution and the uti possidetis norm 
Eritrea’s legitimate territorial jurisdiction over Assab was not under dispute and its 
forceful take-over was unlikely to be recognized. Ethiopia’s conduct o f the war 
ultimately proved that its aim was not territorial aggrandizement, as many had
86 International Crisis Group 22 December 2005. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War, Africa Report 
N° 101'. Nairobi/Brussels, pp. 10-14.
87 Kocs, 1995, op. cit., p. 164.
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suggested.88 Ethiopia’s ruling party was constrained by international legal norms and 
values and, quite correctly, seems to have taken into consideration that any forceful 
attempt to capture the port o f Assab undermined Ethiopia’s international standing. 
The correctness o f this political decision was confirmed at the international level: the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) on December 19, 2005 recognised 
Eritrea’s violation of the jus ad bellum and concluded that Ethiopia resorted to force 
in self-defence.89
By resorting to force to settle the border disputes with its neighbours, Eritrea 
overlooked international legal norms. In addition, this conduct perhaps brings to the 
fore the paradox of Eritrea’s double standards concerning its own and other’s 
sovereignty. While Eritrea was overly concerned about breaches to its own 
sovereignty, reciprocity was overlooked in its foreign policy towards contiguous 
neighbouring countries.90 Eritrea’s entry into international society was marred by its 
disregard for the prevailing norm which outlawed the resort to force to settle 
territorial disputes.
Eritrea’s turbulent entry into the regional sovereign society of states brings to 
the fore important lessons for both extra-regional and regional actors when assessing 
the pending international recognition of new states in the region and the required 
mechanisms for entry and socialization within international society.
As the Eritrean case shows, it cannot be taken for granted that upon entering 
international society states’ authorities will know how to adjust to the prevailing 
norms, values and institutions. Eritrea’s membership in a conflict prone region was 
constrained by its neighbours’ incursions across its frontiers, namely Sudan and 
Ethiopia. In the western border Sudanese insurgents entered its territory and the 
Sudanese state did not exercise restraint in engaging in hot-pursuit missions across 
state boundaries. The same conduct was followed by Ethiopia across Eritrea’s eastern 
boundaries. Following on from this, Eritrea’s socialization into the regional sovereign
88 International Crisis Group 24 September 2003. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?, Africa Report 
N °68 '. Nairobi/ Brussels, pp. 10-11.
89 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission December 19, 2005. 'Partial Award Ethiopia's Claims 1-8 Jus 
ad bellum between the Federal Democratic Republic o f  Ethiopia and the State o f Eritrea,
http ://www.pca-cpa. org/EN G LI SH/RPC/#EECC%20 Awards ’.
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society o f states increased its sense of vulnerability in the face of the disregard for the 
non-interference norm. Indeed the thesis shows that the region’s deep structure o f 
politics also played its part and influenced Eritrea’s foreign policy decision-making. 
As a consequence, Eritrea evaluated poorly the limits o f what was acceptable within 
the Horn o f Africa’s prevailing pattern of mutual interference in the domestic affairs 
o f neighbouring states.
The seriousness o f Eritrea’s foreign policy practices towards the region was 
perhaps overlooked when Eritrea resorted to force to settle its maritime boundary 
dispute with Yemen. Ultimately, the crisis did not escalate into full-scale war but it 
showed that Eritrea was inclined to resort to force to demarcate its porous borders in 
order to diminish the likelihood of breaches o f its sovereignty. By doing so Eritrea 
disregarded the international legal norms which outlawed the resort to force to settle 
boundary disputes. The use o f force in international relations is only lawful in self- 
defence and under a Chapter VII resolution, authorised by the United Nations 
Security Council, in conditions o f a threat to international peace and security and 
when all the other alternative means for a settlement have been exhausted.91 
Humanitarian intervention, although entailing the use o f force in international 
relations, is lawful when justice needs to be prioritised over order, according to the 
solidarist principle which denounces serious and extreme violations of human rights. 
Eritrea in its dispute with Yemen and with Ethiopia neither exhausted all the 
alternative means for a peaceful settlement, nor was compelled to resort to force in 
self-defence or for any o f the aforementioned reasons. The Eritrean case shows that 
upon independence state authorities are unlikely to automatically become fluent in the 
grammar of the institutions o f international law and diplomacy, let alone that they will 
be able to navigate through the paradoxes and different degrees o f consent each 
regional sovereign society o f states is willing to accommodate, concerning breaches to 
sovereignty, and its entailments in uti possidetis and the non-interference norms.
The challenges to uti possidetis and to the non-interference norms within the 
Horn of Africa
90 Clapham, 2001, op.cit., p. 130.
91 Mayall, 2000, op.cit., pp. 132-33.
92 Wheeler, N. J. 1992 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society*. Millennium 21, p. 
474.
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The norms that bind the African state system into a regional sovereign society of 
states are uti possidetis and the principle o f non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
other states.
In the Horn o f Africa, the deeply engrained patterns of power and of political 
warfare have waxed and waned over the decades. The deep structure of regional 
politics is characterised by the combination o f a pattern o f mutual interference in each
O'!
other’s internal affairs with a pattern o f power - reflected in the motto ‘my enemy’s 
enemy is my friend’. The 1998-2000 war further magnified these patterns, and 
contributed to its ramification for neighbouring countries. The war engaged the armed 
forces of two sovereign states and appeared as a conventional inter-state war. While 
this was the case, the analysis o f the structure of regional politics lends credence to 
Jacquin-Berdal’s contention that the pattern o f mutual intervention and the support to 
each other’s opposition groups show that the war was not a pure Clausewitzian type- 
of-war.94 Ultimately, the regional structure of politics reasserted itself and further 
undermined the prospects for reconciliation between the two political leaderships in 
the aftermath o f the 12 December, 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement. Both the conduct 
o f the war and the continuous stalemate over the boundaries’ demarcation process has 
subordinated the pattern o f forces concerning regional alignments to further 
variations; as the rivalry between the two states is played out on the regional stage and 
in neighbouring countries’ own conflicts. It should be noted that the involvement of 
superpowers or extra- regional actors in the Horn o f Africa’s politics did not create 
these dynamics in the first place, but it has certainly magnified their implications for 
regional order and stability.
The two inter-state wars challenged the regional organizations in different 
ways. The Ethiopia-Somalia war was a first test for the OAU. An OAU good-offices 
committee was set up but it failed and the dispute was temporarily settled on the 
battlefield.95 The stalemate was overcome at the founding summit o f the new sub-
93 Bull and Holbraad, 1995, op. cit., pp. 157- 167. Refer to Chapter 1 and 6 for the discussion on the 
applicability o f  this concept to understanding the management o f  security in the Horn o f  Africa.
94 Jacquin-Berdal, 2005, op. cit., p. xi.
95 Keller, E. J. 1997. 'Rethinking African Regional Security' in Lake, D.A., and, Morgan, Patrick M. 
(ed.) Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, p. 312.
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regional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
(IGADD), and this initiative was a very important step towards bringing the two 
leaders to the negotiation table. A peace settlement was finally reached in April 1988. 
Quite significantly, the peace accord signed by Mengistu Haile Mariam and Siyad 
Barre in 1988 obliged each side to stop supporting the other’s dissidents.96
In contrast, the 1998-2000 war paralysed IGAD. When the hostilities broke 
out President Aptidon of Djibouti tried to mediate between President Issaias Afewerki 
o f Eritrea and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia but to no avail. 
Simultaneously, other actors were involved in peace mediating initiatives, namely the 
Rwanda- US Peace Plan. During a brief lull o f hostilities, the OUA- mediation was 
recognized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the legitimate venue 
for any peace talks. However, it took another round o f fighting and Ethiopia’s victory 
on the battlefield for the parties to agree on the cease-fire and peace agreement 
proposed by the OAU.
The 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement led to the creation o f the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). At first sight, the conventional character 
o f the war presented the UN with a far less daunting task than other UN- mediated 
post- conflict settlements. In addition, an international Boundary Commission 
(EEBC) was created.
The parties’ disagreement on the legal border decision led to the persistence o f 
the stalemate and fuelled mutual suspicion. The stalemate undermined both IGAD’s 
role in conflict resolution and the AU’s role in peace negotiations in the Horn o f 
Africa. This further confirms that other conflicts in Africa do not challenge uti 
possidetis and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs o f 
neighbouring states in the same way, as they tend to be intra-state rather than inter­
state territorial.
96 Lewis, I., and, Mayall, James 1996. 'Somalia' in Mayall, J. (ed.) The New Interventionism 1991- 
1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 105.
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Paradoxically, while Eritrea’s decision to resort to force to settle the border 
dispute with its southern neighbour did not aim to pose a fundamental challenge to the 
formal commitment to the doctrine o f uti possidetis, in practice the outcome o f this 
decision had quite the reverse effect. Following on from this, the 1998-2000 war 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia lends credence to Clapham’s contention that it has 
become impossible to regard the principles o f non- intervention and respect for 
existing frontiers as operative rules for African state behaviour in two ways.97 First, 
both belligerents provided support to each other’s opposition movements through 
neighbouring countries and also to the opposing side the other was supporting in their 
neighbours’ own conflicts. Second, the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
shows how the respect in principle for the territorial integrity o f the neighbouring 
states tends to be by-passed when a conflict reaches a stage beyond negotiability. The 
increasing challenges on the ground to these norms perhaps confirm again that war is 
a catalyst for change. The 1998-2000 war provides some broader basis for evaluating 
the erosion o f the consensus on these specific norms. However, rather than diluting 
their importance for regional peace and security, the 1998-2000 war confirms that 
regional states need to comply with these two international and regional norms. Uti 
possidetis has been the means through which inter-state rivalry has been controlled 
and non-interference has been the means through which internal fragmentation has 
been contained.
The cyclical challenges to these norms seem to suggest that rather than 
contributing to state consolidation, the resort to force to bring about changes in the 
colonial inherited boundaries is leading increasingly to state disintegration; and the 
breaches of the non-interference norm have increased incursions into neighbouring 
state’s territory, that have been just short o f declaring war.
In Eritrea’s case the inherited colonial borders had crystallized by 1936 - but 
the borders changed formal status over the decades until Eritrea achieved 
independence. The case- study suggests that prior and/or upon assumption of 
independence expeditious and peaceful negotiations over the ill-delimited inherited 
colonial boundaries of the successor state and the boundary politics (namely currency
97 Clapham, C. 2001. 'Rethinking African States'. African Security Review 10, p. 5.
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exchange mechanisms and citizenship rules) with implications for the inter-state 
relations between the successor and predecessor states should take place either 
between the parties, and/or with regional or international arbitration. Indeed, Jacquin- 
Berdal’s claim comes as a portent reminder: once established borders will only be
98changed at great cost.
The recognition of the sacredness of the territorial boundaries over which 
governments preside, the creation of Eritrea in the aftermath o f the Cold War and the 
subsequent 1998-2000 war with the predecessor state lead us to qualify Herbst’s 
contention that:
The system o f territorial boundaries has been critical to the particular 
patterns of state consolidation and has been seen as a tremendous asset by 
African leaders, both in the colonial and independence periods. Far from 
being a hindrance to state consolidation, African boundaries have been 
perhaps the critical foundation upon which leaders have built their 
states."
Indeed the case-study shows that it should not be taken for granted that new states 
will automatically comply with a consensual international norm. Indeed, rather than 
suggesting the need to substitute this norm, the 1998-2000 war shows that regional 
organizations need to put in place effective mechanisms to promote and uphold it. 
However, in very extreme cases the re-appraisal o f uti possidetis should not be 
altogether discarded without considering the merits o f the particular cases. As the 
civil war in Sudan seems to suggest perhaps the attachment to this norm may do more 
harm and hamper any attempts to successfully break the cyclical outburst o f armed 
conflict. In addition, this conclusion does not challenge the need to consider the 
merits of other particular cases which justify humanitarian intervention, as per 
Tanzania’s earlier intervention in Uganda and the AU interventions in Sudan and 
Somalia.
7.4 State trajectories and neighbourly relations in the Horn of Africa in the post- 
Cold War era
98Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit., p. 219.
99 Herbst, 2000, op. cit., p. 25.
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While the Cold War ruled out territorial change, the post-Cold War era allowed for 
territorial change as long as it did not challenge the conventional interpretation o f 
self- determination as de-colonization.100 Eritrea’s independence led to a re-drawing 
o f the boundaries o f existing states (of its southern neighbour in particular) but 
without challenging the conventional interpretation o f self- determination.101 
However, Eritrea’s pattern o f foreign policy towards contiguous neighbouring 
countries since independence shows that the ruling party was not reluctant to assert 
Eritrea’s territorial claims by force. Eritrea’s foreign policy since 1993 reflected the 
difficulty in reconciling self-determination with the deliberate use of force to bring 
about delimitation and demarcation of its ambiguous colonially-inherited boundaries. 
Eritrea’s deliberate use of force to change its boundaries brought to the fore the 
pitfalls of the prevailing interpretation o f the principle o f self- determination as, 
paraphrasing Mayall, a once-and-for-all act o f decolonization.102
Instead, Eritrea’s foreign policy suggests that decolonization should be 
understood as a process in which negotiations over a variety o f factors, and not only 
disputed areas o f the territorial boundary, should take place.
The case-study shows that the arrangements on ill-delimited inherited colonial 
boundaries, the boundary politics o f the state and the legitimacy of state authority, 
that is, the implementation o f a set of institutions ensuring democratic national 
(self)govemment, cannot continue to be given scant attention or entirely taken for 
granted. Eritrea’s case has clear implications as it points to the need to set up in 
advance mechanisms to foster peaceful negotiations between the predecessor and the 
successor state over: 1) ill-delimited or contentious boundaries; 2) the mechanisms 
that will diminish the likelihood o f tension arising from divergent boundary politics, 
namely currency exchange mechanisms and citizenship rules and, finally, but equally 
as important, 3) the internal and external accountability mechanisms that will hamper 
political leaderships from subverting the principle o f democratic national government 
and, instead cling onto military or authoritarian practices o f government.
100 ibid., p. 477.
101 Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, op. cit.
102 Mayall, 2000, op. cit., p. 52.
289
The analysis of the relationship between war making and state making 
confirms that the democratic credentials of state’s authorities take precedence over 
their nationalist credentials vindicated on the battlefield. While the war increased the 
political leaderships’ legitimacy, its conduct and outcomes contributed to a decrease 
o f the citizens’ willingness to contribute to the trajectories of state and nation building 
projects o f the EPRDF and the PFDJ and, instead, increased the demands for the 
creation o f mechanisms of internal accountability. In this sense the authoritarian paths 
followed by both governments eroded the ante bellum legitimacy of the PFDJ and the 
ratchet effect of the war on the EPRDF’s legitimacy. The war-induced activities of 
state and nation building were marred by the failure o f both governments to embark 
on meaningful political liberalization.
The thesis’ findings suggest that the survival o f state authorities at the current 
juncture o f world politics is likely to be eroded by war making.
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Appendix 1: Studies of the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
Contributions produced during the conflict
Internal contributions from an Ethiopian perspective
1) M edhane T adesse, 1999. The Eritrean- Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects: Reflections on 
the Making o f Conflicts in the Horn o f Africa 1991- 1998 .
Internal contributions from an Eritrean perspective
1) Eritrean Studies Review , 1999. Eritrea & Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation to Cooperation 
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1) Abbink, J., 1998. Briefing: The Eritrean- Ethiopian Border Dispute;
2) Trivelli, R.M., 1998. Divided histories, opportunistic alliances: Background notes on the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean war;
3) CORNWELL, R., 1998. Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal Conflict in the Horn;
4) G ilkes, P., and, Plaut, Martin , 1999. War in the Horn: The Conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia;
5) G ilkes, P., 1999. Ethiopia- Perspectives o f Conflict 1991-1999 ;
6) Guazzini, F., 1999. La Geografia Variabile del Confine Eritreo- Etiopico tra Passato e Presente;
7) Cliffe, L., 1999. Regional Dimensions o f conflict in the Horn o f Africa;
8) Tekeste N egash & Tronvoll, K., 2000. Brothers at War: Making Sense o f the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian War;
9) Iyob, R., 2000. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn o f  
Africa, 1991-2000;
10) CLAPHAM, C., 2000. War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Paper presented at the 
colloquium ' La guerre entre le local et le global1, Paris, Centre d' 'Etudes et de Recherches 
Internationales, 29- 30 May 2000 (published in French in 2003).
Contributions produced in the aftermath of the conflict
1) Abbink , J., 2001. Creating Borders: Exploring the Impact o f the Ethio- Eritrean War on the Local 
Population;
2) Alemseged Abbay , 2001.' Not With Them, Not Without Them': The Staggering o f  Eritrea to 
Nationhood;
3)Battera, F., 2001. II Conflito Etiopia-Eritrea e i suoi Efetti sulla Crisi Permanente del Como ;
4) Triulzi, A., Janeiro/ Julho 2002. Violence and the acknowledgement o f tense past in the Horn : a 
note on the Ethio- Eritrean War (1998-2000);
5) Abbink, J., 2003. Ethiopia- Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects o f Peace in the Horn of Africa;
6) Leenco Lata, 2003. The Ethiopia- Eritrea War;
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Eritrea Conflict;
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10) Koser, K., 2003. Mobilizing New African Diasporas: An Eritrean Case Study;
11) S0 RB0 , G.M., and , Siegfried Pausewang, 2004. Prospects for Peace, Security and Human 
Rights in Africa’s Horn;
12) Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, M artin Plaut, 2005. Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business;
13) Reid , R., 2005. Caught in the headlights o f history: Eritrea, the EPLF and the postwar nation state;
14) Dorman, S.R., 2005. Narratives o f nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism;
15) Taddesse Berhe, H.G., &, de Waal, Alex , 2005. War and HIV Prevalence: Evidence from 
Tigray, Ethiopia;
16) Hansen, S.J., 11 January 2006. Organisational Culture at War: Ethiopian Decision - making and 
the War with Eritrea ( 1998- 2000) ;
17) Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, A ida M engistu, 2006. Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea: Building Multiethnic States;
18) Triulzi, A., 2006. The past as contested terrain: Commemorating new sites o f memory in War- 
Torn Ethiopia;
19) Lyons, T., 2006. Diasporas and homeland conflict;
20)Lyons, T., 2006. Avoiding Conflict in the Horn o f  Africa: U.S. Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea ;
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Appendix 2: Table of Figures 1-4
Table 1: Military Expenditure as % of GDP: 1991-2003
1 2 Ante bellum and post bellum levels
Military Expenditure as % of GDP
Eritrea Ethiopia
1991 5.9
1992 3.2
1993 21.4 2.9
1994 13.4 2.4
1995 20.8 2
1996 22 1.8
1997 12.8 3.4
1998 35.3 6.7
1999 37.6 10.7
2000 36.4 9.6
2001 24.8 6.2
2002 24.2 5.5
2003 19.6 4.4
1 SIPRI 1999. SIPR1 Yearbook 1999 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 316.
2 — 1997. SIPRI Yearbook 1997 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.; SIPRI, 1999, op. c it .; SIPRI 2000. SIPRI Yearbook 2000 Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Wuyi Omitoogun 2003. 'Military 
Expenditure Data in Africa: A Survey o f Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda'. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: SIPRI Research Report N°. 17.; SIPRI 2005. SIPRI Yearbook 2005 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford Oxford University Press.
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Appendix 3: Tables of Figures 5-11
Table 2 of figure 5: Asylum applicants from Eritrea1
Eritrea
Year
1996 610
1997 748
1998 1389
1999 2394
2000 2675
2001 3025
2002 32280
2003 1063
2004 6706
2005 6350
Table 3 of Figure 6: Refugees from Eritrea: Countries of Asylum2
Refugees
from Eritrea:
Country of
Asylum Sudan Ethiopia
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
328307
315030
342295
342129
2000 367735 3276
2001 324546 4212
2002 305294 5126
2003 108251 6754
2004 110927 8719
2005 116746 10700
2006
UK Germany Italy other total
3918 332225
4046 319077
4485 346781
3 5006 347138
16 5824 376851
40 4431 333229
975 2553 94 4134 318176
1748 2754 177 4437 124121
2404 2974 785 5322 131131
3617 2746 2705 7552 144066
1 UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea’. UNHCR 324-325, 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/.
2 Ibid.
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Table 4 of Figure 7: Refugees from Eritrea3
Eritrea
Year
1996 332225
1997 319077
1998 346781
1999 347138
2000 376851
2001 333229
2002 318176
2003 124121
2004 131131
2005 144066
Table 5 of Figure 8: Refugees and Asylum seekers in Eritrea4
Eritrea
Year
1996 2148
1997 2694
1998 2501
1999 2972
2000 1984
2001 2272
2002 3624
2003 4089
2004 4696
2005 6009
2006
Table 6 of Figure 9: Asylum Applicants from Ethiopia5
Ethiopia
Year
1996 6108
1997 5772
1998 7204
1999 11845
2000 13837
2001 11728
2002 9898
2003 12125
2004 10260
2005 11572
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Ethiopia'. UNHCR 328-329, 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/.
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Table 7 of Figure 10: Refugees from Ethiopia: Countries of Asylum6
Refugees 
Ethiopia: 
Country of
Asylum Kenya Sudan
Year
1996 7109 51467
1997 8634 44284
1998 8099 35559
1999 8191 35396
2000 4053 34132
2001 13541 16120
2002 11202 14571
2003 11139 15251
2004 12595 14812
2005
2006
14862 14633
US Germany Canada other total
10230 3750 23714 96270
7832 2543 21108 84401
5600 1724 19698 70680
7849 1405 18214 71055
9765 1635 16825 66410
11536 2034 15766 58997
12454 8134 2244 12635 61240
12835 7966 2873 12613 62677
12980 6669 3549 12545 63150
13844 5146 3986 12990 65461
Table 8 of Figure 11: Refugees from Ethiopia7
Ethiopia
Year
1996 96270
1997 84401
1998 70680
1999 71055
2000 66410
2001 58997
2002 61240
2003 62677
2004 63150
2005 65461
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
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Appendix 4: Table of Figures 12-13
Table 9: Horn of Africa’s states boundaries
H A 1
(%) shared
Djibouti 
451, 500/ 20.5
Eritrea 
4, 135, 950/
Ethiopia 
64,117, 450/
Kenya 
30, 339,
Somalia
7,253,150/
Sudan3
35,080,000/
j Uganda 
27, 317,
land
boundary
Source2:
per km2 34.1 per 
km2
56.9 per km2 800/
52.1 km2
11.4 per km2 14.0 per km2
. ? * -i ' V ' l
550/
98.3 per 
km2
Djibouti 113 km
(6.9%)
337
(6.4%)
km 58km
(2.5%)
Eritrea 113 km
(223%)
912
(17.2%)
km 605 km 
(7.9%)
Ethiopia 337 km 912 km 830 km 1,626 km 1,606 km
(66.3%) (56%) (24.1%) (68.7%) (20.9%)
Kenya 830
(15.6%)
km 682 km 
(28.8%)
232 km 
(3% )
933km
(34.6%)
Somalia 58 km 
(11.4%)
1, 626 
(30.6%)
km 682 km 
(19.8%)
Sudan 605 km
(37.1%)
1,606
(30.2%)
km 232 km
(6.7%)
435 km 
(16.1%)
Tanzania 769 km
(223 %)
396 km 
(14.7%)
Uganda 933 km 
(27.1%)
435 km 
(5.6%)
1 For more recent data the World D evelopm ent Indicators database, as o f  April 2005, provides the 
follow ing Population totals ( in millions): DJI 0,705; ER 4,4; ETH 68, 6; KEN 31,9; SOM 9,6; SU D  
33,5; UG 25,3. in IG A D ,’ Comparative Physiographic and Demographic Data on IGAD States’ in 
http://www.igad.org/m states/index.htm (accessed: 12/06/06).
2 Anderson, E. M. 2003. International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas. London: TSO. The table is 
based on calculations by the author on the basis o f  the data provided in Anderson. For the original data 
for each country refer to Anderson in the follow ing pages: Djibouti, p. 235; Eritrea, p. 260; Ethiopia, p. 
268; Kenya, p. 447; Somalia, p. 733; Sudan, p. 752; Uganda, p. 833.
3 Sudan shares boundaries also with: Libya 383 km (5%); Democratic Republic o f  Congo 628 km 
(8.2%); Central African Republic 1, 165 km (15.1% ); Egypt 1, 273 km (16.6% ); Chad 1, 360  km 
(17.7% ).
4 Uganda shares boundaries also with: Rwanda 169 km (6.3%); Democratic Republic o f  the Congo 765 
km (28.3%).
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